Pass the full apdev to the add_ap() function instead of just ifname.
This allows us to handle also remote hosts while we can check
apdev['hostname'], apdev['port'].
This step (1) converts the cases where apdev[#]['ifname'] was used as
the argument to hostapd.add_ap().
Signed-off-by: Janusz Dziedzic <janusz.dziedzic@tieto.com>
This needs to be allowed with OpenSSL 1.1.0 since the RC4-based cipher
has been disabled by default.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Incorrect path and file name was used in the openssl command to generate
one of the OCSP responses. Also fix
ap_wpa2_eap_tls_intermediate_ca_ocsp_multi to expect success rather than
failure due to OCSP response. Based on the test description, this was
supposed to succeed, but apparently that root_ocsp() bug prevented this
from happening.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This is needed to fix ap_wpa2_eap_psk_oom, ap_wpa2_eap_sim_oom,
eap_proto_psk_errors, and ap_ft_oom with the new OpenSSL dynamic memory
allocation design.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
These test cases verify that EAP-SIM with external GSM auth supports the
use case of replacing the SIM. The first test case does this incorrectly
by not clearing the pseudonym identity (anonymous_identity in the
network profile) while the second one clears that and shows successful
connection.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
It was possible to hit an error case in ap_wpa2_eap_in_bridge where the
selectedMethod STATUS field was not available. This resulted in not very
helpful "'selectedMethod'" message in the test log file. Make this
clearer by dumping all received STATUS fields and a clearer exception
message indicating that selectedMethod was missing.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
rsn_ie_proto_eap_sta followed by eap_ttls_mschapv2_session_resumption
showed a failure case where the special RSNE from rsn_ie_proto_eap_sta
ended up remaining in a wpa_supplicant BSS entry and the SELECT_NETWORK
command used the previous scan results without checking for changed AP
configuration. This resulted in test failure due to RSN IE being claimed
to be different in EAPOL-Key msg 3/4. This is not really a real world
issue, but try to avoid false failure reports by explicitly clearing the
BSS table at the end of rsn_ie_proto_eap_sta.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The previously used 10 second timeout allowed only two scan attempts
(five seconds between scans) and it was possible to hit a failure every
now and then when running under heavy load and the Probe Response frame
got delayed by 40 ms or so twice in a row. Add more time for one more
scan attempt to reduce the likelihood of this happening.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This is needed for number of EAP test cases at least when using the
internal TLS server implementation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This adds some more test coverage for phase1 parameters that had not
previously been included in any of the test cases.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The decrypted copy of a GTK from EAPOL-Key is cleared from memory only
after having sent out CTRL-EVENT-CONNECTED. As such, there was a race
condition on the test case reading the wpa_supplicant process memory
after the connection. This was unlikely to occur due to the one second
sleep, but even with that, it would be at least theorically possible to
hit this race under heavy load (e.g., when using large number of VMs to
run parallel testing). Avoid this by running a PING command to make sure
wpa_supplicant has returned to eloop before reading the process memory.
This should make it less likely to report false positives on GTK being
found in memory.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
It looks like it is possible for the GTK to be found from memory every
now and then. This makes these test cases fail. Write the memory
addresses in which the GTK was found to the log to make it somewhat
easier to try to figure out where the key can be left in memory.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This verifies client private key use in encrypted PKCS #8 format with
PKCS #5 v1.5 format using pbeWithMD5AndDES-CBC and PKCS #5 v2.0 format
using PBES2 with des-ede3-cbc.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
