Run through the hunting-and-pecking loop 40 times to mask the time
necessary to find PWE. The odds of PWE not being found in 40 loops is
roughly 1 in 1 trillion.
Signed-off-by: Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
BoringSSL is Google's cleanup of OpenSSL and an attempt to unify
Chromium, Android and internal codebases around a single OpenSSL.
As part of moving Android to BoringSSL, the wpa_supplicant maintainers
in Android requested that I upstream the change. I've worked to reduce
the size of the patch a lot but I'm afraid that it still contains a
number of #ifdefs.
[1] https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/06/20/boringssl.html
Signed-off-by: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
This changes OpenSSL calls to explicitly clear the EC_POINT memory
allocations when freeing them. This adds an extra layer of security by
avoiding leaving potentially private keys into local memory after they
are not needed anymore. While some of these variables are not really
private (e.g., they are sent in clear anyway), the extra cost of
clearing them is not significant and it is simpler to just clear these
explicitly rather than review each possible code path to confirm where
this does not help.
Signed-off-by: Florent Daigniere <nextgens@freenetproject.org>
This changes OpenSSL calls to explicitly clear the bignum memory
allocations when freeing them. This adds an extra layer of security by
avoiding leaving potentially private keys into local memory after they
are not needed anymore. While some of these variables are not really
private (e.g., they are sent in clear anyway), the extra cost of
clearing them is not significant and it is simpler to just clear these
explicitly rather than review each possible code path to confirm where
this does not help.
Signed-off-by: Florent Daigniere <nextgens@freenetproject.org>
At least some error paths (e.g., hitting the limit on hunt-and-peck
iterations) could have resulted in double-freeing of some memory
allocations. Avoid this by setting the pointers to NULL after they have
been freed instead of trying to free the data structure in a location
where some external references cannot be cleared. [Bug 453]
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The previously used limit (10) is too small for practical purposes since
it can result in about 1 out of 1000 authentication attempts failing.
Increase the limit to 30 to avoid such issues. [Bug 453]
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
intended-for: hostap-1
Remove the GPL notification text from EAP-pwd implementation per
approval from Dan Harkins who contributed these files.
(email from Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> dated
Wed, 4 Jan 2012 16:25:48 -0800)
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Another niceness of OpenSSL is that if the high-order bit of a 521-bit
big num is not set then BN_bn2bin() will just return 65 bytes instead of
66 bytes with the 1st (big endian, after all) being all zero. When this
happens the wrong number of octets are mixed into function H(). So
there's a whole bunch of "offset" computations and BN_bn2bin() dumps the
big number into a buffer + offset. That should be obvious in the patch
too.
The previous EAP-pwd KDF implemented has an issue with group 21, that is
an elliptic curve group based on a 521 bit prime. 521 is not an even
multiple of 8, and therein lies the problem.
OpenSSL's BN library interprets a string of bits as in big-endian format
so all the calls of BN_bin2bn() will take the binary blob of bits and
turn it into a big number in big-endian format. In the EAP-pwd KDF, I am
stretching the key to "primebitlen". When that is not an even multiple
of 8 I have to mask off the excess. But I was masking off the excess
bits in the 1st octet (big endian after all) but that isn't right. The
KDF produces a string of endian-less bits. The 521st bit is the first
bit in the last octet, not the 7th bit in the first octet. So that has
been fixed and you can see in the attached diff what I'm doing.
The changes are:
1. the word "and" in the hunting-and-pecking string passed to the KDF
should be capitalized.
2. the primebitlen used in the KDF should be a short not an int.
3. the computation of MK in hostap is based on an older version of the
draft and is not the way it's specified in the RFC.
4. the group being passed into computation of the Commit was not in
network order.
