assoc_freq needs to be cleared when an interface gets disconnected.
This fixes an issue where P2P Action frame transmission may fail
because of missing remain-on-channel operation when using the same
interface for group operations (or non-P2P connections) and P2P
management operations.
Getting rid of these inline functions seems to reduce the code size
quite a bit, so convert the most commonly used hostapd driver ops to
function calls.
This is not needed anymore and just makes things more difficult
to understand, so move the remaining function pointers to direct
function calls and get rid of the struct hostapd_driver_ops.
send_eapol, set_key, read_sta_data, sta_clear_stats,
set_radius_acl_auth, set_radius_acl_expire, and set_beacon
to use inline functions instead of extra abstraction.
Commit bf65bc638f started the path to
add this new abstraction for driver operations in AP mode to allow
wpa_supplicant to control AP mode operations. At that point, the
extra abstraction was needed, but it is not needed anymore since
hostapd and wpa_supplicant share the same struct wpa_driver_ops.
Start removing the unneeded abstraction by converting
send_mgmt_frame() to an inline function, hostapd_drv_send_mlme().
This is similar to the design that is used in wpa_supplicant and
that was used in hostapd in the past (hostapd_send_mgmt_frame()
inline function).
driver.h defines these functions to return 0 on success, not
number of bytes transmitted. Most callers are checking "< 0" for
error condition, but not all. Address this by following the driver
API specification on 0 meaning success.
The wpa_supplicant_event() EVENT_TX_STATUS ack field needs to be
converted to use wpas_send_action_tx_status()
enum p2p_send_action_result in this case, too, to avoid getting
incorrect TX status for P2P processing.
On Linux, verify that the kernel entropy pool is capable of providing
strong random data before allowing WPA/WPA2 connection to be
established. If 20 bytes of data cannot be read from /dev/random,
force first two 4-way handshakes to fail while collecting entropy
into the internal pool in hostapd. After that, give up on /dev/random
and allow the AP to function based on the combination of /dev/urandom
and whatever data has been collected into the internal entropy pool.
wlan0: RADIUS No authentication server configured
MEMLEAK[0x999feb8]: len 1040
WPA_TRACE: memleak - START
[3]: ./hostapd(radius_msg_new+0x33) [0x8074f43]
radius_msg_new() ../src/radius/radius.c:117
[4]: ./hostapd() [0x806095e]
ieee802_1x_encapsulate_radius() ../src/ap/ieee802_1x.c:439
ieee802_1x_aaa_send() ../src/ap/ieee802_1x.c:1496
For example, this error occured when I used WPS hostapd without
"eap_server=1" definition in configuration file.
By default, make hostapd and wpa_supplicant maintain an internal
entropy pool that is fed with following information:
hostapd:
- Probe Request frames (timing, RSSI)
- Association events (timing)
- SNonce from Supplicants
wpa_supplicant:
- Scan results (timing, signal/noise)
- Association events (timing)
The internal pool is used to augment the random numbers generated
with the OS mechanism (os_get_random()). While the internal
implementation is not expected to be very strong due to limited
amount of generic (non-platform specific) information to feed the
pool, this may strengthen key derivation on some devices that are
not configured to provide strong random numbers through
os_get_random() (e.g., /dev/urandom on Linux/BSD).
This new mechanism is not supposed to replace proper OS provided
random number generation mechanism. The OS mechanism needs to be
initialized properly (e.g., hw random number generator,
maintaining entropy pool over reboots, etc.) for any of the
security assumptions to hold.
If the os_get_random() is known to provide strong ramdom data (e.g., on
Linux/BSD, the board in question is known to have reliable source of
random data from /dev/urandom), the internal hostapd random pool can be
disabled. This will save some in binary size and CPU use. However, this
should only be considered for builds that are known to be used on
devices that meet the requirements described above. The internal pool
is disabled by adding CONFIG_NO_RANDOM_POOL=y to the .config file.
This commit adds a new wrapper, random_get_bytes(), that is currently
defined to use os_get_random() as is. The places using
random_get_bytes() depend on the returned value being strong random
number, i.e., something that is infeasible for external device to
figure out. These values are used either directly as a key or as
nonces/challenges that are used as input for key derivation or
authentication.
The remaining direct uses of os_get_random() do not need as strong
random numbers to function correctly.
This adds more time for the system entropy pool to be filled before
requesting random data for generating the WPA/WPA2 encryption keys.
This can be helpful especially on embedded devices that do not have
hardware random number generator and may lack good sources of
randomness especially early in the bootup sequence when hostapd is
likely to be started.
GMK and Key Counter are still initialized once in the beginning to
match the RSN Authenticator state machine behavior and to make sure
that the driver does not transmit broadcast frames unencrypted.
However, both GMK (and GTK derived from it) and Key Counter will be
re-initialized when the first station connects and is about to
enter 4-way handshake.
The example GMK-to-GTK derivation described in the IEEE 802.11 standard
is marked informative and there is no protocol reason for following it
since this derivation is done only on the AP/Authenticator and does not
need to match with the Supplicant. Mix in more data into the derivation
process to get more separation from GMK.
