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hostap/src/ap/ieee802_1x.c

3004 lines
82 KiB
C

/*
* hostapd / IEEE 802.1X-2004 Authenticator
* Copyright (c) 2002-2019, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
*
* This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
* See README for more details.
*/
#include "utils/includes.h"
#ifdef CONFIG_SQLITE
#include <sqlite3.h>
#endif /* CONFIG_SQLITE */
#include "utils/common.h"
#include "utils/eloop.h"
#include "crypto/md5.h"
#include "crypto/crypto.h"
#include "crypto/random.h"
#include "common/ieee802_11_defs.h"
#include "radius/radius.h"
#include "radius/radius_client.h"
#include "eap_server/eap.h"
#include "eap_common/eap_wsc_common.h"
#include "eapol_auth/eapol_auth_sm.h"
#include "eapol_auth/eapol_auth_sm_i.h"
#include "p2p/p2p.h"
#include "hostapd.h"
#include "accounting.h"
#include "sta_info.h"
#include "wpa_auth.h"
#include "preauth_auth.h"
#include "pmksa_cache_auth.h"
#include "ap_config.h"
#include "ap_drv_ops.h"
#include "wps_hostapd.h"
#include "hs20.h"
/* FIX: Not really a good thing to require ieee802_11.h here.. (FILS) */
#include "ieee802_11.h"
#include "ieee802_1x.h"
#include "wpa_auth_kay.h"
#ifdef CONFIG_HS20
static void ieee802_1x_wnm_notif_send(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx);
#endif /* CONFIG_HS20 */
static void ieee802_1x_finished(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
struct sta_info *sta, int success,
int remediation);
static void ieee802_1x_send(struct hostapd_data *hapd, struct sta_info *sta,
u8 type, const u8 *data, size_t datalen)
{
u8 *buf;
struct ieee802_1x_hdr *xhdr;
size_t len;
int encrypt = 0;
len = sizeof(*xhdr) + datalen;
buf = os_zalloc(len);
if (!buf) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "malloc() failed for %s(len=%lu)",
__func__, (unsigned long) len);
return;
}
xhdr = (struct ieee802_1x_hdr *) buf;
xhdr->version = hapd->conf->eapol_version;
#ifdef CONFIG_MACSEC
if (xhdr->version > 2 && hapd->conf->macsec_policy == 0)
xhdr->version = 2;
#endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */
xhdr->type = type;
xhdr->length = host_to_be16(datalen);
if (datalen > 0 && data != NULL)
os_memcpy(xhdr + 1, data, datalen);
if (wpa_auth_pairwise_set(sta->wpa_sm))
encrypt = 1;
#ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
if (hapd->ext_eapol_frame_io) {
size_t hex_len = 2 * len + 1;
char *hex = os_malloc(hex_len);
if (hex) {
wpa_snprintf_hex(hex, hex_len, buf, len);
wpa_msg(hapd->msg_ctx, MSG_INFO,
"EAPOL-TX " MACSTR " %s",
MAC2STR(sta->addr), hex);
os_free(hex);
}
} else
#endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
if (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_PREAUTH) {
rsn_preauth_send(hapd, sta, buf, len);
} else {
hostapd_drv_hapd_send_eapol(
hapd, sta->addr, buf, len,
encrypt, hostapd_sta_flags_to_drv(sta->flags));
}
os_free(buf);
}
void ieee802_1x_set_sta_authorized(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
struct sta_info *sta, int authorized)
{
int res;
if (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_PREAUTH)
return;
if (authorized) {
ap_sta_set_authorized(hapd, sta, 1);
res = hostapd_set_authorized(hapd, sta, 1);
hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE8021X,
HOSTAPD_LEVEL_DEBUG, "authorizing port");
} else {
ap_sta_set_authorized(hapd, sta, 0);
res = hostapd_set_authorized(hapd, sta, 0);
hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE8021X,
HOSTAPD_LEVEL_DEBUG, "unauthorizing port");
}
if (res && errno != ENOENT) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Could not set station " MACSTR
" flags for kernel driver (errno=%d).",
MAC2STR(sta->addr), errno);
}
if (authorized) {
os_get_reltime(&sta->connected_time);
accounting_sta_start(hapd, sta);
}
}
#ifdef CONFIG_WEP
#ifndef CONFIG_FIPS
#ifndef CONFIG_NO_RC4
static void ieee802_1x_tx_key_one(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
struct sta_info *sta,
int idx, int broadcast,
u8 *key_data, size_t key_len)
{
u8 *buf, *ekey;
struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
struct ieee802_1x_eapol_key *key;
size_t len, ekey_len;
struct eapol_state_machine *sm = sta->eapol_sm;
if (!sm)
return;
len = sizeof(*key) + key_len;
buf = os_zalloc(sizeof(*hdr) + len);
if (!buf)
return;
hdr = (struct ieee802_1x_hdr *) buf;
key = (struct ieee802_1x_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1);
key->type = EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RC4;
WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_length, key_len);
wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(key->replay_counter);
if (os_memcmp(key->replay_counter,
hapd->last_1x_eapol_key_replay_counter,
IEEE8021X_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN) <= 0) {
/* NTP timestamp did not increment from last EAPOL-Key frame;
* use previously used value + 1 instead. */
inc_byte_array(hapd->last_1x_eapol_key_replay_counter,
IEEE8021X_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
os_memcpy(key->replay_counter,
hapd->last_1x_eapol_key_replay_counter,
IEEE8021X_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
} else {
os_memcpy(hapd->last_1x_eapol_key_replay_counter,
key->replay_counter,
IEEE8021X_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
}
if (random_get_bytes(key->key_iv, sizeof(key->key_iv))) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not get random numbers");
os_free(buf);
return;
}
key->key_index = idx | (broadcast ? 0 : BIT(7));
if (hapd->conf->eapol_key_index_workaround) {
/* According to some information, WinXP Supplicant seems to
* interpret bit7 as an indication whether the key is to be
* activated, so make it possible to enable workaround that
* sets this bit for all keys. */
key->key_index |= BIT(7);
}
/* Key is encrypted using "Key-IV + MSK[0..31]" as the RC4-key and
* MSK[32..63] is used to sign the message. */
if (!sm->eap_if->eapKeyData || sm->eap_if->eapKeyDataLen < 64) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
"No eapKeyData available for encrypting and signing EAPOL-Key");
os_free(buf);
return;
}
os_memcpy((u8 *) (key + 1), key_data, key_len);
ekey_len = sizeof(key->key_iv) + 32;
ekey = os_malloc(ekey_len);
if (!ekey) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not encrypt key");
os_free(buf);
return;
}
os_memcpy(ekey, key->key_iv, sizeof(key->key_iv));
os_memcpy(ekey + sizeof(key->key_iv), sm->eap_if->eapKeyData, 32);
rc4_skip(ekey, ekey_len, 0, (u8 *) (key + 1), key_len);
os_free(ekey);
/* This header is needed here for HMAC-MD5, but it will be regenerated
* in ieee802_1x_send() */
hdr->version = hapd->conf->eapol_version;
#ifdef CONFIG_MACSEC
if (hdr->version > 2)
hdr->version = 2;
#endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */
hdr->type = IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_KEY;
hdr->length = host_to_be16(len);
hmac_md5(sm->eap_if->eapKeyData + 32, 32, buf, sizeof(*hdr) + len,
key->key_signature);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "IEEE 802.1X: Sending EAPOL-Key to " MACSTR
" (%s index=%d)", MAC2STR(sm->addr),
broadcast ? "broadcast" : "unicast", idx);
ieee802_1x_send(hapd, sta, IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_KEY, (u8 *) key, len);
if (sta->eapol_sm)
sta->eapol_sm->dot1xAuthEapolFramesTx++;
os_free(buf);
}
static void ieee802_1x_tx_key(struct hostapd_data *hapd, struct sta_info *sta)
{
struct eapol_authenticator *eapol = hapd->eapol_auth;
struct eapol_state_machine *sm = sta->eapol_sm;
if (!sm || !sm->eap_if->eapKeyData)
return;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "IEEE 802.1X: Sending EAPOL-Key(s) to " MACSTR,
MAC2STR(sta->addr));
#ifndef CONFIG_NO_VLAN
VLAN: Separate station grouping and uplink configuration Separate uplink configuration (IEEE 802.1q VID) and grouping of stations into AP_VLAN interfaces. The int vlan_id will continue to identify the AP_VLAN interface the station should be assigned to. Each AP_VLAN interface corresponds to an instance of struct hostapd_vlan that is uniquely identified by int vlan_id within an BSS. New: Each station and struct hostapd_vlan holds a struct vlan_description vlan_desc member that describes the uplink configuration requested. Currently this is just an int untagged IEEE 802.1q VID, but can be extended to tagged VLANs and other settings easily. When the station was about to be assigned its vlan_id, vlan_desc and vlan_id will now be set simultaneously by ap_sta_set_vlan(). So sta->vlan_id can still be tested for whether the station needs to be moved to an AP_VLAN interface. To ease addition of tagged VLAN support, a member notempty is added to struct vlan_description. Is is set to 1 if an untagged or tagged VLAN assignment is requested and needs to be validated. The inverted form allows os_zalloc() to initialize an empty description. Though not depended on by the code, vlan_id assignment ensures: * vlan_id = 0 will continue to mean no AP_VLAN interface * vlan_id < 4096 will continue to mean vlan_id = untagged vlan id with no per_sta_vif and no extra tagged vlan. * vlan_id > 4096 will be used for per_sta_vif and/or tagged vlans. This way struct wpa_group and drivers API do not need to be changed in order to implement tagged VLANs or per_sta_vif support. DYNAMIC_VLAN_* will refer to (struct vlan_description).notempty only, thus grouping of the stations for per_sta_vif can be used with DYNAMIC_VLAN_DISABLED, but not with CONFIG_NO_VLAN, as struct hostapd_vlan is still used to manage AP_VLAN interfaces. MAX_VLAN_ID will be checked in hostapd_vlan_valid and during setup of VLAN interfaces and refer to IEEE 802.1q VID. VLAN_ID_WILDCARD will continue to refer to int vlan_id. Renaming vlan_id to vlan_desc when type changed from int to struct vlan_description was avoided when vlan_id was also used in a way that did not depend on its type (for example, when passed to another function). Output of "VLAN ID %d" continues to refer to int vlan_id, while "VLAN %d" will refer to untagged IEEE 802.1q VID. Signed-off-by: Michael Braun <michael-dev@fami-braun.de>
8 years ago
if (sta->vlan_id > 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Using WEP with vlans is not supported.");
return;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_NO_VLAN */
if (eapol->default_wep_key) {
ieee802_1x_tx_key_one(hapd, sta, eapol->default_wep_key_idx, 1,
eapol->default_wep_key,
hapd->conf->default_wep_key_len);
}
if (hapd->conf->individual_wep_key_len > 0) {
u8 *ikey;
ikey = os_malloc(hapd->conf->individual_wep_key_len);
if (!ikey ||
random_get_bytes(ikey, hapd->conf->individual_wep_key_len))
{
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
"Could not generate random individual WEP key");
os_free(ikey);
return;
}
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Individual WEP key",
ikey, hapd->conf->individual_wep_key_len);
ieee802_1x_tx_key_one(hapd, sta, 0, 0, ikey,
hapd->conf->individual_wep_key_len);
/* TODO: set encryption in TX callback, i.e., only after STA
* has ACKed EAPOL-Key frame */
if (hostapd_drv_set_key(hapd->conf->iface, hapd, WPA_ALG_WEP,
sta->addr, 0, 0, 1, NULL, 0, ikey,
Introduce and add key_flag Add the new set_key() parameter "key_flag" to provide more specific description of what type of a key is being configured. This is needed to be able to add support for "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" from IEEE Std 802.11-2016. In addition, this may be used to replace the set_tx boolean eventually once all the driver wrappers have moved to using the new key_flag. The following flag are defined: KEY_FLAG_MODIFY Set when an already installed key must be updated. So far the only use-case is changing RX/TX status of installed keys. Must not be set when deleting a key. KEY_FLAG_DEFAULT Set when the key is also a default key. Must not be set when deleting a key. (This is the replacement for set_tx.) KEY_FLAG_RX The key is valid for RX. Must not be set when deleting a key. KEY_FLAG_TX The key is valid for TX. Must not be set when deleting a key. KEY_FLAG_GROUP The key is a broadcast or group key. KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE The key is a pairwise key. KEY_FLAG_PMK The key is a Pairwise Master Key (PMK). Predefined and needed flag combinations so far are: KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX_TX WEP key not used as default key (yet). KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX_TX_DEFAULT Default WEP or WPA-NONE key. KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX GTK key valid for RX only. KEY_FLAG_GROUP_TX_DEFAULT GTK key valid for TX only, immediately taking over TX. KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX_TX Pairwise key immediately becoming the active pairwise key. KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX Pairwise key not yet valid for TX. (Only usable with Extended Key ID support.) KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX_TX_MODIFY Enable TX for a pairwise key installed with KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX. KEY_FLAG_RX_TX Not a valid standalone key type and can only used in combination with other flags to mark a key for RX/TX. This commit is not changing any functionality. It just adds the new key_flag to all hostapd/wpa_supplicant set_key() functions without using it, yet. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de>
4 years ago
hapd->conf->individual_wep_key_len,
KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX_TX)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
"Could not set individual WEP encryption");
}
os_free(ikey);
}
}
#endif /* CONFIG_NO_RC4 */
#endif /* CONFIG_FIPS */
#endif /* CONFIG_WEP */
const char *radius_mode_txt(struct hostapd_data *hapd)
{
switch (hapd->iface->conf->hw_mode) {
case HOSTAPD_MODE_IEEE80211AD:
return "802.11ad";
case HOSTAPD_MODE_IEEE80211A:
return "802.11a";
case HOSTAPD_MODE_IEEE80211G:
return "802.11g";
case HOSTAPD_MODE_IEEE80211B:
default:
return "802.11b";
}
}
int radius_sta_rate(struct hostapd_data *hapd, struct sta_info *sta)
{
int i;
u8 rate = 0;
for (i = 0; i < sta->supported_rates_len; i++)
if ((sta->supported_rates[i] & 0x7f) > rate)
rate = sta->supported_rates[i] & 0x7f;
return rate;
}
#ifndef CONFIG_NO_RADIUS
static void ieee802_1x_learn_identity(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
struct eapol_state_machine *sm,
const u8 *eap, size_t len)
{
const u8 *identity;
size_t identity_len;
const struct eap_hdr *hdr = (const struct eap_hdr *) eap;
if (len <= sizeof(struct eap_hdr) ||
(hdr->code == EAP_CODE_RESPONSE &&
eap[sizeof(struct eap_hdr)] != EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY) ||
(hdr->code == EAP_CODE_INITIATE &&
eap[sizeof(struct eap_hdr)] != EAP_ERP_TYPE_REAUTH) ||
(hdr->code != EAP_CODE_RESPONSE &&
hdr->code != EAP_CODE_INITIATE))
return;
eap_erp_update_identity(sm->eap, eap, len);
identity = eap_get_identity(sm->eap, &identity_len);
if (!identity)
return;
/* Save station identity for future RADIUS packets */
os_free(sm->identity);
sm->identity = (u8 *) dup_binstr(identity, identity_len);
if (!sm->identity) {
sm->identity_len = 0;
return;
}
sm->identity_len = identity_len;
hostapd_logger(hapd, sm->addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE8021X,
HOSTAPD_LEVEL_DEBUG, "STA identity '%s'", sm->identity);
sm->dot1xAuthEapolRespIdFramesRx++;
}
static int add_common_radius_sta_attr_rsn(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
struct hostapd_radius_attr *req_attr,
struct sta_info *sta,
struct radius_msg *msg)
{
u32 suite;
int ver, val;
ver = wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(sta->wpa_sm);
val = wpa_auth_get_pairwise(sta->wpa_sm);
suite = wpa_cipher_to_suite(ver, val);
if (val != -1 &&
!hostapd_config_get_radius_attr(req_attr,
RADIUS_ATTR_WLAN_PAIRWISE_CIPHER) &&
!radius_msg_add_attr_int32(msg, RADIUS_ATTR_WLAN_PAIRWISE_CIPHER,
suite)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not add WLAN-Pairwise-Cipher");
return -1;
}
suite = wpa_cipher_to_suite(((hapd->conf->wpa & 0x2) ||
hapd->conf->osen) ?
WPA_PROTO_RSN : WPA_PROTO_WPA,
hapd->conf->wpa_group);
if (!hostapd_config_get_radius_attr(req_attr,
RADIUS_ATTR_WLAN_GROUP_CIPHER) &&
!radius_msg_add_attr_int32(msg, RADIUS_ATTR_WLAN_GROUP_CIPHER,
suite)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not add WLAN-Group-Cipher");
return -1;
}
val = wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(sta->wpa_sm);
suite = wpa_akm_to_suite(val);
if (val != -1 &&
!hostapd_config_get_radius_attr(req_attr,
RADIUS_ATTR_WLAN_AKM_SUITE) &&
!radius_msg_add_attr_int32(msg, RADIUS_ATTR_WLAN_AKM_SUITE,
suite)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not add WLAN-AKM-Suite");
return -1;
}
if (hapd->conf->ieee80211w != NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION) {
suite = wpa_cipher_to_suite(WPA_PROTO_RSN,
hapd->conf->group_mgmt_cipher);
if (!hostapd_config_get_radius_attr(
req_attr, RADIUS_ATTR_WLAN_GROUP_MGMT_CIPHER) &&
!radius_msg_add_attr_int32(
msg, RADIUS_ATTR_WLAN_GROUP_MGMT_CIPHER, suite)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
"Could not add WLAN-Group-Mgmt-Cipher");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int add_common_radius_sta_attr(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
struct hostapd_radius_attr *req_attr,
struct sta_info *sta,
struct radius_msg *msg)
{
char buf[128];
if (!hostapd_config_get_radius_attr(req_attr,
RADIUS_ATTR_SERVICE_TYPE) &&
!radius_msg_add_attr_int32(msg, RADIUS_ATTR_SERVICE_TYPE,
RADIUS_SERVICE_TYPE_FRAMED)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not add Service-Type");
return -1;
}
if (!hostapd_config_get_radius_attr(req_attr,
RADIUS_ATTR_NAS_PORT) &&
sta->aid > 0 &&
!radius_msg_add_attr_int32(msg, RADIUS_ATTR_NAS_PORT, sta->aid)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not add NAS-Port");
return -1;
}
os_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), RADIUS_802_1X_ADDR_FORMAT,
MAC2STR(sta->addr));
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
if (!radius_msg_add_attr(msg, RADIUS_ATTR_CALLING_STATION_ID,
(u8 *) buf, os_strlen(buf))) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not add Calling-Station-Id");
return -1;
}
if (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_PREAUTH) {
os_strlcpy(buf, "IEEE 802.11i Pre-Authentication",
sizeof(buf));
} else {
os_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "CONNECT %d%sMbps %s",
radius_sta_rate(hapd, sta) / 2,
(radius_sta_rate(hapd, sta) & 1) ? ".5" : "",
radius_mode_txt(hapd));
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
}
if (!hostapd_config_get_radius_attr(req_attr,
RADIUS_ATTR_CONNECT_INFO) &&
!radius_msg_add_attr(msg, RADIUS_ATTR_CONNECT_INFO,
(u8 *) buf, os_strlen(buf))) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not add Connect-Info");
return -1;
}
if (sta->acct_session_id) {
os_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%016llX",
(unsigned long long) sta->acct_session_id);
if (!radius_msg_add_attr(msg, RADIUS_ATTR_ACCT_SESSION_ID,
(u8 *) buf, os_strlen(buf))) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not add Acct-Session-Id");
return -1;
}
}
if ((hapd->conf->wpa & 2) &&
!hapd->conf->disable_pmksa_caching &&
sta->eapol_sm && sta->eapol_sm->acct_multi_session_id) {
os_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%016llX",
(unsigned long long)
sta->eapol_sm->acct_multi_session_id);
if (!radius_msg_add_attr(
msg, RADIUS_ATTR_ACCT_MULTI_SESSION_ID,
(u8 *) buf, os_strlen(buf))) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"Could not add Acct-Multi-Session-Id");
return -1;
}
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
if (hapd->conf->wpa && wpa_key_mgmt_ft(hapd->conf->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
sta->wpa_sm &&
(wpa_key_mgmt_ft(wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(sta->wpa_sm)) ||
sta->auth_alg == WLAN_AUTH_FT) &&
!hostapd_config_get_radius_attr(req_attr,
RADIUS_ATTR_MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID) &&
!radius_msg_add_attr_int32(msg, RADIUS_ATTR_MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID,
WPA_GET_BE16(
hapd->conf->mobility_domain))) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not add Mobility-Domain-Id");
return -1;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
if ((hapd->conf->wpa || hapd->conf->osen) && sta->wpa_sm &&
add_common_radius_sta_attr_rsn(hapd, req_attr, sta, msg) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
int add_common_radius_attr(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
struct hostapd_radius_attr *req_attr,
struct sta_info *sta,
struct radius_msg *msg)
{
char buf[128];
struct hostapd_radius_attr *attr;
int len;
if (!hostapd_config_get_radius_attr(req_attr,
RADIUS_ATTR_NAS_IP_ADDRESS) &&
hapd->conf->own_ip_addr.af == AF_INET &&
!radius_msg_add_attr(msg, RADIUS_ATTR_NAS_IP_ADDRESS,
(u8 *) &hapd->conf->own_ip_addr.u.v4, 4)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not add NAS-IP-Address");
return -1;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6
if (!hostapd_config_get_radius_attr(req_attr,
RADIUS_ATTR_NAS_IPV6_ADDRESS) &&
hapd->conf->own_ip_addr.af == AF_INET6 &&
!radius_msg_add_attr(msg, RADIUS_ATTR_NAS_IPV6_ADDRESS,
(u8 *) &hapd->conf->own_ip_addr.u.v6, 16)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not add NAS-IPv6-Address");
return -1;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
if (!hostapd_config_get_radius_attr(req_attr,
RADIUS_ATTR_NAS_IDENTIFIER) &&
hapd->conf->nas_identifier &&
!radius_msg_add_attr(msg, RADIUS_ATTR_NAS_IDENTIFIER,
(u8 *) hapd->conf->nas_identifier,
os_strlen(hapd->conf->nas_identifier))) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not add NAS-Identifier");
return -1;
}
len = os_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), RADIUS_802_1X_ADDR_FORMAT ":",
MAC2STR(hapd->own_addr));
os_memcpy(&buf[len], hapd->conf->ssid.ssid,
hapd->conf->ssid.ssid_len);
len += hapd->conf->ssid.ssid_len;
if (!hostapd_config_get_radius_attr(req_attr,
RADIUS_ATTR_CALLED_STATION_ID) &&
!radius_msg_add_attr(msg, RADIUS_ATTR_CALLED_STATION_ID,
(u8 *) buf, len)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not add Called-Station-Id");
return -1;
}
if (!hostapd_config_get_radius_attr(req_attr,
RADIUS_ATTR_NAS_PORT_TYPE) &&
!radius_msg_add_attr_int32(msg, RADIUS_ATTR_NAS_PORT_TYPE,
RADIUS_NAS_PORT_TYPE_IEEE_802_11)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not add NAS-Port-Type");
return -1;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_INTERWORKING
if (hapd->conf->interworking &&
!is_zero_ether_addr(hapd->conf->hessid)) {
os_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), RADIUS_802_1X_ADDR_FORMAT,
MAC2STR(hapd->conf->hessid));
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
if (!hostapd_config_get_radius_attr(req_attr,
RADIUS_ATTR_WLAN_HESSID) &&
!radius_msg_add_attr(msg, RADIUS_ATTR_WLAN_HESSID,
(u8 *) buf, os_strlen(buf))) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not add WLAN-HESSID");
return -1;
}
}
#endif /* CONFIG_INTERWORKING */
if (sta && add_common_radius_sta_attr(hapd, req_attr, sta, msg) < 0)
return -1;
for (attr = req_attr; attr; attr = attr->next) {
if (!radius_msg_add_attr(msg, attr->type,
wpabuf_head(attr->val),
wpabuf_len(attr->val))) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not add RADIUS attribute");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
int add_sqlite_radius_attr(struct hostapd_data *hapd, struct sta_info *sta,
struct radius_msg *msg, int acct)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SQLITE
const char *attrtxt;
char addrtxt[3 * ETH_ALEN];
char *sql;
sqlite3_stmt *stmt = NULL;
if (!hapd->rad_attr_db)
return 0;
os_snprintf(addrtxt, sizeof(addrtxt), MACSTR, MAC2STR(sta->addr));
sql = "SELECT attr FROM radius_attributes WHERE sta=? AND (reqtype=? OR reqtype IS NULL);";
if (sqlite3_prepare_v2(hapd->rad_attr_db, sql, os_strlen(sql), &stmt,
NULL) != SQLITE_OK) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "DB: Failed to prepare SQL statement: %s",
sqlite3_errmsg(hapd->rad_attr_db));
return -1;
}
sqlite3_bind_text(stmt, 1, addrtxt, os_strlen(addrtxt), SQLITE_STATIC);
sqlite3_bind_text(stmt, 2, acct ? "acct" : "auth", 4, SQLITE_STATIC);
while (sqlite3_step(stmt) == SQLITE_ROW) {
struct hostapd_radius_attr *attr;
struct radius_attr_hdr *hdr;
attrtxt = (const char *) sqlite3_column_text(stmt, 0);
attr = hostapd_parse_radius_attr(attrtxt);
if (!attr) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
"Skipping invalid attribute from SQL: %s",
attrtxt);
continue;
}
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Adding RADIUS attribute from SQL: %s",
attrtxt);
hdr = radius_msg_add_attr(msg, attr->type,
wpabuf_head(attr->val),
wpabuf_len(attr->val));
hostapd_config_free_radius_attr(attr);
if (!hdr) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
"Could not add RADIUS attribute from SQL");
continue;
}
}
sqlite3_reset(stmt);
sqlite3_clear_bindings(stmt);
sqlite3_finalize(stmt);
#endif /* CONFIG_SQLITE */
return 0;
}
void ieee802_1x_encapsulate_radius(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
struct sta_info *sta,
const u8 *eap, size_t len)
{
struct radius_msg *msg;
struct eapol_state_machine *sm = sta->eapol_sm;
if (!sm)
return;
ieee802_1x_learn_identity(hapd, sm, eap, len);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Encapsulating EAP message into a RADIUS packet");
sm->radius_identifier = radius_client_get_id(hapd->radius);
msg = radius_msg_new(RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_REQUEST,
sm->radius_identifier);
if (!msg) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Could not create new RADIUS packet");
return;
}
if (radius_msg_make_authenticator(msg) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Could not make Request Authenticator");
goto fail;
}
if (sm->identity &&
!radius_msg_add_attr(msg, RADIUS_ATTR_USER_NAME,
sm->identity, sm->identity_len)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Could not add User-Name");
goto fail;
}
if (add_common_radius_attr(hapd, hapd->conf->radius_auth_req_attr, sta,
msg) < 0)
goto fail;
if (sta && add_sqlite_radius_attr(hapd, sta, msg, 0) < 0)
goto fail;
/* TODO: should probably check MTU from driver config; 2304 is max for
* IEEE 802.11, but use 1400 to avoid problems with too large packets
*/
if (!hostapd_config_get_radius_attr(hapd->conf->radius_auth_req_attr,
RADIUS_ATTR_FRAMED_MTU) &&
!radius_msg_add_attr_int32(msg, RADIUS_ATTR_FRAMED_MTU, 1400)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Could not add Framed-MTU");
goto fail;
}
if (!radius_msg_add_eap(msg, eap, len)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Could not add EAP-Message");
goto fail;
}
/* State attribute must be copied if and only if this packet is
* Access-Request reply to the previous Access-Challenge */
if (sm->last_recv_radius &&
radius_msg_get_hdr(sm->last_recv_radius)->code ==
RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE) {
int res = radius_msg_copy_attr(msg, sm->last_recv_radius,
RADIUS_ATTR_STATE);
if (res < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"Could not copy State attribute from previous Access-Challenge");
goto fail;
}
if (res > 0)
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Copied RADIUS State Attribute");
}
if (hapd->conf->radius_request_cui) {
const u8 *cui;
size_t cui_len;
/* Add previously learned CUI or nul CUI to request CUI */
if (sm->radius_cui) {
cui = wpabuf_head(sm->radius_cui);
cui_len = wpabuf_len(sm->radius_cui);
} else {
cui = (const u8 *) "\0";
cui_len = 1;
}
if (!radius_msg_add_attr(msg,
RADIUS_ATTR_CHARGEABLE_USER_IDENTITY,
cui, cui_len)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not add CUI");
goto fail;
}
}
#ifdef CONFIG_HS20
if (hapd->conf->hs20) {
u8 ver = hapd->conf->hs20_release - 1;
if (!radius_msg_add_wfa(
msg, RADIUS_VENDOR_ATTR_WFA_HS20_AP_VERSION,
&ver, 1)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
"Could not add HS 2.0 AP version");
goto fail;
}
if (sta->hs20_ie && wpabuf_len(sta->hs20_ie) > 0) {
const u8 *pos;
u8 buf[3];
u16 id;
pos = wpabuf_head_u8(sta->hs20_ie);
buf[0] = (*pos) >> 4;
if (((*pos) & HS20_PPS_MO_ID_PRESENT) &&
wpabuf_len(sta->hs20_ie) >= 3)
id = WPA_GET_LE16(pos + 1);
else
id = 0;
WPA_PUT_BE16(buf + 1, id);
if (!radius_msg_add_wfa(
msg,
RADIUS_VENDOR_ATTR_WFA_HS20_STA_VERSION,
buf, sizeof(buf))) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
"Could not add HS 2.0 STA version");
goto fail;
}
}
if (sta->roaming_consortium &&
!radius_msg_add_wfa(
msg, RADIUS_VENDOR_ATTR_WFA_HS20_ROAMING_CONSORTIUM,
wpabuf_head(sta->roaming_consortium),
wpabuf_len(sta->roaming_consortium))) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
"Could not add HS 2.0 Roaming Consortium");
goto fail;
}
if (hapd->conf->t_c_filename) {
be32 timestamp;
if (!radius_msg_add_wfa(
msg,
RADIUS_VENDOR_ATTR_WFA_HS20_T_C_FILENAME,
(const u8 *) hapd->conf->t_c_filename,
os_strlen(hapd->conf->t_c_filename))) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
"Could not add HS 2.0 T&C Filename");
goto fail;
}
timestamp = host_to_be32(hapd->conf->t_c_timestamp);
if (!radius_msg_add_wfa(
msg,
RADIUS_VENDOR_ATTR_WFA_HS20_TIMESTAMP,
(const u8 *) &timestamp,
sizeof(timestamp))) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
"Could not add HS 2.0 Timestamp");
goto fail;
}
}
}
#endif /* CONFIG_HS20 */
if (radius_client_send(hapd->radius, msg, RADIUS_AUTH, sta->addr) < 0)
goto fail;
return;
fail:
radius_msg_free(msg);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_NO_RADIUS */
static void handle_eap_response(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
struct sta_info *sta, struct eap_hdr *eap,
size_t len)
{
u8 type, *data;
struct eapol_state_machine *sm = sta->eapol_sm;
if (!sm)
return;
data = (u8 *) (eap + 1);
if (len < sizeof(*eap) + 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "%s: too short response data", __func__);
return;
}
sm->eap_type_supp = type = data[0];
hostapd_logger(hapd, sm->addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE8021X,
HOSTAPD_LEVEL_DEBUG, "received EAP packet (code=%d "
"id=%d len=%d) from STA: EAP Response-%s (%d)",
eap->code, eap->identifier, be_to_host16(eap->length),
eap_server_get_name(0, type), type);
sm->dot1xAuthEapolRespFramesRx++;
wpabuf_free(sm->eap_if->eapRespData);
sm->eap_if->eapRespData = wpabuf_alloc_copy(eap, len);
sm->eapolEap = true;
}
static void handle_eap_initiate(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
struct sta_info *sta, struct eap_hdr *eap,
size_t len)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_ERP
u8 type, *data;
struct eapol_state_machine *sm = sta->eapol_sm;
if (!sm)
return;
if (len < sizeof(*eap) + 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "%s: too short response data", __func__);
return;
}
data = (u8 *) (eap + 1);
type = data[0];
hostapd_logger(hapd, sm->addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE8021X,
HOSTAPD_LEVEL_DEBUG,
"received EAP packet (code=%d id=%d len=%d) from STA: EAP Initiate type %u",
eap->code, eap->identifier, be_to_host16(eap->length),
type);
wpabuf_free(sm->eap_if->eapRespData);
sm->eap_if->eapRespData = wpabuf_alloc_copy(eap, len);
sm->eapolEap = true;
#endif /* CONFIG_ERP */
}
#ifndef CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG
static const char * eap_code_str(u8 code)
{
switch (code) {
case EAP_CODE_REQUEST:
return "request";
case EAP_CODE_RESPONSE:
return "response";
case EAP_CODE_SUCCESS:
return "success";
case EAP_CODE_FAILURE:
return "failure";
case EAP_CODE_INITIATE:
return "initiate";
case EAP_CODE_FINISH:
return "finish";
default:
return "unknown";
}
}
#endif /* CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG */
/* Process incoming EAP packet from Supplicant */
static void handle_eap(struct hostapd_data *hapd, struct sta_info *sta,
u8 *buf, size_t len)
{
struct eap_hdr *eap;
u16 eap_len;
if (len < sizeof(*eap)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, " too short EAP packet");
return;
}
eap = (struct eap_hdr *) buf;
eap_len = be_to_host16(eap->length);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP: code=%d (%s) identifier=%d length=%d",
eap->code, eap_code_str(eap->code), eap->identifier,
eap_len);
if (eap_len < sizeof(*eap)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " Invalid EAP length");
return;
} else if (eap_len > len) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
" Too short frame to contain this EAP packet");
return;
} else if (eap_len < len) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
" Ignoring %lu extra bytes after EAP packet",
(unsigned long) len - eap_len);
}
switch (eap->code) {
case EAP_CODE_RESPONSE:
handle_eap_response(hapd, sta, eap, eap_len);
break;
case EAP_CODE_INITIATE:
handle_eap_initiate(hapd, sta, eap, eap_len);
break;
}
}
struct eapol_state_machine *
ieee802_1x_alloc_eapol_sm(struct hostapd_data *hapd, struct sta_info *sta)
{
int flags = 0;
if (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_PREAUTH)
flags |= EAPOL_SM_PREAUTH;
if (sta->wpa_sm) {
flags |= EAPOL_SM_USES_WPA;
if (wpa_auth_sta_get_pmksa(sta->wpa_sm))
flags |= EAPOL_SM_FROM_PMKSA_CACHE;
}
return eapol_auth_alloc(hapd->eapol_auth, sta->addr, flags,
sta->wps_ie, sta->p2p_ie, sta,
sta->identity, sta->radius_cui);
}
static void ieee802_1x_save_eapol(struct sta_info *sta, const u8 *buf,
size_t len)
{
if (sta->pending_eapol_rx) {
wpabuf_free(sta->pending_eapol_rx->buf);
} else {
sta->pending_eapol_rx =
os_malloc(sizeof(*sta->pending_eapol_rx));
if (!sta->pending_eapol_rx)
return;
}
sta->pending_eapol_rx->buf = wpabuf_alloc_copy(buf, len);
if (!sta->pending_eapol_rx->buf) {
os_free(sta->pending_eapol_rx);
sta->pending_eapol_rx = NULL;
return;
}
os_get_reltime(&sta->pending_eapol_rx->rx_time);
}
/**
* ieee802_1x_receive - Process the EAPOL frames from the Supplicant
* @hapd: hostapd BSS data
* @sa: Source address (sender of the EAPOL frame)
* @buf: EAPOL frame
* @len: Length of buf in octets
*
* This function is called for each incoming EAPOL frame from the interface
*/
void ieee802_1x_receive(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *sa, const u8 *buf,
size_t len)
{
struct sta_info *sta;
struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
struct ieee802_1x_eapol_key *key;
u16 datalen;
struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *pmksa;
int key_mgmt;
if (!hapd->conf->ieee802_1x && !hapd->conf->wpa && !hapd->conf->osen &&
!hapd->conf->wps_state)
return;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "IEEE 802.1X: %lu bytes from " MACSTR,
(unsigned long) len, MAC2STR(sa));
sta = ap_get_sta(hapd, sa);
if (!sta || (!(sta->flags & (WLAN_STA_ASSOC | WLAN_STA_PREAUTH)) &&
!(hapd->iface->drv_flags & WPA_DRIVER_FLAGS_WIRED))) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"IEEE 802.1X data frame from not associated/Pre-authenticating STA");
if (sta && (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_AUTH)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Saving EAPOL frame from " MACSTR
" for later use", MAC2STR(sta->addr));
ieee802_1x_save_eapol(sta, buf, len);
}
return;
}
if (len < sizeof(*hdr)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, " too short IEEE 802.1X packet");
return;
}
hdr = (struct ieee802_1x_hdr *) buf;
datalen = be_to_host16(hdr->length);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " IEEE 802.1X: version=%d type=%d length=%d",
hdr->version, hdr->type, datalen);
if (len - sizeof(*hdr) < datalen) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
" frame too short for this IEEE 802.1X packet");
if (sta->eapol_sm)
sta->eapol_sm->dot1xAuthEapLengthErrorFramesRx++;
return;
}
if (len - sizeof(*hdr) > datalen) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
" ignoring %lu extra octets after IEEE 802.1X packet",
(unsigned long) len - sizeof(*hdr) - datalen);
}
if (sta->eapol_sm) {
sta->eapol_sm->dot1xAuthLastEapolFrameVersion = hdr->version;
sta->eapol_sm->dot1xAuthEapolFramesRx++;
}
key = (struct ieee802_1x_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1);
if (datalen >= sizeof(struct ieee802_1x_eapol_key) &&
hdr->type == IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_KEY &&
(key->type == EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA ||
key->type == EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN)) {
wpa_receive(hapd->wpa_auth, sta->wpa_sm, (u8 *) hdr,
sizeof(*hdr) + datalen);
return;
}
if (!hapd->conf->ieee802_1x && !hapd->conf->osen &&
!(sta->flags & (WLAN_STA_WPS | WLAN_STA_MAYBE_WPS))) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"IEEE 802.1X: Ignore EAPOL message - 802.1X not enabled and WPS not used");
return;
}
key_mgmt = wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(sta->wpa_sm);
if (key_mgmt != -1 &&
(wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(key_mgmt) || key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE ||
key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"IEEE 802.1X: Ignore EAPOL message - STA is using PSK");
return;
}
if (!sta->eapol_sm) {
sta->eapol_sm = ieee802_1x_alloc_eapol_sm(hapd, sta);
if (!sta->eapol_sm)
return;
#ifdef CONFIG_WPS
if (!hapd->conf->ieee802_1x && hapd->conf->wps_state) {
u32 wflags = sta->flags & (WLAN_STA_WPS |
WLAN_STA_WPS2 |
WLAN_STA_MAYBE_WPS);
if (wflags == WLAN_STA_MAYBE_WPS ||
wflags == (WLAN_STA_WPS | WLAN_STA_MAYBE_WPS)) {
/*
* Delay EAPOL frame transmission until a
* possible WPS STA initiates the handshake
* with EAPOL-Start. Only allow the wait to be
* skipped if the STA is known to support WPS
* 2.0.
*/
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"WPS: Do not start EAPOL until EAPOL-Start is received");
sta->eapol_sm->flags |= EAPOL_SM_WAIT_START;
}
}
#endif /* CONFIG_WPS */
sta->eapol_sm->eap_if->portEnabled = true;
}
/* since we support version 1, we can ignore version field and proceed
* as specified in version 1 standard [IEEE Std 802.1X-2001, 7.5.5] */
/* TODO: actually, we are not version 1 anymore.. However, Version 2
* does not change frame contents, so should be ok to process frames
* more or less identically. Some changes might be needed for
* verification of fields. */
switch (hdr->type) {
case IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAP_PACKET:
handle_eap(hapd, sta, (u8 *) (hdr + 1), datalen);
break;
case IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_START:
hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE8021X,
HOSTAPD_LEVEL_DEBUG,
"received EAPOL-Start from STA");
sta->eapol_sm->flags &= ~EAPOL_SM_WAIT_START;
pmksa = wpa_auth_sta_get_pmksa(sta->wpa_sm);
if (pmksa) {
hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_WPA,
HOSTAPD_LEVEL_DEBUG,
"cached PMKSA available - ignore it since STA sent EAPOL-Start");
wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(sta->wpa_sm, pmksa);
}
sta->eapol_sm->eapolStart = true;
sta->eapol_sm->dot1xAuthEapolStartFramesRx++;
eap_server_clear_identity(sta->eapol_sm->eap);
wpa_auth_sm_event(sta->wpa_sm, WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL);
break;
case IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_LOGOFF:
hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE8021X,
HOSTAPD_LEVEL_DEBUG,
"received EAPOL-Logoff from STA");
sta->acct_terminate_cause =
RADIUS_ACCT_TERMINATE_CAUSE_USER_REQUEST;
accounting_sta_stop(hapd, sta);
sta->eapol_sm->eapolLogoff = true;
sta->eapol_sm->dot1xAuthEapolLogoffFramesRx++;
eap_server_clear_identity(sta->eapol_sm->eap);
break;
case IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_KEY:
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " EAPOL-Key");
if (!ap_sta_is_authorized(sta)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
" Dropped key data from unauthorized Supplicant");
break;
}
break;
case IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_ENCAPSULATED_ASF_ALERT:
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " EAPOL-Encapsulated-ASF-Alert");
/* TODO: implement support for this; show data */
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_MACSEC
case IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_MKA:
wpa_printf(MSG_EXCESSIVE,
"EAPOL type %d will be handled by MKA", hdr->type);
break;
#endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */
default:
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " unknown IEEE 802.1X packet type");
sta->eapol_sm->dot1xAuthInvalidEapolFramesRx++;
break;
}
eapol_auth_step(sta->eapol_sm);
}
/**
* ieee802_1x_new_station - Start IEEE 802.1X authentication
* @hapd: hostapd BSS data
* @sta: The station
*
* This function is called to start IEEE 802.1X authentication when a new
* station completes IEEE 802.11 association.
*/
void ieee802_1x_new_station(struct hostapd_data *hapd, struct sta_info *sta)
{
struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *pmksa;
int reassoc = 1;
int force_1x = 0;
int key_mgmt;
#ifdef CONFIG_WPS
if (hapd->conf->wps_state &&
((hapd->conf->wpa && (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_MAYBE_WPS)) ||
(sta->flags & WLAN_STA_WPS))) {
/*
* Need to enable IEEE 802.1X/EAPOL state machines for possible
* WPS handshake even if IEEE 802.1X/EAPOL is not used for
* authentication in this BSS.
*/
force_1x = 1;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_WPS */
if (!force_1x && !hapd->conf->ieee802_1x && !hapd->conf->osen) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"IEEE 802.1X: Ignore STA - 802.1X not enabled or forced for WPS");
/*
* Clear any possible EAPOL authenticator state to support
* reassociation change from WPS to PSK.
*/
ieee802_1x_free_station(hapd, sta);
return;
}
key_mgmt = wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(sta->wpa_sm);
if (key_mgmt != -1 &&
(wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(key_mgmt) || key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE ||
key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "IEEE 802.1X: Ignore STA - using PSK");
/*
* Clear any possible EAPOL authenticator state to support
* reassociation change from WPA-EAP to PSK.
*/
ieee802_1x_free_station(hapd, sta);
return;
}
if (!sta->eapol_sm) {
hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE8021X,
HOSTAPD_LEVEL_DEBUG, "start authentication");
sta->eapol_sm = ieee802_1x_alloc_eapol_sm(hapd, sta);
if (!sta->eapol_sm) {
hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr,
HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE8021X,
HOSTAPD_LEVEL_INFO,
"failed to allocate state machine");
return;
}
reassoc = 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_WPS
sta->eapol_sm->flags &= ~EAPOL_SM_WAIT_START;
if (!hapd->conf->ieee802_1x && hapd->conf->wps_state &&
!(sta->flags & WLAN_STA_WPS2)) {
/*
* Delay EAPOL frame transmission until a possible WPS STA
* initiates the handshake with EAPOL-Start. Only allow the
* wait to be skipped if the STA is known to support WPS 2.0.
*/
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"WPS: Do not start EAPOL until EAPOL-Start is received");
sta->eapol_sm->flags |= EAPOL_SM_WAIT_START;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_WPS */
sta->eapol_sm->eap_if->portEnabled = true;
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
if (sta->auth_alg == WLAN_AUTH_FT) {
hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE8021X,
HOSTAPD_LEVEL_DEBUG,
"PMK from FT - skip IEEE 802.1X/EAP");
/* Setup EAPOL state machines to already authenticated state
* because of existing FT information from R0KH. */
sta->eapol_sm->keyRun = true;
sta->eapol_sm->eap_if->eapKeyAvailable = true;
sta->eapol_sm->auth_pae_state = AUTH_PAE_AUTHENTICATING;
sta->eapol_sm->be_auth_state = BE_AUTH_SUCCESS;
sta->eapol_sm->authSuccess = true;
sta->eapol_sm->authFail = false;
sta->eapol_sm->portValid = true;
if (sta->eapol_sm->eap)
eap_sm_notify_cached(sta->eapol_sm->eap);
ap_sta_bind_vlan(hapd, sta);
return;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
#ifdef CONFIG_FILS
if (sta->auth_alg == WLAN_AUTH_FILS_SK ||
sta->auth_alg == WLAN_AUTH_FILS_SK_PFS ||
sta->auth_alg == WLAN_AUTH_FILS_PK) {
hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE8021X,
HOSTAPD_LEVEL_DEBUG,
"PMK from FILS - skip IEEE 802.1X/EAP");
/* Setup EAPOL state machines to already authenticated state
* because of existing FILS information. */
sta->eapol_sm->keyRun = true;
sta->eapol_sm->eap_if->eapKeyAvailable = true;
sta->eapol_sm->auth_pae_state = AUTH_PAE_AUTHENTICATING;
sta->eapol_sm->be_auth_state = BE_AUTH_SUCCESS;
sta->eapol_sm->authSuccess = true;
sta->eapol_sm->authFail = false;
sta->eapol_sm->portValid = true;
if (sta->eapol_sm->eap)
eap_sm_notify_cached(sta->eapol_sm->eap);
wpa_auth_set_ptk_rekey_timer(sta->wpa_sm);
return;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
pmksa = wpa_auth_sta_get_pmksa(sta->wpa_sm);
if (pmksa) {
hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE8021X,
HOSTAPD_LEVEL_DEBUG,
"PMK from PMKSA cache - skip IEEE 802.1X/EAP");
/* Setup EAPOL state machines to already authenticated state
* because of existing PMKSA information in the cache. */
sta->eapol_sm->keyRun = true;
sta->eapol_sm->eap_if->eapKeyAvailable = true;
sta->eapol_sm->auth_pae_state = AUTH_PAE_AUTHENTICATING;
sta->eapol_sm->be_auth_state = BE_AUTH_SUCCESS;
sta->eapol_sm->authSuccess = true;
sta->eapol_sm->authFail = false;
if (sta->eapol_sm->eap)
eap_sm_notify_cached(sta->eapol_sm->eap);
VLAN: Separate station grouping and uplink configuration Separate uplink configuration (IEEE 802.1q VID) and grouping of stations into AP_VLAN interfaces. The int vlan_id will continue to identify the AP_VLAN interface the station should be assigned to. Each AP_VLAN interface corresponds to an instance of struct hostapd_vlan that is uniquely identified by int vlan_id within an BSS. New: Each station and struct hostapd_vlan holds a struct vlan_description vlan_desc member that describes the uplink configuration requested. Currently this is just an int untagged IEEE 802.1q VID, but can be extended to tagged VLANs and other settings easily. When the station was about to be assigned its vlan_id, vlan_desc and vlan_id will now be set simultaneously by ap_sta_set_vlan(). So sta->vlan_id can still be tested for whether the station needs to be moved to an AP_VLAN interface. To ease addition of tagged VLAN support, a member notempty is added to struct vlan_description. Is is set to 1 if an untagged or tagged VLAN assignment is requested and needs to be validated. The inverted form allows os_zalloc() to initialize an empty description. Though not depended on by the code, vlan_id assignment ensures: * vlan_id = 0 will continue to mean no AP_VLAN interface * vlan_id < 4096 will continue to mean vlan_id = untagged vlan id with no per_sta_vif and no extra tagged vlan. * vlan_id > 4096 will be used for per_sta_vif and/or tagged vlans. This way struct wpa_group and drivers API do not need to be changed in order to implement tagged VLANs or per_sta_vif support. DYNAMIC_VLAN_* will refer to (struct vlan_description).notempty only, thus grouping of the stations for per_sta_vif can be used with DYNAMIC_VLAN_DISABLED, but not with CONFIG_NO_VLAN, as struct hostapd_vlan is still used to manage AP_VLAN interfaces. MAX_VLAN_ID will be checked in hostapd_vlan_valid and during setup of VLAN interfaces and refer to IEEE 802.1q VID. VLAN_ID_WILDCARD will continue to refer to int vlan_id. Renaming vlan_id to vlan_desc when type changed from int to struct vlan_description was avoided when vlan_id was also used in a way that did not depend on its type (for example, when passed to another function). Output of "VLAN ID %d" continues to refer to int vlan_id, while "VLAN %d" will refer to untagged IEEE 802.1q VID. Signed-off-by: Michael Braun <michael-dev@fami-braun.de>
8 years ago
pmksa_cache_to_eapol_data(hapd, pmksa, sta->eapol_sm);
ap_sta_bind_vlan(hapd, sta);
} else {
if (reassoc) {
/*
* Force EAPOL state machines to start
* re-authentication without having to wait for the
* Supplicant to send EAPOL-Start.
*/
sta->eapol_sm->reAuthenticate = true;
}
eapol_auth_step(sta->eapol_sm);
}
}
void ieee802_1x_free_station(struct hostapd_data *hapd, struct sta_info *sta)
{
struct eapol_state_machine *sm = sta->eapol_sm;
#ifdef CONFIG_HS20
eloop_cancel_timeout(ieee802_1x_wnm_notif_send, hapd, sta);
#endif /* CONFIG_HS20 */
if (sta->pending_eapol_rx) {
wpabuf_free(sta->pending_eapol_rx->buf);
os_free(sta->pending_eapol_rx);
sta->pending_eapol_rx = NULL;
}
if (!sm)
return;
sta->eapol_sm = NULL;
#ifndef CONFIG_NO_RADIUS
radius_msg_free(sm->last_recv_radius);
radius_free_class(&sm->radius_class);
#endif /* CONFIG_NO_RADIUS */
eapol_auth_free(sm);
}
#ifndef CONFIG_NO_RADIUS
static void ieee802_1x_decapsulate_radius(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
struct sta_info *sta)
{
struct wpabuf *eap;
const struct eap_hdr *hdr;
int eap_type = -1;
char buf[64];
struct radius_msg *msg;
struct eapol_state_machine *sm = sta->eapol_sm;
if (!sm || !sm->last_recv_radius) {
if (sm)
sm->eap_if->aaaEapNoReq = true;
return;
}
msg = sm->last_recv_radius;
eap = radius_msg_get_eap(msg);
if (!eap) {
/* RFC 3579, Chap. 2.6.3:
* RADIUS server SHOULD NOT send Access-Reject/no EAP-Message
* attribute */
hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE8021X,
HOSTAPD_LEVEL_WARNING,
"could not extract EAP-Message from RADIUS message");
sm->eap_if->aaaEapNoReq = true;
return;
}
if (wpabuf_len(eap) < sizeof(*hdr)) {
hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE8021X,
HOSTAPD_LEVEL_WARNING,
"too short EAP packet received from authentication server");
wpabuf_free(eap);
sm->eap_if->aaaEapNoReq = true;
return;
}
if (wpabuf_len(eap) > sizeof(*hdr))
eap_type = (wpabuf_head_u8(eap))[sizeof(*hdr)];
hdr = wpabuf_head(eap);
switch (hdr->code) {
case EAP_CODE_REQUEST:
if (eap_type >= 0)
sm->eap_type_authsrv = eap_type;
os_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "EAP-Request-%s (%d)",
eap_server_get_name(0, eap_type), eap_type);
break;
case EAP_CODE_RESPONSE:
os_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "EAP Response-%s (%d)",
eap_server_get_name(0, eap_type), eap_type);
break;
case EAP_CODE_SUCCESS:
os_strlcpy(buf, "EAP Success", sizeof(buf));
break;
case EAP_CODE_FAILURE:
os_strlcpy(buf, "EAP Failure", sizeof(buf));
break;
default:
os_strlcpy(buf, "unknown EAP code", sizeof(buf));
break;
}
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE8021X,
HOSTAPD_LEVEL_DEBUG,
"decapsulated EAP packet (code=%d id=%d len=%d) from RADIUS server: %s",
hdr->code, hdr->identifier, be_to_host16(hdr->length),
buf);
sm->eap_if->aaaEapReq = true;
wpabuf_free(sm->eap_if->aaaEapReqData);
sm->eap_if->aaaEapReqData = eap;
}
static void ieee802_1x_get_keys(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
struct sta_info *sta, struct radius_msg *msg,
struct radius_msg *req,
const u8 *shared_secret,
size_t shared_secret_len)
{
struct radius_ms_mppe_keys *keys;
u8 *buf;
size_t len;
struct eapol_state_machine *sm = sta->eapol_sm;
if (!sm)
return;
keys = radius_msg_get_ms_keys(msg, req, shared_secret,
shared_secret_len);
if (keys && keys->send && keys->recv) {
len = keys->send_len + keys->recv_len;
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "MS-MPPE-Send-Key",
keys->send, keys->send_len);
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "MS-MPPE-Recv-Key",
keys->recv, keys->recv_len);
os_free(sm->eap_if->aaaEapKeyData);
sm->eap_if->aaaEapKeyData = os_malloc(len);
if (sm->eap_if->aaaEapKeyData) {
os_memcpy(sm->eap_if->aaaEapKeyData, keys->recv,
keys->recv_len);
os_memcpy(sm->eap_if->aaaEapKeyData + keys->recv_len,
keys->send, keys->send_len);
sm->eap_if->aaaEapKeyDataLen = len;
sm->eap_if->aaaEapKeyAvailable = true;
}
} else {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"MS-MPPE: 1x_get_keys, could not get keys: %p send: %p recv: %p",
keys, keys ? keys->send : NULL,
keys ? keys->recv : NULL);
}
if (keys) {
os_free(keys->send);
os_free(keys->recv);
os_free(keys);
}
if (radius_msg_get_attr_ptr(msg, RADIUS_ATTR_EAP_KEY_NAME, &buf, &len,
NULL) == 0) {
os_free(sm->eap_if->eapSessionId);
sm->eap_if->eapSessionId = os_memdup(buf, len);
if (sm->eap_if->eapSessionId) {
sm->eap_if->eapSessionIdLen = len;
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-Key Name",
sm->eap_if->eapSessionId,
sm->eap_if->eapSessionIdLen);
}
} else {
sm->eap_if->eapSessionIdLen = 0;
}
}
static void ieee802_1x_store_radius_class(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
struct sta_info *sta,
struct radius_msg *msg)
{
u8 *attr_class;
size_t class_len;
struct eapol_state_machine *sm = sta->eapol_sm;
int count, i;
struct radius_attr_data *nclass;
size_t nclass_count;
if (!hapd->conf->radius->acct_server || !hapd->radius || !sm)
return;
radius_free_class(&sm->radius_class);
count = radius_msg_count_attr(msg, RADIUS_ATTR_CLASS, 1);
if (count <= 0)
return;
nclass = os_calloc(count, sizeof(struct radius_attr_data));
if (!nclass)
return;
nclass_count = 0;
attr_class = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
do {
if (radius_msg_get_attr_ptr(msg, RADIUS_ATTR_CLASS,
&attr_class, &class_len,
attr_class) < 0) {
i = count;
break;
}
} while (class_len < 1);
nclass[nclass_count].data = os_memdup(attr_class, class_len);
if (!nclass[nclass_count].data)
break;
nclass[nclass_count].len = class_len;
nclass_count++;
}
sm->radius_class.attr = nclass;
sm->radius_class.count = nclass_count;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"IEEE 802.1X: Stored %lu RADIUS Class attributes for "
MACSTR,
(unsigned long) sm->radius_class.count,
MAC2STR(sta->addr));
}
/* Update sta->identity based on User-Name attribute in Access-Accept */
static void ieee802_1x_update_sta_identity(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
struct sta_info *sta,
struct radius_msg *msg)
{
u8 *buf, *identity;
size_t len;
struct eapol_state_machine *sm = sta->eapol_sm;
if (!sm)
return;
if (radius_msg_get_attr_ptr(msg, RADIUS_ATTR_USER_NAME, &buf, &len,
NULL) < 0)
return;
identity = (u8 *) dup_binstr(buf, len);
if (!identity)
return;
hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE8021X,
HOSTAPD_LEVEL_DEBUG,
"old identity '%s' updated with User-Name from Access-Accept '%s'",
sm->identity ? (char *) sm->identity : "N/A",
(char *) identity);
os_free(sm->identity);
sm->identity = identity;
sm->identity_len = len;
}
/* Update CUI based on Chargeable-User-Identity attribute in Access-Accept */
static void ieee802_1x_update_sta_cui(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
struct sta_info *sta,
struct radius_msg *msg)
{
struct eapol_state_machine *sm = sta->eapol_sm;
struct wpabuf *cui;
u8 *buf;
size_t len;
if (!sm)
return;
if (radius_msg_get_attr_ptr(msg, RADIUS_ATTR_CHARGEABLE_USER_IDENTITY,
&buf, &len, NULL) < 0)
return;
cui = wpabuf_alloc_copy(buf, len);
if (!cui)
return;
wpabuf_free(sm->radius_cui);
sm->radius_cui = cui;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_HS20
static void ieee802_1x_hs20_sub_rem(struct sta_info *sta, u8 *pos, size_t len)
{
sta->remediation = 1;
os_free(sta->remediation_url);
if (len > 2) {
sta->remediation_url = os_malloc(len);
if (!sta->remediation_url)
return;
sta->remediation_method = pos[0];
os_memcpy(sta->remediation_url, pos + 1, len - 1);
sta->remediation_url[len - 1] = '\0';
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"HS 2.0: Subscription remediation needed for "
MACSTR " - server method %u URL %s",
MAC2STR(sta->addr), sta->remediation_method,
sta->remediation_url);
} else {
sta->remediation_url = NULL;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"HS 2.0: Subscription remediation needed for "
MACSTR, MAC2STR(sta->addr));
}
/* TODO: assign the STA into remediation VLAN or add filtering */
}
static void ieee802_1x_hs20_deauth_req(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
struct sta_info *sta, u8 *pos,
size_t len)
{
if (len < 3)
return; /* Malformed information */
sta->hs20_deauth_requested = 1;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"HS 2.0: Deauthentication request - Code %u Re-auth Delay %u",
*pos, WPA_GET_LE16(pos + 1));
wpabuf_free(sta->hs20_deauth_req);
sta->hs20_deauth_req = wpabuf_alloc(len + 1);
if (sta->hs20_deauth_req) {
wpabuf_put_data(sta->hs20_deauth_req, pos, 3);
wpabuf_put_u8(sta->hs20_deauth_req, len - 3);
wpabuf_put_data(sta->hs20_deauth_req, pos + 3, len - 3);
}
ap_sta_session_timeout(hapd, sta, hapd->conf->hs20_deauth_req_timeout);
}
static void ieee802_1x_hs20_session_info(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
struct sta_info *sta, u8 *pos,
size_t len, int session_timeout)
{
unsigned int swt;
int warning_time, beacon_int;
if (len < 1)
return; /* Malformed information */
os_free(sta->hs20_session_info_url);
sta->hs20_session_info_url = os_malloc(len);
if (!sta->hs20_session_info_url)
return;
swt = pos[0];
os_memcpy(sta->hs20_session_info_url, pos + 1, len - 1);
sta->hs20_session_info_url[len - 1] = '\0';
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"HS 2.0: Session Information URL='%s' SWT=%u (session_timeout=%d)",
sta->hs20_session_info_url, swt, session_timeout);
if (session_timeout < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"HS 2.0: No Session-Timeout set - ignore session info URL");
return;
}
if (swt == 255)
swt = 1; /* Use one minute as the AP selected value */
if ((unsigned int) session_timeout < swt * 60)
warning_time = 0;
else
warning_time = session_timeout - swt * 60;
beacon_int = hapd->iconf->beacon_int;
if (beacon_int < 1)
beacon_int = 100; /* best guess */
sta->hs20_disassoc_timer = swt * 60 * 1000 / beacon_int * 125 / 128;
if (sta->hs20_disassoc_timer > 65535)
sta->hs20_disassoc_timer = 65535;
ap_sta_session_warning_timeout(hapd, sta, warning_time);
}
static void ieee802_1x_hs20_t_c_filtering(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
struct sta_info *sta, u8 *pos,
size_t len)
{
if (len < 4)
return; /* Malformed information */
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"HS 2.0: Terms and Conditions filtering %02x %02x %02x %02x",
pos[0], pos[1], pos[2], pos[3]);
hs20_t_c_filtering(hapd, sta, pos[0] & BIT(0));
}
static void ieee802_1x_hs20_t_c_url(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
struct sta_info *sta, u8 *pos, size_t len)
{
os_free(sta->t_c_url);
sta->t_c_url = os_malloc(len + 1);
if (!sta->t_c_url)
return;
os_memcpy(sta->t_c_url, pos, len);
sta->t_c_url[len] = '\0';
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"HS 2.0: Terms and Conditions URL %s", sta->t_c_url);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_HS20 */
static void ieee802_1x_check_hs20(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
struct sta_info *sta,
struct radius_msg *msg,
int session_timeout)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_HS20
u8 *buf, *pos, *end, type, sublen;
size_t len;
buf = NULL;
sta->remediation = 0;
sta->hs20_deauth_requested = 0;
for (;;) {
if (radius_msg_get_attr_ptr(msg, RADIUS_ATTR_VENDOR_SPECIFIC,
&buf, &len, buf) < 0)
break;
if (len < 6)
continue;
pos = buf;
end = buf + len;
if (WPA_GET_BE32(pos) != RADIUS_VENDOR_ID_WFA)
continue;
pos += 4;
type = *pos++;
sublen = *pos++;
if (sublen < 2)
continue; /* invalid length */
sublen -= 2; /* skip header */
if (pos + sublen > end)
continue; /* invalid WFA VSA */
switch (type) {
case RADIUS_VENDOR_ATTR_WFA_HS20_SUBSCR_REMEDIATION:
ieee802_1x_hs20_sub_rem(sta, pos, sublen);
break;
case RADIUS_VENDOR_ATTR_WFA_HS20_DEAUTH_REQ:
ieee802_1x_hs20_deauth_req(hapd, sta, pos, sublen);
break;
case RADIUS_VENDOR_ATTR_WFA_HS20_SESSION_INFO_URL:
ieee802_1x_hs20_session_info(hapd, sta, pos, sublen,
session_timeout);
break;
case RADIUS_VENDOR_ATTR_WFA_HS20_T_C_FILTERING:
ieee802_1x_hs20_t_c_filtering(hapd, sta, pos, sublen);
break;
case RADIUS_VENDOR_ATTR_WFA_HS20_T_C_URL:
ieee802_1x_hs20_t_c_url(hapd, sta, pos, sublen);
break;
}
}
#endif /* CONFIG_HS20 */
}
struct sta_id_search {
u8 identifier;
struct eapol_state_machine *sm;
};
static int ieee802_1x_select_radius_identifier(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
struct sta_info *sta,
void *ctx)
{
struct sta_id_search *id_search = ctx;
struct eapol_state_machine *sm = sta->eapol_sm;
if (sm && sm->radius_identifier >= 0 &&
sm->radius_identifier == id_search->identifier) {
id_search->sm = sm;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static struct eapol_state_machine *
ieee802_1x_search_radius_identifier(struct hostapd_data *hapd, u8 identifier)
{
struct sta_id_search id_search;
id_search.identifier = identifier;
id_search.sm = NULL;
ap_for_each_sta(hapd, ieee802_1x_select_radius_identifier, &id_search);
return id_search.sm;
}
Allow remote RADIUS authentication with local VLAN management The documentation in the hostapd.conf file says that the dynamic_vlan variable is used to control whether VLAN assignments are accepted from a RADIUS server. The implication seems to be that a static VLAN assignment will come from the accept_mac_file if dynamic_vlan is set to 0, and a dynamic assignment will come from the RADIUS server if dynamic_vlan is set to 1. Instead, I'm seeing that the static settings from the accept_mac_file are ignored if dynamic_vlan is set to 0, but used if dynamic_vlan is set to 1. If dynamic_vlan is set to 1 and the RADIUS server does not provide a VLAN, then the accept_mac_file assignment is overridden and the STA is assigned to the default non-VLANed interface. If my understanding of the expected behavior is correct, then I believe the problem is in ap_sta_set_vlan(). That routine checks the dynamic_vlan setting, but has no way of determining whether the incoming vlan_desc is static (i.e., from accept_mac_file) or dynamic (i.e., from a RADIUS server). I've attached a patch that gets hostapd working as I believe it's meant to, and updates the documentation to make the implicit behavior explicit. The functional changes are: - hostapd_allowed_address() will always extract the vlan_id from the accept_macs file. It will not update the vlan_id from the RADIUS cache if dynamic_vlan is DISABLED. - hostapd_acl_recv_radius() will not update the cached vlan_id if dynamic_vlan is DISABLED. - ieee802_1x_receive_auth() will not update the vlan_id if dynamic_vlan is DISABLED. More cosmetic: Most of the delta is just moving code out of ieee802_1x_receive_auth() into a new ieee802_1x_update_vlan() routine. While I initially did this because the new DISABLED check introduced excessive indentation, it has the added advantage of eliminating the vlan_description allocation and os_memset() call for all DYNAMIC_VLAN_DISABLED configs. I've done a couple rounds of review offline with Michael Braun (who has done much of the work in this part of the code) and incorporated his feedback. If dynamic_vlan=0 (disabled), vlan assignments will be managed using the local accept_mac_file ACL file, even if a RADIUS server is being used for user authentication. This allows us to manage users and devices independently. Signed-off-by: Nils Nieuwejaar <nils.nieuwejaar@gmail.com>
6 years ago
#ifndef CONFIG_NO_VLAN
static int ieee802_1x_update_vlan(struct radius_msg *msg,
struct hostapd_data *hapd,
struct sta_info *sta)
{
struct vlan_description vlan_desc;
os_memset(&vlan_desc, 0, sizeof(vlan_desc));
vlan_desc.notempty = !!radius_msg_get_vlanid(msg, &vlan_desc.untagged,
MAX_NUM_TAGGED_VLAN,
vlan_desc.tagged, 0);
Allow remote RADIUS authentication with local VLAN management The documentation in the hostapd.conf file says that the dynamic_vlan variable is used to control whether VLAN assignments are accepted from a RADIUS server. The implication seems to be that a static VLAN assignment will come from the accept_mac_file if dynamic_vlan is set to 0, and a dynamic assignment will come from the RADIUS server if dynamic_vlan is set to 1. Instead, I'm seeing that the static settings from the accept_mac_file are ignored if dynamic_vlan is set to 0, but used if dynamic_vlan is set to 1. If dynamic_vlan is set to 1 and the RADIUS server does not provide a VLAN, then the accept_mac_file assignment is overridden and the STA is assigned to the default non-VLANed interface. If my understanding of the expected behavior is correct, then I believe the problem is in ap_sta_set_vlan(). That routine checks the dynamic_vlan setting, but has no way of determining whether the incoming vlan_desc is static (i.e., from accept_mac_file) or dynamic (i.e., from a RADIUS server). I've attached a patch that gets hostapd working as I believe it's meant to, and updates the documentation to make the implicit behavior explicit. The functional changes are: - hostapd_allowed_address() will always extract the vlan_id from the accept_macs file. It will not update the vlan_id from the RADIUS cache if dynamic_vlan is DISABLED. - hostapd_acl_recv_radius() will not update the cached vlan_id if dynamic_vlan is DISABLED. - ieee802_1x_receive_auth() will not update the vlan_id if dynamic_vlan is DISABLED. More cosmetic: Most of the delta is just moving code out of ieee802_1x_receive_auth() into a new ieee802_1x_update_vlan() routine. While I initially did this because the new DISABLED check introduced excessive indentation, it has the added advantage of eliminating the vlan_description allocation and os_memset() call for all DYNAMIC_VLAN_DISABLED configs. I've done a couple rounds of review offline with Michael Braun (who has done much of the work in this part of the code) and incorporated his feedback. If dynamic_vlan=0 (disabled), vlan assignments will be managed using the local accept_mac_file ACL file, even if a RADIUS server is being used for user authentication. This allows us to manage users and devices independently. Signed-off-by: Nils Nieuwejaar <nils.nieuwejaar@gmail.com>
6 years ago
if (vlan_desc.notempty &&
!hostapd_vlan_valid(hapd->conf->vlan, &vlan_desc)) {
sta->eapol_sm->authFail = true;
Allow remote RADIUS authentication with local VLAN management The documentation in the hostapd.conf file says that the dynamic_vlan variable is used to control whether VLAN assignments are accepted from a RADIUS server. The implication seems to be that a static VLAN assignment will come from the accept_mac_file if dynamic_vlan is set to 0, and a dynamic assignment will come from the RADIUS server if dynamic_vlan is set to 1. Instead, I'm seeing that the static settings from the accept_mac_file are ignored if dynamic_vlan is set to 0, but used if dynamic_vlan is set to 1. If dynamic_vlan is set to 1 and the RADIUS server does not provide a VLAN, then the accept_mac_file assignment is overridden and the STA is assigned to the default non-VLANed interface. If my understanding of the expected behavior is correct, then I believe the problem is in ap_sta_set_vlan(). That routine checks the dynamic_vlan setting, but has no way of determining whether the incoming vlan_desc is static (i.e., from accept_mac_file) or dynamic (i.e., from a RADIUS server). I've attached a patch that gets hostapd working as I believe it's meant to, and updates the documentation to make the implicit behavior explicit. The functional changes are: - hostapd_allowed_address() will always extract the vlan_id from the accept_macs file. It will not update the vlan_id from the RADIUS cache if dynamic_vlan is DISABLED. - hostapd_acl_recv_radius() will not update the cached vlan_id if dynamic_vlan is DISABLED. - ieee802_1x_receive_auth() will not update the vlan_id if dynamic_vlan is DISABLED. More cosmetic: Most of the delta is just moving code out of ieee802_1x_receive_auth() into a new ieee802_1x_update_vlan() routine. While I initially did this because the new DISABLED check introduced excessive indentation, it has the added advantage of eliminating the vlan_description allocation and os_memset() call for all DYNAMIC_VLAN_DISABLED configs. I've done a couple rounds of review offline with Michael Braun (who has done much of the work in this part of the code) and incorporated his feedback. If dynamic_vlan=0 (disabled), vlan assignments will be managed using the local accept_mac_file ACL file, even if a RADIUS server is being used for user authentication. This allows us to manage users and devices independently. Signed-off-by: Nils Nieuwejaar <nils.nieuwejaar@gmail.com>
6 years ago
hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_RADIUS,
HOSTAPD_LEVEL_INFO,
"Invalid VLAN %d%s received from RADIUS server",
vlan_desc.untagged,
vlan_desc.tagged[0] ? "+" : "");
os_memset(&vlan_desc, 0, sizeof(vlan_desc));
ap_sta_set_vlan(hapd, sta, &vlan_desc);
return -1;
}
if (hapd->conf->ssid.dynamic_vlan == DYNAMIC_VLAN_REQUIRED &&
!vlan_desc.notempty) {
sta->eapol_sm->authFail = true;
Allow remote RADIUS authentication with local VLAN management The documentation in the hostapd.conf file says that the dynamic_vlan variable is used to control whether VLAN assignments are accepted from a RADIUS server. The implication seems to be that a static VLAN assignment will come from the accept_mac_file if dynamic_vlan is set to 0, and a dynamic assignment will come from the RADIUS server if dynamic_vlan is set to 1. Instead, I'm seeing that the static settings from the accept_mac_file are ignored if dynamic_vlan is set to 0, but used if dynamic_vlan is set to 1. If dynamic_vlan is set to 1 and the RADIUS server does not provide a VLAN, then the accept_mac_file assignment is overridden and the STA is assigned to the default non-VLANed interface. If my understanding of the expected behavior is correct, then I believe the problem is in ap_sta_set_vlan(). That routine checks the dynamic_vlan setting, but has no way of determining whether the incoming vlan_desc is static (i.e., from accept_mac_file) or dynamic (i.e., from a RADIUS server). I've attached a patch that gets hostapd working as I believe it's meant to, and updates the documentation to make the implicit behavior explicit. The functional changes are: - hostapd_allowed_address() will always extract the vlan_id from the accept_macs file. It will not update the vlan_id from the RADIUS cache if dynamic_vlan is DISABLED. - hostapd_acl_recv_radius() will not update the cached vlan_id if dynamic_vlan is DISABLED. - ieee802_1x_receive_auth() will not update the vlan_id if dynamic_vlan is DISABLED. More cosmetic: Most of the delta is just moving code out of ieee802_1x_receive_auth() into a new ieee802_1x_update_vlan() routine. While I initially did this because the new DISABLED check introduced excessive indentation, it has the added advantage of eliminating the vlan_description allocation and os_memset() call for all DYNAMIC_VLAN_DISABLED configs. I've done a couple rounds of review offline with Michael Braun (who has done much of the work in this part of the code) and incorporated his feedback. If dynamic_vlan=0 (disabled), vlan assignments will be managed using the local accept_mac_file ACL file, even if a RADIUS server is being used for user authentication. This allows us to manage users and devices independently. Signed-off-by: Nils Nieuwejaar <nils.nieuwejaar@gmail.com>
6 years ago
hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE8021X,
HOSTAPD_LEVEL_INFO,
"authentication server did not include required VLAN ID in Access-Accept");
return -1;
}
return ap_sta_set_vlan(hapd, sta, &vlan_desc);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_NO_VLAN */
/**
* ieee802_1x_receive_auth - Process RADIUS frames from Authentication Server
* @msg: RADIUS response message
* @req: RADIUS request message
* @shared_secret: RADIUS shared secret
* @shared_secret_len: Length of shared_secret in octets
* @data: Context data (struct hostapd_data *)
* Returns: Processing status
*/
static RadiusRxResult
ieee802_1x_receive_auth(struct radius_msg *msg, struct radius_msg *req,
const u8 *shared_secret, size_t shared_secret_len,
void *data)
{
struct hostapd_data *hapd = data;
struct sta_info *sta;
u32 session_timeout = 0, termination_action, acct_interim_interval;
VLAN: Separate station grouping and uplink configuration Separate uplink configuration (IEEE 802.1q VID) and grouping of stations into AP_VLAN interfaces. The int vlan_id will continue to identify the AP_VLAN interface the station should be assigned to. Each AP_VLAN interface corresponds to an instance of struct hostapd_vlan that is uniquely identified by int vlan_id within an BSS. New: Each station and struct hostapd_vlan holds a struct vlan_description vlan_desc member that describes the uplink configuration requested. Currently this is just an int untagged IEEE 802.1q VID, but can be extended to tagged VLANs and other settings easily. When the station was about to be assigned its vlan_id, vlan_desc and vlan_id will now be set simultaneously by ap_sta_set_vlan(). So sta->vlan_id can still be tested for whether the station needs to be moved to an AP_VLAN interface. To ease addition of tagged VLAN support, a member notempty is added to struct vlan_description. Is is set to 1 if an untagged or tagged VLAN assignment is requested and needs to be validated. The inverted form allows os_zalloc() to initialize an empty description. Though not depended on by the code, vlan_id assignment ensures: * vlan_id = 0 will continue to mean no AP_VLAN interface * vlan_id < 4096 will continue to mean vlan_id = untagged vlan id with no per_sta_vif and no extra tagged vlan. * vlan_id > 4096 will be used for per_sta_vif and/or tagged vlans. This way struct wpa_group and drivers API do not need to be changed in order to implement tagged VLANs or per_sta_vif support. DYNAMIC_VLAN_* will refer to (struct vlan_description).notempty only, thus grouping of the stations for per_sta_vif can be used with DYNAMIC_VLAN_DISABLED, but not with CONFIG_NO_VLAN, as struct hostapd_vlan is still used to manage AP_VLAN interfaces. MAX_VLAN_ID will be checked in hostapd_vlan_valid and during setup of VLAN interfaces and refer to IEEE 802.1q VID. VLAN_ID_WILDCARD will continue to refer to int vlan_id. Renaming vlan_id to vlan_desc when type changed from int to struct vlan_description was avoided when vlan_id was also used in a way that did not depend on its type (for example, when passed to another function). Output of "VLAN ID %d" continues to refer to int vlan_id, while "VLAN %d" will refer to untagged IEEE 802.1q VID. Signed-off-by: Michael Braun <michael-dev@fami-braun.de>
8 years ago
int session_timeout_set;
u32 reason_code;
struct eapol_state_machine *sm;
int override_eapReq = 0;
struct radius_hdr *hdr = radius_msg_get_hdr(msg);
sm = ieee802_1x_search_radius_identifier(hapd, hdr->identifier);
if (!sm) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"IEEE 802.1X: Could not find matching station for this RADIUS message");
return RADIUS_RX_UNKNOWN;
}
sta = sm->sta;
/* RFC 2869, Ch. 5.13: valid Message-Authenticator attribute MUST be
* present when packet contains an EAP-Message attribute */
if (hdr->code == RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT &&
radius_msg_get_attr(msg, RADIUS_ATTR_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR, NULL,
0) < 0 &&
radius_msg_get_attr(msg, RADIUS_ATTR_EAP_MESSAGE, NULL, 0) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"Allowing RADIUS Access-Reject without Message-Authenticator since it does not include EAP-Message");
} else if (radius_msg_verify(msg, shared_secret, shared_secret_len,
req, 1)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"Incoming RADIUS packet did not have correct Message-Authenticator - dropped");
return RADIUS_RX_INVALID_AUTHENTICATOR;
}
if (hdr->code != RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT &&
hdr->code != RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT &&
hdr->code != RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Unknown RADIUS message code");
return RADIUS_RX_UNKNOWN;
}
sm->radius_identifier = -1;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "RADIUS packet matching with station " MACSTR,
MAC2STR(sta->addr));
radius_msg_free(sm->last_recv_radius);
sm->last_recv_radius = msg;
session_timeout_set =
!radius_msg_get_attr_int32(msg, RADIUS_ATTR_SESSION_TIMEOUT,
&session_timeout);
if (radius_msg_get_attr_int32(msg, RADIUS_ATTR_TERMINATION_ACTION,
&termination_action))
termination_action = RADIUS_TERMINATION_ACTION_DEFAULT;
if (hapd->conf->acct_interim_interval == 0 &&
hdr->code == RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT &&
radius_msg_get_attr_int32(msg, RADIUS_ATTR_ACCT_INTERIM_INTERVAL,
&acct_interim_interval) == 0) {
if (acct_interim_interval < 60) {
hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr,
HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE8021X,
HOSTAPD_LEVEL_INFO,
"ignored too small Acct-Interim-Interval %d",
acct_interim_interval);
} else
sta->acct_interim_interval = acct_interim_interval;
}
switch (hdr->code) {
case RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT:
#ifndef CONFIG_NO_VLAN
Allow remote RADIUS authentication with local VLAN management The documentation in the hostapd.conf file says that the dynamic_vlan variable is used to control whether VLAN assignments are accepted from a RADIUS server. The implication seems to be that a static VLAN assignment will come from the accept_mac_file if dynamic_vlan is set to 0, and a dynamic assignment will come from the RADIUS server if dynamic_vlan is set to 1. Instead, I'm seeing that the static settings from the accept_mac_file are ignored if dynamic_vlan is set to 0, but used if dynamic_vlan is set to 1. If dynamic_vlan is set to 1 and the RADIUS server does not provide a VLAN, then the accept_mac_file assignment is overridden and the STA is assigned to the default non-VLANed interface. If my understanding of the expected behavior is correct, then I believe the problem is in ap_sta_set_vlan(). That routine checks the dynamic_vlan setting, but has no way of determining whether the incoming vlan_desc is static (i.e., from accept_mac_file) or dynamic (i.e., from a RADIUS server). I've attached a patch that gets hostapd working as I believe it's meant to, and updates the documentation to make the implicit behavior explicit. The functional changes are: - hostapd_allowed_address() will always extract the vlan_id from the accept_macs file. It will not update the vlan_id from the RADIUS cache if dynamic_vlan is DISABLED. - hostapd_acl_recv_radius() will not update the cached vlan_id if dynamic_vlan is DISABLED. - ieee802_1x_receive_auth() will not update the vlan_id if dynamic_vlan is DISABLED. More cosmetic: Most of the delta is just moving code out of ieee802_1x_receive_auth() into a new ieee802_1x_update_vlan() routine. While I initially did this because the new DISABLED check introduced excessive indentation, it has the added advantage of eliminating the vlan_description allocation and os_memset() call for all DYNAMIC_VLAN_DISABLED configs. I've done a couple rounds of review offline with Michael Braun (who has done much of the work in this part of the code) and incorporated his feedback. If dynamic_vlan=0 (disabled), vlan assignments will be managed using the local accept_mac_file ACL file, even if a RADIUS server is being used for user authentication. This allows us to manage users and devices independently. Signed-off-by: Nils Nieuwejaar <nils.nieuwejaar@gmail.com>
6 years ago
if (hapd->conf->ssid.dynamic_vlan != DYNAMIC_VLAN_DISABLED &&
ieee802_1x_update_vlan(msg, hapd, sta) < 0)
break;
VLAN: Separate station grouping and uplink configuration Separate uplink configuration (IEEE 802.1q VID) and grouping of stations into AP_VLAN interfaces. The int vlan_id will continue to identify the AP_VLAN interface the station should be assigned to. Each AP_VLAN interface corresponds to an instance of struct hostapd_vlan that is uniquely identified by int vlan_id within an BSS. New: Each station and struct hostapd_vlan holds a struct vlan_description vlan_desc member that describes the uplink configuration requested. Currently this is just an int untagged IEEE 802.1q VID, but can be extended to tagged VLANs and other settings easily. When the station was about to be assigned its vlan_id, vlan_desc and vlan_id will now be set simultaneously by ap_sta_set_vlan(). So sta->vlan_id can still be tested for whether the station needs to be moved to an AP_VLAN interface. To ease addition of tagged VLAN support, a member notempty is added to struct vlan_description. Is is set to 1 if an untagged or tagged VLAN assignment is requested and needs to be validated. The inverted form allows os_zalloc() to initialize an empty description. Though not depended on by the code, vlan_id assignment ensures: * vlan_id = 0 will continue to mean no AP_VLAN interface * vlan_id < 4096 will continue to mean vlan_id = untagged vlan id with no per_sta_vif and no extra tagged vlan. * vlan_id > 4096 will be used for per_sta_vif and/or tagged vlans. This way struct wpa_group and drivers API do not need to be changed in order to implement tagged VLANs or per_sta_vif support. DYNAMIC_VLAN_* will refer to (struct vlan_description).notempty only, thus grouping of the stations for per_sta_vif can be used with DYNAMIC_VLAN_DISABLED, but not with CONFIG_NO_VLAN, as struct hostapd_vlan is still used to manage AP_VLAN interfaces. MAX_VLAN_ID will be checked in hostapd_vlan_valid and during setup of VLAN interfaces and refer to IEEE 802.1q VID. VLAN_ID_WILDCARD will continue to refer to int vlan_id. Renaming vlan_id to vlan_desc when type changed from int to struct vlan_description was avoided when vlan_id was also used in a way that did not depend on its type (for example, when passed to another function). Output of "VLAN ID %d" continues to refer to int vlan_id, while "VLAN %d" will refer to untagged IEEE 802.1q VID. Signed-off-by: Michael Braun <michael-dev@fami-braun.de>
8 years ago
if (sta->vlan_id > 0) {
hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr,
HOSTAPD_MODULE_RADIUS,
HOSTAPD_LEVEL_INFO,
"VLAN ID %d", sta->vlan_id);
}
if ((sta->flags & WLAN_STA_ASSOC) &&
ap_sta_bind_vlan(hapd, sta) < 0)
break;
Allow remote RADIUS authentication with local VLAN management The documentation in the hostapd.conf file says that the dynamic_vlan variable is used to control whether VLAN assignments are accepted from a RADIUS server. The implication seems to be that a static VLAN assignment will come from the accept_mac_file if dynamic_vlan is set to 0, and a dynamic assignment will come from the RADIUS server if dynamic_vlan is set to 1. Instead, I'm seeing that the static settings from the accept_mac_file are ignored if dynamic_vlan is set to 0, but used if dynamic_vlan is set to 1. If dynamic_vlan is set to 1 and the RADIUS server does not provide a VLAN, then the accept_mac_file assignment is overridden and the STA is assigned to the default non-VLANed interface. If my understanding of the expected behavior is correct, then I believe the problem is in ap_sta_set_vlan(). That routine checks the dynamic_vlan setting, but has no way of determining whether the incoming vlan_desc is static (i.e., from accept_mac_file) or dynamic (i.e., from a RADIUS server). I've attached a patch that gets hostapd working as I believe it's meant to, and updates the documentation to make the implicit behavior explicit. The functional changes are: - hostapd_allowed_address() will always extract the vlan_id from the accept_macs file. It will not update the vlan_id from the RADIUS cache if dynamic_vlan is DISABLED. - hostapd_acl_recv_radius() will not update the cached vlan_id if dynamic_vlan is DISABLED. - ieee802_1x_receive_auth() will not update the vlan_id if dynamic_vlan is DISABLED. More cosmetic: Most of the delta is just moving code out of ieee802_1x_receive_auth() into a new ieee802_1x_update_vlan() routine. While I initially did this because the new DISABLED check introduced excessive indentation, it has the added advantage of eliminating the vlan_description allocation and os_memset() call for all DYNAMIC_VLAN_DISABLED configs. I've done a couple rounds of review offline with Michael Braun (who has done much of the work in this part of the code) and incorporated his feedback. If dynamic_vlan=0 (disabled), vlan assignments will be managed using the local accept_mac_file ACL file, even if a RADIUS server is being used for user authentication. This allows us to manage users and devices independently. Signed-off-by: Nils Nieuwejaar <nils.nieuwejaar@gmail.com>
6 years ago
#endif /* CONFIG_NO_VLAN */
sta->session_timeout_set = !!session_timeout_set;
os_get_reltime(&sta->session_timeout);
sta->session_timeout.sec += session_timeout;
/* RFC 3580, Ch. 3.17 */
if (session_timeout_set && termination_action ==
RADIUS_TERMINATION_ACTION_RADIUS_REQUEST)
sm->reAuthPeriod = session_timeout;
else if (session_timeout_set)
ap_sta_session_timeout(hapd, sta, session_timeout);
else
ap_sta_no_session_timeout(hapd, sta);
sm->eap_if->aaaSuccess = true;
override_eapReq = 1;
ieee802_1x_get_keys(hapd, sta, msg, req, shared_secret,
shared_secret_len);
ieee802_1x_store_radius_class(hapd, sta, msg);
ieee802_1x_update_sta_identity(hapd, sta, msg);
ieee802_1x_update_sta_cui(hapd, sta, msg);
ieee802_1x_check_hs20(hapd, sta, msg,
session_timeout_set ?
(int) session_timeout : -1);
break;
case RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT:
sm->eap_if->aaaFail = true;
override_eapReq = 1;
if (radius_msg_get_attr_int32(msg, RADIUS_ATTR_WLAN_REASON_CODE,
&reason_code) == 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"RADIUS server indicated WLAN-Reason-Code %u in Access-Reject for "
MACSTR, reason_code, MAC2STR(sta->addr));
sta->disconnect_reason_code = reason_code;
}
break;
case RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
sm->eap_if->aaaEapReq = true;
if (session_timeout_set) {
/* RFC 2869, Ch. 2.3.2; RFC 3580, Ch. 3.17 */
sm->eap_if->aaaMethodTimeout = session_timeout;
hostapd_logger(hapd, sm->addr,
HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE8021X,
HOSTAPD_LEVEL_DEBUG,
"using EAP timeout of %d seconds (from RADIUS)",
sm->eap_if->aaaMethodTimeout);
} else {
/*
* Use dynamic retransmission behavior per EAP
* specification.
*/
sm->eap_if->aaaMethodTimeout = 0;
}
break;
}
ieee802_1x_decapsulate_radius(hapd, sta);
if (override_eapReq)
sm->eap_if->aaaEapReq = false;
#ifdef CONFIG_FILS
#ifdef NEED_AP_MLME
if (sta->flags &
(WLAN_STA_PENDING_FILS_ERP | WLAN_STA_PENDING_PASN_FILS_ERP)) {
/* TODO: Add a PMKSA entry on success? */
ieee802_11_finish_fils_auth(
hapd, sta, hdr->code == RADIUS_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT,
sm->eap_if->aaaEapReqData,
sm->eap_if->aaaEapKeyData,
sm->eap_if->aaaEapKeyDataLen);
}
#endif /* NEED_AP_MLME */
#endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
eapol_auth_step(sm);
return RADIUS_RX_QUEUED;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_NO_RADIUS */
void ieee802_1x_abort_auth(struct hostapd_data *hapd, struct sta_info *sta)
{
struct eapol_state_machine *sm = sta->eapol_sm;
if (!sm)
return;
hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE8021X,
HOSTAPD_LEVEL_DEBUG, "aborting authentication");
#ifndef CONFIG_NO_RADIUS
radius_msg_free(sm->last_recv_radius);
sm->last_recv_radius = NULL;
#endif /* CONFIG_NO_RADIUS */
if (sm->eap_if->eapTimeout) {
/*
* Disconnect the STA since it did not reply to the last EAP
* request and we cannot continue EAP processing (EAP-Failure
* could only be sent if the EAP peer actually replied).
*/
wpa_dbg(hapd->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "EAP Timeout, STA " MACSTR,
MAC2STR(sta->addr));
sm->eap_if->portEnabled = false;
ap_sta_disconnect(hapd, sta, sta->addr,
WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID);
}
}
#ifdef CONFIG_WEP
static int ieee802_1x_rekey_broadcast(struct hostapd_data *hapd)
{
struct eapol_authenticator *eapol = hapd->eapol_auth;
if (hapd->conf->default_wep_key_len < 1)
return 0;
os_free(eapol->default_wep_key);
eapol->default_wep_key = os_malloc(hapd->conf->default_wep_key_len);
if (!eapol->default_wep_key ||
random_get_bytes(eapol->default_wep_key,
hapd->conf->default_wep_key_len)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Could not generate random WEP key");
os_free(eapol->default_wep_key);
eapol->default_wep_key = NULL;
return -1;
}
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "IEEE 802.1X: New default WEP key",
eapol->default_wep_key,
hapd->conf->default_wep_key_len);
return 0;
}
static int ieee802_1x_sta_key_available(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
struct sta_info *sta, void *ctx)
{
if (sta->eapol_sm) {
sta->eapol_sm->eap_if->eapKeyAvailable = true;
eapol_auth_step(sta->eapol_sm);
}
return 0;
}
static void ieee802_1x_rekey(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
{
struct hostapd_data *hapd = eloop_ctx;
struct eapol_authenticator *eapol = hapd->eapol_auth;
if (eapol->default_wep_key_idx >= 3)
eapol->default_wep_key_idx =
hapd->conf->individual_wep_key_len > 0 ? 1 : 0;
else
eapol->default_wep_key_idx++;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "IEEE 802.1X: New default WEP key index %d",
eapol->default_wep_key_idx);
if (ieee802_1x_rekey_broadcast(hapd)) {
hostapd_logger(hapd, NULL, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE8021X,
HOSTAPD_LEVEL_WARNING,
"failed to generate a new broadcast key");
os_free(eapol->default_wep_key);
eapol->default_wep_key = NULL;
return;
}
/* TODO: Could setup key for RX here, but change default TX keyid only
* after new broadcast key has been sent to all stations. */
if (hostapd_drv_set_key(hapd->conf->iface, hapd, WPA_ALG_WEP,
broadcast_ether_addr,
eapol->default_wep_key_idx, 0, 1, NULL, 0,
eapol->default_wep_key,
Introduce and add key_flag Add the new set_key() parameter "key_flag" to provide more specific description of what type of a key is being configured. This is needed to be able to add support for "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" from IEEE Std 802.11-2016. In addition, this may be used to replace the set_tx boolean eventually once all the driver wrappers have moved to using the new key_flag. The following flag are defined: KEY_FLAG_MODIFY Set when an already installed key must be updated. So far the only use-case is changing RX/TX status of installed keys. Must not be set when deleting a key. KEY_FLAG_DEFAULT Set when the key is also a default key. Must not be set when deleting a key. (This is the replacement for set_tx.) KEY_FLAG_RX The key is valid for RX. Must not be set when deleting a key. KEY_FLAG_TX The key is valid for TX. Must not be set when deleting a key. KEY_FLAG_GROUP The key is a broadcast or group key. KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE The key is a pairwise key. KEY_FLAG_PMK The key is a Pairwise Master Key (PMK). Predefined and needed flag combinations so far are: KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX_TX WEP key not used as default key (yet). KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX_TX_DEFAULT Default WEP or WPA-NONE key. KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX GTK key valid for RX only. KEY_FLAG_GROUP_TX_DEFAULT GTK key valid for TX only, immediately taking over TX. KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX_TX Pairwise key immediately becoming the active pairwise key. KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX Pairwise key not yet valid for TX. (Only usable with Extended Key ID support.) KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX_TX_MODIFY Enable TX for a pairwise key installed with KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE_RX. KEY_FLAG_RX_TX Not a valid standalone key type and can only used in combination with other flags to mark a key for RX/TX. This commit is not changing any functionality. It just adds the new key_flag to all hostapd/wpa_supplicant set_key() functions without using it, yet. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de>
4 years ago
hapd->conf->default_wep_key_len,
KEY_FLAG_GROUP_RX_TX_DEFAULT)) {
hostapd_logger(hapd, NULL, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE8021X,
HOSTAPD_LEVEL_WARNING,
"failed to configure a new broadcast key");
os_free(eapol->default_wep_key);
eapol->default_wep_key = NULL;
return;
}
ap_for_each_sta(hapd, ieee802_1x_sta_key_available, NULL);
if (hapd->conf->wep_rekeying_period > 0) {
eloop_register_timeout(hapd->conf->wep_rekeying_period, 0,
ieee802_1x_rekey, hapd, NULL);
}
}
#endif /* CONFIG_WEP */
static void ieee802_1x_eapol_send(void *ctx, void *sta_ctx, u8 type,
const u8 *data, size_t datalen)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_WPS
struct sta_info *sta = sta_ctx;
if ((sta->flags & (WLAN_STA_WPS | WLAN_STA_MAYBE_WPS)) ==
WLAN_STA_MAYBE_WPS) {
const u8 *identity;
size_t identity_len;
struct eapol_state_machine *sm = sta->eapol_sm;
identity = eap_get_identity(sm->eap, &identity_len);
if (identity &&
((identity_len == WSC_ID_ENROLLEE_LEN &&
os_memcmp(identity, WSC_ID_ENROLLEE,
WSC_ID_ENROLLEE_LEN) == 0) ||
(identity_len == WSC_ID_REGISTRAR_LEN &&
os_memcmp(identity, WSC_ID_REGISTRAR,
WSC_ID_REGISTRAR_LEN) == 0))) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"WPS: WLAN_STA_MAYBE_WPS -> WLAN_STA_WPS");
sta->flags |= WLAN_STA_WPS;
}
}
#endif /* CONFIG_WPS */
ieee802_1x_send(ctx, sta_ctx, type, data, datalen);
}
static void ieee802_1x_aaa_send(void *ctx, void *sta_ctx,
const u8 *data, size_t datalen)
{
#ifndef CONFIG_NO_RADIUS
struct hostapd_data *hapd = ctx;
struct sta_info *sta = sta_ctx;
ieee802_1x_encapsulate_radius(hapd, sta, data, datalen);
#endif /* CONFIG_NO_RADIUS */
}
static void _ieee802_1x_finished(void *ctx, void *sta_ctx, int success,
int preauth, int remediation)
{
struct hostapd_data *hapd = ctx;
struct sta_info *sta = sta_ctx;
if (preauth)
rsn_preauth_finished(hapd, sta, success);
else
ieee802_1x_finished(hapd, sta, success, remediation);
}
static int ieee802_1x_get_eap_user(void *ctx, const u8 *identity,
size_t identity_len, int phase2,
struct eap_user *user)
{
struct hostapd_data *hapd = ctx;
const struct hostapd_eap_user *eap_user;
int i;
int rv = -1;
eap_user = hostapd_get_eap_user(hapd, identity, identity_len, phase2);
if (!eap_user)
goto out;
os_memset(user, 0, sizeof(*user));
user->phase2 = phase2;
for (i = 0; i < EAP_MAX_METHODS; i++) {
user->methods[i].vendor = eap_user->methods[i].vendor;
user->methods[i].method = eap_user->methods[i].method;
}
if (eap_user->password) {
user->password = os_memdup(eap_user->password,
eap_user->password_len);
if (!user->password)
goto out;
user->password_len = eap_user->password_len;
user->password_hash = eap_user->password_hash;
if (eap_user->salt && eap_user->salt_len) {
user->salt = os_memdup(eap_user->salt,
eap_user->salt_len);
if (!user->salt)
goto out;
user->salt_len = eap_user->salt_len;
}
}
user->force_version = eap_user->force_version;
user->macacl = eap_user->macacl;
user->ttls_auth = eap_user->ttls_auth;
user->remediation = eap_user->remediation;
rv = 0;
out:
if (rv)
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Failed to find user", __func__);
return rv;
}
static int ieee802_1x_sta_entry_alive(void *ctx, const u8 *addr)
{
struct hostapd_data *hapd = ctx;
struct sta_info *sta;
sta = ap_get_sta(hapd, addr);
if (!sta || !sta->eapol_sm)
return 0;
return 1;
}
static void ieee802_1x_logger(void *ctx, const u8 *addr,
eapol_logger_level level, const char *txt)
{
#ifndef CONFIG_NO_HOSTAPD_LOGGER
struct hostapd_data *hapd = ctx;
int hlevel;
switch (level) {
case EAPOL_LOGGER_WARNING:
hlevel = HOSTAPD_LEVEL_WARNING;
break;
case EAPOL_LOGGER_INFO:
hlevel = HOSTAPD_LEVEL_INFO;
break;
case EAPOL_LOGGER_DEBUG:
default:
hlevel = HOSTAPD_LEVEL_DEBUG;
break;
}
hostapd_logger(hapd, addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE8021X, hlevel, "%s",
txt);
#endif /* CONFIG_NO_HOSTAPD_LOGGER */
}
static void ieee802_1x_set_port_authorized(void *ctx, void *sta_ctx,
int authorized)
{
struct hostapd_data *hapd = ctx;
struct sta_info *sta = sta_ctx;
ieee802_1x_set_sta_authorized(hapd, sta, authorized);
}
static void _ieee802_1x_abort_auth(void *ctx, void *sta_ctx)
{
struct hostapd_data *hapd = ctx;
struct sta_info *sta = sta_ctx;
ieee802_1x_abort_auth(hapd, sta);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_WEP
static void _ieee802_1x_tx_key(void *ctx, void *sta_ctx)
{
#ifndef CONFIG_FIPS
#ifndef CONFIG_NO_RC4
struct hostapd_data *hapd = ctx;
struct sta_info *sta = sta_ctx;
ieee802_1x_tx_key(hapd, sta);
#endif /* CONFIG_NO_RC4 */
#endif /* CONFIG_FIPS */
}
#endif /* CONFIG_WEP */
static void ieee802_1x_eapol_event(void *ctx, void *sta_ctx,
enum eapol_event type)
{
/* struct hostapd_data *hapd = ctx; */
struct sta_info *sta = sta_ctx;
switch (type) {
case EAPOL_AUTH_SM_CHANGE:
wpa_auth_sm_notify(sta->wpa_sm);
break;
case EAPOL_AUTH_REAUTHENTICATE:
wpa_auth_sm_event(sta->wpa_sm, WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL);
break;
}
}
#ifdef CONFIG_ERP
static struct eap_server_erp_key *
ieee802_1x_erp_get_key(void *ctx, const char *keyname)
{
struct hostapd_data *hapd = ctx;
struct eap_server_erp_key *erp;
dl_list_for_each(erp, &hapd->erp_keys, struct eap_server_erp_key,
list) {
if (os_strcmp(erp->keyname_nai, keyname) == 0)
return erp;
}
return NULL;
}
static int ieee802_1x_erp_add_key(void *ctx, struct eap_server_erp_key *erp)
{
struct hostapd_data *hapd = ctx;
dl_list_add(&hapd->erp_keys, &erp->list);
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_ERP */
int ieee802_1x_init(struct hostapd_data *hapd)
{
struct eapol_auth_config conf;
struct eapol_auth_cb cb;
dl_list_init(&hapd->erp_keys);
os_memset(&conf, 0, sizeof(conf));
conf.eap_cfg = hapd->eap_cfg;
conf.ctx = hapd;
conf.eap_reauth_period = hapd->conf->eap_reauth_period;
conf.wpa = hapd->conf->wpa;
#ifdef CONFIG_WEP
conf.individual_wep_key_len = hapd->conf->individual_wep_key_len;
#endif /* CONFIG_WEP */
conf.eap_req_id_text = hapd->conf->eap_req_id_text;
conf.eap_req_id_text_len = hapd->conf->eap_req_id_text_len;
conf.erp_send_reauth_start = hapd->conf->erp_send_reauth_start;
conf.erp_domain = hapd->conf->erp_domain;
os_memset(&cb, 0, sizeof(cb));
cb.eapol_send = ieee802_1x_eapol_send;
cb.aaa_send = ieee802_1x_aaa_send;
cb.finished = _ieee802_1x_finished;
cb.get_eap_user = ieee802_1x_get_eap_user;
cb.sta_entry_alive = ieee802_1x_sta_entry_alive;
cb.logger = ieee802_1x_logger;
cb.set_port_authorized = ieee802_1x_set_port_authorized;
cb.abort_auth = _ieee802_1x_abort_auth;
#ifdef CONFIG_WEP
cb.tx_key = _ieee802_1x_tx_key;
#endif /* CONFIG_WEP */
cb.eapol_event = ieee802_1x_eapol_event;
#ifdef CONFIG_ERP
cb.erp_get_key = ieee802_1x_erp_get_key;
cb.erp_add_key = ieee802_1x_erp_add_key;
#endif /* CONFIG_ERP */
hapd->eapol_auth = eapol_auth_init(&conf, &cb);
if (!hapd->eapol_auth)
return -1;
if ((hapd->conf->ieee802_1x || hapd->conf->wpa) &&
hostapd_set_drv_ieee8021x(hapd, hapd->conf->iface, 1))
return -1;
#ifndef CONFIG_NO_RADIUS
if (radius_client_register(hapd->radius, RADIUS_AUTH,
ieee802_1x_receive_auth, hapd))
return -1;
#endif /* CONFIG_NO_RADIUS */
#ifdef CONFIG_WEP
if (hapd->conf->default_wep_key_len) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
hostapd_drv_set_key(hapd->conf->iface, hapd,
WPA_ALG_NONE, NULL, i, 0, 0, NULL,
0, NULL, 0, KEY_FLAG_GROUP);
ieee802_1x_rekey(hapd, NULL);
if (!hapd->eapol_auth->default_wep_key)
return -1;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_WEP */
return 0;
}
void ieee802_1x_erp_flush(struct hostapd_data *hapd)
{
struct eap_server_erp_key *erp;
while ((erp = dl_list_first(&hapd->erp_keys, struct eap_server_erp_key,
list)) != NULL) {
dl_list_del(&erp->list);
bin_clear_free(erp, sizeof(*erp));
}
}
void ieee802_1x_deinit(struct hostapd_data *hapd)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_WEP
eloop_cancel_timeout(ieee802_1x_rekey, hapd, NULL);
#endif /* CONFIG_WEP */
if (hapd->driver && hapd->drv_priv &&
(hapd->conf->ieee802_1x || hapd->conf->wpa))
hostapd_set_drv_ieee8021x(hapd, hapd->conf->iface, 0);
eapol_auth_deinit(hapd->eapol_auth);
hapd->eapol_auth = NULL;
ieee802_1x_erp_flush(hapd);
}
int ieee802_1x_tx_status(struct hostapd_data *hapd, struct sta_info *sta,
const u8 *buf, size_t len, int ack)
{
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
u8 *pos;
const unsigned char rfc1042_hdr[ETH_ALEN] =
{ 0xaa, 0xaa, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
if (!sta)
return -1;
if (len < sizeof(*hdr) + sizeof(rfc1042_hdr) + 2)
return 0;
hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) buf;
pos = (u8 *) (hdr + 1);
if (os_memcmp(pos, rfc1042_hdr, sizeof(rfc1042_hdr)) != 0)
return 0;
pos += sizeof(rfc1042_hdr);
if (WPA_GET_BE16(pos) != ETH_P_PAE)
return 0;
pos += 2;
return ieee802_1x_eapol_tx_status(hapd, sta, pos, buf + len - pos,
ack);
}
int ieee802_1x_eapol_tx_status(struct hostapd_data *hapd, struct sta_info *sta,
const u8 *buf, int len, int ack)
{
const struct ieee802_1x_hdr *xhdr =
(const struct ieee802_1x_hdr *) buf;
const u8 *pos = buf + sizeof(*xhdr);
struct ieee802_1x_eapol_key *key;
if (len < (int) sizeof(*xhdr))
return 0;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "IEEE 802.1X: " MACSTR
" TX status - version=%d type=%d length=%d - ack=%d",
MAC2STR(sta->addr), xhdr->version, xhdr->type,
be_to_host16(xhdr->length), ack);
#ifdef CONFIG_WPS
if (xhdr->type == IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAP_PACKET && ack &&
(sta->flags & WLAN_STA_WPS) &&
ap_sta_pending_delayed_1x_auth_fail_disconnect(hapd, sta)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"WPS: Indicate EAP completion on ACK for EAP-Failure");
hostapd_wps_eap_completed(hapd);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_WPS */
if (xhdr->type != IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_KEY)
return 0;
if (pos + sizeof(struct wpa_eapol_key) <= buf + len) {
const struct wpa_eapol_key *wpa;
wpa = (const struct wpa_eapol_key *) pos;
if (wpa->type == EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN ||
wpa->type == EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA)
wpa_auth_eapol_key_tx_status(hapd->wpa_auth,
sta->wpa_sm, ack);
}
/* EAPOL EAP-Packet packets are eventually re-sent by either Supplicant
* or Authenticator state machines, but EAPOL-Key packets are not
* retransmitted in case of failure. Try to re-send failed EAPOL-Key
* packets couple of times because otherwise STA keys become
* unsynchronized with AP. */
if (!ack && pos + sizeof(*key) <= buf + len) {
key = (struct ieee802_1x_eapol_key *) pos;
hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE8021X,
HOSTAPD_LEVEL_DEBUG,
"did not Ack EAPOL-Key frame (%scast index=%d)",
key->key_index & BIT(7) ? "uni" : "broad",
key->key_index & ~BIT(7));
/* TODO: re-send EAPOL-Key couple of times (with short delay
* between them?). If all attempt fail, report error and
* deauthenticate STA so that it will get new keys when
* authenticating again (e.g., after returning in range).
* Separate limit/transmit state needed both for unicast and
* broadcast keys(?) */
}
/* TODO: could move unicast key configuration from ieee802_1x_tx_key()
* to here and change the key only if the EAPOL-Key packet was Acked.
*/
return 1;
}
u8 * ieee802_1x_get_identity(struct eapol_state_machine *sm, size_t *len)
{
if (!sm || !sm->identity)
return NULL;
*len = sm->identity_len;
return sm->identity;
}
u8 * ieee802_1x_get_radius_class(struct eapol_state_machine *sm, size_t *len,
int idx)
{
if (!sm || !sm->radius_class.attr ||
idx >= (int) sm->radius_class.count)
return NULL;
*len = sm->radius_class.attr[idx].len;
return sm->radius_class.attr[idx].data;
}
struct wpabuf * ieee802_1x_get_radius_cui(struct eapol_state_machine *sm)
{
if (!sm)
return NULL;
return sm->radius_cui;
}
const u8 * ieee802_1x_get_key(struct eapol_state_machine *sm, size_t *len)
{
*len = 0;
if (!sm)
return NULL;
*len = sm->eap_if->eapKeyDataLen;
return sm->eap_if->eapKeyData;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_MACSEC
const u8 * ieee802_1x_get_session_id(struct eapol_state_machine *sm,
size_t *len)
{
*len = 0;
if (!sm || !sm->eap_if)
return NULL;
*len = sm->eap_if->eapSessionIdLen;
return sm->eap_if->eapSessionId;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */
void ieee802_1x_notify_port_enabled(struct eapol_state_machine *sm,
bool enabled)
{
if (!sm)
return;
sm->eap_if->portEnabled = enabled;
eapol_auth_step(sm);
}
void ieee802_1x_notify_port_valid(struct eapol_state_machine *sm, bool valid)
{
if (!sm)
return;
sm->portValid = valid;
eapol_auth_step(sm);
}
void ieee802_1x_notify_pre_auth(struct eapol_state_machine *sm, bool pre_auth)
{
if (!sm)
return;
if (pre_auth)
sm->flags |= EAPOL_SM_PREAUTH;
else
sm->flags &= ~EAPOL_SM_PREAUTH;
}
static const char * bool_txt(bool val)
{
return val ? "TRUE" : "FALSE";
}
int ieee802_1x_get_mib(struct hostapd_data *hapd, char *buf, size_t buflen)
{
/* TODO */
return 0;
}
int ieee802_1x_get_mib_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd, struct sta_info *sta,
char *buf, size_t buflen)
{
int len = 0, ret;
struct eapol_state_machine *sm = sta->eapol_sm;
struct os_reltime diff;
const char *name1;
const char *name2;
char *identity_buf = NULL;
if (!sm)
return 0;
ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len,
"dot1xPaePortNumber=%d\n"
"dot1xPaePortProtocolVersion=%d\n"
"dot1xPaePortCapabilities=1\n"
"dot1xPaePortInitialize=%d\n"
"dot1xPaePortReauthenticate=FALSE\n",
sta->aid,
EAPOL_VERSION,
sm->initialize);
if (os_snprintf_error(buflen - len, ret))
return len;
len += ret;
/* dot1xAuthConfigTable */
ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len,
"dot1xAuthPaeState=%d\n"
"dot1xAuthBackendAuthState=%d\n"
"dot1xAuthAdminControlledDirections=%d\n"
"dot1xAuthOperControlledDirections=%d\n"
"dot1xAuthAuthControlledPortStatus=%d\n"
"dot1xAuthAuthControlledPortControl=%d\n"
"dot1xAuthQuietPeriod=%u\n"
"dot1xAuthServerTimeout=%u\n"
"dot1xAuthReAuthPeriod=%u\n"
"dot1xAuthReAuthEnabled=%s\n"
"dot1xAuthKeyTxEnabled=%s\n",
sm->auth_pae_state + 1,
sm->be_auth_state + 1,
sm->adminControlledDirections,
sm->operControlledDirections,
sm->authPortStatus,
sm->portControl,
sm->quietPeriod,
sm->serverTimeout,
sm->reAuthPeriod,
bool_txt(sm->reAuthEnabled),
bool_txt(sm->keyTxEnabled));
if (os_snprintf_error(buflen - len, ret))
return len;
len += ret;
/* dot1xAuthStatsTable */
ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len,
"dot1xAuthEapolFramesRx=%u\n"
"dot1xAuthEapolFramesTx=%u\n"
"dot1xAuthEapolStartFramesRx=%u\n"
"dot1xAuthEapolLogoffFramesRx=%u\n"
"dot1xAuthEapolRespIdFramesRx=%u\n"
"dot1xAuthEapolRespFramesRx=%u\n"
"dot1xAuthEapolReqIdFramesTx=%u\n"
"dot1xAuthEapolReqFramesTx=%u\n"
"dot1xAuthInvalidEapolFramesRx=%u\n"
"dot1xAuthEapLengthErrorFramesRx=%u\n"
"dot1xAuthLastEapolFrameVersion=%u\n"
"dot1xAuthLastEapolFrameSource=" MACSTR "\n",
sm->dot1xAuthEapolFramesRx,
sm->dot1xAuthEapolFramesTx,
sm->dot1xAuthEapolStartFramesRx,
sm->dot1xAuthEapolLogoffFramesRx,
sm->dot1xAuthEapolRespIdFramesRx,
sm->dot1xAuthEapolRespFramesRx,
sm->dot1xAuthEapolReqIdFramesTx,
sm->dot1xAuthEapolReqFramesTx,
sm->dot1xAuthInvalidEapolFramesRx,
sm->dot1xAuthEapLengthErrorFramesRx,
sm->dot1xAuthLastEapolFrameVersion,
MAC2STR(sm->addr));
if (os_snprintf_error(buflen - len, ret))
return len;
len += ret;
/* dot1xAuthDiagTable */
ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len,
"dot1xAuthEntersConnecting=%u\n"
"dot1xAuthEapLogoffsWhileConnecting=%u\n"
"dot1xAuthEntersAuthenticating=%u\n"
"dot1xAuthAuthSuccessesWhileAuthenticating=%u\n"
"dot1xAuthAuthTimeoutsWhileAuthenticating=%u\n"
"dot1xAuthAuthFailWhileAuthenticating=%u\n"
"dot1xAuthAuthEapStartsWhileAuthenticating=%u\n"
"dot1xAuthAuthEapLogoffWhileAuthenticating=%u\n"
"dot1xAuthAuthReauthsWhileAuthenticated=%u\n"
"dot1xAuthAuthEapStartsWhileAuthenticated=%u\n"
"dot1xAuthAuthEapLogoffWhileAuthenticated=%u\n"
"dot1xAuthBackendResponses=%u\n"
"dot1xAuthBackendAccessChallenges=%u\n"
"dot1xAuthBackendOtherRequestsToSupplicant=%u\n"
"dot1xAuthBackendAuthSuccesses=%u\n"
"dot1xAuthBackendAuthFails=%u\n",
sm->authEntersConnecting,
sm->authEapLogoffsWhileConnecting,
sm->authEntersAuthenticating,
sm->authAuthSuccessesWhileAuthenticating,
sm->authAuthTimeoutsWhileAuthenticating,
sm->authAuthFailWhileAuthenticating,
sm->authAuthEapStartsWhileAuthenticating,
sm->authAuthEapLogoffWhileAuthenticating,
sm->authAuthReauthsWhileAuthenticated,
sm->authAuthEapStartsWhileAuthenticated,
sm->authAuthEapLogoffWhileAuthenticated,
sm->backendResponses,
sm->backendAccessChallenges,
sm->backendOtherRequestsToSupplicant,
sm->backendAuthSuccesses,
sm->backendAuthFails);
if (os_snprintf_error(buflen - len, ret))
return len;
len += ret;
/* dot1xAuthSessionStatsTable */
os_reltime_age(&sta->acct_session_start, &diff);
if (sm->eap && !sm->identity) {
const u8 *id;
size_t id_len;
id = eap_get_identity(sm->eap, &id_len);
if (id)
identity_buf = dup_binstr(id, id_len);
}
ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len,
/* TODO: dot1xAuthSessionOctetsRx */
/* TODO: dot1xAuthSessionOctetsTx */
/* TODO: dot1xAuthSessionFramesRx */
/* TODO: dot1xAuthSessionFramesTx */
"dot1xAuthSessionId=%016llX\n"
"dot1xAuthSessionAuthenticMethod=%d\n"
"dot1xAuthSessionTime=%u\n"
"dot1xAuthSessionTerminateCause=999\n"
"dot1xAuthSessionUserName=%s\n",
(unsigned long long) sta->acct_session_id,
(wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(
wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(sta->wpa_sm))) ?
1 : 2,
(unsigned int) diff.sec,
sm->identity ? (char *) sm->identity :
(identity_buf ? identity_buf : "N/A"));
os_free(identity_buf);
if (os_snprintf_error(buflen - len, ret))
return len;
len += ret;
if (sm->acct_multi_session_id) {
ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len,
"authMultiSessionId=%016llX\n",
(unsigned long long)
sm->acct_multi_session_id);
if (os_snprintf_error(buflen - len, ret))
return len;
len += ret;
}
name1 = eap_server_get_name(0, sm->eap_type_authsrv);
name2 = eap_server_get_name(0, sm->eap_type_supp);
ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len,
"last_eap_type_as=%d (%s)\n"
"last_eap_type_sta=%d (%s)\n",
sm->eap_type_authsrv, name1,
sm->eap_type_supp, name2);
if (os_snprintf_error(buflen - len, ret))
return len;
len += ret;
return len;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_HS20
static void ieee802_1x_wnm_notif_send(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
{
struct hostapd_data *hapd = eloop_ctx;
struct sta_info *sta = timeout_ctx;
if (sta->remediation) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "HS 2.0: Send WNM-Notification to "
MACSTR " to indicate Subscription Remediation",
MAC2STR(sta->addr));
hs20_send_wnm_notification(hapd, sta->addr,
sta->remediation_method,
sta->remediation_url);
os_free(sta->remediation_url);
sta->remediation_url = NULL;
}
if (sta->hs20_deauth_req) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "HS 2.0: Send WNM-Notification to "
MACSTR " to indicate imminent deauthentication",
MAC2STR(sta->addr));
hs20_send_wnm_notification_deauth_req(hapd, sta->addr,
sta->hs20_deauth_req);
}
if (sta->hs20_t_c_filtering) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "HS 2.0: Send WNM-Notification to "
MACSTR " to indicate Terms and Conditions filtering",
MAC2STR(sta->addr));
hs20_send_wnm_notification_t_c(hapd, sta->addr, sta->t_c_url);
os_free(sta->t_c_url);
sta->t_c_url = NULL;
}
}
#endif /* CONFIG_HS20 */
static void ieee802_1x_finished(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
struct sta_info *sta, int success,
int remediation)
{
const u8 *key;
size_t len;
/* TODO: get PMKLifetime from WPA parameters */
static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime = 43200;
unsigned int session_timeout;
struct os_reltime now, remaining;
#ifdef CONFIG_HS20
if (remediation && !sta->remediation) {
sta->remediation = 1;
os_free(sta->remediation_url);
sta->remediation_url =
os_strdup(hapd->conf->subscr_remediation_url);
sta->remediation_method = 1; /* SOAP-XML SPP */
}
if (success && (sta->remediation || sta->hs20_deauth_req ||
sta->hs20_t_c_filtering)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "HS 2.0: Schedule WNM-Notification to "
MACSTR " in 100 ms", MAC2STR(sta->addr));
eloop_cancel_timeout(ieee802_1x_wnm_notif_send, hapd, sta);
eloop_register_timeout(0, 100000, ieee802_1x_wnm_notif_send,
hapd, sta);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_HS20 */
#ifdef CONFIG_MACSEC
ieee802_1x_notify_create_actor_hapd(hapd, sta);
#endif /* CONFIG_MACSEC */
key = ieee802_1x_get_key(sta->eapol_sm, &len);
if (sta->session_timeout_set) {
os_get_reltime(&now);
os_reltime_sub(&sta->session_timeout, &now, &remaining);
session_timeout = (remaining.sec > 0) ? remaining.sec : 1;
} else {
session_timeout = dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime;
}
if (success && key && len >= PMK_LEN && !sta->remediation &&
!sta->hs20_deauth_requested &&
wpa_auth_pmksa_add(sta->wpa_sm, key, len, session_timeout,
sta->eapol_sm) == 0) {
hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_WPA,
HOSTAPD_LEVEL_DEBUG,
"Added PMKSA cache entry (IEEE 802.1X)");
}
if (!success) {
/*
* Many devices require deauthentication after WPS provisioning
* and some may not be be able to do that themselves, so
* disconnect the client here. In addition, this may also
* benefit IEEE 802.1X/EAPOL authentication cases, too since
* the EAPOL PAE state machine would remain in HELD state for
* considerable amount of time and some EAP methods, like
* EAP-FAST with anonymous provisioning, may require another
* EAPOL authentication to be started to complete connection.
*/
ap_sta_delayed_1x_auth_fail_disconnect(hapd, sta);
}
}