2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2008-08-16 09:17:22 +02:00
|
|
|
* EAP peer method: EAP-TTLS (RFC 5281)
|
EAP peer: External server certificate chain validation
This adds support for optional functionality to validate server
certificate chain in TLS-based EAP methods in an external program.
wpa_supplicant control interface is used to indicate when such
validation is needed and what the result of the external validation is.
This external validation can extend or replace the internal validation.
When ca_cert or ca_path parameter is set, the internal validation is
used. If these parameters are omitted, only the external validation is
used. It needs to be understood that leaving those parameters out will
disable most of the validation steps done with the TLS library and that
configuration is not really recommend.
By default, the external validation is not used. It can be enabled by
addingtls_ext_cert_check=1 into the network profile phase1 parameter.
When enabled, external validation is required through the CTRL-REQ/RSP
mechanism similarly to other EAP authentication parameters through the
control interface.
The request to perform external validation is indicated by the following
event:
CTRL-REQ-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:External server certificate validation needed for SSID <ssid>
Before that event, the server certificate chain is provided with the
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT events that include the cert=<hexdump>
parameter. depth=# indicates which certificate is in question (0 for the
server certificate, 1 for its issues, and so on).
The result of the external validation is provided with the following
command:
CTRL-RSP-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:<good|bad>
It should be noted that this is currently enabled only for OpenSSL (and
BoringSSL/LibreSSL). Due to the constraints in the library API, the
validation result from external processing cannot be reported cleanly
with TLS alert. In other words, if the external validation reject the
server certificate chain, the pending TLS handshake is terminated
without sending more messages to the server.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2015-12-12 17:16:54 +01:00
|
|
|
* Copyright (c) 2004-2015, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
*
|
2012-02-11 15:46:35 +01:00
|
|
|
* This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
|
|
|
|
* See README for more details.
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include "includes.h"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include "common.h"
|
2009-11-29 22:04:43 +01:00
|
|
|
#include "crypto/ms_funcs.h"
|
2009-12-20 20:33:32 +01:00
|
|
|
#include "crypto/sha1.h"
|
2009-11-29 22:04:43 +01:00
|
|
|
#include "crypto/tls.h"
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
#include "eap_common/chap.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "eap_common/eap_ttls.h"
|
2009-11-29 22:04:43 +01:00
|
|
|
#include "mschapv2.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "eap_i.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "eap_tls_common.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "eap_config.h"
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2011-09-25 20:28:32 +02:00
|
|
|
#define EAP_TTLS_VERSION 0
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void eap_ttls_deinit(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct eap_ttls_data {
|
|
|
|
struct eap_ssl_data ssl;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-09-25 20:28:32 +02:00
|
|
|
int ttls_version;
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const struct eap_method *phase2_method;
|
|
|
|
void *phase2_priv;
|
|
|
|
int phase2_success;
|
|
|
|
int phase2_start;
|
2016-01-15 12:37:15 +01:00
|
|
|
EapDecision decision_succ;
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
enum phase2_types {
|
|
|
|
EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_EAP,
|
|
|
|
EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_MSCHAPV2,
|
|
|
|
EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_MSCHAP,
|
|
|
|
EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_PAP,
|
|
|
|
EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_CHAP
|
|
|
|
} phase2_type;
|
|
|
|
struct eap_method_type phase2_eap_type;
|
|
|
|
struct eap_method_type *phase2_eap_types;
|
|
|
|
size_t num_phase2_eap_types;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
u8 auth_response[MSCHAPV2_AUTH_RESPONSE_LEN];
|
|
|
|
int auth_response_valid;
|
|
|
|
u8 master_key[MSCHAPV2_MASTER_KEY_LEN]; /* MSCHAPv2 master key */
|
|
|
|
u8 ident;
|
|
|
|
int resuming; /* starting a resumed session */
|
|
|
|
int reauth; /* reauthentication */
|
|
|
|
u8 *key_data;
|
2013-02-06 17:52:33 +01:00
|
|
|
u8 *session_id;
|
|
|
|
size_t id_len;
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct wpabuf *pending_phase2_req;
|
EAP peer: External server certificate chain validation
This adds support for optional functionality to validate server
certificate chain in TLS-based EAP methods in an external program.
wpa_supplicant control interface is used to indicate when such
validation is needed and what the result of the external validation is.
This external validation can extend or replace the internal validation.
When ca_cert or ca_path parameter is set, the internal validation is
used. If these parameters are omitted, only the external validation is
used. It needs to be understood that leaving those parameters out will
disable most of the validation steps done with the TLS library and that
configuration is not really recommend.
By default, the external validation is not used. It can be enabled by
addingtls_ext_cert_check=1 into the network profile phase1 parameter.
When enabled, external validation is required through the CTRL-REQ/RSP
mechanism similarly to other EAP authentication parameters through the
control interface.
The request to perform external validation is indicated by the following
event:
CTRL-REQ-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:External server certificate validation needed for SSID <ssid>
Before that event, the server certificate chain is provided with the
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT events that include the cert=<hexdump>
parameter. depth=# indicates which certificate is in question (0 for the
server certificate, 1 for its issues, and so on).
The result of the external validation is provided with the following
command:
CTRL-RSP-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:<good|bad>
It should be noted that this is currently enabled only for OpenSSL (and
BoringSSL/LibreSSL). Due to the constraints in the library API, the
validation result from external processing cannot be reported cleanly
with TLS alert. In other words, if the external validation reject the
server certificate chain, the pending TLS handshake is terminated
without sending more messages to the server.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2015-12-12 17:16:54 +01:00
|
|
|
struct wpabuf *pending_resp;
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef EAP_TNC
|
|
|
|
int ready_for_tnc;
|
|
|
|
int tnc_started;
|
|
|
|
#endif /* EAP_TNC */
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void * eap_ttls_init(struct eap_sm *sm)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct eap_ttls_data *data;
|
|
|
|
struct eap_peer_config *config = eap_get_config(sm);
|
2015-12-06 12:01:32 +01:00
|
|
|
int selected_non_eap;
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
char *selected;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
data = os_zalloc(sizeof(*data));
|
|
|
|
if (data == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
data->ttls_version = EAP_TTLS_VERSION;
|
|
|
|
selected = "EAP";
|
2015-12-06 12:01:32 +01:00
|
|
|
selected_non_eap = 0;
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
data->phase2_type = EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_EAP;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-06 12:01:32 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Either one auth= type or one or more autheap= methods can be
|
|
|
|
* specified.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
if (config && config->phase2) {
|
2015-12-06 12:01:32 +01:00
|
|
|
const char *token, *last = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while ((token = cstr_token(config->phase2, " \t", &last))) {
|
|
|
|
if (os_strncmp(token, "auth=", 5) != 0)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
token += 5;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (last - token == 8 &&
|
|
|
|
os_strncmp(token, "MSCHAPV2", 8) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
selected = "MSCHAPV2";
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_type = EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_MSCHAPV2;
|
|
|
|
} else if (last - token == 6 &&
|
|
|
|
os_strncmp(token, "MSCHAP", 6) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
selected = "MSCHAP";
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_type = EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_MSCHAP;
|
|
|
|
} else if (last - token == 3 &&
|
|
|
|
os_strncmp(token, "PAP", 3) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
selected = "PAP";
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_type = EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_PAP;
|
|
|
|
} else if (last - token == 4 &&
|
|
|
|
os_strncmp(token, "CHAP", 4) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
selected = "CHAP";
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_type = EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_CHAP;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
|
|
|
|
"EAP-TTLS: Unsupported Phase2 type '%s'",
|
|
|
|
token);
|
|
|
|
eap_ttls_deinit(sm, data);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (selected_non_eap) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
|
|
|
|
"EAP-TTLS: Only one Phase2 type can be specified");
|
|
|
|
eap_ttls_deinit(sm, data);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
selected_non_eap = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
if (os_strstr(config->phase2, "autheap=")) {
|
2015-12-06 12:01:32 +01:00
|
|
|
if (selected_non_eap) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
|
|
|
|
"EAP-TTLS: Both auth= and autheap= params cannot be specified");
|
|
|
|
eap_ttls_deinit(sm, data);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
selected = "EAP";
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_type = EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_EAP;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-12-06 12:01:32 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: Phase2 type: %s", selected);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (data->phase2_type == EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_EAP) {
|
|
|
|
if (eap_peer_select_phase2_methods(config, "autheap=",
|
|
|
|
&data->phase2_eap_types,
|
|
|
|
&data->num_phase2_eap_types)
|
|
|
|
< 0) {
|
|
|
|
eap_ttls_deinit(sm, data);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_eap_type.vendor = EAP_VENDOR_IETF;
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_eap_type.method = EAP_TYPE_NONE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-08-17 21:26:28 +02:00
|
|
|
if (eap_peer_tls_ssl_init(sm, &data->ssl, config, EAP_TYPE_TTLS)) {
|
2011-09-25 20:28:32 +02:00
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-TTLS: Failed to initialize SSL.");
|
|
|
|
eap_ttls_deinit(sm, data);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return data;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void eap_ttls_phase2_eap_deinit(struct eap_sm *sm,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_ttls_data *data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (data->phase2_priv && data->phase2_method) {
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_method->deinit(sm, data->phase2_priv);
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_method = NULL;
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_priv = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-29 20:16:30 +02:00
|
|
|
static void eap_ttls_free_key(struct eap_ttls_data *data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (data->key_data) {
|
2014-12-01 00:27:01 +01:00
|
|
|
bin_clear_free(data->key_data, EAP_TLS_KEY_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN);
|
2014-06-29 20:16:30 +02:00
|
|
|
data->key_data = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
static void eap_ttls_deinit(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct eap_ttls_data *data = priv;
|
|
|
|
if (data == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
eap_ttls_phase2_eap_deinit(sm, data);
|
|
|
|
os_free(data->phase2_eap_types);
|
2011-09-25 20:28:32 +02:00
|
|
|
eap_peer_tls_ssl_deinit(sm, &data->ssl);
|
2014-06-29 20:16:30 +02:00
|
|
|
eap_ttls_free_key(data);
|
2013-02-06 17:52:33 +01:00
|
|
|
os_free(data->session_id);
|
2019-02-05 19:26:50 +01:00
|
|
|
wpabuf_clear_free(data->pending_phase2_req);
|
|
|
|
wpabuf_clear_free(data->pending_resp);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
os_free(data);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static u8 * eap_ttls_avp_hdr(u8 *avphdr, u32 avp_code, u32 vendor_id,
|
|
|
|
int mandatory, size_t len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ttls_avp_vendor *avp;
|
|
|
|
u8 flags;
|
|
|
|
size_t hdrlen;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
avp = (struct ttls_avp_vendor *) avphdr;
|
|
|
|
flags = mandatory ? AVP_FLAGS_MANDATORY : 0;
|
|
|
|
if (vendor_id) {
|
|
|
|
flags |= AVP_FLAGS_VENDOR;
|
|
|
|
hdrlen = sizeof(*avp);
|
|
|
|
avp->vendor_id = host_to_be32(vendor_id);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
hdrlen = sizeof(struct ttls_avp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
avp->avp_code = host_to_be32(avp_code);
|
2015-07-07 14:41:51 +02:00
|
|
|
avp->avp_length = host_to_be32(((u32) flags << 24) |
|
|
|
|
(u32) (hdrlen + len));
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return avphdr + hdrlen;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static u8 * eap_ttls_avp_add(u8 *start, u8 *avphdr, u32 avp_code,
|
|
|
|
u32 vendor_id, int mandatory,
|
|
|
|
const u8 *data, size_t len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
u8 *pos;
|
|
|
|
pos = eap_ttls_avp_hdr(avphdr, avp_code, vendor_id, mandatory, len);
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, data, len);
|
|
|
|
pos += len;
|
|
|
|
AVP_PAD(start, pos);
|
|
|
|
return pos;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int eap_ttls_avp_encapsulate(struct wpabuf **resp, u32 avp_code,
|
|
|
|
int mandatory)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct wpabuf *msg;
|
|
|
|
u8 *avp, *pos;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
msg = wpabuf_alloc(sizeof(struct ttls_avp) + wpabuf_len(*resp) + 4);
|
|
|
|
if (msg == NULL) {
|
2019-02-05 19:26:50 +01:00
|
|
|
wpabuf_clear_free(*resp);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
*resp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
avp = wpabuf_mhead(msg);
|
|
|
|
pos = eap_ttls_avp_hdr(avp, avp_code, 0, mandatory, wpabuf_len(*resp));
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, wpabuf_head(*resp), wpabuf_len(*resp));
|
|
|
|
pos += wpabuf_len(*resp);
|
|
|
|
AVP_PAD(avp, pos);
|
2019-02-05 19:26:50 +01:00
|
|
|
wpabuf_clear_free(*resp);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
wpabuf_put(msg, pos - avp);
|
|
|
|
*resp = msg;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int eap_ttls_v0_derive_key(struct eap_sm *sm,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_ttls_data *data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2014-06-29 20:16:30 +02:00
|
|
|
eap_ttls_free_key(data);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
data->key_data = eap_peer_tls_derive_key(sm, &data->ssl,
|
|
|
|
"ttls keying material",
|
2019-03-11 12:21:36 +01:00
|
|
|
NULL, 0,
|
2014-12-01 00:27:01 +01:00
|
|
|
EAP_TLS_KEY_LEN +
|
|
|
|
EAP_EMSK_LEN);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!data->key_data) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-TTLS: Failed to derive key");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: Derived key",
|
|
|
|
data->key_data, EAP_TLS_KEY_LEN);
|
2014-12-01 00:27:01 +01:00
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: Derived EMSK",
|
|
|
|
data->key_data + EAP_TLS_KEY_LEN,
|
|
|
|
EAP_EMSK_LEN);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2013-02-06 17:52:33 +01:00
|
|
|
os_free(data->session_id);
|
|
|
|
data->session_id = eap_peer_tls_derive_session_id(sm, &data->ssl,
|
|
|
|
EAP_TYPE_TTLS,
|
|
|
|
&data->id_len);
|
|
|
|
if (data->session_id) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: Derived Session-Id",
|
|
|
|
data->session_id, data->id_len);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "EAP-TTLS: Failed to derive Session-Id");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-08-01 15:53:16 +02:00
|
|
|
#ifndef CONFIG_FIPS
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
static u8 * eap_ttls_implicit_challenge(struct eap_sm *sm,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_ttls_data *data, size_t len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2019-03-11 12:21:36 +01:00
|
|
|
return eap_peer_tls_derive_key(sm, &data->ssl, "ttls challenge",
|
|
|
|
NULL, 0, len);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-08-01 15:53:16 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_FIPS */
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void eap_ttls_phase2_select_eap_method(struct eap_ttls_data *data,
|
|
|
|
u8 method)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < data->num_phase2_eap_types; i++) {
|
|
|
|
if (data->phase2_eap_types[i].vendor != EAP_VENDOR_IETF ||
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_eap_types[i].method != method)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_eap_type.vendor =
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_eap_types[i].vendor;
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_eap_type.method =
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_eap_types[i].method;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: Selected "
|
|
|
|
"Phase 2 EAP vendor %d method %d",
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_eap_type.vendor,
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_eap_type.method);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int eap_ttls_phase2_eap_process(struct eap_sm *sm,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_ttls_data *data,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_method_ret *ret,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_hdr *hdr, size_t len,
|
|
|
|
struct wpabuf **resp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct wpabuf msg;
|
|
|
|
struct eap_method_ret iret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
os_memset(&iret, 0, sizeof(iret));
|
|
|
|
wpabuf_set(&msg, hdr, len);
|
|
|
|
*resp = data->phase2_method->process(sm, data->phase2_priv, &iret,
|
|
|
|
&msg);
|
|
|
|
if ((iret.methodState == METHOD_DONE ||
|
|
|
|
iret.methodState == METHOD_MAY_CONT) &&
|
|
|
|
(iret.decision == DECISION_UNCOND_SUCC ||
|
|
|
|
iret.decision == DECISION_COND_SUCC ||
|
|
|
|
iret.decision == DECISION_FAIL)) {
|
|
|
|
ret->methodState = iret.methodState;
|
|
|
|
ret->decision = iret.decision;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int eap_ttls_phase2_request_eap_method(struct eap_sm *sm,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_ttls_data *data,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_method_ret *ret,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_hdr *hdr, size_t len,
|
|
|
|
u8 method, struct wpabuf **resp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
#ifdef EAP_TNC
|
|
|
|
if (data->tnc_started && data->phase2_method &&
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_priv && method == EAP_TYPE_TNC &&
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_eap_type.method == EAP_TYPE_TNC)
|
|
|
|
return eap_ttls_phase2_eap_process(sm, data, ret, hdr, len,
|
|
|
|
resp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (data->ready_for_tnc && !data->tnc_started &&
|
|
|
|
method == EAP_TYPE_TNC) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: Start TNC after completed "
|
|
|
|
"EAP method");
|
|
|
|
data->tnc_started = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (data->tnc_started) {
|
|
|
|
if (data->phase2_eap_type.vendor != EAP_VENDOR_IETF ||
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_eap_type.method == EAP_TYPE_TNC) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: Unexpected EAP "
|
|
|
|
"type %d for TNC", method);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_eap_type.vendor = EAP_VENDOR_IETF;
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_eap_type.method = method;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: Selected "
|
|
|
|
"Phase 2 EAP vendor %d method %d (TNC)",
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_eap_type.vendor,
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_eap_type.method);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (data->phase2_type == EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_EAP)
|
|
|
|
eap_ttls_phase2_eap_deinit(sm, data);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* EAP_TNC */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (data->phase2_eap_type.vendor == EAP_VENDOR_IETF &&
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_eap_type.method == EAP_TYPE_NONE)
|
|
|
|
eap_ttls_phase2_select_eap_method(data, method);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (method != data->phase2_eap_type.method || method == EAP_TYPE_NONE)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (eap_peer_tls_phase2_nak(data->phase2_eap_types,
|
|
|
|
data->num_phase2_eap_types,
|
|
|
|
hdr, resp))
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (data->phase2_priv == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_method = eap_peer_get_eap_method(
|
|
|
|
EAP_VENDOR_IETF, method);
|
|
|
|
if (data->phase2_method) {
|
|
|
|
sm->init_phase2 = 1;
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_priv = data->phase2_method->init(sm);
|
|
|
|
sm->init_phase2 = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (data->phase2_priv == NULL || data->phase2_method == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-TTLS: failed to initialize "
|
|
|
|
"Phase 2 EAP method %d", method);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return eap_ttls_phase2_eap_process(sm, data, ret, hdr, len, resp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int eap_ttls_phase2_request_eap(struct eap_sm *sm,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_ttls_data *data,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_method_ret *ret,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_hdr *hdr,
|
|
|
|
struct wpabuf **resp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
size_t len = be_to_host16(hdr->length);
|
|
|
|
u8 *pos;
|
|
|
|
struct eap_peer_config *config = eap_get_config(sm);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (len <= sizeof(struct eap_hdr)) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-TTLS: too short "
|
|
|
|
"Phase 2 request (len=%lu)", (unsigned long) len);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pos = (u8 *) (hdr + 1);
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: Phase 2 EAP Request: type=%d", *pos);
|
|
|
|
switch (*pos) {
|
|
|
|
case EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY:
|
|
|
|
*resp = eap_sm_buildIdentity(sm, hdr->identifier, 1);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
if (eap_ttls_phase2_request_eap_method(sm, data, ret, hdr, len,
|
|
|
|
*pos, resp) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (*resp == NULL &&
|
|
|
|
(config->pending_req_identity || config->pending_req_password ||
|
2017-02-09 01:46:41 +01:00
|
|
|
config->pending_req_otp || config->pending_req_sim)) {
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (*resp == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump_buf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: AVP encapsulate EAP Response",
|
|
|
|
*resp);
|
|
|
|
return eap_ttls_avp_encapsulate(resp, RADIUS_ATTR_EAP_MESSAGE, 1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int eap_ttls_phase2_request_mschapv2(struct eap_sm *sm,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_ttls_data *data,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_method_ret *ret,
|
|
|
|
struct wpabuf **resp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2015-08-01 15:53:16 +02:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_FIPS
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "EAP-TTLS: MSCHAPV2 not supported in FIPS build");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
#else /* CONFIG_FIPS */
|
2012-08-16 18:02:44 +02:00
|
|
|
#ifdef EAP_MSCHAPv2
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
struct wpabuf *msg;
|
|
|
|
u8 *buf, *pos, *challenge, *peer_challenge;
|
|
|
|
const u8 *identity, *password;
|
|
|
|
size_t identity_len, password_len;
|
|
|
|
int pwhash;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: Phase 2 MSCHAPV2 Request");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
identity = eap_get_config_identity(sm, &identity_len);
|
|
|
|
password = eap_get_config_password2(sm, &password_len, &pwhash);
|
|
|
|
if (identity == NULL || password == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
msg = wpabuf_alloc(identity_len + 1000);
|
|
|
|
if (msg == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
|
|
|
|
"EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPV2: Failed to allocate memory");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pos = buf = wpabuf_mhead(msg);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* User-Name */
|
|
|
|
pos = eap_ttls_avp_add(buf, pos, RADIUS_ATTR_USER_NAME, 0, 1,
|
|
|
|
identity, identity_len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* MS-CHAP-Challenge */
|
|
|
|
challenge = eap_ttls_implicit_challenge(
|
2008-03-23 11:07:59 +01:00
|
|
|
sm, data, EAP_TTLS_MSCHAPV2_CHALLENGE_LEN + 1);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
if (challenge == NULL) {
|
2019-02-05 19:26:50 +01:00
|
|
|
wpabuf_clear_free(msg);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPV2: Failed to derive "
|
|
|
|
"implicit challenge");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pos = eap_ttls_avp_add(buf, pos, RADIUS_ATTR_MS_CHAP_CHALLENGE,
|
|
|
|
RADIUS_VENDOR_ID_MICROSOFT, 1,
|
|
|
|
challenge, EAP_TTLS_MSCHAPV2_CHALLENGE_LEN);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* MS-CHAP2-Response */
|
|
|
|
pos = eap_ttls_avp_hdr(pos, RADIUS_ATTR_MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE,
|
|
|
|
RADIUS_VENDOR_ID_MICROSOFT, 1,
|
|
|
|
EAP_TTLS_MSCHAPV2_RESPONSE_LEN);
|
|
|
|
data->ident = challenge[EAP_TTLS_MSCHAPV2_CHALLENGE_LEN];
|
|
|
|
*pos++ = data->ident;
|
|
|
|
*pos++ = 0; /* Flags */
|
2012-03-05 15:59:03 +01:00
|
|
|
if (os_get_random(pos, EAP_TTLS_MSCHAPV2_CHALLENGE_LEN) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
os_free(challenge);
|
2019-02-05 19:26:50 +01:00
|
|
|
wpabuf_clear_free(msg);
|
2012-03-05 15:59:03 +01:00
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPV2: Failed to get "
|
|
|
|
"random data for peer challenge");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
peer_challenge = pos;
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
pos += EAP_TTLS_MSCHAPV2_CHALLENGE_LEN;
|
|
|
|
os_memset(pos, 0, 8); /* Reserved, must be zero */
|
|
|
|
pos += 8;
|
2009-08-16 18:07:57 +02:00
|
|
|
if (mschapv2_derive_response(identity, identity_len, password,
|
|
|
|
password_len, pwhash, challenge,
|
|
|
|
peer_challenge, pos, data->auth_response,
|
|
|
|
data->master_key)) {
|
2012-03-05 15:59:03 +01:00
|
|
|
os_free(challenge);
|
2019-02-05 19:26:50 +01:00
|
|
|
wpabuf_clear_free(msg);
|
2009-08-16 18:07:57 +02:00
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPV2: Failed to derive "
|
|
|
|
"response");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
data->auth_response_valid = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pos += 24;
|
|
|
|
os_free(challenge);
|
|
|
|
AVP_PAD(buf, pos);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wpabuf_put(msg, pos - buf);
|
|
|
|
*resp = msg;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2012-08-16 18:02:44 +02:00
|
|
|
#else /* EAP_MSCHAPv2 */
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "EAP-TTLS: MSCHAPv2 not included in the build");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
#endif /* EAP_MSCHAPv2 */
|
2015-08-01 15:53:16 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_FIPS */
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int eap_ttls_phase2_request_mschap(struct eap_sm *sm,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_ttls_data *data,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_method_ret *ret,
|
|
|
|
struct wpabuf **resp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2015-08-01 15:53:16 +02:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_FIPS
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "EAP-TTLS: MSCHAP not supported in FIPS build");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
#else /* CONFIG_FIPS */
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
struct wpabuf *msg;
|
|
|
|
u8 *buf, *pos, *challenge;
|
|
|
|
const u8 *identity, *password;
|
|
|
|
size_t identity_len, password_len;
|
|
|
|
int pwhash;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: Phase 2 MSCHAP Request");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
identity = eap_get_config_identity(sm, &identity_len);
|
|
|
|
password = eap_get_config_password2(sm, &password_len, &pwhash);
|
|
|
|
if (identity == NULL || password == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
msg = wpabuf_alloc(identity_len + 1000);
|
|
|
|
if (msg == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
|
|
|
|
"EAP-TTLS/MSCHAP: Failed to allocate memory");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pos = buf = wpabuf_mhead(msg);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* User-Name */
|
|
|
|
pos = eap_ttls_avp_add(buf, pos, RADIUS_ATTR_USER_NAME, 0, 1,
|
|
|
|
identity, identity_len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* MS-CHAP-Challenge */
|
2008-03-23 11:07:59 +01:00
|
|
|
challenge = eap_ttls_implicit_challenge(
|
|
|
|
sm, data, EAP_TTLS_MSCHAP_CHALLENGE_LEN + 1);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
if (challenge == NULL) {
|
2019-02-05 19:26:50 +01:00
|
|
|
wpabuf_clear_free(msg);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "EAP-TTLS/MSCHAP: Failed to derive "
|
|
|
|
"implicit challenge");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pos = eap_ttls_avp_add(buf, pos, RADIUS_ATTR_MS_CHAP_CHALLENGE,
|
|
|
|
RADIUS_VENDOR_ID_MICROSOFT, 1,
|
|
|
|
challenge, EAP_TTLS_MSCHAP_CHALLENGE_LEN);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* MS-CHAP-Response */
|
|
|
|
pos = eap_ttls_avp_hdr(pos, RADIUS_ATTR_MS_CHAP_RESPONSE,
|
|
|
|
RADIUS_VENDOR_ID_MICROSOFT, 1,
|
|
|
|
EAP_TTLS_MSCHAP_RESPONSE_LEN);
|
|
|
|
data->ident = challenge[EAP_TTLS_MSCHAP_CHALLENGE_LEN];
|
|
|
|
*pos++ = data->ident;
|
|
|
|
*pos++ = 1; /* Flags: Use NT style passwords */
|
|
|
|
os_memset(pos, 0, 24); /* LM-Response */
|
|
|
|
pos += 24;
|
|
|
|
if (pwhash) {
|
2017-02-28 10:11:12 +01:00
|
|
|
/* NT-Response */
|
2017-06-08 10:17:59 +02:00
|
|
|
if (challenge_response(challenge, password, pos)) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
|
|
|
|
"EAP-TTLS/MSCHAP: Failed derive password hash");
|
2019-02-05 19:26:50 +01:00
|
|
|
wpabuf_clear_free(msg);
|
2017-07-08 15:21:01 +02:00
|
|
|
os_free(challenge);
|
2017-02-28 10:11:12 +01:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2017-06-08 10:17:59 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: MSCHAP password hash",
|
|
|
|
password, 16);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2017-02-28 10:11:12 +01:00
|
|
|
/* NT-Response */
|
|
|
|
if (nt_challenge_response(challenge, password, password_len,
|
2017-06-08 10:17:59 +02:00
|
|
|
pos)) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
|
|
|
|
"EAP-TTLS/MSCHAP: Failed derive password");
|
2019-02-05 19:26:50 +01:00
|
|
|
wpabuf_clear_free(msg);
|
2017-07-08 15:21:01 +02:00
|
|
|
os_free(challenge);
|
2017-02-28 10:11:12 +01:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2017-06-08 10:17:59 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: MSCHAP password",
|
|
|
|
password, password_len);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: MSCHAP implicit challenge",
|
|
|
|
challenge, EAP_TTLS_MSCHAP_CHALLENGE_LEN);
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: MSCHAP response", pos, 24);
|
|
|
|
pos += 24;
|
|
|
|
os_free(challenge);
|
|
|
|
AVP_PAD(buf, pos);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wpabuf_put(msg, pos - buf);
|
|
|
|
*resp = msg;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-09-25 20:28:32 +02:00
|
|
|
/* EAP-TTLS/MSCHAP does not provide tunneled success
|
|
|
|
* notification, so assume that Phase2 succeeds. */
|
|
|
|
ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
|
|
|
|
ret->decision = DECISION_COND_SUCC;
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2015-08-01 15:53:16 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_FIPS */
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int eap_ttls_phase2_request_pap(struct eap_sm *sm,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_ttls_data *data,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_method_ret *ret,
|
|
|
|
struct wpabuf **resp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct wpabuf *msg;
|
|
|
|
u8 *buf, *pos;
|
|
|
|
size_t pad;
|
|
|
|
const u8 *identity, *password;
|
|
|
|
size_t identity_len, password_len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: Phase 2 PAP Request");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
identity = eap_get_config_identity(sm, &identity_len);
|
|
|
|
password = eap_get_config_password(sm, &password_len);
|
|
|
|
if (identity == NULL || password == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
msg = wpabuf_alloc(identity_len + password_len + 100);
|
|
|
|
if (msg == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
|
|
|
|
"EAP-TTLS/PAP: Failed to allocate memory");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pos = buf = wpabuf_mhead(msg);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* User-Name */
|
|
|
|
pos = eap_ttls_avp_add(buf, pos, RADIUS_ATTR_USER_NAME, 0, 1,
|
|
|
|
identity, identity_len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* User-Password; in RADIUS, this is encrypted, but EAP-TTLS encrypts
|
|
|
|
* the data, so no separate encryption is used in the AVP itself.
|
|
|
|
* However, the password is padded to obfuscate its length. */
|
2009-12-09 22:42:54 +01:00
|
|
|
pad = password_len == 0 ? 16 : (16 - (password_len & 15)) & 15;
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
pos = eap_ttls_avp_hdr(pos, RADIUS_ATTR_USER_PASSWORD, 0, 1,
|
|
|
|
password_len + pad);
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(pos, password, password_len);
|
|
|
|
pos += password_len;
|
|
|
|
os_memset(pos, 0, pad);
|
|
|
|
pos += pad;
|
|
|
|
AVP_PAD(buf, pos);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wpabuf_put(msg, pos - buf);
|
|
|
|
*resp = msg;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-09-25 20:28:32 +02:00
|
|
|
/* EAP-TTLS/PAP does not provide tunneled success notification,
|
|
|
|
* so assume that Phase2 succeeds. */
|
|
|
|
ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
|
|
|
|
ret->decision = DECISION_COND_SUCC;
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int eap_ttls_phase2_request_chap(struct eap_sm *sm,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_ttls_data *data,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_method_ret *ret,
|
|
|
|
struct wpabuf **resp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2015-08-01 15:53:16 +02:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_FIPS
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "EAP-TTLS: CHAP not supported in FIPS build");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
#else /* CONFIG_FIPS */
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
struct wpabuf *msg;
|
|
|
|
u8 *buf, *pos, *challenge;
|
|
|
|
const u8 *identity, *password;
|
|
|
|
size_t identity_len, password_len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: Phase 2 CHAP Request");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
identity = eap_get_config_identity(sm, &identity_len);
|
|
|
|
password = eap_get_config_password(sm, &password_len);
|
|
|
|
if (identity == NULL || password == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
msg = wpabuf_alloc(identity_len + 1000);
|
|
|
|
if (msg == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
|
|
|
|
"EAP-TTLS/CHAP: Failed to allocate memory");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pos = buf = wpabuf_mhead(msg);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* User-Name */
|
|
|
|
pos = eap_ttls_avp_add(buf, pos, RADIUS_ATTR_USER_NAME, 0, 1,
|
|
|
|
identity, identity_len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* CHAP-Challenge */
|
2008-03-23 11:07:59 +01:00
|
|
|
challenge = eap_ttls_implicit_challenge(
|
|
|
|
sm, data, EAP_TTLS_CHAP_CHALLENGE_LEN + 1);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
if (challenge == NULL) {
|
2019-02-05 19:26:50 +01:00
|
|
|
wpabuf_clear_free(msg);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "EAP-TTLS/CHAP: Failed to derive "
|
|
|
|
"implicit challenge");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pos = eap_ttls_avp_add(buf, pos, RADIUS_ATTR_CHAP_CHALLENGE, 0, 1,
|
|
|
|
challenge, EAP_TTLS_CHAP_CHALLENGE_LEN);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* CHAP-Password */
|
|
|
|
pos = eap_ttls_avp_hdr(pos, RADIUS_ATTR_CHAP_PASSWORD, 0, 1,
|
|
|
|
1 + EAP_TTLS_CHAP_PASSWORD_LEN);
|
|
|
|
data->ident = challenge[EAP_TTLS_CHAP_CHALLENGE_LEN];
|
|
|
|
*pos++ = data->ident;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* MD5(Ident + Password + Challenge) */
|
|
|
|
chap_md5(data->ident, password, password_len, challenge,
|
|
|
|
EAP_TTLS_CHAP_CHALLENGE_LEN, pos);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: CHAP username",
|
|
|
|
identity, identity_len);
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: CHAP password",
|
|
|
|
password, password_len);
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: CHAP implicit challenge",
|
|
|
|
challenge, EAP_TTLS_CHAP_CHALLENGE_LEN);
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: CHAP password",
|
|
|
|
pos, EAP_TTLS_CHAP_PASSWORD_LEN);
|
|
|
|
pos += EAP_TTLS_CHAP_PASSWORD_LEN;
|
|
|
|
os_free(challenge);
|
|
|
|
AVP_PAD(buf, pos);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wpabuf_put(msg, pos - buf);
|
|
|
|
*resp = msg;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-09-25 20:28:32 +02:00
|
|
|
/* EAP-TTLS/CHAP does not provide tunneled success
|
|
|
|
* notification, so assume that Phase2 succeeds. */
|
|
|
|
ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
|
|
|
|
ret->decision = DECISION_COND_SUCC;
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2015-08-01 15:53:16 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_FIPS */
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int eap_ttls_phase2_request(struct eap_sm *sm,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_ttls_data *data,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_method_ret *ret,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_hdr *hdr,
|
|
|
|
struct wpabuf **resp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int res = 0;
|
|
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
|
|
enum phase2_types phase2_type = data->phase2_type;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef EAP_TNC
|
|
|
|
if (data->tnc_started) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: Processing TNC");
|
|
|
|
phase2_type = EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_EAP;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* EAP_TNC */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (phase2_type == EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_MSCHAPV2 ||
|
|
|
|
phase2_type == EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_MSCHAP ||
|
|
|
|
phase2_type == EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_PAP ||
|
|
|
|
phase2_type == EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_CHAP) {
|
|
|
|
if (eap_get_config_identity(sm, &len) == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
|
|
|
|
"EAP-TTLS: Identity not configured");
|
|
|
|
eap_sm_request_identity(sm);
|
|
|
|
if (eap_get_config_password(sm, &len) == NULL)
|
|
|
|
eap_sm_request_password(sm);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (eap_get_config_password(sm, &len) == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
|
|
|
|
"EAP-TTLS: Password not configured");
|
|
|
|
eap_sm_request_password(sm);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-03-09 11:04:10 +01:00
|
|
|
switch (phase2_type) {
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
case EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_EAP:
|
|
|
|
res = eap_ttls_phase2_request_eap(sm, data, ret, hdr, resp);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_MSCHAPV2:
|
|
|
|
res = eap_ttls_phase2_request_mschapv2(sm, data, ret, resp);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_MSCHAP:
|
|
|
|
res = eap_ttls_phase2_request_mschap(sm, data, ret, resp);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_PAP:
|
|
|
|
res = eap_ttls_phase2_request_pap(sm, data, ret, resp);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_CHAP:
|
|
|
|
res = eap_ttls_phase2_request_chap(sm, data, ret, resp);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "EAP-TTLS: Phase 2 - Unknown");
|
|
|
|
res = -1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (res < 0) {
|
|
|
|
ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
|
|
|
|
ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return res;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct ttls_parse_avp {
|
|
|
|
u8 *mschapv2;
|
|
|
|
u8 *eapdata;
|
|
|
|
size_t eap_len;
|
|
|
|
int mschapv2_error;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int eap_ttls_parse_attr_eap(const u8 *dpos, size_t dlen,
|
|
|
|
struct ttls_parse_avp *parse)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: AVP - EAP Message");
|
|
|
|
if (parse->eapdata == NULL) {
|
2017-03-07 10:17:23 +01:00
|
|
|
parse->eapdata = os_memdup(dpos, dlen);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
if (parse->eapdata == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-TTLS: Failed to allocate "
|
|
|
|
"memory for Phase 2 EAP data");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
parse->eap_len = dlen;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
u8 *neweap = os_realloc(parse->eapdata, parse->eap_len + dlen);
|
|
|
|
if (neweap == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-TTLS: Failed to allocate "
|
|
|
|
"memory for Phase 2 EAP data");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
os_memcpy(neweap + parse->eap_len, dpos, dlen);
|
|
|
|
parse->eapdata = neweap;
|
|
|
|
parse->eap_len += dlen;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int eap_ttls_parse_avp(u8 *pos, size_t left,
|
|
|
|
struct ttls_parse_avp *parse)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ttls_avp *avp;
|
|
|
|
u32 avp_code, avp_length, vendor_id = 0;
|
|
|
|
u8 avp_flags, *dpos;
|
|
|
|
size_t dlen;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
avp = (struct ttls_avp *) pos;
|
|
|
|
avp_code = be_to_host32(avp->avp_code);
|
|
|
|
avp_length = be_to_host32(avp->avp_length);
|
|
|
|
avp_flags = (avp_length >> 24) & 0xff;
|
|
|
|
avp_length &= 0xffffff;
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: AVP: code=%d flags=0x%02x "
|
|
|
|
"length=%d", (int) avp_code, avp_flags,
|
|
|
|
(int) avp_length);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (avp_length > left) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-TTLS: AVP overflow "
|
|
|
|
"(len=%d, left=%lu) - dropped",
|
|
|
|
(int) avp_length, (unsigned long) left);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (avp_length < sizeof(*avp)) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-TTLS: Invalid AVP length %d",
|
|
|
|
avp_length);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dpos = (u8 *) (avp + 1);
|
|
|
|
dlen = avp_length - sizeof(*avp);
|
|
|
|
if (avp_flags & AVP_FLAGS_VENDOR) {
|
|
|
|
if (dlen < 4) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-TTLS: Vendor AVP "
|
|
|
|
"underflow");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vendor_id = WPA_GET_BE32(dpos);
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: AVP vendor_id %d",
|
|
|
|
(int) vendor_id);
|
|
|
|
dpos += 4;
|
|
|
|
dlen -= 4;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: AVP data", dpos, dlen);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (vendor_id == 0 && avp_code == RADIUS_ATTR_EAP_MESSAGE) {
|
|
|
|
if (eap_ttls_parse_attr_eap(dpos, dlen, parse) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
} else if (vendor_id == 0 && avp_code == RADIUS_ATTR_REPLY_MESSAGE) {
|
|
|
|
/* This is an optional message that can be displayed to
|
|
|
|
* the user. */
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: AVP - Reply-Message",
|
|
|
|
dpos, dlen);
|
|
|
|
} else if (vendor_id == RADIUS_VENDOR_ID_MICROSOFT &&
|
|
|
|
avp_code == RADIUS_ATTR_MS_CHAP2_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: MS-CHAP2-Success",
|
|
|
|
dpos, dlen);
|
|
|
|
if (dlen != 43) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-TTLS: Unexpected "
|
|
|
|
"MS-CHAP2-Success length "
|
|
|
|
"(len=%lu, expected 43)",
|
|
|
|
(unsigned long) dlen);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
parse->mschapv2 = dpos;
|
|
|
|
} else if (vendor_id == RADIUS_VENDOR_ID_MICROSOFT &&
|
|
|
|
avp_code == RADIUS_ATTR_MS_CHAP_ERROR) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: MS-CHAP-Error",
|
|
|
|
dpos, dlen);
|
|
|
|
parse->mschapv2_error = 1;
|
|
|
|
} else if (avp_flags & AVP_FLAGS_MANDATORY) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-TTLS: Unsupported mandatory AVP "
|
|
|
|
"code %d vendor_id %d - dropped",
|
|
|
|
(int) avp_code, (int) vendor_id);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: Ignoring unsupported AVP "
|
|
|
|
"code %d vendor_id %d",
|
|
|
|
(int) avp_code, (int) vendor_id);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return avp_length;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int eap_ttls_parse_avps(struct wpabuf *in_decrypted,
|
|
|
|
struct ttls_parse_avp *parse)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
u8 *pos;
|
|
|
|
size_t left, pad;
|
|
|
|
int avp_length;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pos = wpabuf_mhead(in_decrypted);
|
|
|
|
left = wpabuf_len(in_decrypted);
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: Decrypted Phase 2 AVPs", pos, left);
|
|
|
|
if (left < sizeof(struct ttls_avp)) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-TTLS: Too short Phase 2 AVP frame"
|
|
|
|
" len=%lu expected %lu or more - dropped",
|
|
|
|
(unsigned long) left,
|
|
|
|
(unsigned long) sizeof(struct ttls_avp));
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Parse AVPs */
|
|
|
|
os_memset(parse, 0, sizeof(*parse));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (left > 0) {
|
|
|
|
avp_length = eap_ttls_parse_avp(pos, left, parse);
|
|
|
|
if (avp_length < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pad = (4 - (avp_length & 3)) & 3;
|
|
|
|
pos += avp_length + pad;
|
|
|
|
if (left < avp_length + pad)
|
|
|
|
left = 0;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
left -= avp_length + pad;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static u8 * eap_ttls_fake_identity_request(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct eap_hdr *hdr;
|
|
|
|
u8 *buf;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: empty data in beginning of "
|
|
|
|
"Phase 2 - use fake EAP-Request Identity");
|
|
|
|
buf = os_malloc(sizeof(*hdr) + 1);
|
|
|
|
if (buf == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-TTLS: failed to allocate "
|
|
|
|
"memory for fake EAP-Identity Request");
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hdr = (struct eap_hdr *) buf;
|
|
|
|
hdr->code = EAP_CODE_REQUEST;
|
|
|
|
hdr->identifier = 0;
|
|
|
|
hdr->length = host_to_be16(sizeof(*hdr) + 1);
|
|
|
|
buf[sizeof(*hdr)] = EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return buf;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int eap_ttls_encrypt_response(struct eap_sm *sm,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_ttls_data *data,
|
|
|
|
struct wpabuf *resp, u8 identifier,
|
|
|
|
struct wpabuf **out_data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (resp == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump_buf_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: Encrypting Phase 2 data",
|
|
|
|
resp);
|
|
|
|
if (eap_peer_tls_encrypt(sm, &data->ssl, EAP_TYPE_TTLS,
|
|
|
|
data->ttls_version, identifier,
|
|
|
|
resp, out_data)) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-TTLS: Failed to encrypt a Phase 2 "
|
|
|
|
"frame");
|
2019-02-05 19:26:50 +01:00
|
|
|
wpabuf_clear_free(resp);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2019-02-05 19:26:50 +01:00
|
|
|
wpabuf_clear_free(resp);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int eap_ttls_process_phase2_eap(struct eap_sm *sm,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_ttls_data *data,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_method_ret *ret,
|
|
|
|
struct ttls_parse_avp *parse,
|
|
|
|
struct wpabuf **resp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct eap_hdr *hdr;
|
|
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (parse->eapdata == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-TTLS: No EAP Message in the "
|
|
|
|
"packet - dropped");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: Phase 2 EAP",
|
|
|
|
parse->eapdata, parse->eap_len);
|
|
|
|
hdr = (struct eap_hdr *) parse->eapdata;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (parse->eap_len < sizeof(*hdr)) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-TTLS: Too short Phase 2 EAP "
|
|
|
|
"frame (len=%lu, expected %lu or more) - dropped",
|
|
|
|
(unsigned long) parse->eap_len,
|
|
|
|
(unsigned long) sizeof(*hdr));
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
len = be_to_host16(hdr->length);
|
|
|
|
if (len > parse->eap_len) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-TTLS: Length mismatch in Phase 2 "
|
|
|
|
"EAP frame (EAP hdr len=%lu, EAP data len in "
|
|
|
|
"AVP=%lu)",
|
|
|
|
(unsigned long) len,
|
|
|
|
(unsigned long) parse->eap_len);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: received Phase 2: code=%d "
|
|
|
|
"identifier=%d length=%lu",
|
|
|
|
hdr->code, hdr->identifier, (unsigned long) len);
|
|
|
|
switch (hdr->code) {
|
|
|
|
case EAP_CODE_REQUEST:
|
|
|
|
if (eap_ttls_phase2_request(sm, data, ret, hdr, resp)) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-TTLS: Phase2 Request "
|
|
|
|
"processing failed");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-TTLS: Unexpected code=%d in "
|
|
|
|
"Phase 2 EAP header", hdr->code);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int eap_ttls_process_phase2_mschapv2(struct eap_sm *sm,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_ttls_data *data,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_method_ret *ret,
|
|
|
|
struct ttls_parse_avp *parse)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2012-08-16 18:02:44 +02:00
|
|
|
#ifdef EAP_MSCHAPv2
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
if (parse->mschapv2_error) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPV2: Received "
|
|
|
|
"MS-CHAP-Error - failed");
|
|
|
|
ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
|
|
|
|
ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
|
|
|
|
/* Reply with empty data to ACK error */
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (parse->mschapv2 == NULL) {
|
2008-03-09 11:04:10 +01:00
|
|
|
#ifdef EAP_TNC
|
|
|
|
if (data->phase2_success && parse->eapdata) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Allow EAP-TNC to be started after successfully
|
|
|
|
* completed MSCHAPV2.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* EAP_TNC */
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-TTLS: no MS-CHAP2-Success AVP "
|
|
|
|
"received for Phase2 MSCHAPV2");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (parse->mschapv2[0] != data->ident) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-TTLS: Ident mismatch for Phase 2 "
|
|
|
|
"MSCHAPV2 (received Ident 0x%02x, expected 0x%02x)",
|
|
|
|
parse->mschapv2[0], data->ident);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!data->auth_response_valid ||
|
|
|
|
mschapv2_verify_auth_response(data->auth_response,
|
|
|
|
parse->mschapv2 + 1, 42)) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-TTLS: Invalid authenticator "
|
|
|
|
"response in Phase 2 MSCHAPV2 success request");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-TTLS: Phase 2 MSCHAPV2 "
|
|
|
|
"authentication succeeded");
|
2011-09-25 20:28:32 +02:00
|
|
|
ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
|
|
|
|
ret->decision = DECISION_UNCOND_SUCC;
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_success = 1;
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Reply with empty data; authentication server will reply
|
|
|
|
* with EAP-Success after this.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2012-08-16 18:02:44 +02:00
|
|
|
#else /* EAP_MSCHAPv2 */
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "EAP-TTLS: MSCHAPv2 not included in the build");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
#endif /* EAP_MSCHAPv2 */
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef EAP_TNC
|
|
|
|
static int eap_ttls_process_tnc_start(struct eap_sm *sm,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_ttls_data *data,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_method_ret *ret,
|
|
|
|
struct ttls_parse_avp *parse,
|
|
|
|
struct wpabuf **resp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* TNC uses inner EAP method after non-EAP TTLS phase 2. */
|
|
|
|
if (parse->eapdata == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-TTLS: Phase 2 received "
|
|
|
|
"unexpected tunneled data (no EAP)");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!data->ready_for_tnc) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-TTLS: Phase 2 received "
|
|
|
|
"EAP after non-EAP, but not ready for TNC");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: Start TNC after completed "
|
|
|
|
"non-EAP method");
|
|
|
|
data->tnc_started = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (eap_ttls_process_phase2_eap(sm, data, ret, parse, resp) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* EAP_TNC */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int eap_ttls_process_decrypted(struct eap_sm *sm,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_ttls_data *data,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_method_ret *ret,
|
|
|
|
u8 identifier,
|
|
|
|
struct ttls_parse_avp *parse,
|
|
|
|
struct wpabuf *in_decrypted,
|
|
|
|
struct wpabuf **out_data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct wpabuf *resp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
struct eap_peer_config *config = eap_get_config(sm);
|
|
|
|
int res;
|
|
|
|
enum phase2_types phase2_type = data->phase2_type;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef EAP_TNC
|
|
|
|
if (data->tnc_started)
|
|
|
|
phase2_type = EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_EAP;
|
|
|
|
#endif /* EAP_TNC */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (phase2_type) {
|
|
|
|
case EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_EAP:
|
|
|
|
if (eap_ttls_process_phase2_eap(sm, data, ret, parse, &resp) <
|
|
|
|
0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_MSCHAPV2:
|
|
|
|
res = eap_ttls_process_phase2_mschapv2(sm, data, ret, parse);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef EAP_TNC
|
2008-03-09 11:04:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (res == 1 && parse->eapdata && data->phase2_success) {
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* TNC may be required as the next
|
|
|
|
* authentication method within the tunnel.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ret->methodState = METHOD_MAY_CONT;
|
|
|
|
data->ready_for_tnc = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (eap_ttls_process_tnc_start(sm, data, ret, parse,
|
|
|
|
&resp) == 0)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* EAP_TNC */
|
|
|
|
return res;
|
|
|
|
case EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_MSCHAP:
|
|
|
|
case EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_PAP:
|
|
|
|
case EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_CHAP:
|
|
|
|
#ifdef EAP_TNC
|
|
|
|
if (eap_ttls_process_tnc_start(sm, data, ret, parse, &resp) <
|
|
|
|
0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#else /* EAP_TNC */
|
|
|
|
/* EAP-TTLS/{MSCHAP,PAP,CHAP} should not send any TLS tunneled
|
|
|
|
* requests to the supplicant */
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-TTLS: Phase 2 received unexpected "
|
|
|
|
"tunneled data");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
#endif /* EAP_TNC */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (resp) {
|
|
|
|
if (eap_ttls_encrypt_response(sm, data, resp, identifier,
|
|
|
|
out_data) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
} else if (config->pending_req_identity ||
|
|
|
|
config->pending_req_password ||
|
|
|
|
config->pending_req_otp ||
|
2017-02-09 01:46:41 +01:00
|
|
|
config->pending_req_new_password ||
|
|
|
|
config->pending_req_sim) {
|
2019-02-05 19:26:50 +01:00
|
|
|
wpabuf_clear_free(data->pending_phase2_req);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
data->pending_phase2_req = wpabuf_dup(in_decrypted);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int eap_ttls_implicit_identity_request(struct eap_sm *sm,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_ttls_data *data,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_method_ret *ret,
|
|
|
|
u8 identifier,
|
|
|
|
struct wpabuf **out_data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int retval = 0;
|
|
|
|
struct eap_hdr *hdr;
|
|
|
|
struct wpabuf *resp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hdr = (struct eap_hdr *) eap_ttls_fake_identity_request();
|
|
|
|
if (hdr == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
|
|
|
|
ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
resp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (eap_ttls_phase2_request(sm, data, ret, hdr, &resp)) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-TTLS: Phase2 Request "
|
|
|
|
"processing failed");
|
|
|
|
retval = -1;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2011-10-30 11:02:20 +01:00
|
|
|
struct eap_peer_config *config = eap_get_config(sm);
|
|
|
|
if (resp == NULL &&
|
|
|
|
(config->pending_req_identity ||
|
|
|
|
config->pending_req_password ||
|
|
|
|
config->pending_req_otp ||
|
2017-02-09 01:46:41 +01:00
|
|
|
config->pending_req_new_password ||
|
|
|
|
config->pending_req_sim)) {
|
2011-10-30 11:02:20 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Use empty buffer to force implicit request
|
|
|
|
* processing when EAP request is re-processed after
|
|
|
|
* user input.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-02-05 19:26:50 +01:00
|
|
|
wpabuf_clear_free(data->pending_phase2_req);
|
2011-10-30 11:02:20 +01:00
|
|
|
data->pending_phase2_req = wpabuf_alloc(0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
retval = eap_ttls_encrypt_response(sm, data, resp, identifier,
|
|
|
|
out_data);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
os_free(hdr);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (retval < 0) {
|
|
|
|
ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
|
|
|
|
ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return retval;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int eap_ttls_phase2_start(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_ttls_data *data,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_method_ret *ret, u8 identifier,
|
|
|
|
struct wpabuf **out_data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_start = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* EAP-TTLS does not use Phase2 on fast re-auth; this must be done only
|
|
|
|
* if TLS part was indeed resuming a previous session. Most
|
|
|
|
* Authentication Servers terminate EAP-TTLS before reaching this
|
|
|
|
* point, but some do not. Make wpa_supplicant stop phase 2 here, if
|
|
|
|
* needed.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (data->reauth &&
|
|
|
|
tls_connection_resumed(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn)) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: Session resumption - "
|
|
|
|
"skip phase 2");
|
|
|
|
*out_data = eap_peer_tls_build_ack(identifier, EAP_TYPE_TTLS,
|
|
|
|
data->ttls_version);
|
|
|
|
ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
|
|
|
|
ret->decision = DECISION_UNCOND_SUCC;
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_success = 1;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return eap_ttls_implicit_identity_request(sm, data, ret, identifier,
|
|
|
|
out_data);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int eap_ttls_decrypt(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_ttls_data *data,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_method_ret *ret, u8 identifier,
|
|
|
|
const struct wpabuf *in_data,
|
|
|
|
struct wpabuf **out_data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct wpabuf *in_decrypted = NULL;
|
|
|
|
int retval = 0;
|
|
|
|
struct ttls_parse_avp parse;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
os_memset(&parse, 0, sizeof(parse));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: received %lu bytes encrypted data for"
|
|
|
|
" Phase 2",
|
|
|
|
in_data ? (unsigned long) wpabuf_len(in_data) : 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (data->pending_phase2_req) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: Pending Phase 2 request - "
|
|
|
|
"skip decryption and use old data");
|
|
|
|
/* Clear TLS reassembly state. */
|
|
|
|
eap_peer_tls_reset_input(&data->ssl);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
in_decrypted = data->pending_phase2_req;
|
|
|
|
data->pending_phase2_req = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (wpabuf_len(in_decrypted) == 0) {
|
2019-02-05 19:26:50 +01:00
|
|
|
wpabuf_clear_free(in_decrypted);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
return eap_ttls_implicit_identity_request(
|
|
|
|
sm, data, ret, identifier, out_data);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
goto continue_req;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((in_data == NULL || wpabuf_len(in_data) == 0) &&
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_start) {
|
|
|
|
return eap_ttls_phase2_start(sm, data, ret, identifier,
|
|
|
|
out_data);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (in_data == NULL || wpabuf_len(in_data) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* Received TLS ACK - requesting more fragments */
|
|
|
|
return eap_peer_tls_encrypt(sm, &data->ssl, EAP_TYPE_TTLS,
|
|
|
|
data->ttls_version,
|
|
|
|
identifier, NULL, out_data);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
retval = eap_peer_tls_decrypt(sm, &data->ssl, in_data, &in_decrypted);
|
|
|
|
if (retval)
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
continue_req:
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_start = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (eap_ttls_parse_avps(in_decrypted, &parse) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
retval = -1;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
retval = eap_ttls_process_decrypted(sm, data, ret, identifier,
|
|
|
|
&parse, in_decrypted, out_data);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
2019-02-05 19:26:50 +01:00
|
|
|
wpabuf_clear_free(in_decrypted);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
os_free(parse.eapdata);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (retval < 0) {
|
|
|
|
ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
|
|
|
|
ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return retval;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int eap_ttls_process_handshake(struct eap_sm *sm,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_ttls_data *data,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_method_ret *ret,
|
|
|
|
u8 identifier,
|
2015-05-02 15:42:19 +02:00
|
|
|
const struct wpabuf *in_data,
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
struct wpabuf **out_data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int res;
|
|
|
|
|
EAP peer: External server certificate chain validation
This adds support for optional functionality to validate server
certificate chain in TLS-based EAP methods in an external program.
wpa_supplicant control interface is used to indicate when such
validation is needed and what the result of the external validation is.
This external validation can extend or replace the internal validation.
When ca_cert or ca_path parameter is set, the internal validation is
used. If these parameters are omitted, only the external validation is
used. It needs to be understood that leaving those parameters out will
disable most of the validation steps done with the TLS library and that
configuration is not really recommend.
By default, the external validation is not used. It can be enabled by
addingtls_ext_cert_check=1 into the network profile phase1 parameter.
When enabled, external validation is required through the CTRL-REQ/RSP
mechanism similarly to other EAP authentication parameters through the
control interface.
The request to perform external validation is indicated by the following
event:
CTRL-REQ-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:External server certificate validation needed for SSID <ssid>
Before that event, the server certificate chain is provided with the
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT events that include the cert=<hexdump>
parameter. depth=# indicates which certificate is in question (0 for the
server certificate, 1 for its issues, and so on).
The result of the external validation is provided with the following
command:
CTRL-RSP-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:<good|bad>
It should be noted that this is currently enabled only for OpenSSL (and
BoringSSL/LibreSSL). Due to the constraints in the library API, the
validation result from external processing cannot be reported cleanly
with TLS alert. In other words, if the external validation reject the
server certificate chain, the pending TLS handshake is terminated
without sending more messages to the server.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2015-12-12 17:16:54 +01:00
|
|
|
if (sm->waiting_ext_cert_check && data->pending_resp) {
|
|
|
|
struct eap_peer_config *config = eap_get_config(sm);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (config->pending_ext_cert_check == EXT_CERT_CHECK_GOOD) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
|
|
"EAP-TTLS: External certificate check succeeded - continue handshake");
|
|
|
|
*out_data = data->pending_resp;
|
|
|
|
data->pending_resp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
sm->waiting_ext_cert_check = 0;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (config->pending_ext_cert_check == EXT_CERT_CHECK_BAD) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
|
|
"EAP-TTLS: External certificate check failed - force authentication failure");
|
|
|
|
ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
|
|
|
|
ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
|
|
|
|
sm->waiting_ext_cert_check = 0;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
|
|
"EAP-TTLS: Continuing to wait external server certificate validation");
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
res = eap_peer_tls_process_helper(sm, &data->ssl, EAP_TYPE_TTLS,
|
|
|
|
data->ttls_version, identifier,
|
2015-05-02 15:42:19 +02:00
|
|
|
in_data, out_data);
|
2015-07-28 15:30:41 +02:00
|
|
|
if (res < 0) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: TLS processing failed");
|
|
|
|
ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
|
|
|
|
ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
EAP peer: External server certificate chain validation
This adds support for optional functionality to validate server
certificate chain in TLS-based EAP methods in an external program.
wpa_supplicant control interface is used to indicate when such
validation is needed and what the result of the external validation is.
This external validation can extend or replace the internal validation.
When ca_cert or ca_path parameter is set, the internal validation is
used. If these parameters are omitted, only the external validation is
used. It needs to be understood that leaving those parameters out will
disable most of the validation steps done with the TLS library and that
configuration is not really recommend.
By default, the external validation is not used. It can be enabled by
addingtls_ext_cert_check=1 into the network profile phase1 parameter.
When enabled, external validation is required through the CTRL-REQ/RSP
mechanism similarly to other EAP authentication parameters through the
control interface.
The request to perform external validation is indicated by the following
event:
CTRL-REQ-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:External server certificate validation needed for SSID <ssid>
Before that event, the server certificate chain is provided with the
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT events that include the cert=<hexdump>
parameter. depth=# indicates which certificate is in question (0 for the
server certificate, 1 for its issues, and so on).
The result of the external validation is provided with the following
command:
CTRL-RSP-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:<good|bad>
It should be noted that this is currently enabled only for OpenSSL (and
BoringSSL/LibreSSL). Due to the constraints in the library API, the
validation result from external processing cannot be reported cleanly
with TLS alert. In other words, if the external validation reject the
server certificate chain, the pending TLS handshake is terminated
without sending more messages to the server.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2015-12-12 17:16:54 +01:00
|
|
|
if (sm->waiting_ext_cert_check) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
|
|
"EAP-TTLS: Waiting external server certificate validation");
|
2019-02-05 19:26:50 +01:00
|
|
|
wpabuf_clear_free(data->pending_resp);
|
EAP peer: External server certificate chain validation
This adds support for optional functionality to validate server
certificate chain in TLS-based EAP methods in an external program.
wpa_supplicant control interface is used to indicate when such
validation is needed and what the result of the external validation is.
This external validation can extend or replace the internal validation.
When ca_cert or ca_path parameter is set, the internal validation is
used. If these parameters are omitted, only the external validation is
used. It needs to be understood that leaving those parameters out will
disable most of the validation steps done with the TLS library and that
configuration is not really recommend.
By default, the external validation is not used. It can be enabled by
addingtls_ext_cert_check=1 into the network profile phase1 parameter.
When enabled, external validation is required through the CTRL-REQ/RSP
mechanism similarly to other EAP authentication parameters through the
control interface.
The request to perform external validation is indicated by the following
event:
CTRL-REQ-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:External server certificate validation needed for SSID <ssid>
Before that event, the server certificate chain is provided with the
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT events that include the cert=<hexdump>
parameter. depth=# indicates which certificate is in question (0 for the
server certificate, 1 for its issues, and so on).
The result of the external validation is provided with the following
command:
CTRL-RSP-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:<good|bad>
It should be noted that this is currently enabled only for OpenSSL (and
BoringSSL/LibreSSL). Due to the constraints in the library API, the
validation result from external processing cannot be reported cleanly
with TLS alert. In other words, if the external validation reject the
server certificate chain, the pending TLS handshake is terminated
without sending more messages to the server.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2015-12-12 17:16:54 +01:00
|
|
|
data->pending_resp = *out_data;
|
|
|
|
*out_data = NULL;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
if (tls_connection_established(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn)) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: TLS done, proceed to "
|
|
|
|
"Phase 2");
|
|
|
|
if (data->resuming) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: fast reauth - may "
|
|
|
|
"skip Phase 2");
|
|
|
|
ret->decision = DECISION_COND_SUCC;
|
|
|
|
ret->methodState = METHOD_MAY_CONT;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_start = 1;
|
2011-09-25 20:28:32 +02:00
|
|
|
eap_ttls_v0_derive_key(sm, data);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (*out_data == NULL || wpabuf_len(*out_data) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (eap_ttls_decrypt(sm, data, ret, identifier,
|
|
|
|
NULL, out_data)) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-TTLS: "
|
|
|
|
"failed to process early "
|
|
|
|
"start for Phase 2");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
res = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data->resuming = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (res == 2) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Application data included in the handshake message.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-02-05 19:26:50 +01:00
|
|
|
wpabuf_clear_free(data->pending_phase2_req);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
data->pending_phase2_req = *out_data;
|
|
|
|
*out_data = NULL;
|
2015-05-02 15:42:19 +02:00
|
|
|
res = eap_ttls_decrypt(sm, data, ret, identifier, in_data,
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
out_data);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return res;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-27 16:11:27 +01:00
|
|
|
static void eap_ttls_check_auth_status(struct eap_sm *sm,
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
struct eap_ttls_data *data,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_method_ret *ret)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2011-09-25 20:28:32 +02:00
|
|
|
if (ret->methodState == METHOD_DONE) {
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
ret->allowNotifications = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
if (ret->decision == DECISION_UNCOND_SUCC ||
|
|
|
|
ret->decision == DECISION_COND_SUCC) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: Authentication "
|
|
|
|
"completed successfully");
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_success = 1;
|
2016-01-15 12:37:15 +01:00
|
|
|
data->decision_succ = ret->decision;
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
#ifdef EAP_TNC
|
|
|
|
if (!data->ready_for_tnc && !data->tnc_started) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* TNC may be required as the next
|
|
|
|
* authentication method within the tunnel.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ret->methodState = METHOD_MAY_CONT;
|
|
|
|
data->ready_for_tnc = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* EAP_TNC */
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-09-25 20:28:32 +02:00
|
|
|
} else if (ret->methodState == METHOD_MAY_CONT &&
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
(ret->decision == DECISION_UNCOND_SUCC ||
|
|
|
|
ret->decision == DECISION_COND_SUCC)) {
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: Authentication "
|
|
|
|
"completed successfully (MAY_CONT)");
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_success = 1;
|
2016-01-15 12:37:15 +01:00
|
|
|
data->decision_succ = ret->decision;
|
|
|
|
} else if (data->decision_succ != DECISION_FAIL &&
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_success &&
|
|
|
|
!data->ssl.tls_out) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This is needed to cover the case where the final Phase 2
|
|
|
|
* message gets fragmented since fragmentation clears
|
|
|
|
* decision back to FAIL.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
|
|
|
"EAP-TTLS: Restore success decision after fragmented frame sent completely");
|
|
|
|
ret->decision = data->decision_succ;
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct wpabuf * eap_ttls_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
|
|
|
|
struct eap_method_ret *ret,
|
|
|
|
const struct wpabuf *reqData)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
size_t left;
|
|
|
|
int res;
|
|
|
|
u8 flags, id;
|
|
|
|
struct wpabuf *resp;
|
|
|
|
const u8 *pos;
|
|
|
|
struct eap_ttls_data *data = priv;
|
2015-05-02 15:42:19 +02:00
|
|
|
struct wpabuf msg;
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pos = eap_peer_tls_process_init(sm, &data->ssl, EAP_TYPE_TTLS, ret,
|
|
|
|
reqData, &left, &flags);
|
|
|
|
if (pos == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
id = eap_get_id(reqData);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (flags & EAP_TLS_FLAGS_START) {
|
2011-09-25 20:28:32 +02:00
|
|
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TTLS: Start (server ver=%d, own "
|
|
|
|
"ver=%d)", flags & EAP_TLS_VERSION_MASK,
|
|
|
|
data->ttls_version);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2008-08-16 09:17:22 +02:00
|
|
|
/* RFC 5281, Ch. 9.2:
|
|
|
|
* "This packet MAY contain additional information in the form
|
|
|
|
* of AVPs, which may provide useful hints to the client"
|
|
|
|
* For now, ignore any potential extra data.
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
left = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-05-02 15:42:19 +02:00
|
|
|
wpabuf_set(&msg, pos, left);
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
resp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (tls_connection_established(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) &&
|
|
|
|
!data->resuming) {
|
|
|
|
res = eap_ttls_decrypt(sm, data, ret, id, &msg, &resp);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
res = eap_ttls_process_handshake(sm, data, ret, id,
|
2015-05-02 15:42:19 +02:00
|
|
|
&msg, &resp);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
eap_ttls_check_auth_status(sm, data, ret);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* FIX: what about res == -1? Could just move all error processing into
|
|
|
|
* the other functions and get rid of this res==1 case here. */
|
|
|
|
if (res == 1) {
|
2019-02-05 19:26:50 +01:00
|
|
|
wpabuf_clear_free(resp);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
return eap_peer_tls_build_ack(id, EAP_TYPE_TTLS,
|
|
|
|
data->ttls_version);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return resp;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static Boolean eap_ttls_has_reauth_data(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct eap_ttls_data *data = priv;
|
|
|
|
return tls_connection_established(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) &&
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_success;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void eap_ttls_deinit_for_reauth(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct eap_ttls_data *data = priv;
|
2017-02-10 17:55:26 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (data->phase2_priv && data->phase2_method &&
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_method->deinit_for_reauth)
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_method->deinit_for_reauth(sm, data->phase2_priv);
|
2019-02-05 19:26:50 +01:00
|
|
|
wpabuf_clear_free(data->pending_phase2_req);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
data->pending_phase2_req = NULL;
|
2019-02-05 19:26:50 +01:00
|
|
|
wpabuf_clear_free(data->pending_resp);
|
EAP peer: External server certificate chain validation
This adds support for optional functionality to validate server
certificate chain in TLS-based EAP methods in an external program.
wpa_supplicant control interface is used to indicate when such
validation is needed and what the result of the external validation is.
This external validation can extend or replace the internal validation.
When ca_cert or ca_path parameter is set, the internal validation is
used. If these parameters are omitted, only the external validation is
used. It needs to be understood that leaving those parameters out will
disable most of the validation steps done with the TLS library and that
configuration is not really recommend.
By default, the external validation is not used. It can be enabled by
addingtls_ext_cert_check=1 into the network profile phase1 parameter.
When enabled, external validation is required through the CTRL-REQ/RSP
mechanism similarly to other EAP authentication parameters through the
control interface.
The request to perform external validation is indicated by the following
event:
CTRL-REQ-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:External server certificate validation needed for SSID <ssid>
Before that event, the server certificate chain is provided with the
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT events that include the cert=<hexdump>
parameter. depth=# indicates which certificate is in question (0 for the
server certificate, 1 for its issues, and so on).
The result of the external validation is provided with the following
command:
CTRL-RSP-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:<good|bad>
It should be noted that this is currently enabled only for OpenSSL (and
BoringSSL/LibreSSL). Due to the constraints in the library API, the
validation result from external processing cannot be reported cleanly
with TLS alert. In other words, if the external validation reject the
server certificate chain, the pending TLS handshake is terminated
without sending more messages to the server.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2015-12-12 17:16:54 +01:00
|
|
|
data->pending_resp = NULL;
|
2016-01-15 12:37:15 +01:00
|
|
|
data->decision_succ = DECISION_FAIL;
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
#ifdef EAP_TNC
|
|
|
|
data->ready_for_tnc = 0;
|
|
|
|
data->tnc_started = 0;
|
|
|
|
#endif /* EAP_TNC */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void * eap_ttls_init_for_reauth(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct eap_ttls_data *data = priv;
|
2014-06-29 20:16:30 +02:00
|
|
|
eap_ttls_free_key(data);
|
2013-02-06 17:52:33 +01:00
|
|
|
os_free(data->session_id);
|
|
|
|
data->session_id = NULL;
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
if (eap_peer_tls_reauth_init(sm, &data->ssl)) {
|
|
|
|
os_free(data);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (data->phase2_priv && data->phase2_method &&
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_method->init_for_reauth)
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_method->init_for_reauth(sm, data->phase2_priv);
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_start = 0;
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_success = 0;
|
|
|
|
data->resuming = 1;
|
|
|
|
data->reauth = 1;
|
|
|
|
return priv;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int eap_ttls_get_status(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, char *buf,
|
|
|
|
size_t buflen, int verbose)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct eap_ttls_data *data = priv;
|
|
|
|
int len, ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
len = eap_peer_tls_status(sm, &data->ssl, buf, buflen, verbose);
|
|
|
|
ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len,
|
|
|
|
"EAP-TTLSv%d Phase2 method=",
|
|
|
|
data->ttls_version);
|
Check os_snprintf() result more consistently - automatic 1
This converts os_snprintf() result validation cases to use
os_snprintf_error() where the exact rule used in os_snprintf_error() was
used. These changes were done automatically with spatch using the
following semantic patch:
@@
identifier E1;
expression E2,E3,E4,E5,E6;
statement S1;
@@
(
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
|
int E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
|
if (E5)
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
else
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
|
if (E5)
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
else if (E6)
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
else
E1 = 0;
|
if (E5) {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
} else {
...
return -1;
}
|
if (E5) {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
} else if (E6) {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
} else {
...
return -1;
}
|
if (E5) {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
} else {
...
E1 = os_snprintf(E2, E3, ...);
}
)
? os_free(E4);
- if (E1 < 0 || \( E1 >= E3 \| (size_t) E1 >= E3 \| (unsigned int) E1 >= E3 \| E1 >= (int) E3 \))
+ if (os_snprintf_error(E3, E1))
(
S1
|
{ ... }
)
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2014-12-08 10:15:51 +01:00
|
|
|
if (os_snprintf_error(buflen - len, ret))
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
return len;
|
|
|
|
len += ret;
|
|
|
|
switch (data->phase2_type) {
|
|
|
|
case EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_EAP:
|
|
|
|
ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len, "EAP-%s\n",
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_method ?
|
|
|
|
data->phase2_method->name : "?");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_MSCHAPV2:
|
|
|
|
ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len, "MSCHAPV2\n");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_MSCHAP:
|
|
|
|
ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len, "MSCHAP\n");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_PAP:
|
|
|
|
ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len, "PAP\n");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case EAP_TTLS_PHASE2_CHAP:
|
|
|
|
ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len, "CHAP\n");
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-12-07 11:52:59 +01:00
|
|
|
if (os_snprintf_error(buflen - len, ret))
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
return len;
|
|
|
|
len += ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return len;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static Boolean eap_ttls_isKeyAvailable(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct eap_ttls_data *data = priv;
|
|
|
|
return data->key_data != NULL && data->phase2_success;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static u8 * eap_ttls_getKey(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, size_t *len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct eap_ttls_data *data = priv;
|
|
|
|
u8 *key;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (data->key_data == NULL || !data->phase2_success)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-07 10:17:23 +01:00
|
|
|
key = os_memdup(data->key_data, EAP_TLS_KEY_LEN);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
if (key == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*len = EAP_TLS_KEY_LEN;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return key;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2013-02-06 17:52:33 +01:00
|
|
|
static u8 * eap_ttls_get_session_id(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, size_t *len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct eap_ttls_data *data = priv;
|
|
|
|
u8 *id;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (data->session_id == NULL || !data->phase2_success)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-07 10:17:23 +01:00
|
|
|
id = os_memdup(data->session_id, data->id_len);
|
2013-02-06 17:52:33 +01:00
|
|
|
if (id == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*len = data->id_len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return id;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-01 00:27:01 +01:00
|
|
|
static u8 * eap_ttls_get_emsk(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, size_t *len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct eap_ttls_data *data = priv;
|
|
|
|
u8 *key;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (data->key_data == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-07 10:17:23 +01:00
|
|
|
key = os_memdup(data->key_data + EAP_TLS_KEY_LEN, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
|
2014-12-01 00:27:01 +01:00
|
|
|
if (key == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*len = EAP_EMSK_LEN;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return key;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
int eap_peer_ttls_register(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct eap_method *eap;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
eap = eap_peer_method_alloc(EAP_PEER_METHOD_INTERFACE_VERSION,
|
|
|
|
EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_TTLS, "TTLS");
|
|
|
|
if (eap == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
eap->init = eap_ttls_init;
|
|
|
|
eap->deinit = eap_ttls_deinit;
|
|
|
|
eap->process = eap_ttls_process;
|
|
|
|
eap->isKeyAvailable = eap_ttls_isKeyAvailable;
|
|
|
|
eap->getKey = eap_ttls_getKey;
|
2013-02-06 17:52:33 +01:00
|
|
|
eap->getSessionId = eap_ttls_get_session_id;
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
eap->get_status = eap_ttls_get_status;
|
|
|
|
eap->has_reauth_data = eap_ttls_has_reauth_data;
|
|
|
|
eap->deinit_for_reauth = eap_ttls_deinit_for_reauth;
|
|
|
|
eap->init_for_reauth = eap_ttls_init_for_reauth;
|
2014-12-01 00:27:01 +01:00
|
|
|
eap->get_emsk = eap_ttls_get_emsk;
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-01-13 22:25:54 +01:00
|
|
|
return eap_peer_method_register(eap);
|
2008-02-28 02:34:43 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|