This allows a separate machine credential to be used for authentication
if the server requests Identity-Type = 2 (machine).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This is an initial step in adding support for configuring separate user
and machine credentials. The new wpa_supplicant network profile
parameters machine_identity and machine_password are similar to the
existing identity and password, but explicitly assigned for the purpose
of machine authentication.
This commit alone does not change actual EAP peer method behavior as
separate commits are needed to determine when there is an explicit
request for machine authentication. Furthermore, this is only addressing
the username/password credential type, i.e., additional changes
following this design approach will be needed for certificate
credentials.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Be more consistent on checking all parameter allocation and copying
steps within radius_server_init() and abort startup if anything fails
instead of trying to continue with other parts of the configuration.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Use struct eap_config as-is within RADIUS server to avoid having to
duplicate all the configuration variables at each interface. This
continues cleanup on struct eap_config duplication in hostapd.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The Crypto-Binding TLV is included without Intermediate-Result TLV in
this sequence since the server is skipping all inner authentication
methods and is only sending out Result TLV with the Crypto-Binding TLV.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new hostapd configuration parameter eap_teap_id can be used to
configure the expected behavior for used identity type.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Parse the received Identity-Type TLV and report the used Identity-Type
in response if the request included this TLV. For now, only the
Identity-Type 1 (User) is supported.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Wait for hostapd to report completion of connection so that the WNM
Notification Request frame does not get sent before the AP has processed
EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 and configured the TK. This could result in a race
condition especially when testing using UML with time-travel.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
This is needed with the increased maximum EAP round limit since the
server side sends out longer messages in this exchange and that prevent
the short message limit from being reached.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Allow 100 rounds of EAP messages if there is data being transmitted.
Keep the old 50 round limit for cases where only short EAP messages are
sent (i.e., the likely case of getting stuck in ACK loop).
This allows larger EAP data (e.g., large certificates) to be exchanged
without breaking the workaround for ACK loop interop issues.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Use struct eap_config as-is within struct eap_sm and EAPOL authenticator
to avoid having to duplicate all the configuration variables at each
interface. Split the couple of session specific variables into a
separate struct to allow a single const struct eap_config to be used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The implementation was previously hardcoded to use only the non-expanded
IETF EAP methods in Phase 2. Extend that to allow vendor EAP methods
with expanded header to be used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This was already allowed with EAP-PEAP, but EAP-TEAP was hardcoded to
use only the non-expanded EAP types. Extend that to allow vendor EAP
types to be used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The implementation was previously hardcoded to use only the non-expanded
IETF EAP methods in Phase 2. Extend that to allow vendor EAP methods
with expanded header to be used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This was already allowed with EAP-PEAP, but EAP-FAST was hardcoded to
use only the non-expanded EAP types. Extend that to allow vendor EAP
types to be used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The implementation was previously hardcoded to allow only the Microsoft
SoH expanded EAP method in Phase 2 in addition to non-expanded EAP
methods. Extend that to allow any vendor EAP method with an expanded
header to be used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The implementation was previously hardcoded to use only the non-expanded
IETF EAP methods in Phase 2. Extend that to allow vendor EAP methods
with expanded header to be used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This was already allowed with EAP-PEAP, but EAP-TTLS was hardcoded to
use only the non-expanded EAP types. Extend that to allow vendor EAP
types to be used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This cleans up coding style of the EAP implementation by avoiding
typedef of an enum hiding the type of the variables.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new eap_teap_separate_result=1 hostapd configuration parameter can
be used to test TEAP exchange where the Intermediate-Result TLV and
Crypto-Binding TLV are send in one message exchange while the Result TLV
exchange in done after that in a separate message exchange.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If the Crypto-Binding TLV for the last EAP method has been validated
successfully in a previous message exchange with Intermediate-Result TLV
and no new EAP method has been started, Result TLV can be accepted
without an additional Crypto-Binding TLV. This allows the server to go
through additional message exchanges after inner EAP method, if needed.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
It is not sufficient for the peer to include only the Result TLV if the
server included both the Intermediate-Result TLV and Result TLV.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Previously, only the Result TLV was added when writing Crypto-Binding
TLV response. This is not sufficient, since RFC 7170 require
Intermediate-Result TLV response to be included from the peer if the
server included Intermediate-Result TLV.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This version of TLS PRF is needed when using TEAP with TLS ciphersuites
that are defined to use SHA384 instead of SHA256.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
In addition, update the generation script to allow convenient update of
the server and user certificates without having to generate new keys.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
The previously used single TOD policy was split into two policies:
TOD-STRICT and TOD-TOFU. Report these separately in the
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT events (tod=1 for TOD-STRICT and tod=2 for
TOD-TOFU).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
This is needed for the drivers implementing SME to include the PMKID in
the Association Request frame directly following SAE authentication.
This commit extends the commit d2b2083843 ("SAE: Allow PMKID to be
added into Association Request frame following SAE") for drivers with
internal SME that use the external authentication mechanism.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
pending_bssid is cleared in the connected state and thus is not valid if
SAE authentication is done to a new BSSID when in the connected state.
Hence use the BSSID from ext_auth_bssid while configuring the PMK for
the external authentication case. This is required for roaming to a new
BSSID with driver-based-SME while the SAE processing happens with
wpa_supplicant.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
A new DH public key is sent through this interface to the driver after
every successful connection/roam to a BSS. This helps to do OWE roaming
to a new BSS with drivers that implement SME/MLME operations during
roaming.
This updated DH IEs are added in the subsequent (Re)Association Request
frame sent by the station when roaming. The DH IE from the roamed AP is
given to wpa_supplicant in the roam result event. wpa_supplicant shall
further process these DH IEs to generate the PMK for the 4-way
handshake.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Update Connection Params is intended for drivers that implement
internal SME and expect these updated connection params from
wpa_supplicant. Do not send this request for the drivers using
SME from wpa_supplicant.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
If FT over-the-DS case is enforced through the "FT_DS <BSSID>" control
interface command, the PMF capability check during BSS selection is not
used and that could have allowed PMF to be disabled in the over-the-DS
case even if the local network profile mandated use of PMF. Check
against this explicitly to avoid unexpected cases if the APs within the
same mobility domain are not configured consistently.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
