Explicitly check for the failure event to include a certificate before
trying to build the event.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
While this could in theory be claimed to be ready for something to be
added to read a field following the server_write_IV, it does not look
likely that such a use case would show up. As such, just remove the
unused incrementing of pos at the end of the function to get rid of a
useless static analyzer complaint.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This extends multi-OCSP support to verify status for intermediate CAs in
the server certificate chain.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This adds a minimal support for using status_request_v2 extension and
ocsp_multi format (OCSPResponseList instead of OCSPResponse) for
CertificateStatus. This commit does not yet extend use of OCSP stapling
to validate the intermediate CA certificates.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This allows hostapd with the internal TLS server implementation to
support the extended OCSP stapling mechanism with multiple responses
(ocsp_stapling_response_multi).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This adds support for hostapd-as-authentication-server to be build with
the internal TLS implementation and OCSP stapling server side support.
This is more or less identical to the design used with OpenSSL, i.e.,
the cached response is read from the ocsp_stapling_response=<file> and
sent as a response if the client requests it during the TLS handshake.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This adds a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR and CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STATUS
messages with 'bad certificate status response' for cases where no valid
OCSP response was received, but the network profile requires OCSP to be
used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This completes OCSP stapling support on the TLS client side. Each
SingleResponse value is iterated until a response matching the server
certificate is found. The validity time of the SingleResponse is
verified and certStatus good/revoked is reported if all validation step
succeed.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds the next step in completing TLS client support for OCSP
stapling. The BasicOCSPResponse is parsed, a signing certificate is
found, and the signature is verified. The actual sequence of OCSP
responses (SignleResponse) is not yet processed in this commit.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds the next step for OCSP stapling. The received OCSPResponse is
parsed to get the BasicOCSPResponse. This commit does not yet process
the BasicOCSPResponse.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This allows the internal TLS client implementation to accept
CertificateStatus message from the server when trying to use OCSP
stapling. The actual OCSPResponse is not yet processed in this commit,
but the CertificateStatus message is accepted to allow the TLS handshake
to continue.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This allows the internal TLS implementation to request server
certificate status using OCSP stapling. This commit is only adding code
to add the request. The response is not yet used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This prints the received ServerHello extensions into the debug log and
allows handshake to continue even if such extensions are included.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This allows the internal TLS implementation to parse a private key and a
certificate from a PKCS #12 file protected with
pbeWithSHAAnd3-KeyTripleDES-CBC.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds support for decrypting private keys protected with the old
PKCS #12 mechanism using OID pbeWithSHAAnd3-KeyTripleDES-CBC.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This extends the internal TLS support for PKCS #5 v2.0 PBES2 private key
format with des-ede3-cbc encryption and PBKDF2 SHA-1.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
conn->session_resumed was not set to 1 after successful use of a TLS
session ticket with EAP-FAST. This resulted in the wpa_supplicant STATUS
tls_session_reused showing incorrect value (0 instead of 1) when
EAP-FAST PAC was used. Fix this by setting conn->session_resumed = 1
when TLS handshake using the session ticket succeeds.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If the server/client certificate includes the extKeyUsage extension,
verify that the listed key purposes include either the
anyExtendedKeyUsage wildcard or id-kp-serverAuth/id-kp-clientAuth,
respectively.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The internal TLS client implementation in wpa_supplicant can now be used
with the phase2 parameters tls_disable_tlsv1_0=1, tls_disable_tlsv1_1=1,
and tls_disable_tlsv1_2=1 to disable the specified TLS version(s).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes it simpler to add support for new TLS_CONN_* flags without
having to add a new configuration function for each flag.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This allows wpa_supplicant to return eap_tls_version STATUS information
when using the internal TLS client implementation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The internal TLS client implementation can now be used with
ca_cert="probe://" to probe the server certificate chain. This is also
adding the related CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR and
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT events.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This extends the internal TLS client implementation to support signature
algorithms SHA384 and SHA512 in addition to the previously supported
SHA256.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Since we support only SHA256 (and not the default SHA1) with TLS v1.2,
the signature_algorithms extensions needs to be added into ClientHello.
This fixes interop issues with the current version of OpenSSL that uses
the default SHA1 hash if ClientHello does not specify allowed signature
algorithms.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This commit adds support for validating certificates with SHA384 and
SHA512 hashes. Those certificates are now very common so wpa_supplicant
needs support for them.
SHA384 and SHA512 hash functions are included in the previous commit.
Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár <pali.rohar@gmail.com>
This commit adds support for "hash://server/sha256/cert_hash_in_hex"
scheme in ca_cert property for the internal TLS implementation.
Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár <pali.rohar@gmail.com>
In documentation is written: "If ca_cert and ca_path are not included,
server certificate will not be verified". This is the case when
wpa_supplicant is compiled with OpenSSL library, but when using the
internal TLS implementation and some certificates in CA chain are in
unsupported format (e.g., use SHA384 or SHA512 hash functions) then
verification fails even if ca_cert property is not specified.
This commit changes behavior so that certificate verification in
internal TLS implementation is really skipped when ca_cert is not
specified.
Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár <pali.rohar@gmail.com>
Reorder terms in a way that no invalid pointers are generated with
pos+len operations. end-pos is always defined (with a valid pos pointer)
while pos+len could end up pointing beyond the end pointer which would
be undefined behavior.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Commit 94f1fe6f63 ('Remove master key
extraction from tls_connection_get_keys()') left only fetching of
server/client random, but did not rename the function and structure to
minimize code changes. The only name is quite confusing, so rename this
through the repository to match the new purpose.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Previously, it would have been possible for va_end(args) to be called
twice in case mp_init() fails. While that may not cause issues on number
of platforms, that is not how va_start()/va_end() are supposed to be
used. Fix this by returning from the function without using va_end()
twice on the same va_list args.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If the mp_init_multi() call had failed due to memory allocation failure,
mp_div() would have returned 1 instead of MP_MEM (-2). It looks like all
callers are checking the return value against MP_OKAY instead of <1
(etc.), so this does not seem to result in difference in behavior.
Anyway, it's best to fix the mp_div() return value for the MP_MEM error
case to avoid unexpected behavior.
Signed-off-by: Maks Naumov <maksqwe1@ukr.net>
This is not needed anymore with the tls_connection_prf() being used to
handle all key derivation needs. tls_connection_get_keys() is a bit
misnamed for now, but it is only used to fetch the client and server
random for Session-Id derivation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
It does not look likely that the old DSA design would be added into the
internal TLS implement, so remove this otherwise dead code.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
For some reason, "pos + len > end" is not clear enough, but "len > end -
pos" is recognized. Use that to get rid of a false positive from a
static analyzer (CID 72697).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Use a temporary, local variable to check the DH parameters received from
the server before assigning the length to the struct tlsv1_client
variables. This will hopefully make it easier for static analyzers to
figure out that there is bounds checking for the value. (CID 72699)
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The dh_p_len, dh_g_len, and dh_ys_len parameters were validated against
the received message structure, but that did not seem to be done in a
way that some static analyzers would understand this (CID 72699).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This is similar to the existing functionality that parsed ASN.1-encoded
RSA public key by generating a similar public key instance from already
parsed n and e parameters.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Follow the PKCS #1 v1.5, 8.1 constraint of at least eight octets long PS
for the case where the internal TLS implementation decrypts PKCS #1
formatted data. Similar limit was already in place for signature
validation, but not for this decryption routine.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
