The firmware sends new reason codes to indicate TWT teardown due to
single channel and multi channel concurrency. Update the enum
qca_wlan_vendor_twt_status to represent new reason code.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Dump pending monitor interface messages between each roaming step to
make the test log easier to understand and hostapd wait for the new
connection more robust by ensuring that the processed event if for the
very last reassociation. It looks like at least ap_ft_vlan_over_ds_many
could fail due to the connectivity check being started before the final
roam had been completed on the AP side even though there was an explicit
hapd2ap.wait_sta() wait before the test.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
APs PMF capabilities can differ. wpa_supplicant should be able to
disable and enable MBO when roaming to and from a misbehaving MBO AP
that doesn't support PMF. Verify that this is indeed happening.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wang <matthewmwang@chromium.org>
gcc-10 seems to be inlining eap_eke_prf() and eap_eke_prfplus() which
breaks this test case due to a different backtrace being generated for
triggering the local failures. Point to the functions called by those
instead of these two functions to get this working with both gcc-9 and
gcc-10.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Hide /usr/share/wireshark from hostfs to prevent tshark from loading all
the data from there since that can take significant amount of time and
is not really needed for the test cases. In addition, set HOME to point
to local tmpfs to avoid unnecessary references through hostfs.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
The new wpa_supplicant control interface command "PASN_DEAUTH
bssid=<BSSID>" can now be used to flush the local PTKSA cache for the
specified BSS and to notify the AP to request it to drop its PTKSA as
well.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
To allow for a PASN station to deauthenticate from an AP to clear any
PTKSA cache entry for it, extend the nl80211 interface to allow sending
a Deauthentication frame with off channel enabled.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
When a Deauthentication frame is received, clear the corresponding PTKSA
cache entry for the given station, to invalidate previous PTK
information.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
The anti-clogging code was under CONFIG_SAE. Change this so it can be
used both with CONFIG_SAE and CONFIG_PASN.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
PASN authentication mandates support for comeback flow, which
among others can be used for anti-clogging purposes.
As the SAE support for anti clogging can also be used for PASN,
start modifying the source code so the anti clogging support
can be used for both SAE and PASN.
As a start, rename some variables/functions etc. so that they would not
be SAE specific. The configuration variable is also renamed, but the old
version remains available for backwards compatibility.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
For testing purposes, add support for corrupting the MIC in PASN
Authentication frames for both wpa_supplicant and hostapd.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
When a public key is included in the PASN Parameters element, it should
be encoded using the RFC 5480 conventions, and thus the first octet of
the Ephemeral Public Key field should indicate whether the public key is
compressed and the actual key part starts from the second octet.
Fix the implementation to properly adhere to the convention
requirements for both wpa_supplicant and hostapd.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
As defined in IEEE P802.11az/D3.0, 12.12.3.2 for the second PASN frame.
This was previously covered only for the case when the explicit PMKSA
was provided to the helper function. Extend that to cover the PMKID from
SAE/FILS authentication cases.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
When ERP initialization was moved from the METHOD state to the SUCCESS
state, the conditions for checking against EAP state being cleared was
missed. The METHOD state verified that sm->m is not NULL while the
SUCCESS state did not have such a check. This opened a window for a race
condition where processing of deauthentication event and EAPOL RX events
could end up delivering an EAP-Success to the EAP peer state machine
after the state had been cleared. This issue has now been worked around
in another manner, but the root cause for this regression should be
fixed as well.
Check that the EAP state machine is properly configured before trying to
initialize ERP in the SUCCESS state.
Fixes: 2a71673e27 ("ERP: Derive ERP key only after successful EAP authentication")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
These parameters were already defined in struct hostapd_data, but there
was no way of setting them. Add these to hostapd control interface
similarly to the wpa_supplicant implementation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The highest supported TLS version for pre_master_secret needs to be
limited based on the local configuration for the case where the highest
version number is being explicitly disabled. Without this, the server
would likely detect a downgrade attack.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Even though the STA in this test case does not actually use SAE, it
needs to recognize the "SAE H2E only "BSS membership selector.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The supported hash algorithms do not use AlgorithmIdentifier parameters.
However, there are implementations that include NULL parameters in
addition to ones that omit the parameters. Previous implementation did
not check the parameters value at all which supported both these cases,
but did not reject any other unexpected information.
Use strict validation of digest algorithm parameters and reject any
unexpected value when validating a signature. This is needed to prevent
potential forging attacks.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Digest is within the DigestInfo SEQUENCE and as such, parsing for it
should use the end of that data instead of the end of the decrypted
signature as the end point. Fix this in the PKCS #1 and X.509
implementations to avoid accepting invalid digest data that is
constructed to get the hash value from after the actual DigestInfo
container.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The definite long form for the length is allowed only for cases where
the definite short form cannot be used, i.e., if the length is 128 or
greater. This was not previously enforced and as such, multiple
different encoding options for the same length could have been accepted.
Perform more strict checks to reject invalid cases for the definite long
form for the length. This is needed for a compliant implementation and
this is especially important for the case of verifying DER encoded
signatures to prevent potential forging attacks.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The extended tag case is allowed only for tag values that are 31 or
larger (i.e., the ones that would not fit in the single octet identifier
case with five bits). Extended tag format was previously accepted even
for the values 0..31 and this would enable multiple different encodings
for the same tag value. That is not allowed for DER.
Perform more strict checks to reject invalid extended tag values. This
is needed for a compliant implementation and this is especially
important for the case of verifying DER encoded signatures to prevent
potential forging attacks.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The identifier octet in DER encoding includes three components. Only two
of these (Class and Tag) were checked in most cases when looking for a
specific data type. Also check the Primitive/Constructed bit to avoid
accepting invalid encoding.
This is needed for correct behavior in DER parsing and especially
important for the case of verifying DER encoded signatures to prevent
potential forging attacks.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Need to explicitly wait for hostapd to report STA connection before
starting the traffic test to avoid the potential race condition when
testing with UML and time travel mode.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
