hostap/src/common/sae_pk.c

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/*
* SAE-PK
* Copyright (c) 2020, The Linux Foundation
*
* This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
* See README for more details.
*/
#include "utils/includes.h"
#include <stdint.h>
#include "utils/common.h"
#include "utils/base64.h"
#include "common/ieee802_11_defs.h"
#include "common/ieee802_11_common.h"
#include "crypto/crypto.h"
#include "crypto/aes.h"
#include "crypto/aes_siv.h"
#include "sae.h"
/* RFC 4648 base 32 alphabet with lowercase characters */
static const char *sae_pk_base32_table = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz234567";
bool sae_pk_valid_password(const char *pw)
{
int pos;
if (os_strlen(pw) < 9) {
/* Not long enough to meet the minimum required resistance to
* preimage attacks, so do not consider this valid for SAE-PK.
*/
return false;
}
for (pos = 0; pw[pos]; pos++) {
if (pos && pos % 5 == 4) {
if (pw[pos] != '-')
return false;
continue;
}
if (!os_strchr(sae_pk_base32_table, pw[pos]))
return false;
}
if (pos == 0)
return false;
return pw[pos - 1] != '-';
}
static char * add_char(const char *start, char *pos, u8 idx, size_t *bits)
{
if (*bits == 0)
return pos;
if (*bits > 5)
*bits -= 5;
else
*bits = 0;
if ((pos - start) % 5 == 4)
*pos++ = '-';
*pos++ = sae_pk_base32_table[idx];
return pos;
}
char * sae_pk_base32_encode(const u8 *src, size_t len_bits)
{
char *out, *pos;
size_t olen, extra_pad, i;
u64 block = 0;
u8 val;
size_t len = (len_bits + 7) / 8;
size_t left = len_bits;
int j;
if (len == 0 || len >= SIZE_MAX / 8)
return NULL;
olen = len * 8 / 5 + 1;
olen += olen / 4; /* hyphen separators */
pos = out = os_zalloc(olen + 1);
if (!out)
return NULL;
extra_pad = (5 - len % 5) % 5;
for (i = 0; i < len + extra_pad; i++) {
val = i < len ? src[i] : 0;
block <<= 8;
block |= val;
if (i % 5 == 4) {
for (j = 7; j >= 0; j--)
pos = add_char(out, pos,
(block >> j * 5) & 0x1f, &left);
block = 0;
}
}
return out;
}
u8 * sae_pk_base32_decode(const char *src, size_t len, size_t *out_len)
{
u8 dtable[256], *out, *pos, tmp;
u64 block = 0;
size_t i, count, olen;
int pad = 0;
size_t extra_pad;
os_memset(dtable, 0x80, 256);
for (i = 0; sae_pk_base32_table[i]; i++)
dtable[(u8) sae_pk_base32_table[i]] = i;
dtable['='] = 0;
count = 0;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if (dtable[(u8) src[i]] != 0x80)
count++;
}
if (count == 0)
return NULL;
extra_pad = (8 - count % 8) % 8;
olen = (count + extra_pad) / 8 * 5;
pos = out = os_malloc(olen);
if (!out)
return NULL;
count = 0;
for (i = 0; i < len + extra_pad; i++) {
u8 val;
if (i >= len)
val = '=';
else
val = src[i];
tmp = dtable[val];
if (tmp == 0x80)
continue;
if (val == '=')
pad++;
block <<= 5;
block |= tmp;
count++;
if (count == 8) {
*pos++ = (block >> 32) & 0xff;
*pos++ = (block >> 24) & 0xff;
*pos++ = (block >> 16) & 0xff;
*pos++ = (block >> 8) & 0xff;
*pos++ = block & 0xff;
count = 0;
block = 0;
if (pad) {
/* Leave in all the available bits with zero
* padding to full octets from right. */
pos -= pad * 5 / 8;
break;
}
}
}
*out_len = pos - out;
return out;
}
int sae_pk_set_password(struct sae_data *sae, const char *password)
{
struct sae_temporary_data *tmp = sae->tmp;
size_t len;
len = os_strlen(password);
if (!tmp || len < 1)
return -1;
bin_clear_free(tmp->pw, tmp->pw_len);
tmp->pw = sae_pk_base32_decode(password, len, &tmp->pw_len);
tmp->lambda = len - len / 5;
return tmp->pw ? 0 : -1;
}
static size_t sae_group_2_hash_len(int group)
{
switch (group) {
case 19:
return 32;
case 20:
return 48;
case 21:
return 64;
}
return 0;
}
void sae_deinit_pk(struct sae_pk *pk)
{
if (pk) {
wpabuf_free(pk->m);
crypto_ec_key_deinit(pk->key);
wpabuf_free(pk->pubkey);
os_free(pk);
}
}
struct sae_pk * sae_parse_pk(const char *val)
{
struct sae_pk *pk;
const char *pos;
size_t len;
unsigned char *der;
size_t der_len;
/* <m-as-hexdump>:<base64-encoded-DER-encoded-key> */
pos = os_strchr(val, ':');
if (!pos || (pos - val) & 0x01)
return NULL;
len = (pos - val) / 2;
if (len != SAE_PK_M_LEN) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "SAE: Unexpected Modifier M length %zu",
len);
return NULL;
}
pk = os_zalloc(sizeof(*pk));
if (!pk)
return NULL;
pk->m = wpabuf_alloc(len);
if (!pk->m || hexstr2bin(val, wpabuf_put(pk->m, len), len)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "SAE: Failed to parse m");
goto fail;
}
pos++;
der = base64_decode(pos, os_strlen(pos), &der_len);
if (!der) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "SAE: Failed to base64 decode PK key");
goto fail;
}
pk->key = crypto_ec_key_parse_priv(der, der_len);
bin_clear_free(der, der_len);
if (!pk->key)
goto fail;
pk->group = crypto_ec_key_group(pk->key);
pk->pubkey = crypto_ec_key_get_subject_public_key(pk->key);
if (!pk->pubkey)
goto fail;
return pk;
fail:
sae_deinit_pk(pk);
return NULL;
}
int sae_hash(size_t hash_len, const u8 *data, size_t len, u8 *hash)
{
if (hash_len == 32)
return sha256_vector(1, &data, &len, hash);
#ifdef CONFIG_SHA384
if (hash_len == 48)
return sha384_vector(1, &data, &len, hash);
#endif /* CONFIG_SHA384 */
#ifdef CONFIG_SHA512
if (hash_len == 64)
return sha512_vector(1, &data, &len, hash);
#endif /* CONFIG_SHA512 */
return -1;
}
static int sae_pk_hash_sig_data(struct sae_data *sae, size_t hash_len,
bool ap, const u8 *m, size_t m_len,
const u8 *pubkey, size_t pubkey_len, u8 *hash)
{
struct sae_temporary_data *tmp = sae->tmp;
struct wpabuf *sig_data;
u8 *pos;
int ret = -1;
/* Signed data for KeyAuth: eleAP || eleSTA || scaAP || scaSTA ||
* M || K_AP || AP-BSSID || STA-MAC */
sig_data = wpabuf_alloc(tmp->prime_len * 6 + m_len + pubkey_len +
2 * ETH_ALEN);
if (!sig_data)
goto fail;
pos = wpabuf_put(sig_data, 2 * tmp->prime_len);
if (crypto_ec_point_to_bin(tmp->ec, ap ? tmp->own_commit_element_ecc :
tmp->peer_commit_element_ecc,
pos, pos + tmp->prime_len) < 0)
goto fail;
pos = wpabuf_put(sig_data, 2 * tmp->prime_len);
if (crypto_ec_point_to_bin(tmp->ec, ap ? tmp->peer_commit_element_ecc :
tmp->own_commit_element_ecc,
pos, pos + tmp->prime_len) < 0)
goto fail;
if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(ap ? tmp->own_commit_scalar :
sae->peer_commit_scalar,
wpabuf_put(sig_data, tmp->prime_len),
tmp->prime_len, tmp->prime_len) < 0 ||
crypto_bignum_to_bin(ap ? sae->peer_commit_scalar :
tmp->own_commit_scalar,
wpabuf_put(sig_data, tmp->prime_len),
tmp->prime_len, tmp->prime_len) < 0)
goto fail;
wpabuf_put_data(sig_data, m, m_len);
wpabuf_put_data(sig_data, pubkey, pubkey_len);
wpabuf_put_data(sig_data, ap ? tmp->own_addr : tmp->peer_addr,
ETH_ALEN);
wpabuf_put_data(sig_data, ap ? tmp->peer_addr : tmp->own_addr,
ETH_ALEN);
wpa_hexdump_buf_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: Data to be signed for KeyAuth",
sig_data);
if (sae_hash(hash_len, wpabuf_head(sig_data), wpabuf_len(sig_data),
hash) < 0)
goto fail;
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: hash(data to be signed)",
hash, hash_len);
ret = 0;
fail:
wpabuf_free(sig_data);
return ret;
}
int sae_write_confirm_pk(struct sae_data *sae, struct wpabuf *buf)
{
struct sae_temporary_data *tmp = sae->tmp;
struct wpabuf *elem = NULL, *sig = NULL;
size_t extra;
int ret = -1;
u8 *encr_mod;
size_t encr_mod_len;
const struct sae_pk *pk;
u8 hash[SAE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
size_t hash_len;
if (!tmp)
return -1;
pk = tmp->ap_pk;
if (!pk)
return 0;
if (tmp->kek_len != 32 && tmp->kek_len != 48 && tmp->kek_len != 64) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "SAE-PK: No KEK available for confirm");
return -1;
}
if (!tmp->ec) {
/* Only ECC groups are supported for SAE-PK in the current
* implementation. */
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"SAE-PK: SAE commit did not use an ECC group");
return -1;
}
hash_len = sae_group_2_hash_len(pk->group);
if (sae_pk_hash_sig_data(sae, hash_len, true, wpabuf_head(pk->m),
wpabuf_len(pk->m), wpabuf_head(pk->pubkey),
wpabuf_len(pk->pubkey), hash) < 0)
goto fail;
sig = crypto_ec_key_sign(pk->key, hash, hash_len);
if (!sig)
goto fail;
wpa_hexdump_buf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: KeyAuth = Sig_AP()", sig);
elem = wpabuf_alloc(1500 + wpabuf_len(sig));
if (!elem)
goto fail;
/* EncryptedModifier = AES-SIV-Q(M); no AAD */
encr_mod_len = wpabuf_len(pk->m) + AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
wpabuf_put_u8(elem, encr_mod_len);
encr_mod = wpabuf_put(elem, encr_mod_len);
if (aes_siv_encrypt(tmp->kek, tmp->kek_len,
wpabuf_head(pk->m), wpabuf_len(pk->m),
0, NULL, NULL, encr_mod) < 0)
goto fail;
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: EncryptedModifier",
encr_mod, encr_mod_len);
/* FILS Public Key element */
wpabuf_put_u8(elem, WLAN_EID_EXTENSION);
wpabuf_put_u8(elem, 2 + wpabuf_len(pk->pubkey));
wpabuf_put_u8(elem, WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_PUBLIC_KEY);
wpabuf_put_u8(elem, 3); /* Key Type: ECDSA public key */
wpabuf_put_buf(elem, pk->pubkey);
/* FILS Key Confirmation element (KeyAuth) */
wpabuf_put_u8(elem, WLAN_EID_EXTENSION);
wpabuf_put_u8(elem, 1 + wpabuf_len(sig));
wpabuf_put_u8(elem, WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_KEY_CONFIRM);
/* KeyAuth = Sig_AP(eleAP || eleSTA || scaAP || scaSTA || M || K_AP ||
* AP-BSSID || STA-MAC) */
wpabuf_put_buf(elem, sig);
/* TODO: fragmentation */
extra = 6; /* Vendor specific element header */
if (wpabuf_tailroom(elem) < extra + wpabuf_len(buf)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"SAE-PK: No room in message buffer for SAE-PK element (%zu < %zu)",
wpabuf_tailroom(buf), extra + wpabuf_len(buf));
goto fail;
}
/* SAE-PK element */
wpabuf_put_u8(buf, WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC);
wpabuf_put_u8(buf, 4 + wpabuf_len(elem));
wpabuf_put_be32(buf, SAE_PK_IE_VENDOR_TYPE);
wpabuf_put_buf(buf, elem);
ret = 0;
fail:
wpabuf_free(elem);
wpabuf_free(sig);
return ret;
}
static bool sae_pk_valid_fingerprint(struct sae_data *sae,
const u8 *m, size_t m_len,
const u8 *k_ap, size_t k_ap_len, int group)
{
struct sae_temporary_data *tmp = sae->tmp;
size_t sec, i;
u8 *fingerprint_exp, *hash_data, *pos;
size_t hash_len, hash_data_len, fingerprint_bits, fingerprint_bytes;
u8 hash[SAE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
int res;
if (!tmp->pw || tmp->pw_len < 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"SAE-PK: No PW available for K_AP fingerprint check");
return false;
}
/* Fingerprint = L(Hash(SSID || M || K_AP), 0, 8*Sec + 5*Lambda - 2) */
hash_len = sae_group_2_hash_len(group);
hash_data_len = tmp->ssid_len + m_len + k_ap_len;
hash_data = os_malloc(hash_data_len);
if (!hash_data)
return false;
pos = hash_data;
os_memcpy(pos, tmp->ssid, tmp->ssid_len);
pos += tmp->ssid_len;
os_memcpy(pos, m, m_len);
pos += m_len;
os_memcpy(pos, k_ap, k_ap_len);
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: SSID || M || K_AP",
hash_data, hash_data_len);
res = sae_hash(hash_len, hash_data, hash_data_len, hash);
bin_clear_free(hash_data, hash_data_len);
if (res < 0)
return false;
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: Hash(SSID || M || K_AP)",
hash, hash_len);
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: PW", tmp->pw, tmp->pw_len);
sec = (tmp->pw[0] >> 6) + 2;
fingerprint_bits = 8 * sec + 5 * tmp->lambda - 2;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: Sec=%zu Lambda=%zu fingerprint_bits=%zu",
sec, tmp->lambda, fingerprint_bits);
if (fingerprint_bits > hash_len * 8) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"SAE-PK: Not enough hash output bits for the fingerprint");
return false;
}
fingerprint_bytes = (fingerprint_bits + 7) / 8;
if (fingerprint_bits % 8) {
size_t extra;
/* Zero out the extra bits in the last octet */
extra = 8 - fingerprint_bits % 8;
pos = &hash[fingerprint_bits / 8];
*pos = (*pos >> extra) << extra;
}
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: Fingerprint", hash, fingerprint_bytes);
fingerprint_exp = os_zalloc(sec + tmp->pw_len);
if (!fingerprint_exp)
return false;
pos = fingerprint_exp + sec;
for (i = 0; i < tmp->pw_len; i++) {
u8 next = i + 1 < tmp->pw_len ? tmp->pw[i + 1] : 0;
*pos++ = tmp->pw[i] << 2 | next >> 6;
}
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: Fingerprint_Expected",
fingerprint_exp, fingerprint_bytes);
res = os_memcmp_const(hash, fingerprint_exp, fingerprint_bytes);
bin_clear_free(fingerprint_exp, tmp->pw_len);
if (res) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: K_AP fingerprint mismatch");
return false;
}
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: Valid K_AP fingerprint");
return true;
}
int sae_check_confirm_pk(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *ies, size_t ies_len)
{
struct sae_temporary_data *tmp = sae->tmp;
const u8 *sae_pk, *pos, *end, *encr_mod, *k_ap, *key_auth;
u8 m[SAE_PK_M_LEN];
size_t k_ap_len, key_auth_len;
struct crypto_ec_key *key;
int res;
u8 hash[SAE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
size_t hash_len;
int group;
if (!tmp)
return -1;
if (!sae->pk || tmp->ap_pk)
return 0;
if (tmp->kek_len != 32 && tmp->kek_len != 48 && tmp->kek_len != 64) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "SAE-PK: No KEK available for confirm");
return -1;
}
if (!tmp->ec) {
/* Only ECC groups are supported for SAE-PK in the current
* implementation. */
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"SAE-PK: SAE commit did not use an ECC group");
return -1;
}
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: Received confirm IEs", ies, ies_len);
sae_pk = get_vendor_ie(ies, ies_len, SAE_PK_IE_VENDOR_TYPE);
if (!sae_pk) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "SAE-PK: No SAE-PK element included");
return -1;
}
/* TODO: Fragment reassembly */
pos = sae_pk + 2;
end = pos + sae_pk[1];
if (end - pos < 4 + 1 + SAE_PK_M_LEN + AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"SAE-PK: No room for EncryptedModifier in SAE-PK element");
return -1;
}
pos += 4;
if (*pos != SAE_PK_M_LEN + AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"SAE-PK: Unexpected EncryptedModifier length %u",
*pos);
return -1;
}
pos++;
encr_mod = pos;
pos += SAE_PK_M_LEN + AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
if (end - pos < 4 || pos[0] != WLAN_EID_EXTENSION || pos[1] < 2 ||
pos[1] > end - pos - 2 ||
pos[2] != WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_PUBLIC_KEY) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"SAE-PK: No FILS Public Key element in SAE-PK element");
return -1;
}
if (pos[3] != 3) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "SAE-PK: Unsupported public key type %u",
pos[3]);
return -1;
}
k_ap_len = pos[1] - 2;
pos += 4;
k_ap = pos;
pos += k_ap_len;
if (end - pos < 4 || pos[0] != WLAN_EID_EXTENSION || pos[1] < 1 ||
pos[1] > end - pos - 2 ||
pos[2] != WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_KEY_CONFIRM) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"SAE-PK: No FILS Key Confirm element in SAE-PK element");
return -1;
}
key_auth_len = pos[1] - 1;
pos += 3;
key_auth = pos;
pos += key_auth_len;
if (pos < end) {
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG,
"SAE-PK: Extra data at the end of SAE-PK element",
pos, end - pos);
}
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: EncryptedModifier",
encr_mod, SAE_PK_M_LEN + AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
if (aes_siv_decrypt(tmp->kek, tmp->kek_len,
encr_mod, SAE_PK_M_LEN + AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
0, NULL, NULL, m) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"SAE-PK: Failed to decrypt EncryptedModifier");
return -1;
}
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: Modifier M", m, SAE_PK_M_LEN);
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: Received K_AP", k_ap, k_ap_len);
/* TODO: Check against the public key, if one is stored in the network
* profile */
key = crypto_ec_key_parse_pub(k_ap, k_ap_len);
if (!key) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "SAE-PK: Failed to parse K_AP");
return -1;
}
group = crypto_ec_key_group(key);
if (!sae_pk_valid_fingerprint(sae, m, SAE_PK_M_LEN, k_ap, k_ap_len,
group)) {
crypto_ec_key_deinit(key);
return -1;
}
/* TODO: Could support alternative groups as long as the combination
* meets the requirements. */
if (group != sae->group) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"SAE-PK: K_AP group %d does not match SAE group %d",
group, sae->group);
crypto_ec_key_deinit(key);
return -1;
}
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: Received KeyAuth",
key_auth, key_auth_len);
hash_len = sae_group_2_hash_len(group);
if (sae_pk_hash_sig_data(sae, hash_len, false, m, SAE_PK_M_LEN,
k_ap, k_ap_len, hash) < 0) {
crypto_ec_key_deinit(key);
return -1;
}
res = crypto_ec_key_verify_signature(key, hash, hash_len,
key_auth, key_auth_len);
crypto_ec_key_deinit(key);
if (res != 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"SAE-PK: Invalid or incorrect signature in KeyAuth");
return -1;
}
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: Valid KeyAuth signature received");
/* TODO: Store validated public key into network profile */
return 0;
}