Call group_form_result() whenever a new group is started, so that
group_ifname gets updated and later, the group can be removed when
needed.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
When resetting a device, remove all the P2P networks to prevent
unexpected behavior in following tests. This is needed for the case
where P2P Device interface is used.
Signed-off-by: Ben Rosenfeld <ben.rosenfeld@intel.com>
This is required for cases where P2P Device is used and the event
happens on the global interface.
Signed-off-by: Ben Rosenfeld <ben.rosenfeld@intel.com>
This is required for cases that multiple interfaces are used and the
event can happen on any of them, for example when a dedicated P2P Device
interface is used.
Signed-off-by: Ben Rosenfeld <ben.rosenfeld@intel.com>
The tests used p2p_dev_addr that can be different from own_addr,
if a dedicated P2P Device interface is used.
Signed-off-by: Ben Rosenfeld <ben.rosenfeld@intel.com>
Do not add a P2P IE when a station interface is trying to associate
to an AP or P2P GO that publishes a P2P IE but does not include
a P2P manageability attribute.
This addresses an interoperability issue that was reported in
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=96471, where a P2P GO
rejects association from a station interface without a specified
reason.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Link Property query vendor command shall facilitate the information
of the Wi-Fi link. MAC address of the Wi-Fi peer is given as an input
for querying the link properties.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The cleanup code will handle this, but it is more robust to make sure
this is cleared to zero when allocating a new buffer.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The cleanup code will handle this, but it is more robust to make sure
this is cleared to zero when allocating a new buffer.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The L (Length) and M (More) flags needs to be cleared before deciding
whether the locally generated response requires fragmentation. This
fixes an issue where these flags from the server could have been invalid
for the following message. In some cases, this could have resulted in
triggering the wpabuf security check that would terminate the process
due to invalid buffer allocation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the
Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked
prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could
have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted
as a huge positive integer.
In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress
before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a
potential memory leak when processing invalid message.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the
Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked
prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could
have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted
as a huge positive integer.
In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress
before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a
potential memory leak when processing invalid message.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
overflow when processing an invalid message.
Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
reporting this issue.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
overflow when processing an invalid message.
Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
reporting this issue.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This increases the coverage for AP mode management frame fuzzing by
allowing number of additional Action frame code paths to be executed.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The length of the WMM Action frame was not properly validated and the
length of the information elements (int left) could end up being
negative. This would result in reading significantly past the stack
buffer while parsing the IEs in ieee802_11_parse_elems() and while doing
so, resulting in segmentation fault.
This can result in an invalid frame being used for a denial of service
attack (hostapd process killed) against an AP with a driver that uses
hostapd for management frame processing (e.g., all mac80211-based
drivers).
Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
reporting this issue.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The debug information from httpread can be helpful in figuring out error
cases in general and as such, should be enabled by default. Get rid of
the hardcoded httpread_debug value that would require source code
changes to enable.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
There is no need to continue processing a HTTP body when it becomes
clear that the end result would be over the maximum length.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Verify that ncopy parameter to memcpy is not negative. While this is not
supposed to be needed, it is a good additional protection against
unknown implementation issues.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
strtoul() return value may end up overflowing the int h->chunk_size and
resulting in a negative value to be stored as the chunk_size. This could
result in the following memcpy operation using a very large length
argument which would result in a buffer overflow and segmentation fault.
This could have been used to cause a denial service by any device that
has been authorized for network access (either wireless or wired). This
would affect both the WPS UPnP functionality in a WPS AP (hostapd with
upnp_iface parameter set in the configuration) and WPS ER
(wpa_supplicant with WPS_ER_START control interface command used).
Validate the parsed chunk length value to avoid this. In addition to
rejecting negative values, we can also reject chunk size that would be
larger than the maximum configured body length.
Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
reporting this issue.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
While being associated, if an ANQP request is received for a different
AP that doesn't exist in the BSS list, the ANQP request will be sent on
the frequency of the AP that we are currently associated to.
In such a case, it is possible that the ANQP request would be sent on
a channel different than that of the requested AP, potentially delaying
other requests/activities.
Avoid sending the ANQP request to an AP that is not in the BSS list.
Signed-off-by: Matti Gottlieb <matti.gottlieb@intel.com>
Fix memory leak introduced in commit
32a097fdd2 ("wpa_cli: Keep track of
available networks") by tracking networks only when in interactive mode.
Signed-off-by: Andrei Otcheretianski <andrei.otcheretianski@intel.com>
Add the TDLS_LINK_STATUS command to the control interface. This command
shows what is the status of our current TDLS connection with the given
peer. Also, add the TDLS_LINK_STATUS command to wpa_cli.
Signed-off-by: Oren Givon <oren.givon@intel.com>
Sanity check added to avoid segmentation fault which occurs, when
issuing ibss_rsn ctrl iface cmd and IBSS was not initialized previously
via IBSS network selection.
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Abinader <eduardo.abinader@openbossa.org>
If the mp_init_multi() call had failed due to memory allocation failure,
mp_div() would have returned 1 instead of MP_MEM (-2). It looks like all
callers are checking the return value against MP_OKAY instead of <1
(etc.), so this does not seem to result in difference in behavior.
Anyway, it's best to fix the mp_div() return value for the MP_MEM error
case to avoid unexpected behavior.
Signed-off-by: Maks Naumov <maksqwe1@ukr.net>
In theory, the previous version could have resulted in reading one byte
beyond the end of the management frame RX buffer if the local driver
were to deliver a truncated Public Action frame for processing. In
practice, this did not seem to happen with mac80211-based drivers and
even if it were, the extra octet would be an uninitialized value in a
buffer rather than read beyond the end of the buffer.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This was previously checked as part of the eap_sim_parse_attr()
processing, but it is easier to review the code if there is an
additional explicit check for confirming that the Reserved field is
present since the pos variable is advanced beyond it.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Couple of the EAP-SIM/AKA protocol test cases were leaving out the
Reserved field. This was not intentional since these test cases were
targeting a specific Subtype processing instead of verifying truncated
header case (which is covered separately). Add the Reserved field to
allow the implementation to add an explicit, earlier check for this.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Clean up eap_sake_parse_add_attr() design by passing in pointer to the
payload of the attribute instead of parsing these separately for each
attribute within the function.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The req_plen argument to eap_pax_process_std_1() and
eap_pax_process_std_3() could be smaller than sizeof(struct eap_pax_hdr)
since the main processing function was only verifying that there is
enough room for the ICV and then removed ICV length from the remaining
payload length.
In theory, this could have resulted in the size_t left parameter being
set to a negative value that would be interpreted as a huge positive
integer. That could then result in a small buffer read overflow and
process termination if MSGDUMP debug verbosity was in use.
In practice, it does not seem to be feasible to construct a short
message that would be able to pass the ICV validation (calculated using
HMAC-SHA1-128) even for the case where an empty password is used.
Anyway, the implementation should really check the length explicitly
instead of depending on implicit check through ICV validation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The EAP-TLS-based helper functions can easily use struct wpabuf in more
places, so continue cleanup in that direction by replacing separate
pointer and length arguments with a single struct wpabuf argument.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This function is only using the Identifier field from the EAP request
header, so there is no need to pass it a pointer to the full message.
This makes it a bit easier to analyze the area that gets access to
unverified message payload.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Commit c2762e410f ('P2P: Update D-Bus
network object semantics during group formation') added this helper
function to determine whether a network block is used for storing a
persistent group information. However, it implemented this in a way that
matches both persistent group storage and an operating persist group
instance. This does not seem to match the expected behavior for the
D-Bus objects, so fix this to match only the persistent group storage
case to avoid registering/unregistered incorrect D-Bus objects for
groups.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Commit bb3df9a569 ('notify: Do not raise
any signal from a P2P management interface') was supposed to only change
D-Bus behavior, but it ended up disabling non-D-Bus functionality as
well for some sequences where the P2P Device interface is used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Number of the P2P test cases through D-Bus commands were not prepared
for there being a separate group interface when the P2P Device concept
is used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
