Disable Probe Request reporting for statically created AP interfaces
during de-initialization. We will enable it again while starting AP
operations.
Signed-off-by: Avinash Patil <avinashapatil@gmail.com>
Some devices have limitations which do not allow changing virtual
interface mode from AP to station or vice versa. To work around this,
check if such AP interface is not dynamic. If such an interface is
enumarated, just set ifmode to AP and avoid setting nlmode to default
station mode on deinit.
Signed-off-by: Avinash Patil <avinashapatil@gmail.com>
This adds hostapd support for the new WLAN-Pairwise-Cipher,
WLAN-Group-Cipher, WLAN-AKM-Suite, and WLAN-Group-Mgmt-Pairwise-Cipher
attributes defined in RFC 7268. These attributes are added to RADIUS
messages when the station negotiates use of WPA/RSN.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds hostapd support for the new WLAN-HESSID attribute defined in
RFC 7268. This attribute contains the HESSID and it is added whenever
Interworking is enabled and HESSID is configured.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds hostapd support for the new Mobility-Domain-Id attribute
defined in RFC 7268. This attribute contains the mobility domain id and
it is added whenever the station negotiates use of FT.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The special PAC_OPAQUE_TYPE_PAD case did not skip incrementing of the
pos pointer and could result in one octet read-after-buffer when parsing
the PAC-Opaque data.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This forces EAP peer implementation to drop any possible fast resumption
data if the network block for the current connection is not the same as
the one used for the previous one. This allows different network blocks
to be used with non-matching parameters to enforce different rules even
if the same authentication server is used. For example, this allows
different CA trust rules to be enforced with different ca_cert
parameters which can prevent EAP-TTLS Phase 2 from being used based on
TLS session resumption.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This is similar to wpa_msg_global() in the same way as wpa_msg_ctrl() is
to wpa_msg(). In other words, wpa_msg_global_ctrl() is used to send
global control interface events without printing them into the debug
log.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Use an explicit memset call to clear any configuration parameter and
dynamic data that contains private information like keys or identity.
This brings in an additional layer of protection by reducing the length
of time this type of private data is kept in memory.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the EAP-pwd server and peer implementations more robust
should OpenSSL fail to derive random number for some reason. While this
is unlikely to happen in practice, the implementation better be prepared
for this should something unexpected ever happen. See
http://jbp.io/2014/01/16/openssl-rand-api/#review-of-randbytes-callers
for more details.
Signed-off-by: Florent Daigniere <nextgens@freenetproject.org>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Florent Daigniere <nextgens@freenetproject.org>
This changes OpenSSL calls to explicitly clear the EC_POINT memory
allocations when freeing them. This adds an extra layer of security by
avoiding leaving potentially private keys into local memory after they
are not needed anymore. While some of these variables are not really
private (e.g., they are sent in clear anyway), the extra cost of
clearing them is not significant and it is simpler to just clear these
explicitly rather than review each possible code path to confirm where
this does not help.
Signed-off-by: Florent Daigniere <nextgens@freenetproject.org>
This changes OpenSSL calls to explicitly clear the bignum memory
allocations when freeing them. This adds an extra layer of security by
avoiding leaving potentially private keys into local memory after they
are not needed anymore. While some of these variables are not really
private (e.g., they are sent in clear anyway), the extra cost of
clearing them is not significant and it is simpler to just clear these
explicitly rather than review each possible code path to confirm where
this does not help.
Signed-off-by: Florent Daigniere <nextgens@freenetproject.org>
FreeRADIUS releases before 1.1.4 did not send MS-CHAP2-Success in
EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPv2. A wpa_supplicant workaround for that was added in
2005 and it has been enabled by default to avoid interoperability
issues. This could be disabled with all other EAP workarounds
(eap_workaround=0). However, that will disable some workarounds that are
still needed with number of authentication servers.
Old FreeRADIUS versions should not be in use anymore, so it makes sense
to remove this EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPv2 workaround completely to get more
complete validation of server behavior. This allows MSCHAPv2 to verify
that the server knows the password instead of relying only on the TLS
certificate validation.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@google.com>
When driver interface is destroyed (via wpa_driver_nl80211_deinit) the
"preq" nl socket isn't always deleted but the callback struct associated
is. After the interface is destroyed we may still get event on the
socket but as the callback has been freed this will cause wpa_supplicant
to crash.
This patch ensures that the "preq" socket is destroyed when destroying
the interface.
Signed-off-by: Cedric IZOARD <cedricx.izoard@intel.com>
This allows external programs to use vendor specific information from
P2P peers without wpa_supplicant having to be able to parse and
understand all such vendor specific elements.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This adds following new control interface commands to allow arbitrary
vendor elements to be added into number of frames:
VENDOR_ELEM_ADD <frame id> <hexdump of elem(s)>
VENDOR_ELEM_GET <frame id>
VENDOR_ELEM_REMOVE <frame id> <hexdump of elem(s)>
VENDOR_ELEM_REMOVE <frame id> *
The following frames are supported in this commit (additional frames can
be added in the future):
0 = Probe Request frame in P2P device discovery
1 = Probe Response frame from P2P Device role
2 = Probe Response frame from P2P GO
3 = Beacon frame from P2P GO
4 = PD Req
5 = PD Resp
6 = GO Neg Req
7 = GO Neg Resp
8 = GO Neg Conf
9 = Invitation Request
10 = Invitation Response
11 = P2P Association Request
12 = P2P Association Response
One or more vendor element can be added/removed with the commands. The
hexdump of the element(s) needs to contain the full element (id, len,
payload) and the buffer needs to pass IE parsing requirements to be
accepted.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
set_dfs_state() return value is not currently checked anywhere, so
remove the dead assignment to avoid static analyzer complaints.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Use an explicit memset call to clear any configuration parameter and
dynamic data that contains private information like keys or identity.
This brings in an additional layer of protection by reducing the length
of time this type of private data is kept in memory.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Use an explicit memset call to clear any hostapd configuration parameter
that contains private information like keys or identity. This brings in
an additional layer of protection by reducing the length of time this
type of private data is kept in memory.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Use an explicit memset call to clear any hs20-osu-client configuration
parameter that contains private information like keys or identity. This
brings in an additional layer of protection by reducing the length of
time this type of private data is kept in memory.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Reduce the amount of time keying material (MSK, EMSK, temporary private
data) remains in memory in EAP methods. This provides additional
protection should there be any issues that could expose process memory
to external observers.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Reduce the amount of time keying material (MSK, EMSK, temporary private
data) remains in memory in EAP methods. This provides additional
protection should there be any issues that could expose process memory
to external observers.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Use an explicit memset call to clear any wpa_supplicant configuration
parameter that contains private information like keys or identity. This
brings in an additional layer of protection by reducing the length of
time this type of private data is kept in memory.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The pos pointer is not used after this now nor in future plans, so no
need to increment the value. This remove a static analyzer warning about
dead increment.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Instead of using the pre-calculated length of the buffer, determine the
length of used data based on the pos pointer. This avoids a static
analyzer warning about dead increment.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
