This was not really a real issue since bin_clear_free() would not use
the emsk_len argument when emsk is NULL as it would be on the path where
emsk_len has not been initilized. Anyway, it is better to get rid of the
warning.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Derive rRK and rIK on EAP peer if ERP is enabled. The new wpa_supplicant
network configuration parameter erp=1 can now be used to configure the
EAP peer to derive EMSK, rRK, and rIK at the successful completion of an
EAP authentication method. This functionality is not included in the
default build and can be enabled with CONFIG_ERP=y.
If EAP authenticator indicates support for re-authentication protocol,
initiate this with EAP-Initiate/Re-auth and complete protocol when
receiving EAP-Finish/Re-auth.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds EAP-PAX server and peer method functions for deriving
Session-Id from Method-Id per RFC 4746 and RFC 5247.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The comment about library not supporting Session-Id derivation was not
accurate and there is no need to check for master key that is not used
as part of derivation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Previously, this was implicitly limited by the 16-bit length field to
65535. This resulted in unhelpful static analyzer warnings (CID 62868).
Add an explicit (but pretty arbitrary) limit of 50000 bytes to avoid
this. The actual WSC messages are significantly shorter in practice, but
there is no specific protocol limit, so 50000 is as good as any limit to
use here.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Some static analyzers seem to have issues understanding "pos +
proposal_len > end" style validation, so convert this to "proposal_len >
end - pos" to make this more obvious to be bounds checking for
proposal_len. (CID 62874)
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Some static analyzers seem to have issues with "pos + len > end"
validation (CID 62875), so convert this to "len > end - pos" to make it
more obvious that len is validated against its bounds.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This was too difficult for some static analyzers (CID 62876). In
addition, the pac_info_len assignment should really have explicitly
validated that there is room for the two octet length field instead of
trusting the following validation step to handle both this and the
actual pac_info_len bounds checking.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This gets registered in tls_openssl.c from tls_init(), so there is no
need for EAP-pwd implementation to register explicitly. This avoids some
corner cases where OpenSSL resources do not get fully freed on exit.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new openssl_cipher configuration parameter can be used to select
which TLS cipher suites are enabled for TLS-based EAP methods when
OpenSSL is used as the TLS library. This parameter can be used both as a
global parameter to set the default for all network blocks and as a
network block parameter to override the default for each network
profile.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This forces EAP peer implementation to drop any possible fast resumption
data if the network block for the current connection is not the same as
the one used for the previous one. This allows different network blocks
to be used with non-matching parameters to enforce different rules even
if the same authentication server is used. For example, this allows
different CA trust rules to be enforced with different ca_cert
parameters which can prevent EAP-TTLS Phase 2 from being used based on
TLS session resumption.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Use an explicit memset call to clear any configuration parameter and
dynamic data that contains private information like keys or identity.
This brings in an additional layer of protection by reducing the length
of time this type of private data is kept in memory.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the EAP-pwd server and peer implementations more robust
should OpenSSL fail to derive random number for some reason. While this
is unlikely to happen in practice, the implementation better be prepared
for this should something unexpected ever happen. See
http://jbp.io/2014/01/16/openssl-rand-api/#review-of-randbytes-callers
for more details.
Signed-off-by: Florent Daigniere <nextgens@freenetproject.org>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Florent Daigniere <nextgens@freenetproject.org>
This changes OpenSSL calls to explicitly clear the EC_POINT memory
allocations when freeing them. This adds an extra layer of security by
avoiding leaving potentially private keys into local memory after they
are not needed anymore. While some of these variables are not really
private (e.g., they are sent in clear anyway), the extra cost of
clearing them is not significant and it is simpler to just clear these
explicitly rather than review each possible code path to confirm where
this does not help.
Signed-off-by: Florent Daigniere <nextgens@freenetproject.org>
This changes OpenSSL calls to explicitly clear the bignum memory
allocations when freeing them. This adds an extra layer of security by
avoiding leaving potentially private keys into local memory after they
are not needed anymore. While some of these variables are not really
private (e.g., they are sent in clear anyway), the extra cost of
clearing them is not significant and it is simpler to just clear these
explicitly rather than review each possible code path to confirm where
this does not help.
Signed-off-by: Florent Daigniere <nextgens@freenetproject.org>
FreeRADIUS releases before 1.1.4 did not send MS-CHAP2-Success in
EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPv2. A wpa_supplicant workaround for that was added in
2005 and it has been enabled by default to avoid interoperability
issues. This could be disabled with all other EAP workarounds
(eap_workaround=0). However, that will disable some workarounds that are
still needed with number of authentication servers.
Old FreeRADIUS versions should not be in use anymore, so it makes sense
to remove this EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPv2 workaround completely to get more
complete validation of server behavior. This allows MSCHAPv2 to verify
that the server knows the password instead of relying only on the TLS
certificate validation.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@google.com>
Reduce the amount of time keying material (MSK, EMSK, temporary private
data) remains in memory in EAP methods. This provides additional
protection should there be any issues that could expose process memory
to external observers.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Use an explicit memset call to clear any wpa_supplicant configuration
parameter that contains private information like keys or identity. This
brings in an additional layer of protection by reducing the length of
time this type of private data is kept in memory.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The pos pointer is not used after this now nor in future plans, so no
need to increment the value. This remove a static analyzer warning about
dead increment.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Instead of using implicit limit based on 16-bit unsigned integer having
a maximum value of 65535, limit the maximum length of a fragmented
EAP-pwd message explicitly to 15000 bytes. None of the supported groups
use longer messages, so it is fine to reject any longer message without
even trying to reassemble it. This will hopefully also help in reducing
false warnings from static analyzers (CID 68124).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes it easier for static analyzers to figure out which code paths
are possible within eap_sim_msg_finish() for EAP-SIM. This will
hopefully avoid some false warnings (CID 68110, CID 68113, CID 68114).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Use a local variable and size_t in length comparison to make this easier
for static analyzers to understand. In addition, set the return list and
list_len values at the end of the function, i.e., only in success case.
These do not change the actual behavior of the only caller for this
function, but clarifies what the helper function is doing.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Use size_t instead of int for storing and comparing the TLV length
against the remaining buffer length to make this easier for static
analyzers to understand.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
These error messages had an incorrect frame name (likely copy-pasted
from the commit message handler) and couple of typos.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
While the hash functions would be very unlikely to fail in practice,
they do have option of returning an error. Check that return value more
consistently.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Since there is a limit on the EAP exchange due to maximum number of
roundtrips, there is no point in allowing excessively large buffers to
be allocated based on what the peer device claims the total message to
be. Instead, reject the message if it would not be possible to receive
it in full anyway.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
In tncc_read_config(), the memory allocted for the config
did not get freed if an error occured.
Signed-off-by: Philippe De Swert <philippe.deswert@jollamobile.com>
It does not look like there is going to be any additional use for this
old build option that could be used to build the EAP-IKEv2 peer
implementation in a way that interoperates with the eap-ikev2.ccns.pl
project. Remove the workarounds that matches incorrect implementation in
that project to clean up implementation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This is for enabling easier testing of TNCS/TNCC functionality as part
of the test scripts without having to use the fixed /etc/tnc_config
location that could be used by the main system and would require changes
within /etc.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
RFC 5106 is not exactly clear on the requirements for the "no data"
packet that is used to acknowledge a fragmented message. Allow it to be
processed without the integrity checksum data field since it is possible
to interpret the RFC as this not being included. This fixes reassembly
of fragmented frames after keys have been derived.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If invalid group was negotiated, compute_password_element() left some of
the data->grp pointer uninitialized and this could result in
segmentation fault when deinitializing the EAP method. Fix this by
explicitly clearing all the pointer with eap_zalloc(). In addition,
speed up EAP failure reporting in this type of error case by indicating
that the EAP method execution cannot continue anymore on the peer side
instead of waiting for a timeout.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The extra data (nonce_s) used in this message was pointing to the
parsed, decrypted data and that buffer was previously freed just before
building the new message. This resulted in use of freed data and
possibly incorrect extra data value that caused the authentication
attempt to fail. Fix this by reordering the code to free the decrypted
data only after the new message has been generated. This was already the
case for EAP-AKA/AKA', but somehow missing from EAP-SIM.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This allows the specific SIM to be identified for authentication
purposes in multi-SIM devices. This SIM number represents the index of
the SIM slot. This SIM number shall be used for the authentication using
the respective SIM for the Wi-Fi connection to the corresponding
network.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Now that WPS 2.0 support is enabled unconditionally, WEP and Shared auth
type are not allowed. This made some of the older code unused and that
can now be removed to clean up the implementation. There is still one
place where WEP is allowed for testing purposes: wpa_supplicant as
Registrar trying to configure an AP to use WEP. That is now only allowed
in CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS=y builds, though.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This is somewhat of a corner case since there is no real point in using
so short a fragmentation threshold that it would result in this message
getting fragmented. Anyway, it is better be complete and support this
case as well.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If fragmentation is used, the temporary inbuf/outbuf could have been
leaked in error cases (e.g., reaching maximum number of roundtrips).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This was previously checked through the eap_peer_tls_ssl_init() call
which made it difficult for static analyzers. Add an explicit check for
config == NULL into the beginnign of eap_fast_init() since this will
always result in initialization failing anyway.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
These can be used to disable TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 as a workaround for AAA
servers that have issues interoperating with newer TLS versions.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@google.com>
The new WPS connection handover select includes Registrar public key
hash instead of credential. Use the new information to start
abbreviated WPS handshake instead of configuring a new network directly
from the old Credential-from-NFC design.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Since the Enrollee can now get the public key hash from the Registrar,
there is need to validate this during the WPS protocol run.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Some EAP methods can go through a step that is expected to fail and as
such, should not trigger temporary network disabling when processing
EAP-Failure or deauthentication. EAP-WSC for WPS was already handled as
a special case, but similar behavior is needed for EAP-FAST with
unauthenticated provisioning.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
EAP-FAST requires pac_file to be configured, so make it clearer from the
debug output if missing configuration parameter was the reason for
EAP-FAST initialization failing.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The hash return buffer was previously left uninitialized in case
externally stored password ("password=ext:...") was used. This could
result in MSCHAPv2 failure if that uninitialized memory happened to be
something else than zero.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
PEAPv2 implementation was not fully completed and there does not seem to
be any deployments of PEAPv2 nor any clear sign of such showing up in
the future either. As such, there is not much point in maintaining this
implementation in hostapd/wpa_supplicant.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The standard fragment_size network parameter can now be used to
configure EAP-pwd fragmentation limit instead of always using the
hardcoded value of 1020.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The standard fragment_size network parameter can now be used to
configure EAP-IKEv2 fragmentation limit instead of always using the
hardcoded value of 1400.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Setting methodState = DONE for the case where GPSK-1 is found to be
invalid or incompatible allows EAP state machine to proceed to FAILURE
state instead of remaining stuck until AP times out the connection.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
phase1 parameter 'cipher' can now be used to specify which algorithm
proposal is selected, e.g., with phase1="cipher=1" selecting AES-based
design and cipher=2 SHA256-based. This is mainly for testing purposes,
but can also be used to enforce stronger algorithms to be used.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
One of the RFC 4137 state transitions (METHOD -> FAILURE) had been
forgotten and this could result in EAP peer method processing not
reporting failure immediately and instead, remain stuck waiting for the
connection to time out. Fix this by adding the methodState == DONE &&
decision == FAIL case to allow immediate reporting of failures.
The condition from RFC 4137 as-is would cause problems for number of the
existing EAP method implementations since they use that in places where
the final message before EAP-Failure should really be sent to the EAP
server (e.g., WSC_Done in EAP-WSC). Address this by includng eapRespData
== NULL as an additional constraint for entering FAILURE state directly
from METHOD.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
phase1 parameters dhgroup, encr, prf, and mac can now be used to specify
which algorithm proposal is selected, e.g., with phase1="dhgroup=3
encr=1 prf=1 mac=1" selecting the mandatory-to-implement case. This is
mainly for testing purposes, but can also be used to enforce stronger
algorithms to be used.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This was already included in all the other calls to eap_proxy, but
somehow the get_imsi call had been forgotten.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This allows the new external_sim=1 case to be used to perform UMTS
authentication step in EAP-AKA/AKA' peer process. Following control
interface event is used to request the operation:
CTRL-REQ-SIM-<network id>:UMTS-AUTH:<RAND>:<AUTN> needed for SSID <SSID>
Response from external processing is returned with
CTRL-RSP-SIM-<network id> UMTS-AUTH:<IK>:<CK>:<RES>
or
CTRL-RSP-SIM-<network id> UMTS-AUTS:<AUTS>
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This allows the new external_sim=1 case to be used to perform GSM
authentication step in EAP-SIM peer process. Following control interface
event is used to request the operation:
CTRL-REQ-SIM-<network id>:GSM-AUTH:<RAND1>:<RAND2>[:<RAND3>] needed
for SSID <SSID>
For example:
<3>CTRL-REQ-SIM-0:GSM-AUTH:5e3496ce7d5863b3b09f97f565513bc3:
73f0f0bc5c47bcbed6f572d07ab74056:447b784f08de80bdc2b1e100fccbb534
needed for SSID test
Response from external processing is returned with
CTRL-RSP-SIM-<network id> GSM-AUTH:<Kc1>:<SRES1>:<Kc2>:<SRES2>
[:<Kc3>:<SRES3>]
For example:
wpa_cli sim 0 GSM-AUTH:d41c76e0079247aa:2709ebfb:43baa77cfc8bcd6c:
0fa98dc1:a8ad1f6e30e
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new configuration parameter external_sim=<0/1> can now be used to
configure wpa_supplicant to use external SIM/USIM processing (e.g., GSM
authentication for EAP-SIM or UMTS authentication for EAP-AKA). The
requests and responses for such operations are sent over the ctrl_iface
CTRL-REQ-SIM and CTRL-RSP-SIM commands similarly to the existing
password query mechanism.
Changes to the EAP methods to use this new mechanism will be added in
separate commits.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new domain_suffix_match (and domain_suffix_match2 for Phase 2
EAP-TLS) can now be used to specify an additional constraint for the
server certificate domain name. If set, one of the dNSName values (or if
no dNSName is present, one of the commonName values) in the certificate
must have a suffix match with the specified value. Suffix match is done
based on full domain name labels, i.e., "example.com" matches
"test.example.com" but not "test-example.com".
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Swisscom SIM cards do not include MNC length within EF_AD, and end up
using incorrect MNC length based on the 3-digit default. Hardcode MNC
length of 2 for Switzerland, in the same manner as it was done for
Finland.
Signed-hostap: Andrejs Cainikovs <andrejs.cainikovs@sonymobile.com>
When using OpenSSL with TLS-based EAP methods, wpa_supplicant can now be
configured to use OCSP stapling (TLS certificate status request) with
ocsp=1 network block parameter. ocsp=2 can be used to require valid OCSP
response before connection is allowed to continue.
hostapd as EAP server can be configured to return cached OCSP response
using the new ocsp_stapling_response parameter and an external mechanism
for updating the response data (e.g., "openssl ocsp ..." command).
This allows wpa_supplicant to verify that the server certificate has not
been revoked as part of the EAP-TLS/PEAP/TTLS/FAST handshake before
actual data connection has been established (i.e., when a CRL could not
be fetched even if a distribution point were specified).
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
There are quite a few places in the current implementation where a nul
terminated string is generated from binary data. Add a helper function
to simplify the code a bit.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
We should not call getSessionID method if it's not provided. This fixes
a regression from commit 950c563076 where
EAP methods that did not implement getSessionId resulted in NULL pointer
dereference when deriving the key.
Signed-off-by: Shijie Zhang <shijiez@qca.qualcomm.com>
WSC specification 2.0 section 7.4 describes OOB password to be expressed
in ASCII format (upper case hexdump) instead of raw binary.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Commit ffdaa05a6b added support for using
NFC password token from an AP. However, it had a bug that prevented the
wpa_supplicant wps_reg command from being used with "nfc-pw" as the PIN
value. Fix string comparison to handle this correctly.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This adds a new getSessionId() callback for EAP peer methods to allow
EAP Session-Id to be derived. This commits implements this for EAP-FAST,
EAP-GPSK, EAP-IKEv2, EAP-PEAP, EAP-TLS, and EAP-TTLS.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
In addition to the offload mechanism, the Android configuration and
makefiles are extended to allow this to be configured for the build by
dropping in platform specific configuration files and makefile without
having to modify any existing files.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Signal the start of EAP authentication as well as when additional
credentials are required to complete.
Signed-hostap: Paul Stewart <pstew@chromium.org>
Even if the PAC file does not start with the proper header line, allow
the file to be used if it is empty. [Bug 423]
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Commit 458cb30191 broke LEAP since it
rejects EAP-Success packet that is used within LEAP and this frame does
not have a payload. Fix LEAP by relaxing the generic EAP packet
validation if LEAP has been negotiated.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
While the existing code already addresses TLS Message Length validation
for both EAP-TLS peer and server side, this adds explicit checks and
rejection of invalid messages in the functions handling reassembly. This
does not change externally observable behavior in case of EAP server.
For EAP peer, this starts rejecting invalid messages instead of
addressing them by reallocating the buffer (i.e., ignoring TLS Message
Length in practice).
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Use the anonymous_identity field to store EAP-SIM/AKA pseudonym identity
so that this can be maintained between EAP sessions (e.g., after
wpa_supplicant restart) even if fast re-authentication data was cleared.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The AT_NONCE_S value needs to be used in AT_MAC calculation for
SIM/Re-authentication response even if re-authentication is rejected
with AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
intended-for: hostap-1
This EAP type uses a vendor specific expanded EAP header to encapsulate
EAP-TLS with a configuration where the EAP server does not authenticate
the EAP peer. In other words, this method includes only server
authentication. The peer is configured with only the ca_cert parameter
(similarly to other TLS-based EAP methods). This method can be used for
cases where the network provides free access to anyone, but use of RSN
with a securely derived unique PMK for each station is desired.
The expanded EAP header uses the hostapd/wpa_supplicant vendor
code 39068 and vendor type 1 to identify the UNAUTH-TLS method.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Some deployed authentication servers seem to be unable to handle the TLS
Session Ticket extension (they are supposed to ignore unrecognized TLS
extensions, but end up rejecting the ClientHello instead). As a
workaround, disable use of TLS Sesson Ticket extension for EAP-TLS,
EAP-PEAP, and EAP-TTLS (EAP-FAST uses session ticket, so any server that
supports EAP-FAST does not need this workaround).
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
tls_disable_session_ticket=1 in phase1/phase2 can now be used to disable
use of TLS Session Ticket extension (which is enabled by default in
recent OpenSSL versions). This can be used to work around issues with
broken authentication servers that do not ignore unrecognized TLS
extensions properly.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Only allow the TLS library keying material exporter functionality to be
used for MSK derivation with TLS-based EAP methods to avoid exporting
internal TLS keys from the library.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Previously, CONFIG_EAP_MSCHAPV2=y was assumed to be set for
CONFIG_EAP_TTLS=y. Avoid this dependency by making including the
MSCHAPv2 parts in EAP-TTLS conditionally.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
These validation steps are already done in the EAP parsing code and in
the EAP methods, but the additional check is defensive programming and
can make the validation of received EAP messages more easier to
understand.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This allows the password parameter for EAP methods to be fetched
from an external storage.
Following example can be used for developer testing:
ext_password_backend=test:pw1=password|pw2=testing
network={
key_mgmt=WPA-EAP
eap=TTLS
identity="user"
password=ext:pw1
ca_cert="ca.pem"
phase2="auth=PAP"
}
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
At least some error paths (e.g., hitting the limit on hunt-and-peck
iterations) could have resulted in double-freeing of some memory
allocations. Avoid this by setting the pointers to NULL after they have
been freed instead of trying to free the data structure in a location
where some external references cannot be cleared. [Bug 453]
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The AP PIN on wps_reg command can now be replaced with special value
"nfc-pw" to use device password from a NFC password token from the AP.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The OOB Device Password is passed in as a hexdump of the real Device
Password (16..32 octets of arbitrary binary data). The hexdump needs to
be converted to binary form before passing it for WPS processing.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Send an "EAP" signal via the new DBus interface under various
conditions during EAP authentication:
- During method selection (ACK and NAK)
- During certificate verification
- While sending and receiving TLS alert messages
- EAP success and failure messages
This provides DBus callers a number of new tools:
- The ability to probe an AP for available EAP methods
(given an identity).
- The ability to identify why the remote certificate was
not verified.
- The ability to identify why the remote peer refused
a TLS connection.
Signed-hostap: Paul Stewart <pstew@chromium.org>
There was a technical change between the last IETF draft version
(draft-arkko-eap-aka-kdf-10) and RFC 5448 in the leading characters
used in the username (i.e., use unique characters for EAP-AKA' instead
of reusing the EAP-AKA ones). This commit updates EAP-AKA' server and
peer implementations to use the leading characters based on the final
RFC.
Note: This will make EAP-AKA' not interoperate between the earlier
draft version and the new version.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
intended-for: hostap-1
OpenSSL wrapper was using the same certificate store for both Phase 1
and Phase 2 TLS exchange in case of EAP-PEAP/TLS, EAP-TTLS/TLS, and
EAP-FAST/TLS. This would be fine if the same CA certificates were used
in both phases, but does not work properly if different CA certificates
are used. Enforce full separation of TLS state between the phases by
using a separate TLS library context in EAP peer implementation.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Commit 30680e9332 changed the length
of the implicit challenge result to match with the exact length used
in TTLS. However, it failed to update the peer_challenge generation
to use a separate random value. Previously, this was generated as
part of the implicit challenge, but more correct way would have been
to generate a random value for it separately. Do this now to fix the
read after the allocated buffer (16 bytes after the implicit
challenge).
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
intended-for: hostap-1
Remove the GPL notification text from EAP-pwd implementation per
approval from Dan Harkins who contributed these files.
(email from Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> dated
Wed, 4 Jan 2012 16:25:48 -0800)
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The pseudonym identity should use a realm in environments where a realm is
used. Thus, the realm of the permanent identity is added to the pseudonym
username sent by the server.
Signed-hostap: Simon Baatz <gmbnomis@gmail.com>
The pseudonym identity should use a realm in environments where a realm is
used. Thus, the realm of the permanent identity is added to the pseudonym
username sent by the server.
Signed-hostap: Simon Baatz <gmbnomis@gmail.com>
Some SIM cards do not include MNC length with in EF_AD. Try to figure
out the MNC length based on the MCC/MNC values in the beginning of the
IMSI. This covers a prepaid Elisa/Kolumbus card that would have ended
up using incorrect MNC length based on the 3-digit default.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The temporary IMSI buffer can be used for this without needing the
extra memory allocation. In addition, the implementation is easier
to understand when the extra identity prefix value for EAP-SIM/AKA
is not included while fetching MCC/MNC from the IMSI.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The pseudonym is a temporary identity, but is no one-time identifier (like
the fast re-authentication identity). Thus, do not forget it if the server
does not include it in every challenge. There are servers that include the
pseudonym identity only at full-auth. [Bug 424]
Prepare for multiple TLS PRF functions by renaming the SHA1+MD5 based
TLS PRF function to more specific name and add tls_prf() within the
internal TLS implementation as a wrapper for this for now.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This structure was not really used for anything apart from figuring out
length of the EAP-pwd header (and even that in a way that would not work
with fragmentation). Since the bitfields in the structure could have
been problematic depending on target endianness, remove this unnecessary
structure.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Another niceness of OpenSSL is that if the high-order bit of a 521-bit
big num is not set then BN_bn2bin() will just return 65 bytes instead of
66 bytes with the 1st (big endian, after all) being all zero. When this
happens the wrong number of octets are mixed into function H(). So
there's a whole bunch of "offset" computations and BN_bn2bin() dumps the
big number into a buffer + offset. That should be obvious in the patch
too.
data->phase2_method cannot really be NULL if
eap_fast_init_phase2_method() returns success, but this construction
seems to be too difficult for some static analyzers. While this change
is not really needed in practice, it makes it easier to go through
warnings from such analyzers.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This function can fail in theory since the SHA-1 functions are
allowed to return an error. While this does not really happen in
practice (we would not get this far if SHA-1 does not work), it is
cleaner to include the error handling here to keep static analyzers
happier. [Bug 421]
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Control requests will be extended for non-EAP uses later, so it makes
sense to have them be generic. Furthermore, having them defined as an
enum is easier for processing internally, and more generic for control
interfaces that may not use field names. The public ctrl_req_type /
field_name conversion function will be used later by the D-Bus control
interface too.
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dcbw@redhat.com>
Special processing is needed to handle EAP user request for
identity or password at the beginning of Phase 2 when the implicit
identity request is used. data->pending_phase2_req needs to be set
to an empty buffer in that case to avoid re-processing the previous
part of TLS negotiation when the user enters the needed information.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This fixes an issue where WPS run leaves a small ClientTimeout
value (2) configured and the next EAPOL authentication is started
with that small value even for Identity exchange. This can cause
problems when an EAPOL packet gets dropped immediately after
association and a retry of that packet is needed (which may take
more than two seconds).
While EAP-FAST uses protected success notification, RFC 5422, Section
3.5 points out a possibility of EAP-Failure being sent out even after
protected success notification in case of provisioning. Change the
EAP-FAST peer implementation to accept that exception to the protected
success notification. This allows the station to re-connect more quickly
to complete EAP-FAST connection in the case the server rejects the
initial attempt by only allowing it to use to provision a new PAC.
These protocols seem to be abandoned: latest IETF drafts have expired
years ago and it does not seem likely that EAP-TTLSv1 would be
deployed. The implementation in hostapd/wpa_supplicant was not complete
and not fully tested. In addition, the TLS/IA functionality was only
available when GnuTLS was used. Since GnuTLS removed this functionality
in 3.0.0, there is no available TLS/IA implementation in the latest
version of any supported TLS library.
Remove the EAP-TTLSv1 and TLS/IA implementation to clean up unwanted
complexity from hostapd and wpa_supplicant. In addition, this removes
any potential use of the GnuTLS extra library.
eapol_test command line argument -o<file> can now be used to request
the received server certificate chain to be written to the specified
file. The certificates will be written in PEM format. [Bug 391]
In general, this patch attemps to extend commit
00468b4650 with dbus support.
This can be used by dbus client to implement subject match text
entry with preset value probed from server. This preset value, if
user accepts it, is remembered and passed to subject_match config
for any future authentication.
Signed-off-by: Michael Chang <mchang@novell.com>
This function does not get called with in_data == NULL in practice, but
it seems to be at least partly prepared for that case, so better make it
consistent by handling the NULL value throughout the function.
The size_t value here can be 64-bit and result in implicit sign
extension. In this particular case, that gets masked out by
host_to_be32(), so there is no practical difference, but it is better
to get rid of the 64-bit variable explicitly.
The supportedTypes parameter is a list of TNC_MessageType values
and the buffer to be copied should use size of TNC_MessageType, not
TNC_MessageTypeList. In practice, these are of same length on most
platforms, so this is not a critical issue, but anyway, the correct
type should be used.
