654 lines
16 KiB
C
654 lines
16 KiB
C
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/*
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* SAE-PK
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* Copyright (c) 2020, The Linux Foundation
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*
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* This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
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* See README for more details.
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*/
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#include "utils/includes.h"
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#include <stdint.h>
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#include "utils/common.h"
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#include "utils/base64.h"
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#include "common/ieee802_11_defs.h"
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#include "common/ieee802_11_common.h"
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#include "crypto/crypto.h"
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#include "crypto/aes.h"
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#include "crypto/aes_siv.h"
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#include "sae.h"
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/* RFC 4648 base 32 alphabet with lowercase characters */
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static const char *sae_pk_base32_table = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz234567";
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bool sae_pk_valid_password(const char *pw)
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{
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int pos;
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/* Minimum password length for SAE-PK is not defined, but the automatic
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* password style determination is more reliable if at least one hyphen
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* is forced to be present in the password. */
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if (os_strlen(pw) < 6)
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return false;
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for (pos = 0; pw[pos]; pos++) {
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if (pos && pos % 5 == 4) {
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if (pw[pos] != '-')
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return false;
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continue;
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}
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if (!os_strchr(sae_pk_base32_table, pw[pos]))
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return false;
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}
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if (pos == 0)
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return false;
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return pw[pos - 1] != '-';
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}
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static char * add_char(const char *start, char *pos, u8 idx, size_t *bits)
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{
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if (*bits == 0)
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return pos;
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if (*bits > 5)
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*bits -= 5;
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else
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*bits = 0;
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if ((pos - start) % 5 == 4)
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*pos++ = '-';
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*pos++ = sae_pk_base32_table[idx];
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return pos;
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}
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char * sae_pk_base32_encode(const u8 *src, size_t len_bits)
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{
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char *out, *pos;
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size_t olen, extra_pad, i;
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u64 block = 0;
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u8 val;
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size_t len = (len_bits + 7) / 8;
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size_t left = len_bits;
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int j;
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if (len == 0 || len >= SIZE_MAX / 8)
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return NULL;
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olen = len * 8 / 5 + 1;
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olen += olen / 4; /* hyphen separators */
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pos = out = os_zalloc(olen + 1);
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if (!out)
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return NULL;
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extra_pad = (5 - len % 5) % 5;
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for (i = 0; i < len + extra_pad; i++) {
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val = i < len ? src[i] : 0;
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block <<= 8;
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block |= val;
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if (i % 5 == 4) {
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for (j = 7; j >= 0; j--)
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pos = add_char(out, pos,
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(block >> j * 5) & 0x1f, &left);
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block = 0;
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}
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}
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return out;
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}
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u8 * sae_pk_base32_decode(const char *src, size_t len, size_t *out_len)
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{
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u8 dtable[256], *out, *pos, tmp;
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u64 block = 0;
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size_t i, count, olen;
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int pad = 0;
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size_t extra_pad;
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os_memset(dtable, 0x80, 256);
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for (i = 0; sae_pk_base32_table[i]; i++)
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dtable[(u8) sae_pk_base32_table[i]] = i;
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dtable['='] = 0;
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count = 0;
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for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
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if (dtable[(u8) src[i]] != 0x80)
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count++;
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}
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if (count == 0)
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return NULL;
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extra_pad = (8 - count % 8) % 8;
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olen = (count + extra_pad) / 8 * 5;
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pos = out = os_malloc(olen);
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if (!out)
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return NULL;
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count = 0;
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for (i = 0; i < len + extra_pad; i++) {
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u8 val;
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if (i >= len)
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val = '=';
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else
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val = src[i];
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tmp = dtable[val];
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if (tmp == 0x80)
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continue;
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if (val == '=')
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pad++;
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block <<= 5;
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block |= tmp;
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count++;
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if (count == 8) {
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*pos++ = (block >> 32) & 0xff;
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*pos++ = (block >> 24) & 0xff;
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*pos++ = (block >> 16) & 0xff;
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*pos++ = (block >> 8) & 0xff;
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*pos++ = block & 0xff;
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count = 0;
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block = 0;
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if (pad) {
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/* Leave in all the available bits with zero
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* padding to full octets from right. */
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pos -= pad * 5 / 8;
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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*out_len = pos - out;
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return out;
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}
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int sae_pk_set_password(struct sae_data *sae, const char *password)
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{
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struct sae_temporary_data *tmp = sae->tmp;
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size_t len;
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len = os_strlen(password);
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if (!tmp || len < 1)
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return -1;
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bin_clear_free(tmp->pw, tmp->pw_len);
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tmp->pw = sae_pk_base32_decode(password, len, &tmp->pw_len);
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tmp->lambda = len - len / 5;
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return tmp->pw ? 0 : -1;
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}
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void sae_deinit_pk(struct sae_pk *pk)
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{
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if (pk) {
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wpabuf_free(pk->m);
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crypto_ec_key_deinit(pk->key);
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wpabuf_free(pk->pubkey);
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os_free(pk);
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}
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}
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struct sae_pk * sae_parse_pk(const char *val)
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{
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struct sae_pk *pk;
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const char *pos;
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size_t len;
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unsigned char *der;
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size_t der_len;
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/* <m-as-hexdump>:<base64-encoded-DER-encoded-key> */
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pos = os_strchr(val, ':');
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if (!pos || (pos - val) & 0x01)
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return NULL;
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len = (pos - val) / 2;
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if (len != SAE_PK_M_LEN) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "SAE: Unexpected Modifier M length %zu",
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len);
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return NULL;
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}
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pk = os_zalloc(sizeof(*pk));
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if (!pk)
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return NULL;
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pk->m = wpabuf_alloc(len);
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if (!pk->m || hexstr2bin(val, wpabuf_put(pk->m, len), len)) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "SAE: Failed to parse m");
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goto fail;
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}
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pos++;
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der = base64_decode(pos, os_strlen(pos), &der_len);
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if (!der) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "SAE: Failed to base64 decode PK key");
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goto fail;
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}
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pk->key = crypto_ec_key_parse_priv(der, der_len);
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bin_clear_free(der, der_len);
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if (!pk->key)
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goto fail;
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pk->group = crypto_ec_key_group(pk->key);
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pk->pubkey = crypto_ec_key_get_subject_public_key(pk->key);
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if (!pk->pubkey)
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goto fail;
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return pk;
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fail:
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sae_deinit_pk(pk);
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return NULL;
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}
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int sae_hash(size_t hash_len, const u8 *data, size_t len, u8 *hash)
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{
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if (hash_len == 32)
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return sha256_vector(1, &data, &len, hash);
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#ifdef CONFIG_SHA384
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if (hash_len == 48)
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return sha384_vector(1, &data, &len, hash);
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#endif /* CONFIG_SHA384 */
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#ifdef CONFIG_SHA512
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if (hash_len == 64)
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return sha512_vector(1, &data, &len, hash);
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#endif /* CONFIG_SHA512 */
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return -1;
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}
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static int sae_pk_hash_sig_data(struct sae_data *sae, size_t hash_len,
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bool ap, const u8 *m, size_t m_len,
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const u8 *pubkey, size_t pubkey_len, u8 *hash)
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{
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struct sae_temporary_data *tmp = sae->tmp;
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struct wpabuf *sig_data;
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u8 *pos;
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int ret = -1;
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/* Signed data for KeyAuth: eleAP || eleSTA || scaAP || scaSTA ||
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* M || K_AP || AP-BSSID || STA-MAC */
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sig_data = wpabuf_alloc(tmp->prime_len * 6 + m_len + pubkey_len +
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2 * ETH_ALEN);
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if (!sig_data)
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goto fail;
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pos = wpabuf_put(sig_data, 2 * tmp->prime_len);
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if (crypto_ec_point_to_bin(tmp->ec, ap ? tmp->own_commit_element_ecc :
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tmp->peer_commit_element_ecc,
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pos, pos + tmp->prime_len) < 0)
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goto fail;
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pos = wpabuf_put(sig_data, 2 * tmp->prime_len);
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if (crypto_ec_point_to_bin(tmp->ec, ap ? tmp->peer_commit_element_ecc :
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tmp->own_commit_element_ecc,
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pos, pos + tmp->prime_len) < 0)
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goto fail;
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if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(ap ? tmp->own_commit_scalar :
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sae->peer_commit_scalar,
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wpabuf_put(sig_data, tmp->prime_len),
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tmp->prime_len, tmp->prime_len) < 0 ||
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crypto_bignum_to_bin(ap ? sae->peer_commit_scalar :
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tmp->own_commit_scalar,
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wpabuf_put(sig_data, tmp->prime_len),
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tmp->prime_len, tmp->prime_len) < 0)
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goto fail;
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wpabuf_put_data(sig_data, m, m_len);
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wpabuf_put_data(sig_data, pubkey, pubkey_len);
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wpabuf_put_data(sig_data, ap ? tmp->own_addr : tmp->peer_addr,
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ETH_ALEN);
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wpabuf_put_data(sig_data, ap ? tmp->peer_addr : tmp->own_addr,
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ETH_ALEN);
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wpa_hexdump_buf_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: Data to be signed for KeyAuth",
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sig_data);
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if (sae_hash(hash_len, wpabuf_head(sig_data), wpabuf_len(sig_data),
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hash) < 0)
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goto fail;
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wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: hash(data to be signed)",
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hash, hash_len);
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ret = 0;
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fail:
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wpabuf_free(sig_data);
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return ret;
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}
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int sae_write_confirm_pk(struct sae_data *sae, struct wpabuf *buf)
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{
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struct sae_temporary_data *tmp = sae->tmp;
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struct wpabuf *elem = NULL, *sig = NULL;
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size_t extra;
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int ret = -1;
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u8 *encr_mod;
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size_t encr_mod_len;
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const struct sae_pk *pk;
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u8 hash[SAE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
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size_t hash_len;
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if (!tmp)
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return -1;
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pk = tmp->ap_pk;
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if (!pk)
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return 0;
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if (tmp->kek_len != 32 && tmp->kek_len != 48 && tmp->kek_len != 64) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "SAE-PK: No KEK available for confirm");
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return -1;
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}
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if (!tmp->ec) {
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/* Only ECC groups are supported for SAE-PK in the current
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* implementation. */
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
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"SAE-PK: SAE commit did not use an ECC group");
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return -1;
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}
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hash_len = sae_ecc_prime_len_2_hash_len(tmp->prime_len);
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if (sae_pk_hash_sig_data(sae, hash_len, true, wpabuf_head(pk->m),
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wpabuf_len(pk->m), wpabuf_head(pk->pubkey),
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wpabuf_len(pk->pubkey), hash) < 0)
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goto fail;
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sig = crypto_ec_key_sign(pk->key, hash, hash_len);
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if (!sig)
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goto fail;
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wpa_hexdump_buf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: KeyAuth = Sig_AP()", sig);
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elem = wpabuf_alloc(1500 + wpabuf_len(sig));
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if (!elem)
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goto fail;
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/* EncryptedModifier = AES-SIV-Q(M); no AAD */
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encr_mod_len = wpabuf_len(pk->m) + AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
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wpabuf_put_u8(elem, encr_mod_len);
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encr_mod = wpabuf_put(elem, encr_mod_len);
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if (aes_siv_encrypt(tmp->kek, tmp->kek_len,
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wpabuf_head(pk->m), wpabuf_len(pk->m),
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0, NULL, NULL, encr_mod) < 0)
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goto fail;
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wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: EncryptedModifier",
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encr_mod, encr_mod_len);
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/* FILS Public Key element */
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wpabuf_put_u8(elem, WLAN_EID_EXTENSION);
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wpabuf_put_u8(elem, 2 + wpabuf_len(pk->pubkey));
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wpabuf_put_u8(elem, WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_PUBLIC_KEY);
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wpabuf_put_u8(elem, 3); /* Key Type: ECDSA public key */
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wpabuf_put_buf(elem, pk->pubkey);
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/* FILS Key Confirmation element (KeyAuth) */
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wpabuf_put_u8(elem, WLAN_EID_EXTENSION);
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wpabuf_put_u8(elem, 1 + wpabuf_len(sig));
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wpabuf_put_u8(elem, WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_KEY_CONFIRM);
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/* KeyAuth = Sig_AP(eleAP || eleSTA || scaAP || scaSTA || M || K_AP ||
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* AP-BSSID || STA-MAC) */
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wpabuf_put_buf(elem, sig);
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/* TODO: fragmentation */
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extra = 6; /* Vendor specific element header */
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if (wpabuf_tailroom(elem) < extra + wpabuf_len(buf)) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
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"SAE-PK: No room in message buffer for SAE-PK element (%zu < %zu)",
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wpabuf_tailroom(buf), extra + wpabuf_len(buf));
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goto fail;
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}
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/* SAE-PK element */
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wpabuf_put_u8(buf, WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC);
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wpabuf_put_u8(buf, 4 + wpabuf_len(elem));
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wpabuf_put_be32(buf, SAE_PK_IE_VENDOR_TYPE);
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wpabuf_put_buf(buf, elem);
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ret = 0;
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fail:
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wpabuf_free(elem);
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wpabuf_free(sig);
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return ret;
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}
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static bool sae_pk_valid_fingerprint(struct sae_data *sae,
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const u8 *m, size_t m_len,
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const u8 *k_ap, size_t k_ap_len)
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{
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struct sae_temporary_data *tmp = sae->tmp;
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size_t sec, i;
|
||
|
u8 *fingerprint_exp, *hash_data, *pos;
|
||
|
size_t hash_len, hash_data_len, fingerprint_bits, fingerprint_bytes;
|
||
|
u8 hash[SAE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
|
||
|
int res;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!tmp->pw || tmp->pw_len < 1) {
|
||
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
||
|
"SAE-PK: No PW available for K_AP fingerprint check");
|
||
|
return false;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Fingerprint = L(Hash(SSID || M || K_AP), 0, 8*Sec + 5*Lambda - 2) */
|
||
|
|
||
|
hash_len = sae_ecc_prime_len_2_hash_len(tmp->prime_len);
|
||
|
hash_data_len = tmp->ssid_len + m_len + k_ap_len;
|
||
|
hash_data = os_malloc(hash_data_len);
|
||
|
if (!hash_data)
|
||
|
return false;
|
||
|
pos = hash_data;
|
||
|
os_memcpy(pos, tmp->ssid, tmp->ssid_len);
|
||
|
pos += tmp->ssid_len;
|
||
|
os_memcpy(pos, m, m_len);
|
||
|
pos += m_len;
|
||
|
os_memcpy(pos, k_ap, k_ap_len);
|
||
|
|
||
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: SSID || M || K_AP",
|
||
|
hash_data, hash_data_len);
|
||
|
res = sae_hash(hash_len, hash_data, hash_data_len, hash);
|
||
|
bin_clear_free(hash_data, hash_data_len);
|
||
|
if (res < 0)
|
||
|
return false;
|
||
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: Hash(SSID || M || K_AP)",
|
||
|
hash, hash_len);
|
||
|
|
||
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: PW", tmp->pw, tmp->pw_len);
|
||
|
sec = (tmp->pw[0] >> 6) + 2;
|
||
|
fingerprint_bits = 8 * sec + 5 * tmp->lambda - 2;
|
||
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: Sec=%zu Lambda=%zu fingerprint_bits=%zu",
|
||
|
sec, tmp->lambda, fingerprint_bits);
|
||
|
if (fingerprint_bits > hash_len * 8) {
|
||
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
|
||
|
"SAE-PK: Not enough hash output bits for the fingerprint");
|
||
|
return false;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
fingerprint_bytes = (fingerprint_bits + 7) / 8;
|
||
|
if (fingerprint_bits % 8) {
|
||
|
size_t extra;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Zero out the extra bits in the last octet */
|
||
|
extra = 8 - fingerprint_bits % 8;
|
||
|
pos = &hash[fingerprint_bits / 8];
|
||
|
*pos = (*pos >> extra) << extra;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: Fingerprint", hash, fingerprint_bytes);
|
||
|
|
||
|
fingerprint_exp = os_zalloc(sec + tmp->pw_len);
|
||
|
if (!fingerprint_exp)
|
||
|
return false;
|
||
|
pos = fingerprint_exp + sec;
|
||
|
for (i = 0; i < tmp->pw_len; i++) {
|
||
|
u8 next = i + 1 < tmp->pw_len ? tmp->pw[i + 1] : 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
*pos++ = tmp->pw[i] << 2 | next >> 6;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: Fingerprint_Expected",
|
||
|
fingerprint_exp, fingerprint_bytes);
|
||
|
res = os_memcmp_const(hash, fingerprint_exp, fingerprint_bytes);
|
||
|
bin_clear_free(fingerprint_exp, tmp->pw_len);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (res) {
|
||
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: K_AP fingerprint mismatch");
|
||
|
return false;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: Valid K_AP fingerprint");
|
||
|
return true;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
int sae_check_confirm_pk(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *ies, size_t ies_len)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
struct sae_temporary_data *tmp = sae->tmp;
|
||
|
const u8 *sae_pk, *pos, *end, *encr_mod, *k_ap, *key_auth;
|
||
|
u8 m[SAE_PK_M_LEN];
|
||
|
size_t k_ap_len, key_auth_len;
|
||
|
struct crypto_ec_key *key;
|
||
|
int res;
|
||
|
u8 hash[SAE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
|
||
|
size_t hash_len;
|
||
|
int group;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!tmp)
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
if (!tmp->pk || tmp->ap_pk)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (tmp->kek_len != 32 && tmp->kek_len != 48 && tmp->kek_len != 64) {
|
||
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "SAE-PK: No KEK available for confirm");
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!tmp->ec) {
|
||
|
/* Only ECC groups are supported for SAE-PK in the current
|
||
|
* implementation. */
|
||
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
|
||
|
"SAE-PK: SAE commit did not use an ECC group");
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: Received confirm IEs", ies, ies_len);
|
||
|
sae_pk = get_vendor_ie(ies, ies_len, SAE_PK_IE_VENDOR_TYPE);
|
||
|
if (!sae_pk) {
|
||
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "SAE-PK: No SAE-PK element included");
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/* TODO: Fragment reassembly */
|
||
|
pos = sae_pk + 2;
|
||
|
end = pos + sae_pk[1];
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (end - pos < 4 + 1 + SAE_PK_M_LEN + AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
|
||
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
|
||
|
"SAE-PK: No room for EncryptedModifier in SAE-PK element");
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
pos += 4;
|
||
|
if (*pos != SAE_PK_M_LEN + AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
|
||
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
|
||
|
"SAE-PK: Unexpected EncryptedModifier length %u",
|
||
|
*pos);
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
pos++;
|
||
|
encr_mod = pos;
|
||
|
pos += SAE_PK_M_LEN + AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (end - pos < 4 || pos[0] != WLAN_EID_EXTENSION || pos[1] < 2 ||
|
||
|
pos[1] > end - pos - 2 ||
|
||
|
pos[2] != WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_PUBLIC_KEY) {
|
||
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
|
||
|
"SAE-PK: No FILS Public Key element in SAE-PK element");
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (pos[3] != 3) {
|
||
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "SAE-PK: Unsupported public key type %u",
|
||
|
pos[3]);
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
k_ap_len = pos[1] - 2;
|
||
|
pos += 4;
|
||
|
k_ap = pos;
|
||
|
pos += k_ap_len;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (end - pos < 4 || pos[0] != WLAN_EID_EXTENSION || pos[1] < 1 ||
|
||
|
pos[1] > end - pos - 2 ||
|
||
|
pos[2] != WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_KEY_CONFIRM) {
|
||
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
|
||
|
"SAE-PK: No FILS Key Confirm element in SAE-PK element");
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
key_auth_len = pos[1] - 1;
|
||
|
pos += 3;
|
||
|
key_auth = pos;
|
||
|
pos += key_auth_len;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (pos < end) {
|
||
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG,
|
||
|
"SAE-PK: Extra data at the end of SAE-PK element",
|
||
|
pos, end - pos);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: EncryptedModifier",
|
||
|
encr_mod, SAE_PK_M_LEN + AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (aes_siv_decrypt(tmp->kek, tmp->kek_len,
|
||
|
encr_mod, SAE_PK_M_LEN + AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
|
||
|
0, NULL, NULL, m) < 0) {
|
||
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
|
||
|
"SAE-PK: Failed to decrypt EncryptedModifier");
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: Modifier M", m, SAE_PK_M_LEN);
|
||
|
|
||
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: Received K_AP", k_ap, k_ap_len);
|
||
|
/* TODO: Check against the public key, if one is stored in the network
|
||
|
* profile */
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!sae_pk_valid_fingerprint(sae, m, SAE_PK_M_LEN, k_ap, k_ap_len))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
key = crypto_ec_key_parse_pub(k_ap, k_ap_len);
|
||
|
if (!key) {
|
||
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "SAE-PK: Failed to parse K_AP");
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
group = crypto_ec_key_group(key);
|
||
|
/* TODO: Could support alternative groups as long as the combination
|
||
|
* meets the requirements. */
|
||
|
if (group != sae->group) {
|
||
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
|
||
|
"SAE-PK: K_AP group %d does not match SAE group %d",
|
||
|
group, sae->group);
|
||
|
crypto_ec_key_deinit(key);
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: Received KeyAuth",
|
||
|
key_auth, key_auth_len);
|
||
|
|
||
|
hash_len = sae_ecc_prime_len_2_hash_len(tmp->prime_len);
|
||
|
if (sae_pk_hash_sig_data(sae, hash_len, false, m, SAE_PK_M_LEN,
|
||
|
k_ap, k_ap_len, hash) < 0) {
|
||
|
crypto_ec_key_deinit(key);
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
res = crypto_ec_key_verify_signature(key, hash, hash_len,
|
||
|
key_auth, key_auth_len);
|
||
|
crypto_ec_key_deinit(key);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (res != 1) {
|
||
|
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
|
||
|
"SAE-PK: Invalid or incorrect signature in KeyAuth");
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE-PK: Valid KeyAuth signature received");
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* TODO: Store validated public key into network profile */
|
||
|
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|