pmksa->pmk or pmksa->pmkid cannot be NULL since they are arrays. Remove
the unnecessary NULL checks and use the provided pmksa pointer directly
to simplify the implementation. (CID 138519)
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This patch add functionality of mesh SAE PMKSA caching. If the local STA
already has peer's PMKSA entry in the cache, skip SAE authentication and
start AMPE with the cached value.
If the peer does not support PMKSA caching or does not have the local
STA's PMKSA entry in the cache, AMPE will fail and the PMKSA cache entry
of the peer will be removed. Then STA retries with ordinary SAE
authentication.
If the peer does not support PMKSA caching and the local STA uses
no_auto_peer=1, the local STA can not retry SAE authentication because
NEW_PEER_CANDIDATE event cannot start SAE authentication when
no_auto_peer=1. So this patch extends MESH_PEER_ADD command to use
duration(sec). Throughout the duration, the local STA can start SAE
authentication triggered by NEW_PEER_CANDIDATE even though
no_auto_peer=1.
This commit requires commit 70c93963ed
('SAE: Fix PMKID calculation for PMKSA cache'). Without that commit,
chosen PMK comparison will fail.
Signed-off-by: Masashi Honma <masashi.honma@gmail.com>
This extends the wpa_supplicant PMKSA_FLUSH control interface command to
allow the PMKSA list from the authenticator side to be flushed for AP
and mesh mode. In addition, this adds a hostapd PMKSA_FLUSH control
interface command to flush the PMKSA entries.
Signed-off-by: Masashi Honma <masashi.honma@gmail.com>
This extends the wpa_supplicant PMKSA control interface command to allow
the PMKSA list from the authenticator side to be listed for AP and mesh
mode. In addition, this adds a hostapd PMKSA control interface command
to show the same list for the AP case.
Signed-off-by: Masashi Honma <masashi.honma@gmail.com>
The SAE PMKID is calculated with IEEE Std 802.11-2012 11.3.5.4, but the
PMKID was re-calculated with 11.6.1.3 and saved into PMKSA cache. Fix
this to save the PMKID calculated with 11.3.5.4 into the PMKSA cache.
Signed-off-by: Masashi Honma <masashi.honma@gmail.com>
This FTIE needs to be an exact copy of the one in (Re)Association
Response frame. Copy the stored element rather than building a new copy
that would not have the correct MIC value. This is needed to fix PTK
rekeying after FT protocol run.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
wpa_insert_pmkid() did not support cases where the original RSN IE
included any PMKIDs. That case can happen when PTK rekeying through
4-way handshake is used after FT protocol run. Such a 4-way handshake
used to fail with wpa_supplicant being unable to build the EAPOL-Key msg
2/4.
Fix this by extending wpa_insert_pmkid() to support removal of the old
PMKIDs, if needed.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
In addition to the PTK length increasing, the length of the PMK was
increased (from 256 to 384 bits) for the 00-0f-ac:12 AKM. This part was
missing from the initial implementation and a fixed length (256-bit) PMK
was used for all AKMs.
Fix this by adding more complete support for variable length PMK and use
384 bits from MSK instead of 256 bits when using this AKM. This is not
backwards compatible with the earlier implementations.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This ensures that group key is set as long as the interface exists.
Additionally, ifconfig_up is needed as wpa_group will enter
FATAL_FAILURE if the interface is still down. Also vlan_remove_dynamic()
is moved after wpa_auth_sta_deinit() so vlan_remove_dynamic() can check
it was the last user of the wpa_group.
Signed-off-by: Michael Braun <michael-dev@fami-braun.de>
It was possible for wpa_auth_sm_event(WPA_DEAUTH) to be called from
wpa_sm_step() iteration in the case the EAPOL authenticator state
machine ended up requesting the station to be disconnected. This
resulted in unnecessary recursive call to wpa_sm_step(). Avoid this by
using the already running call to process the state change.
It was possible to hit this sequence in the hwsim test case
ap_wpa2_eap_eke_server_oom.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The new CONFIG_NO_RC4=y build option can be used to remove all internal
hostapd and wpa_supplicant uses of RC4. It should be noted that external
uses (e.g., within a TLS library) do not get disabled when doing this.
This removes capability of supporting WPA/TKIP, dynamic WEP keys with
IEEE 802.1X, WEP shared key authentication, and MSCHAPv2 password
changes.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Previously, struct wpa_group was created when the first station enters
the group and the struct wpa_group was not freed when all station left
the group. This causes a problem because wpa_group will enter
FATAL_FAILURE when a wpa_group is running while the AP_VLAN interface
has already been removed.
Fix this by adding a reference counter to struct wpa_group and free a
group if it is unused.
Signed-off-by: Michael Braun <michael-dev@fami-braun.de>
If the AP/Authenticator receives an EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 for an association
that negotiated use of PSK and the EAPOL-Key MIC does not match, it is
likely that the station is trying to use incorrect PSK/passphrase.
Report this with "AP-STA-POSSIBLE-PSK-MISMATCH <STA addr>" control
interface event.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This allows WPA2 mode AP to be re-enabled automatically after external
ifconfig down + up on a netdev used by hostapd.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Previously, it was possible for some corner cases to leave the WPA
authenticator state machine running if PMK could not be derived. Change
this to forcefully disconnect the STA to get more consistent behavior
and faster notification of the error.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This modifies struct wpa_ptk to allow the length of KCK and KEK to be
stored. This is needed to allow longer keys to be used, e.g., with
Suite B 192-bit level.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This extends Disconnect-Request processing to check against PMKSA cache
entries if no active session (STA association) match the request.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Previously, only WPA + WPA2 was covered. If FT is enabled in addition to
WPA, MDIE is included in the buffer between RSN and WPA elements. The
previous version ended up leaving only the MDIE after having skipped RSN
element. Fix this to skip MDIE as well to leave only WPA IE regardless
of whether FT is enabled in AP configuration.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This extends the earlier PeerKey station side design to be used on the
AP side as well by passing pointer and already validated length from the
caller rather than parsing the length again from the frame buffer. This
avoids false warnings from static analyzer (CID 62870, CID 62871,
CID 62872).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If the 4-way handshake ends up having to retransmit the EAPOL-Key
message 1/4 due to a timeout on waiting for the response, it is possible
for the Supplicant to change SNonce between the first and second
EAPOL-Key message 2/4. This is not really desirable due to extra
complexities it causes on the Authenticator side, but some deployed
stations are doing this.
This message sequence looks like this:
AP->STA: EAPOL-Key 1/4 (replay counter 1, ANonce)
AP->STA: EAPOL-Key 1/4 (replay counter 2, ANonce)
STA->AP: EAPOL-Key 2/4 (replay counter 1, SNonce 1)
AP->STA: EAPOL-Key 3/4 (replay counter 3, ANonce)
STA->AP: EAPOL-Key 2/4 (replay counter 2, SNonce 2)
followed by either:
STA->AP: EAPOL-Key 4/4 (replay counter 3 using PTK from SNonce 1)
or:
AP->STA: EAPOL-Key 3/4 (replay counter 4, ANonce)
STA->AP: EAPOL-Key 4/4 (replay counter 4, using PTK from SNonce 2)
Previously, Authenticator implementation was able to handle the cases
where SNonce 1 and SNonce 2 were identifical (i.e., Supplicant did not
update SNonce which is the wpa_supplicant behavior) and where PTK
derived using SNonce 2 was used in EAPOL-Key 4/4. However, the case of
using PTK from SNonce 1 was rejected ("WPA: received EAPOL-Key 4/4
Pairwise with unexpected replay counter" since EAPOL-Key 3/4 TX and
following second EAPOL-Key 2/4 invalidated the Replay Counter that was
used previously with the first SNonce).
This commit extends the AP/Authenticator workaround to keep both SNonce
values in memory if two EAPOL-Key 2/4 messages are received with
different SNonce values. The following EAPOL-Key 4/4 message is then
accepted whether the MIC has been calculated with the latest SNonce (the
previously existing behavior) or with the earlier SNonce (the new
extension). This makes 4-way handshake more robust with stations that
update SNonce for each transmitted EAPOL-Key 2/4 message in cases where
EAPOL-Key message 1/4 needs to be retransmitted.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This adds support for AKM 00-0F-AC:11 to specify the integrity and
key-wrap algorithms for EAPOL-Key frames using the new design where
descriptor version is set to 0 and algorithms are determined based on
AKM.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new AKM uses a different mechanism of deriving the PMKID based on
KCK instead of PMK. hostapd was already doing this after the KCK had
been derived, but wpa_supplicant functionality needs to be moved from
processing of EAPOL-Key frame 1/4 to 3/4 to have the KCK available.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes hostapd create PMKSA cache entries from SAE authentication
and allow PMKSA caching to be used with the SAE AKM.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
It looks like the use of sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 in two locations
within the function was a bit too much for clang static analyzer to
understand. Use a separate variable for storing the allocated memory so
that it can be freed unconditionally. The kde variable can point to
either stack memory or temporary allocation, but that is now const
pointer to make the design clearer.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds kek_len argument to aes_wrap() and aes_unwrap() functions and
allows AES to be initialized with 192 and 256 bit KEK in addition to
the previously supported 128 bit KEK.
The test vectors in test-aes.c are extended to cover all the test
vectors from RFC 3394.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Move to PTKINITDONE state and mark PTK valid after successful completion
of FT protocol. This allows the AP/Authenticator to start GTK rekeying
when FT protocol is used. Previously, the station using FT protocol did
not get the new GTK which would break delivery of group addressed
frames.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
clang scan-build does not seem to like the 'd' suffix on floating
constants and ends up reporting analyzer failures. Since this suffix
does not seem to be needed, get rid of it to clear such warnings.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If the PMK-R1 needs to be pulled for the R0KH, the previous
implementation ended up rejecting the over-the-air authentication and
over-the-DS action frame unnecessarily while waiting for the RRB
response. Improve this by postponing the Authentication/Action frame
response until the pull response is received.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This allows hostapd to set a different management group cipher than the
previously hardcoded default BIP (AES-128-CMAC). The new configuration
file parameter group_mgmt_cipher can be set to BIP-GMAC-128,
BIP-GMAC-256, or BIP-CMAC-256 to select one of the ciphers defined in
IEEE Std 802.11ac-2013.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Incorrect PTK length was used in PMK-to-PTK derivation and the Michael
MIC TX/RX key swapping code was incorrectly executed for these ciphers
on supplicant side.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This new mechanism allows P2P Client to request an IPv4 address from the
GO as part of the 4-way handshake to avoid use of DHCP exchange after
4-way handshake. If the new mechanism is used, the assigned IP address
is shown in the P2P-GROUP-STARTED event on the client side with
following new parameters: ip_addr, ip_mask, go_ip_addr. The assigned IP
address is included in the AP-STA-CONNECTED event on the GO side as a
new ip_addr parameter. The IP address is valid for the duration of the
association.
The IP address pool for this new mechanism is configured as global
wpa_supplicant configuration file parameters ip_addr_go, ip_addr_mask,
ip_addr_star, ip_addr_end. For example:
ip_addr_go=192.168.42.1
ip_addr_mask=255.255.255.0
ip_addr_start=192.168.42.2
ip_addr_end=192.168.42.100
DHCP mechanism is expected to be enabled at the same time to support P2P
Devices that do not use the new mechanism. The easiest way of managing
the IP addresses is by splitting the IP address range into two parts and
assign a separate range for wpa_supplicant and DHCP server.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
It was already possible to configure hostapd and wpa_supplicant to use
FT-SAE for the key management, but number of places were missing proper
AKM checks to allow FT to be used with the new AKM.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The previous version could end up calling WPA authenticator routines
even though the authenticator had not been initialized and this could
result in NULL pointer dereference.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If configuration of the group key to the driver fails, move the WPA
group into failed state and indication group setup error to avoid cases
where AP could look like it is working even through the keys are not set
correctly.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Some driver wrappers may implement this by writing eight octets even
though IPN is only six octets. Use a separate WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN (8) octet
buffer in the call to make sure there is enough buffer room available
for the full returned value and then copy it to IPN field.
The previous implementation used the following igtk field as the extra
buffer and then initialized that field afterwards, so this change does
not fix any real issue in behavior, but it is cleaner to use an explicit
buffer of the maximum length for get_seqnum().
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
When using per-device PSKs, select the PSK based on the P2P Device
Address of the connecting client if that client is a P2P Device. This
allows the P2P Interface Address to be changed between P2P group
connections which may happen especially when using persistent groups.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This can be used to implement per-device PSK selection based on the
peer's P2P Device Address instead of P2P Interface Address.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This is needed to avoid allowing the STA to reconnect using a cached
PMKSA. ESS disassoc imminent notification is normally used to indicate
that the STA session will be terminated and as such, requiring full
authentication through the authentication server after this is needed.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
