![]() While the existing code already addresses TLS Message Length validation for both EAP-TLS peer and server side, this adds explicit checks and rejection of invalid messages in the functions handling reassembly. This does not change externally observable behavior in case of EAP server. For EAP peer, this starts rejecting invalid messages instead of addressing them by reallocating the buffer (i.e., ignoring TLS Message Length in practice). Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> |
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.. | ||
ap | ||
common | ||
crypto | ||
drivers | ||
eap_common | ||
eap_peer | ||
eap_server | ||
eapol_auth | ||
eapol_supp | ||
l2_packet | ||
p2p | ||
radius | ||
rsn_supp | ||
tls | ||
utils | ||
wps | ||
lib.rules | ||
Makefile |