The new wpa_supplicant control interface commands FILS_HLP_REQ_FLUSH and
FILS_HLP_REQ_ADD can now be used to request FILS HLP requests to be
added to the (Re)Association Request frame whenever FILS authentication
is used.
FILS_HLP_REQ_ADD parameters use the following format:
<destination MAC address> <hexdump of payload starting from ethertype>
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This adds helper functions for deriving PMK and PMKID from ERP exchange
in FILS shared key authentication as defined in IEEE Std 802.11ai-2016,
12.12.2.5.2 (PMKSA key derivation with FILS authentication). These
functions is used to fix PMK and PMKID derivation which were previously
using the rMSK directly as PMK instead of following the FILS protocol to
derive PMK with HMAC from nonces and rMSK.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Commit c93b7e1888 ('RSN: Check result of
EAPOL-Key frame send request') forgot to update two PeerKey users of
EAPOL-Key TX functions. That resulted in STK handshake failing since
message 2/4 and 4/4 TX calls were assumed to have failed when the return
value was changed from 0 to a positive value for success case. This
resulted in not updating nonce information properly and hitting
following error when processing STK 4-way handshake message 3/4:
RSN: INonce from message 1 of STK 4-Way Handshake differs from 3 of STK
4-Way Handshake - drop packet (src=<addr>)
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Commit 6d014ffc6e ('Make struct
wpa_eapol_key easier to use with variable length MIC') forgot to update
number of EAPOL-Key processing steps for SMK and STK exchanges and broke
PeerKey. Fix this by updating the Key Data field pointers to match the
new style with variable length Key MIC field.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds new wpa_supplicant control interface commands PMKSA_GET and
PMKSA_ADD that can be used to store PMKSA cache entries in an external
persistent storage when terminating a wpa_supplicant process and then
restore those entries when starting a new process. The previously added
PMKSA-CACHE-ADDED/REMOVED events can be used to help in synchronizing
the external storage with the memory-only volatile storage within
wpa_supplicant.
"PMKSA_GET <network_id>" fetches all stored PMKSA cache entries bound to
a specific network profile. The network_id of the current profile is
available with the STATUS command (id=<network_id). In addition, the
network_id is included in the PMKSA-CACHE-ADDED/REMOVED events. The
output of the PMKSA_GET command uses the following format:
<BSSID> <PMKID> <PMK> <reauth_time in seconds> <expiration in seconds>
<akmp> <opportunistic>
For example:
02:00:00:00:03:00 113b8b5dc8eda16594e8274df4caa3d4 355e98681d09e0b69d3a342f96998aa765d10c4459ac592459b5efc6b563eff6 30240 43200 1 0
02:00:00:00:04:00 bbdac8607aaaac28e16aacc9152ffe23 e3dd6adc390e685985e5f40e6fe72df846a0acadc59ba15c208d9cb41732a663 30240 43200 1 0
The PMKSA_GET command uses the following format:
<network_id> <BSSID> <PMKID> <PMK> <reauth_time in seconds> <expiration
in seconds> <akmp> <opportunistic>
(i.e., "PMKSA_ADD <network_id> " prefix followed by a line of PMKSA_GET
output data; however, the reauth_time and expiration values need to be
updated by decrementing them by number of seconds between the PMKSA_GET
and PMKSA_ADD commands)
For example:
PMKSA_ADD 0 02:00:00:00:03:00 113b8b5dc8eda16594e8274df4caa3d4 355e98681d09e0b69d3a342f96998aa765d10c4459ac592459b5efc6b563eff6 30140 43100 1 0
PMKSA_ADD 0 02:00:00:00:04:00 bbdac8607aaaac28e16aacc9152ffe23 e3dd6adc390e685985e5f40e6fe72df846a0acadc59ba15c208d9cb41732a663 30140 43100 1 0
This functionality is disabled be default and can be enabled with
CONFIG_PMKSA_CACHE_EXTERNAL=y build configuration option. It should be
noted that this allows any process that has access to the wpa_supplicant
control interface to use PMKSA_ADD command to fetch keying material
(PMK), so this is for environments in which the control interface access
is restricted.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
These allow external program to monitor PMKSA cache updates in
preparation to enable external persistent storage of PMKSA cache.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
ext_capab/ext_capab_len do not include ID and Length so no extra +2
offset should be used. This fixes a regression from commit
faf427645a ('TDLS: Use proper IE parsing
routine for non-EAPOL-Key cases') that replaced the IE parser without
noticing the difference in the pointer offset.
Signed-off-by: Flavia Vanetti <flavia.vanetti@ceva-dsp.com>
Decrypt the AES-SIV protected elements and verify Key-Auth. Parse and
configure keys to the driver.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
If a PMKSA cache entry for the target AP is available, try to use FILS
with PMKSA caching.
If an ERP key for the target AP is available, try to use FILS with
EAP-Initiate/Re-auth added as Wrapper Data element.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This changes 4-way handshake authenticator processing to decrypt the
EAPOL-Key frames using an AEAD cipher (AES-SIV with FILS AKMs) before
processing the Key Data field. This replaces Key MIC validation for the
cases where AEAD cipher is used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This modifies wpa_eapol_key_send() to use AEAD cipher (AES-SIV for FILS
AKMs) to provide both integrity protection for the EAPOL-Key frame and
encryption for the Key Data field. It should be noted that this starts
encrypting the Key Data field in EAPOL-Key message 2/4 while it remains
unencrypted (but integrity protected) in non-FILS cases. Similarly, the
empty Key Data field in EAPOL-Key message 4/4 gets encrypted for AEAD
cases.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This will be needed to be able to implement AEAD cipher support from
FILS that will need to use KEK to protect the frame.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Suite B 192-bit addition from IEEE Std 802.11ac-2013 replaced the
previous fixed length Key MIC field with a variable length field. That
change was addressed with an addition of a new struct defined for the
second MIC length. This is not really scalable and with FILS coming up
with a zero-length MIC case for AEAD, a more thorough change to support
variable length MIC is needed.
Remove the Key MIC and Key Data Length fields from the struct
wpa_eapol_key and find their location based on the MIC length
information (which is determined by the AKMP). This change allows the
separate struct wpa_eapol_key_192 to be removed since struct
wpa_eapol_key will now include only the fixed length fields that are
shared with all EAPOL-Key cases in IEEE Std 802.11.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The Secure bit in the Key Information field of EAPOL-Key frames is
supposed to be set to 1 when there is a security association. This was
done for other frames, but not for the EAPOL-Key Request frame where
supplicant is requesting a new PTK to be derived (either due to Michael
MIC failure report Error=1 or for other reasons with Error=0). In
practice, EAPOL-Key Request frame is only sent when there is a PTK in
place, so all such frames should have Secure=1.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The SAE PMKID is calculated with IEEE Std 802.11-2012 11.3.5.4, but the
PMKID was re-calculated with 11.6.1.3 and saved into PMKSA cache. Fix
this to save the PMKID calculated with 11.3.5.4 into the PMKSA cache.
Signed-off-by: Masashi Honma <masashi.honma@gmail.com>
Ciuple of the nonce comparisons used a strange '!os_memcmp() == 0' to
check if the values were different. While this resulted in correct
behavior, the construction is not exactly clear and clang has started
warning about this (-Wlogical-not-parentheses). Clean this up by using
'os_mecmp() != 0'.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The PMKSA caching and RSN pre-authentication components were marked as
conditional on IEEE8021X_EAPOL. However, the empty wrappers are needed
also in a case IEEE8021X_EAPOL is defined with CONFIG_NO_WPA.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This message is sent at MSG_INFO level and it is supposed to go out even
even debug messages were to be removed from the build. As such, use
wpa_msg() instead of wpa_dbg() for it.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
When AES-WRAP was used to protect the EAPOL-Key Key Data field, this was
decrypted using a temporary heap buffer with aes_unwrap(). That buffer
was not explicitly cleared, so it was possible for the group keys to
remain in memory unnecessarily until the allocated area was reused.
Clean this up by clearing the temporary allocation explicitly before
freeing it.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The Setup Response timer is relatively fast (500 ms) and there are
instances where it fires on the responder side after the initiator has
already sent out the TDLS Setup Confirm frame. Prevent the processing of
this stale TDLS Setup Response frame on the initiator side.
Signed-off-by: Arik Nemtsov <arikx.nemtsov@intel.com>
wpa_insert_pmkid() did not support cases where the original RSN IE
included any PMKIDs. That case can happen when PTK rekeying through
4-way handshake is used after FT protocol run. Such a 4-way handshake
used to fail with wpa_supplicant being unable to build the EAPOL-Key msg
2/4.
Fix this by extending wpa_insert_pmkid() to support removal of the old
PMKIDs, if needed.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The new wpa_supplicant control interface command "TEST_ASSOC_IE
<hexdump>" can now be used to override the WPA/RSN IE for Association
Request frame and following 4-way handshake to allow protocol testing of
AP side processing of WPA/RSN IE.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Number of places were calling functions that are not included in
CONFIG_NO_WPA=y build anymore. Comment out such calls. In addition, pull
in SHA1 and MD5 for config_internal.c, if needed.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
wpa_sm_key_mgmt_set_pmk() was checking for proactive_key_caching to be
enabled before setting the PMK to the driver. This check is not required
and would mandate configuration setting of okc or proactive_key_caching
for cases which were not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Amarnath Hullur Subramanyam <amarnath@qca.qualcomm.com>
Some APs may send RSC octets in EAPOL-Key message 3 of 4-Way Handshake
or in EAPOL-Key message 1 of Group Key Handshake in the opposite byte
order (or by some other corrupted way). Thus, after a successful
EAPOL-Key exchange the TSC values of received multicast packets, such as
DHCP, don't match the RSC one and as a result these packets are dropped
on replay attack TSC verification. An example of such AP is Sapido
RB-1732.
Work around this by setting RSC octets to 0 on GTK installation if the
AP RSC value is identified as a potentially having the byte order issue.
This may open a short window during which older (but valid)
group-addressed frames could be replayed. However, the local receive
counter will be updated on the first received group-addressed frame and
the workaround is enabled only if the common invalid cases are detected,
so this workaround is acceptable as not decreasing security
significantly. The wpa_rsc_relaxation global configuration property
allows the GTK RSC workaround to be disabled if it's not needed.
Signed-off-by: Max Stepanov <Max.Stepanov@intel.com>
Provide information on whether EAPOL-Key frame was sent successfully to
kernel for transmittion. wpa_eapol_key_send() will return
>= 0 on success and < 0 on failure. After receiving EAPOL-Key msg 3/4,
wpa_supplicant sends EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 and shows CTRL-EVENT-CONNECTED
only after verifying that the msg 4/4 was sent to kernel for
transmission successfully.
Signed-off-by: Avichal Agarwal <avichal.a@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Kyeong-Chae Lim <kcya.lim@samsung.com>
There is no point in sending TPK M3 (TDLS Setup Confirm) with a failure
status if the first transmission attempt fails. Instead, just return a
failure by disabling the link rather than retransmitting the TPK M3
frame with an error status.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Reorder terms in a way that no invalid pointers are generated with
pos+len operations. end-pos is always defined (with a valid pos pointer)
while pos+len could end up pointing beyond the end pointer which would
be undefined behavior.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
On TPK lifetime expiration, tear down the direct link before renewing
the link in the case of TDLS initiator processing. The expired key
cannot be used anymore, so it is better to explicitly tear down the old
link first.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
In addition to the PTK length increasing, the length of the PMK was
increased (from 256 to 384 bits) for the 00-0f-ac:12 AKM. This part was
missing from the initial implementation and a fixed length (256-bit) PMK
was used for all AKMs.
Fix this by adding more complete support for variable length PMK and use
384 bits from MSK instead of 256 bits when using this AKM. This is not
backwards compatible with the earlier implementations.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Commit 7d711541dc ('Clear TK part of PTK
after driver key configuration') started clearing TK from memory
immediately after having configured it to the driver when processing
EAPOL-Key message 3/4. While this covered the most common case, it did
not take into account the possibility of the authenticator having to
retry EAPOL-Key message 3/4 in case the first EAPOL-Key message 4/4
response is lost. That case ended up trying to reinstall the same TK to
the driver, but the key was not available anymore.
Fix the EAPOL-Key message 3/4 retry case by configuring TK to the driver
only once. There was no need to try to set the same key after each
EAPOL-Key message 3/4 since TK could not change. If actual PTK rekeying
is used, the new TK will be configured once when processing the new
EAPOL-Key message 3/4 for the first time.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The GTK value received in RSN (WPA2) group rekeying did not use the
wpa_hexdump_key() version of debug printing that is conditional on -K
being included on the command line.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
wpa_supplicant_parse_ies() was never supposed to be used as a generic IE
parser, i.e., it is for the specific purpose of parsing EAPOL-Key Key
Data IEs and KDEs. TDLS used this function for parsing generic AP IEs
and while that works, it resulted in confusing "WPA: Unrecognized
EAPOL-Key Key Data IE" debug messages. Clean this up by using
ieee802_11_parse_elems() for the cases where generic IEs are being
parsed.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new CONFIG_NO_RC4=y build option can be used to remove all internal
hostapd and wpa_supplicant uses of RC4. It should be noted that external
uses (e.g., within a TLS library) do not get disabled when doing this.
This removes capability of supporting WPA/TKIP, dynamic WEP keys with
IEEE 802.1X, WEP shared key authentication, and MSCHAPv2 password
changes.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If WPA2-Enterprise connection with full EAP authentication (i.e., no
PMKSA caching used) results in a PMKID that does not match the one the
AP/Authenticator indicates in EAPOL-Key msg 1/4, there is not much point
in trying to trigger full EAP authentication by sending EAPOL-Start
since this sequence was immediately after such full authentication
attempt.
There are known examples of authentication servers with incorrect MSK
derivation when TLS v1.2 is used (e.g., FreeRADIUS 2.2.6 or 3.0.7 when
built with OpenSSL 1.0.2). Write a clear debug log entry and also send
it to control interface monitors when it looks likely that this case has
been hit. After doing that, stop the connection attempt by
disassociating instead of trying to send out EAPOL-Start to trigger new
EAP authentication round (such another try can be tried with a new
association).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The FT-specific check for valid group cipher in wpa_ft_gen_req_ies() was
not up-to-date with the current list of supported ciphers. Fix this by
using a generic function to determine validity of the cipher. In
practice, this adds support for using CCMP-256 and GCMP-256 as the group
cipher with FT.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Check the element length in the parser and remove the length field from
struct ieee802_11_elems since the element is of fixed length.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Check the element length in the parser and remove the length field from
struct ieee802_11_elems since the element is of fixed length.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
All the existing users of these elements were already validating the
element length. However, it is clearer to validate this already at the
parser for extra layer of protection for any future changes.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
