All the existing users of these elements were already validating the
element length. However, it is clearer to validate this already at the
parser for extra layer of protection for any future changes.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This program can be used to run fuzzing tests for areas related to EAPOL
frame parsing and processing on the supplicant side.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Old code defaulted to WEP for an AP advertising OSEN. Show as OSEN
instead. Re-use most of the RSN parsing logic since all but the header
is the same.
Example output:
[root@ath9k-f lanforge]# ./local/bin/wpa_cli -i sta0 scan_results
bssid / frequency / signal level / flags / ssid
00:0e:8e:6f:40:49 2462 -23 [OSEN-OSEN-CCMP][ESS] ben-138
Signed-off-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com>
Previously, it would have been possible to complete RSN connection by
skipping the msg 3/4 and 4/4 completely. This would have resulted in
pairwise key not being configured. This is obviously not supposed to
happen in practice and could result in unexpected behavior, so reject
group key message before the initial 4-way handshake has been completed.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Previously, it was possible for the wpa_sm_start_preauth() and
wpa_sm_rekey_ptk() eloop callbacks to remain active after disconnection
and potentially continue to be used for the next association. This is
not correct behavior, so explicitly cancel these timeouts to avoid
unexpected attempts to complete RSN preauthentication or to request PTK
to be rekeyed.
It was possible to trigger this issue, e.g., by running the following
hwsim test case sequence: ap_wpa2_ptk_rekey ap_ft_sae_over_ds
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Some APs (e.g., Cisco 1260) sometimes add padding to the end of short
TDLS management packets and that can look like invalid IEs. This was
allowed on M3 and discovery packets, but not in others. Allow it for the
other packets as well, since required IEs are verified in the code
anyway.
Signed-off-by: Arik Nemtsov <arikx.nemtsov@intel.com>
This modifies struct wpa_ptk to allow the length of KCK and KEK to be
stored. This is needed to allow longer keys to be used, e.g., with
Suite B 192-bit level.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
It is possible for wpa_tdls_teardown_peers() to be called with sm ==
NULL in case interface addition fails before the WPA state machine is
initialized.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The supplicant code does not try to control the actual channel of the
radio at any point. It simply passes the target peer and channel
parameters to the driver. It's the driver's responsibility to
periodically initiate TDLS channel-switch operations when TDLS
channel-switching is enabled.
Allow enable/disable operations to be invoked via the control interface.
Signed-off-by: Arik Nemtsov <arikx.nemtsov@intel.com>
Mark an appropriate sm flag when TDLS switch is prohibited by the AP.
Populate the flag upon association with the AP.
Signed-off-by: Arik Nemtsov <arikx.nemtsov@intel.com>
It was possible for the decrypted EAPOL-Key Key Data field to remain in
heap after the temporary buffer was freed. Explicitly clear that buffer
before freeing it to minimize the time GTK remains in memory.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
There is no need for wpa_supplicant to maintain a copy of the TK part of
PTK after this has been configured to the driver, so clear that from
heap memory and only maintain KEK and KCK during association to allow
additional EAPOL-Key handshakes.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
PMK and PTK are not needed in the supplicant state machine after
disassociation since core wpa_supplicant will reconfigure them for the
next association. As such, clear these from heap in
wpa_sm_notify_disassoc() to reduce time and number of places storing key
material in memory. In addition, clear FT keys in case of
CONFIG_IEEE80211R=y build (sm->xxkey stored a copy of PSK in case of
FT-PSK).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This converts os_snprintf() result validation cases to use
os_snprintf_error() for cases that were note covered by spatch and
semantic patches.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Bounds checking for gd->gtk_len in wpa_supplicant_check_group_cipher()
was apparently too complex for some static analyzers. Use a local
variable and a more explicit validation step to avoid false report.
(CID 62864)
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds support for AKM 00-0F-AC:11 to specify the integrity and
key-wrap algorithms for EAPOL-Key frames using the new design where
descriptor version is set to 0 and algorithms are determined based on
AKM.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new AKM uses a different mechanism of deriving the PMKID based on
KCK instead of PMK. hostapd was already doing this after the KCK had
been derived, but wpa_supplicant functionality needs to be moved from
processing of EAPOL-Key frame 1/4 to 3/4 to have the KCK available.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds definitions for the 128-bit level Suite B AKM 00-0F-AC:11. The
functionality itself is not yet complete, i.e., this commit only
includes parts to negotiate the new AKM.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
It looks like some APs are incorrectly selecting descriptor version 3
(AES-128-CMAC) for EAPOL-Key frames when version 2 (HMAC-SHA1) was
expected to be used. This is likely triggered by an attempt to negotiate
PMF with SHA1-based AKM.
Since AES-128-CMAC is considered stronger than HMAC-SHA1, allow the
incorrect, but stronger, option to be used in these cases to avoid
interoperability issues with deployed APs.
This issue shows up with "WPA: CCMP is used, but EAPOL-Key descriptor
version (3) is not 2" in debug log. With the new workaround, this issue
is ignored and "WPA: Interoperability workaround: allow incorrect
(should have been HMAC-SHA1), but stronger (is AES-128-CMAC), descriptor
version to be used" is written to the log.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This commit introduces a QCA vendor command and event to provide an
option to use extended versions of the nl80211 connect/roam operations
in a way that allows drivers to offload key management operations to the
driver/firmware.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This makes wpa_supplicant SME create PMKSA cache entries from SAE
authentication and try to use PMKSA caching if an entry is found for the
AP. If the AP rejects the attempt, fall back to SAE authentication is
used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
dl_list_del() followed by dl_list_add() seemed to confuse clang static
analyzer somehow, so explicitly check for the prev pointer to be
non-NULL to avoid an incorrect warning.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds kek_len argument to aes_wrap() and aes_unwrap() functions and
allows AES to be initialized with 192 and 256 bit KEK in addition to
the previously supported 128 bit KEK.
The test vectors in test-aes.c are extended to cover all the test
vectors from RFC 3394.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Relying on qos qosinfo is not enough, as it can be 0 for WMM enabled
peers that don't support U-APSD. Further, some peers don't even contain
this IE (Google Nexus 5), but do contain the WMM IE during setup.
Signed-off-by: Arik Nemtsov <arikx.nemtsov@intel.com>
A recent mac80211 patch ("8f02e6b mac80211: make sure TDLS peer STA
exists during setup") forces the TDLS STA to exist before sending any
mgmt packets. Add the STA before sending a concurrent-setup test packet.
Signed-off-by: Arik Nemtsov <arikx.nemtsov@intel.com>
Some drivers need to know the initiator of a TDLS connection in order
to generate a correct TDLS mgmt packet. It is used to determine
the link identifier IE. Pass this information to the driver.
Signed-off-by: Arik Nemtsov <arikx.nemtsov@intel.com>
IEEE 802.11 standard sends AID in a field that is defined in a bit
strange way to set two MSBs to ones. That is not the real AID and those
extra bits need to be filtered from the value before passing this to the
driver.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
TDLS Setup Request frame has to be rejected with status code 37 ("The
request has been declined"), if the BSSID in the received Link
Identifier does not match the current BSSID per IEEE Std 802.11-2012,
10.22.4 ('TDLS direct-link establishment') step (b). The previously used
status code 7 ('Not in same BSS') is described to used only when
processing TPK Handshake Message 2 in TDLS Setup Response frame.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This extends the earlier commit e6270129f6
('Clean up EAPOL-Key Key Data processing') design to be used with
PeerKey EAPOL-key processing as well. This avoids false warnings from
static analyzer (CID 62860, CID 62861, CID 62862).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Use a helper function to avoid multiple copies of the same long list of
argument parameters to wpa_sm_tdls_peer_addset() from the peer entry.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Update the peer STA with full info sending TDLS Setup Response/Confirm
frames instead of after the full setup exchange. This makes it easier
for some drivers to properly negotiate QoS and HT information on the
direct link.
Signed-off-by: Arik Nemtsov <arikx.nemtsov@intel.com>
There is no need to keep the peer entry in memory after the link has
been removed.
Signed-off-by: Arik Nemtsov <arikx.nemtsov@intel.com>
Tested-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Some APs (Cisco) may tack on a weird IE to the end of a TDLS Discovery
Request packet. This needn't fail the response, since the required IEs
are verified separately.
Signed-off-by: Arik Nemtsov <arikx.nemtsov@intel.com>
Some APs (Cisco) may tack on a weird IE to the end of the TDLS confirm
packet, which can fail negotiation. As an interoperability workaround,
ignore IE parser failures and reject the frame only if any of the
mandatory IEs are not included.
Signed-off-by: Arik Nemtsov <arikx.nemtsov@intel.com>
Commit 342bce63cd introduced a possibility
of a NULL pointer dereference on the error path if a new peer entry
fails to get added (i.e., memory allocation failure). Fix that by
skipping the wpa_tdls_peer_free() call if necessary.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The driver might not be able to add the TDLS STA. Fail if this happens.
Also fix the error path to always reset the TDLS peer data.
Signed-off-by: Arik Nemtsov <arikx.nemtsov@intel.com>
If a link is unreachable, the specification mandates we should send a
teardown packet via the AP with a specific teardown reason. Force this
by first disabling the link and only then sending the teardown packet
for the LOW_ACK event.
Rename the TDLS LOW_ACK event handler to better reflect its purpose.
Signed-off-by: Arik Nemtsov <arikx.nemtsov@intel.com>
Use a single location in wpa_sm_rx_eapol() for preparing the pointer to
the Key Data field and to its validated length instead of fetching that
information in number of processing functions separately.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Re-order wpa_sm_rx_eapol() to first go through all EAPOL (802.1X) header
validation steps using the original message buffer and re-allocate and
copy the frame only if this is a valid EAPOL frame that contains an
EAPOL-Key. This makes the implementation easier to understand and saves
unnecessary memory allocations and copying should other types of EAPOL
frames get here.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The additional eight octet field was removed from keydatalen without
proper validation of the Key Data Length field. It would have been
possible for an invalid EAPOL-Key frame to be processed in a way that
ends up reading beyond the buffer. In theory, this could have also
resulted in writing beyond the EAPOL-Key frame buffer, but that is
unlikely to be feasible due to the AES key wrap validation step on
arbitrary memory contents.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The following kde.rsn_ie_len != peer->rsnie_i_len was already taking
care of enforcing the length to be within the target buffer length.
Anyway, this explicit check makes this clearer and matches the design in
TPK M1 processing.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
