Allow an additional context value to be passed to TLS exporter as
specified in RFC 5705 section 4.
This does not yet implement it for the internal TLS implementation.
However, as currently nothing uses context yet, this will not break
anything right now. WolfSSL maintainers also stated that they are not
going to add context support yet, but would look into it if/when this is
required by a published draft or a standard.
Signed-off-by: Ervin Oro <ervin.oro@aalto.fi>
These buffers in TLS-based EAP methods might contain keys or password
(e.g., when using TTLS-PAP or PEAP-GTC), so clear them explicitly to
avoid leaving such material into heap memory unnecessarily.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
This leads to cleaner code overall, and also reduces the size
of the hostapd and wpa_supplicant binaries (in hwsim test build
on x86_64) by about 2.5 and 3.5KiB respectively.
The mechanical conversions all over the code were done with
the following spatch:
@@
expression SIZE, SRC;
expression a;
@@
-a = os_malloc(SIZE);
+a = os_memdup(SRC, SIZE);
<...
if (!a) {...}
...>
-os_memcpy(a, SRC, SIZE);
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
EAP-TTLS/PEAP/FAST were previously doing this for init_for_reauth(), but
not for deinit_for_reauth(). Add the deinit_for_reauth() call as well to
cover cases like EAP-AKA cleaup of AT_CHECKCODE data.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Add an internal flag which indicates to tunneled EAP methods (FAST,
PEAP, TTLS) that they should cache decrypted EAP-SIM/AKA/AKA' requests.
This allows EAP-SIM/AKA/AKA' to be tunneled within these outer methods
while using an external SIM authenticator over the control interface.
Signed-off-by: Paul Stewart <pstew@google.com>
If the final Phase 2 message needed fragmentation, EAP method decision
was cleared from UNCOND_SUCC or COND_SUCC to FAIL and that resulted in
the authentication failing when the EAP-Success message from the server
got rejected. Fix this by restoring the EAP method decision after
fragmentation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Free the allocated structure in error cases to remove need for each EAP
method to handle the error cases separately. Each registration function
can simply do "return eap_peer_method_register(eap);" in the end of the
function.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This patch fixes an issue with an invalid phase2 parameter value
auth=MSCHAPv2 getting interpreted as auth=MSCHAP (v1) which could
degrade security (though, only within a protected TLS tunnel). Now when
invalid or unsupported auth= phase2 parameter combinations are
specified, EAP-TTLS initialization throws an error instead of silently
doing something.
More then one auth= phase2 type cannot be specified and also both auth= and
autheap= options cannot be specified.
Parsing phase2 type is case sensitive (as in other EAP parts), so phase2
parameter auth=MSCHAPv2 is invalid. Only auth=MSCHAPV2 is correct.
Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár <pali.rohar@gmail.com>
[Use cstr_token() to get rid of unnecessary allocation; cleanup]
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds support for optional functionality to validate server
certificate chain in TLS-based EAP methods in an external program.
wpa_supplicant control interface is used to indicate when such
validation is needed and what the result of the external validation is.
This external validation can extend or replace the internal validation.
When ca_cert or ca_path parameter is set, the internal validation is
used. If these parameters are omitted, only the external validation is
used. It needs to be understood that leaving those parameters out will
disable most of the validation steps done with the TLS library and that
configuration is not really recommend.
By default, the external validation is not used. It can be enabled by
addingtls_ext_cert_check=1 into the network profile phase1 parameter.
When enabled, external validation is required through the CTRL-REQ/RSP
mechanism similarly to other EAP authentication parameters through the
control interface.
The request to perform external validation is indicated by the following
event:
CTRL-REQ-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:External server certificate validation needed for SSID <ssid>
Before that event, the server certificate chain is provided with the
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT events that include the cert=<hexdump>
parameter. depth=# indicates which certificate is in question (0 for the
server certificate, 1 for its issues, and so on).
The result of the external validation is provided with the following
command:
CTRL-RSP-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:<good|bad>
It should be noted that this is currently enabled only for OpenSSL (and
BoringSSL/LibreSSL). Due to the constraints in the library API, the
validation result from external processing cannot be reported cleanly
with TLS alert. In other words, if the external validation reject the
server certificate chain, the pending TLS handshake is terminated
without sending more messages to the server.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
FIPS builds do not include support for MD4/MD5, so disable
EAP-TTLS/CHAP, MSCHAP, and MSCHAPV2 when CONFIG_FIPS=y is used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
EAP-TLS was already doing this, but the other TLS-based EAP methods did
not mark methodState DONE and decision FAIL on local TLS processing
errors (instead, they left the connection waiting for a longer timeout).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The EAP-TLS-based helper functions can easily use struct wpabuf in more
places, so continue cleanup in that direction by replacing separate
pointer and length arguments with a single struct wpabuf argument.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This converts os_snprintf() result validation cases to use
os_snprintf_error() for cases that were note covered by spatch and
semantic patches.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
FreeRADIUS releases before 1.1.4 did not send MS-CHAP2-Success in
EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPv2. A wpa_supplicant workaround for that was added in
2005 and it has been enabled by default to avoid interoperability
issues. This could be disabled with all other EAP workarounds
(eap_workaround=0). However, that will disable some workarounds that are
still needed with number of authentication servers.
Old FreeRADIUS versions should not be in use anymore, so it makes sense
to remove this EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPv2 workaround completely to get more
complete validation of server behavior. This allows MSCHAPv2 to verify
that the server knows the password instead of relying only on the TLS
certificate validation.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@google.com>
Reduce the amount of time keying material (MSK, EMSK, temporary private
data) remains in memory in EAP methods. This provides additional
protection should there be any issues that could expose process memory
to external observers.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds a new getSessionId() callback for EAP peer methods to allow
EAP Session-Id to be derived. This commits implements this for EAP-FAST,
EAP-GPSK, EAP-IKEv2, EAP-PEAP, EAP-TLS, and EAP-TTLS.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Some deployed authentication servers seem to be unable to handle the TLS
Session Ticket extension (they are supposed to ignore unrecognized TLS
extensions, but end up rejecting the ClientHello instead). As a
workaround, disable use of TLS Sesson Ticket extension for EAP-TLS,
EAP-PEAP, and EAP-TTLS (EAP-FAST uses session ticket, so any server that
supports EAP-FAST does not need this workaround).
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Previously, CONFIG_EAP_MSCHAPV2=y was assumed to be set for
CONFIG_EAP_TTLS=y. Avoid this dependency by making including the
MSCHAPv2 parts in EAP-TTLS conditionally.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Commit 30680e9332 changed the length
of the implicit challenge result to match with the exact length used
in TTLS. However, it failed to update the peer_challenge generation
to use a separate random value. Previously, this was generated as
part of the implicit challenge, but more correct way would have been
to generate a random value for it separately. Do this now to fix the
read after the allocated buffer (16 bytes after the implicit
challenge).
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
intended-for: hostap-1
Special processing is needed to handle EAP user request for
identity or password at the beginning of Phase 2 when the implicit
identity request is used. data->pending_phase2_req needs to be set
to an empty buffer in that case to avoid re-processing the previous
part of TLS negotiation when the user enters the needed information.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
These protocols seem to be abandoned: latest IETF drafts have expired
years ago and it does not seem likely that EAP-TTLSv1 would be
deployed. The implementation in hostapd/wpa_supplicant was not complete
and not fully tested. In addition, the TLS/IA functionality was only
available when GnuTLS was used. Since GnuTLS removed this functionality
in 3.0.0, there is no available TLS/IA implementation in the latest
version of any supported TLS library.
Remove the EAP-TTLSv1 and TLS/IA implementation to clean up unwanted
complexity from hostapd and wpa_supplicant. In addition, this removes
any potential use of the GnuTLS extra library.
The size_t value here can be 64-bit and result in implicit sign
extension. In this particular case, that gets masked out by
host_to_be32(), so there is no practical difference, but it is better
to get rid of the 64-bit variable explicitly.
The password in User-Password AVP is padded to a multiple of 16 bytes
on EAP-TTLS/PAP. But when the password length is zero, no padding is
added. It doesn't cause connectivity issue. In fact, I could connect
with hostapd RADIUS server with zero length password.
I think it's better for obfuscation to pad the 16 bytes data when the
password length is zero with this patch.
In addition, start ordering header file includes to be in more
consistent order: system header files, src/utils, src/*, same
directory as the *.c file.
Changed peer to derive the full key (both MS-MPPE-Recv-Key and
MS-MPPE-Send-Key for total of 32 octets) to match with server
implementation.
Swapped the order of MPPE keys in MSK derivation since server
MS-MPPE-Recv-Key | MS-MPPE-Send-Key matches with the order specified for
EAP-TLS MSK derivation. This means that PEAPv0 cryptobinding is now
using EAP-MSCHAPv2 MSK as-is for ISK while EAP-FAST will need to swap
the order of the MPPE keys to get ISK in a way that interoperates with
Cisco EAP-FAST implementation.
The previous version was deriving unnecessarily large amount of output data
for the implicit challenge. With the TLS PRF, this was not causing any
problems because the output length is not explicitly bound into the
derivation. Anyway, it is better to use the correct output length should
the PRF be ever changed to a one that uses the output length to change the
beginning of the output data.
Need to process EAP AVP after the non-EAP Phase 2 method. In addition,
EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPv2 needs special code for handling the starting of TNC after
extra roundtrip of MSCHAPv2 success message.