EAP-TTLS/PEAP/FAST were previously doing this for init_for_reauth(), but
not for deinit_for_reauth(). Add the deinit_for_reauth() call as well to
cover cases like EAP-AKA cleaup of AT_CHECKCODE data.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This adds the same changes to EAP-AKA that were previous done for
EAP-SIM to allow functionality within an EAP-TTLS/PEAP/FAST tunnel
without causing issues to the phase 1 identity string.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The "anonymous_identity" configuration field has more than one
semantic meaning. For tunneled EAP methods, this refers to the
outer EAP identity. For EAP-SIM, this refers to the pseudonym
identity. Also, interestingly, EAP-SIM can overwrite the
"anonymous_identity" field if one is provided to it by the
authenticator.
When EAP-SIM is tunneled within an outer method, it makes sense
to only use this value for the outer method, since it's unlikely
that this will also be valid as an identity for the inner EAP-SIM
method. Also, presumably since the outer method protects the
EAP-SIM transaction, there is no need for a pseudonym in this
usage.
Similarly, if EAP-SIM is being used as an inner method, it must
not push the pseudonym identity using eap_set_anon_id() since it
could overwrite the identity for the outer EAP method.
Signed-off-by: Paul Stewart <pstew@google.com>
Add an internal flag which indicates to tunneled EAP methods (FAST,
PEAP, TTLS) that they should cache decrypted EAP-SIM/AKA/AKA' requests.
This allows EAP-SIM/AKA/AKA' to be tunneled within these outer methods
while using an external SIM authenticator over the control interface.
Signed-off-by: Paul Stewart <pstew@google.com>
While RFC 5295 uses "8" as the value to use in the length field in KDF
context when deriving EMSKname, it is clearer to use the macro defining
EMSKname as the value since the KDF design in RFC 5295 encodes the
length of the derived data in octets in that part of the context data.
This change is just making the implementation easier to understand while
not actually changing the behavior.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Unlike the EMSKname and rRK derivations, rIK derivation is actually
using the "optional data" component in the context data (see RFC 5295).
RFC 6696 defines that optional data to be the cryptosuite field for rIK.
This was missing from the previous implementation and that resulted in
incorrect rIK being derived.
In addition, the rIK Label string does not actually include the "EAP "
prefix in the way as the rRK Label in RFC 6696 does. This would also
have resulted in incorrect rIK value.
Fix rIK derivation by adding the cryptosuite value into the KDF context
data and fixing the label string. This change is not backwards
compatible and breaks all ERP use cases (including FILS shared key
authentication) with older (broken) and new (fixed)
hostapd/wpa_supplicant builds.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This registers a new callback to indicate change in SIM state. This
helps to do some clean up (more specifically pmksa_flush) based on the
state change of the SIM. Without this, the reconnection using the cached
PMKSA could happen though the SIM is changed.
Currently eap_proxy_sim_state corresponds to only SIM_STATE_ERROR. This
can be further extended.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The eapol_cb structure was made const and that change resulted in a
compilation warning/error if CONFIG_EAP_PROXY=<name> is enabled in the
wpa_supplicant build configuration. Fix this by updating the function
prototype to match the change.
Note: This results in a change needed to external eap_proxy_*.c
implementations to match the change.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This needs to be callable through the EAPOL supplicant wrappers to allow
FILS implementation to use ERP.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
That function does not need the full EAP header -- it only needs to know
which EAP identifier to use in the message. Make this usable for cases
where the previous EAP message may not exist (FILS).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Fix the pre-processing field in the response when EAP_PWD_PREP_MS is
being used. This fixes interoperability with EAP-pwd servers that
validate the Prep field in EAP-pwd-ID/Response when the RFC2759
(PasswordHashHash) pre-processing is used.
Signed-off-by: Brian Candler <B.Candler@pobox.com>
These are called through function pointers, so no need to make the
function symbols directly available outside this file.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Most protocols extracting keys from TLS use RFC 5705 exporters which is
commonly implemented in TLS libraries. This is the mechanism used by
EAP-TLS. (EAP-TLS actually predates RFC 5705, but RFC 5705 was defined
to be compatible with it.)
EAP-FAST, however, uses a legacy mechanism. It reuses the TLS internal
key block derivation and derives key material after the key block. This
is uncommon and a misuse of TLS internals, so not all TLS libraries
support this. Instead, we reimplement the PRF for the OpenSSL backend
and don't support it at all in the GnuTLS one.
Since these two are very different operations, split
tls_connection_prf() in two. tls_connection_export_key() implements the
standard RFC 5705 mechanism that we expect most TLS libraries to
support. tls_connection_get_eap_fast_key() implements the
EAP-FAST-specific legacy mechanism which may not be implemented on all
backends but is only used by EAP-FAST.
Signed-Off-By: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
This gets rid of a valgrind warning on uninitialized memory read in the
eap_proto_sake_errors test case where the result was used after the
failed eap_sake_compute_mic() call.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This gets rid of a valgrind warning on uninitialized memory read in the
eap_proto_pax_errors test case where the result was used after the
failed eap_pax_mac() call.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This gets rid of a valgrind warning on uninitialized memory read in the
eap_proto_fast_errors test case where the result was used after the
failed sha1_t_prf() call.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Need to clear the pac pointer for the first error case to avoid freeing
the previous PAC entry if the following entry has an invalid header.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
clang started warning about the use of || with constants that came from
PCSC_FUNCS not being enabled in the build. It seems to be easier to just
ifdef this block out completely since that has the same outcome for
builds that do not include PC/SC support.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
If the final Phase 2 message needed fragmentation, EAP method decision
was cleared from UNCOND_SUCC or COND_SUCC to FAIL and that resulted in
the authentication failing when the EAP-Success message from the server
got rejected. Fix this by restoring the EAP method decision after
fragmentation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Free the allocated structure in error cases to remove need for each EAP
method to handle the error cases separately. Each registration function
can simply do "return eap_peer_method_register(eap);" in the end of the
function.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This function can fail at least in theory, so check its return value
before proceeding. This is mainly helping automated test case coverage
to reach some more error paths.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This was reported to fail with Windows 2012r2 with "Invalid Compound_MAC
in cryptobinding TLV". It turns out that the server decided to go
through inner EAP method (EAP-MSCHAPv2 in the reported case) even when
using PEAP fast-reconnect. This seems to be against the [MS-PEAP]
specification which claims that inner EAP method is not used in such a
case. This resulted in a different CMK being derived by the server (used
the version that used ISK) and wpa_supplicant (used the version where
IPMK|CMK = TK without ISK when using fast-reconnect).
Fix this interop issue by making wpa_supplicant to use the
fast-reconnect version of CMK derivation only when using TLS session
resumption and the server having not initiated inner EAP method before
going through the cryptobinding exchange.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The data->state == WAIT_FRAG_ACK case is already handling all cases
where data->out_buf could be non-NULL, so this additional check after
the WAIT_FRAG_ACK steps cannot be reached. Remove the duplicated dead
code.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Previously, a fixed 1300 fragment_size was hardcoded. Now the EAP
profile parameter fragment_size can be used to override this.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
ocsp=3 extends ocsp=2 by require all not-trusted certificates in the
server certificate chain to receive a good OCSP status. This requires
support for ocsp_multi (RFC 6961). This commit is only adding the
configuration value, but all the currently included TLS library wrappers
are rejecting this as unsupported for now.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Instead of using default list of methods, reject a configuration with an
unsupported EAP method at the time the main TLS method is being
initialized.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
eap_peap_parse_phase1() returned 0 unconditionally, so there was no need
for that return value or the code path that tried to address the error
case.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This patch fixes an issue with an invalid phase2 parameter value
auth=MSCHAPv2 getting interpreted as auth=MSCHAP (v1) which could
degrade security (though, only within a protected TLS tunnel). Now when
invalid or unsupported auth= phase2 parameter combinations are
specified, EAP-TTLS initialization throws an error instead of silently
doing something.
More then one auth= phase2 type cannot be specified and also both auth= and
autheap= options cannot be specified.
Parsing phase2 type is case sensitive (as in other EAP parts), so phase2
parameter auth=MSCHAPv2 is invalid. Only auth=MSCHAPV2 is correct.
Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár <pali.rohar@gmail.com>
[Use cstr_token() to get rid of unnecessary allocation; cleanup]
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds support for optional functionality to validate server
certificate chain in TLS-based EAP methods in an external program.
wpa_supplicant control interface is used to indicate when such
validation is needed and what the result of the external validation is.
This external validation can extend or replace the internal validation.
When ca_cert or ca_path parameter is set, the internal validation is
used. If these parameters are omitted, only the external validation is
used. It needs to be understood that leaving those parameters out will
disable most of the validation steps done with the TLS library and that
configuration is not really recommend.
By default, the external validation is not used. It can be enabled by
addingtls_ext_cert_check=1 into the network profile phase1 parameter.
When enabled, external validation is required through the CTRL-REQ/RSP
mechanism similarly to other EAP authentication parameters through the
control interface.
The request to perform external validation is indicated by the following
event:
CTRL-REQ-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:External server certificate validation needed for SSID <ssid>
Before that event, the server certificate chain is provided with the
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT events that include the cert=<hexdump>
parameter. depth=# indicates which certificate is in question (0 for the
server certificate, 1 for its issues, and so on).
The result of the external validation is provided with the following
command:
CTRL-RSP-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:<good|bad>
It should be noted that this is currently enabled only for OpenSSL (and
BoringSSL/LibreSSL). Due to the constraints in the library API, the
validation result from external processing cannot be reported cleanly
with TLS alert. In other words, if the external validation reject the
server certificate chain, the pending TLS handshake is terminated
without sending more messages to the server.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Do not override the parsing error with the "PAC block not terminated
with END" message if the reason for the END line not yet being seen is
in failure to parse an earlier line.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
It was possible to hit a NULL pointer dereference if Session-Id
derivation failed due to a memory allocation failure.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If init_for_reauth fails, the EAP-SIM peer state was not freed properly.
Use eap_sim_deinit() to make sure all allocations get freed. This could
be hit only if no random data could be derived for NONCE_MT.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If the Confirm message is received from the server before the Identity
exchange has been completed, the group has not yet been determined and
data->grp is NULL. The error path in eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange()
did not take this corner case into account and could end up
dereferencing a NULL pointer and terminating the process if invalid
message sequence is received. (CVE-2015-5316)
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining
room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last
fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer.
The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual
buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process
termination. (CVE-2015-5315)
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
While this is not part of RFC 4137, the way m.check(eapReqData) is
implemented in wpa_supplicant allows an EAP method to not update the
ignore value even though each such call is really supposed to get a new
response. It seems to be possible to hit a sequence where a previous EAP
authentication attempt terminates with sm->ignore set from the last
m.check() call and the following EAP authentication attempt could fail
to go through the expected code path if it does not clear the ignore
flag. This is likely only hit in some error cases, though. The hwsim
test cases could trigger this with the following sequence:
eap_proto_ikev2 ap_wps_m1_oom
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
