It is better to have command description around the command definitions:
the chances for omitting usage, forgotting to change/delete them, etc.
are smaller than for the separate usage statement. [Bug 290]
Signed-off-by: Eygene Ryabinkin <rea-fbsd@codelabs.ru>
I had added flags to the every command description: just now the only
meaningful flag tells that this command has sensitive arguments and it
shouldn't be written to the disk. I rewrote the logics for the search
for the sensitive commands: special procedure is now loops over all
commands and tries to see if command has sensitive data. [Bug 289]
Signed-off-by: Eygene Ryabinkin <rea-fbsd@codelabs.ru>
First of all, the history had not been written to the disk, since almost
all commands were cleaned up due to the error in the history cleaning:
the return value of the last os_strncasecmp() call was not compared to
zero, but was rather used as is. So the condition was almost always
true and most commands were removed from the history.
The second problem was that the evaluation of the potentially sensitive
commands was started at the entry number 1, instead of very first entry.
This change replaces -I and -i options (Chargeable-User-Identity) with a
new -N option that can add any RADIUS attribute into the Access-Request
messages without having to modify eapol_test for each new attribute.
Replace " wpa_supplicant" with " %wpa_supplicant" except for
"struct wpa_supplicant". This makes it easier to write Doxygen comments
since there is no need to add the ugly '%' prefix to each instance of
wpa_supplicant text showing up.
The configuration parsing functions seemed to have worked fine before,
but these were real bugs even if they did not show up in practice.
hostapd_ip_diff() was broken for IPv6 addresses (overwrote address and
always returned 1.
This updated all doxygen runs to use the same style that was used for
wpa_supplicant full documents. The full vs. fast configurations are now
otherwise identical apart from fast not generating dot files or
latex/pdf version of the documentation.
Generate a SHA1 hash -based UUID from the local MAC address if the UUID
was not configured. This makes it easier to prepare for WPS since there
is no need to generate an UUID.
When using ap_scan=1, we know before the association request that MFP
will be supported, so we can as well require it. This helps mac80211 in
configuring whether to enable MFP.
IEEE 802.11w/D7.0 incorrectly changed the Action Category from 8 to 7
when renaming Ping to SA Query. Category 7 is reserved for HT (IEEE
802.11n) and IEEE 802.11w will need to continue to use the category 8
that was allocated for it.
mac80211 can now figure out which key to use for injected frames (in
most cases), so we can remove the workaround for configuring IGTK on the
monitor interface that is used for injecting frames.
Previous version assumed that the Flags field is always present and
ended up reading one octet past the end of the buffer should the Flags
field be missing. The message length would also be set incorrectly
(size_t)-1 or (size_t)-5, but it looks like reassembly code ended up
failing in malloc before actually using this huge length to read data.
RFC 2716 uses a somewhat unclear description on what exactly is included
in the TLS Ack message ("no data" can refer to either Data field in 4.1
or TLS Data field in 4.2), so in theory, it would be possible for some
implementations to not include Flags field. However,
EAP-{PEAP,TTLS,FAST} need the Flags field in Ack messages, too, for
indicating the used version.
The EAP peer code will now accept the no-Flags case as an Ack message if
EAP workarounds are enabled (which is the default behavior). If
workarounds are disabled, the message without Flags field will be
rejected.
[Bug 292]
There is not really much else the Authenticator can do if it does not
receive valid EAP response from the Supplicant/EAP peer. EAP-Failure
would need to be sent before trying to start again with
EAP-Request/Identity, but that is not allowed before the EAP peer
actually replies. Anyway, forcing a new association is likely to clean
up peer state, too, so it can help fixing some issues that could have
caused the peer not to be able to reply in the first place.
It looks like this never survived the move from IEEE 802.1X-2001 to
IEEE 802.1X-2004 and EAP state machine (RFC 4137). The retransmission
scheduling and control is now in EAP authenticator and the
calculateTimeout() producedure is used to determine timeout for
retransmission (either dynamic backoff or value from EAP method hint).
The recommended calculations based on SRTT and RTTVAR (RFC 2988) are not
yet implemented since there is no round-trip time measurement available
yet.
This should make EAP authentication much more robust in environments
where initial packets are lost for any reason. If the EAP method does
not provide a hint on timeout, default schedule of 3, 6, 12, 20, 20, 20,
... seconds will be used.
Previously, only the delivery option 1 from RFC 4284
(EAP-Request/Identity from the AP) was supported. Now option 3
(subsequent EAP-Request/Identity from RADIUS server) can also be used
when hostapd is used as a RADIUS server. The eap_user file will need to
have a Phase 1 user entry pointing to Identity method in order for this
to happen (e.g., "* Identity" in the end of the file). The identity hint
is configured in the same was as for AP/Authenticator case (eap_message
in hostapd.conf).
