This allows the FILS KEK and AAD data (nonces) to be configured to the
driver for association so that the driver can encrypt the
(Re)Association Request frame and decrypt the (Re)Association Response
frame.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This implements processing of FILS Authentication frame for FILS shared
key authentication with ERP and PMKSA caching.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
ieee802_1x_encapsulate_radius() and ieee802_1x_alloc_eapol_sm() need to
be called from FILS processing.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
If a PMKSA cache entry for the target AP is available, try to use FILS
with PMKSA caching.
If an ERP key for the target AP is available, try to use FILS with
EAP-Initiate/Re-auth added as Wrapper Data element.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This needs to be callable through the EAPOL supplicant wrappers to allow
FILS implementation to use ERP.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This implements Key-Auth derivation for (Re)Association Request frames
(see P802.11ai/D11.0 12.12.2.6.2) and (Re)Association Response frames
(see P802.11ai/D11.0 12.12.2.6.3).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This is the PTKSA key derivation used as part of the FILS authentication
exchange. See P802.11ai/D11.0 12.12.2.5.3.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This makes it cleaner for the FILS implementation to use the same design
for setting Authentication frame elements as was already done with SAE.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Add operations to allow low level control over RF sectors in QCA DMG
(11ad) chipsets. Operations include getting/setting the configuration of
a specific sector, as well as getting/setting the selected sector which
the HW uses to communicate with a specific station.
Signed-off-by: Lior David <qca_liord@qca.qualcomm.com>
That function does not need the full EAP header -- it only needs to know
which EAP identifier to use in the message. Make this usable for cases
where the previous EAP message may not exist (FILS).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This changes 4-way handshake authenticator processing to decrypt the
EAPOL-Key frames using an AEAD cipher (AES-SIV with FILS AKMs) before
processing the Key Data field. This replaces Key MIC validation for the
cases where AEAD cipher is used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This changes 4-way handshake authenticator processing to decrypt the
EAPOL-Key frames using an AEAD cipher (AES-SIV with FILS AKMs) before
processing the Key Data field. This replaces Key MIC validation for the
cases where AEAD cipher is used. This needs to move the EAPOL-Key msg
2/4 RSN element processing to happen only after the PTK has been derived
and validated. That is done for all AKMs to avoid extra complexity with
having to maintain two code paths for this.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This modifies wpa_eapol_key_send() to use AEAD cipher (AES-SIV for FILS
AKMs) to provide both integrity protection for the EAPOL-Key frame and
encryption for the Key Data field. It should be noted that this starts
encrypting the Key Data field in EAPOL-Key message 2/4 while it remains
unencrypted (but integrity protected) in non-FILS cases. Similarly, the
empty Key Data field in EAPOL-Key message 4/4 gets encrypted for AEAD
cases.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This will be needed to be able to implement AEAD cipher support from
FILS that will need to use KEK to protect the frame.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Suite B 192-bit addition from IEEE Std 802.11ac-2013 replaced the
previous fixed length Key MIC field with a variable length field. That
change was addressed with an addition of a new struct defined for the
second MIC length. This is not really scalable and with FILS coming up
with a zero-length MIC case for AEAD, a more thorough change to support
variable length MIC is needed.
Remove the Key MIC and Key Data Length fields from the struct
wpa_eapol_key and find their location based on the MIC length
information (which is determined by the AKMP). This change allows the
separate struct wpa_eapol_key_192 to be removed since struct
wpa_eapol_key will now include only the fixed length fields that are
shared with all EAPOL-Key cases in IEEE Std 802.11.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Calculate the hashed realm from hostapd erp_domain configuration
parameter and add this to the FILS Indication element when ERP is
enabled.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
If FILS is enabled, indicate that in Beacon, Probe Response, and
(Re)Association Response frames in the Extended Capabilities element.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This adds CONFIG_FILS=y build configuration option and new key
management options for FILS authentication.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This adds definitions for new information elements from P802.11ai/D11.0
and parsing of these IEs.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The previous implementation was hardcoded to use 128-bit AES key
(AEAD_AES_SIV_CMAC_256). Extend this by allowing AEAD_AES_SIV_CMAC_384
and AEAD_AES_SIV_CMAC_512 with 192-bit and 256-bit AES keys.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This allows the CRC-32 routine to be shared for other purposes in
addition to the WEP/TKIP/FCS within wlantest.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Station should be able to connect initially without ft_pmk_cache filled,
so the target AP has the PSK available and thus the same information as
the origin AP. Therefore neither caching nor communication between the
APs with respect to PMK-R0 or PMK-R1 or VLANs is required if the target
AP derives the required PMKs locally.
This patch introduces the generation of the required PMKs locally for
FT-PSK. Additionally, PMK-R0 is not stored (and thus pushed) for FT-PSK.
So for FT-PSK networks, no configuration of inter-AP communication is
needed anymore when using ft_psk_generate_local=1 configuration. The
default behavior (ft_psk_generate_local=0) remains to use the pull/push
protocol.
Signed-off-by: Michael Braun <michael-dev@fami-braun.de>
This also implements the macsec_get_capability for the macsec_qca
driver to maintain the existing behavior.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
RFC 5931 Section 2.8.5.1 does not list the Prep field as something that
the server validates to match the Request. However, the supplicant side
has to use the same pre-processing mechanism for the password for the
authentication to work, so we may as well as enforce this field to match
the requested value now that wpa_supplicant implementation is fixed to
copy the value from the request.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Fix the pre-processing field in the response when EAP_PWD_PREP_MS is
being used. This fixes interoperability with EAP-pwd servers that
validate the Prep field in EAP-pwd-ID/Response when the RFC2759
(PasswordHashHash) pre-processing is used.
Signed-off-by: Brian Candler <B.Candler@pobox.com>
Clean up the driver interface by passing pointers to struct receive_sc
down the stack to the {create,delete}_recevie_sc() ops, instead of
passing the individual properties of the SC.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Jouni Malinen