This is needed with the modified hostapd implementation to fix the
ap_hs20_terms_and_conditions* test cases.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
This makes it more convenient to generate the URL in a way that
interoperates between different vendors. The AP is simply copying the
already constructed URL as-is from Access-Accept to WNM-Notification.
This means that the HO AAA can generate the URL in a manner that works
for the associated T&C Server without having to coordinate with each AP.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
This allows hs20-osu-client to configure wpa_supplicant credential with
a specific EAP method so that roaming consortium OI -based matching can
be used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
It is easier to understand the hostapd debug log here if each step is
noted there before starting the wpa_supplicant operation. In addition,
it looks safer to process all pending event messages between each step
to avoid running out of any buffer limits.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
In the infrastructure BSS case, the AP needs to clear pending SAE state
if a new Commit message is received when already in Committed state.
This allows the non-AP STA to negotiate a new group if it ends up trying
to go through SAE authentication again before the AP side has removed
the previous STA entry.
This fixes an issue where a kernel update changed something in SAE
timing or authentication sequence and started failing the
sae_bignum_failure hwsim test case.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
This test case verifies that wpa_supplicant is able to perform CSA to a
VHT80 channel when having to move the GO due to an avoid-frequencies
driver event.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Prefer channels that support VHT80 (and secondarily, HT40 on the same
band) over other common group channels. If no such channel is found,
prefer any channel that uses the same band so that CSA can be used. This
improves the case where a P2P GO needs to move to another channel and
there is no other reason (e.g., preferred channel from the driver or an
already used channel from a virtual interface sharing the same radio) to
pick a specific channel.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
This makes it easier to debug why wpa_supplicant selects particular
HT/VHT parameters for AP/P2P GO mode.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
When removing an interface, hostapd_bss_deinit() frees all associated
STAs. If any of the stations is 40MHz intolerant, the cleanup invokes
ht40_intolerant_remove(), that in turn registers a 20->40MHz transition
timer for the last station (ap_ht2040_timeout() function). That timer is
never canceled; once it executes, the interface is gone, most likely
resulting in a segfault when referencing it.
While hostapd_interface_deinit() cancels the transition timer, it does
so before cleaning up STAs. Move the cancellation after STA cleanup to
cancel any timer that was registered during that operation.
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Handle NL80211_CMD_WIPHY_REG_CHANGE the same way as the
NL80211_CMD_REG_CHANGE event. The wiphy-specific event is generated by
the cfg80211 reg_process_self_managed_hints() function, e.g., when going
through regulatory_set_wiphy_regd_sync_rtnl(). Previously, such events
were ignored completely in hostapd/wpa_supplicant.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
The AKM 00-0F-AC:13 is supposed to use cryptographic algorithms
consistently, but the current IEEE 802.11 standard is not doing so for
the key names: PMKID (uses SHA-1), PMKR0Name/PMKR1Name (uses SHA-256).
The PMKID case was already implemented with SHA-384 and this commit
replaces use of SHA-256 with SHA-384 for PMKR0Name/PMKR1Name derivation
to be consistent in SHA-384. While this is not compliant with the
current IEEE 802.11 standard, this is clearly needed to meet CNSA Suite
requirements. Matching change is being proposed in REVmd to get the IEEE
802.11 standard to meet the use case requirements.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
A new SAE Commit message should not be allowed to drop an existing STA
entry since the sender of that Commit message cannot be authenticated
before receiving the Confirm message. This is important in particular
when PMF is used since this would provide a potential new path for
forcing a connection to be dropped.
Fix this by allowing a new SAE Authentication instance to be started
when the old instance is in Accepted state and the new Commit message
does not use the same peer-scalar value (checked in
sae_parse_commit_scalar()). When PMF is used, the AP will use SA Query
procedure when receiving the (Re)Association Request frame. In theory,
that step could be skipped in case of SAE Authentication since the
non-AP STA is demonstrating knowledge of the password. Anyway, there is
no allowance for that exception in the IEEE 802.11 standard, so at least
for now, leave this using SA Query procedure just like any other PMF
case.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
wpa_supplicant was hardcoded to use BIP-CMAC-128 in FT protocol if PMF
was enabled. Extend that to allow the other BIP algorithms to be used as
well.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
hostapd was hardcoded to use 128-bit IGTK in FT protocol (IGTK
subelement in FTE). Extend that to allow 256-bit IGTK (i.e.,
BIP-CMAC-256 and BIP-GMAC-256) to be used as well.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Instead of sending out a partially completed frame, abort the
association process if something unexpected happens and remove the STA
entry.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The implementation changes in hostapd FT error path handling in the
follow commit would result in ap_ft_ap_oom7 test case failing. This is
triggered partially by PMF protections and SA Query attempts, so it
looks like it is easier to split each failure case into a separate test
case.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
When support for KCK2 and KEK2 was added, both keys were derived for
FT-FILS cases, but only KCK2 was actually used. Add similar changes to
use KEK2 to protect GTK/IGTK in FTE with using FT-FILS AKMs.
This fixes AES key wrapping to use the correct key. The change is not
backwards compatible.
Fixes: 2f37387812 ("FILS: Add more complete support for FT-FILS use cases")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The bss variable in this function might be NULL, so make the FT MDE
addition case conditional on a BSS entry being available.
Fixes: 3dc3afe298 ("FT: Add MDE to assoc request IEs in connect params")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
When building an RRB message, a failure in wpa_ft_rrb_lin() calls could
have resulted in trying to free an uninitialized pointer. Fix this by
initializing *packet to NULL before going through the initial steps.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
SHA384-based FT AKM uses longer keys, so the RRB receive processing for
push and pull response messages needs to be able to accept variable
length PMK-R1.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The MIC field is now a variable length field, so make FTE generation in
hostapd aware of the two different field lengths.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The MIC field is now a variable length field, so make FTE generation in
wpa_supplicant aware of the two different field lengths.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This defines key lengths for SHA384-based FT AKM and handles writing and
parsing for RSNE AKMs with the new value.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new label string for TLS-Exporter was taken into use for MSK
derivation, but it was missed from EMSK deriation in the server side
implementation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
