Basic support for the 60 GHz band. Neither P2P nor WPS are yet taken
care off. Allows to start AP with very simple config:
network={
ssid="test"
mode=2
frequency=60480
key_mgmt=NONE
}
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Kondratiev <qca_vkondrat@qca.qualcomm.com>
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
CONFIG_SQLITE=y option can now be used to allow the eap_user_file text
file to be replaced with a SQLite database
(eap_user_file=sqlite:/path/to/sqlite.db). hostapd.eap_user_sqlite
shows an example of how the database tables can be created for this
purpose. This commit does not yet include full functionality of the
text file format, but at least basic EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPv2 style
authentication mechanisms with plaintext passwords can be used for
tests.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This allows hostapd_cli and wpa_cli all_sta command to be used to
display connected time (in seconds) of each station in AP mode.
Signed-hostap: Raja Mani <rmani@qca.qualcomm.com>
This simplifies the implementation by using the buffer type to which the
returned data will be converted anyway. This avoids one memory
allocation for each processed RADIUS message.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
New configuration parameters radius_auth_req_attr and
radius_acct_req_attr can now be used to add (or override) RADIUS
attributes in Access-Request and Accounting-Request packets.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
radius_request_cui=1 configuration parameter can now be used to
configure hostapd to request CUI from the RADIUS server by including
Chargeable-User-Identity attribute into Access-Request packets.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If Access-Accept packet includes the Chargeable-User-Identity attribute,
copy this attribute as-is into accounting messages.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
A station may move from EAP/WPS key_mgmt to PSK using re-association. In
practice, this can happen most likely with WPS when the station runs
through the provisioning step (EAP/WPS) followed by PSK authentication.
If a deauthentication event is missed from the station for whatever
reason, the EAPOL authenticator state machine could have been left
running.
This can result in various issues, including unexpected disconnection of
the station while both the 4-way handshake and EAPOL authenticator state
machines (EAP) are running at the same time when the supplicant is
trying to use PSK. Fix this by explicitly clearing EAPOL authenticator
state machine on (re)association if the new association does not use it.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
intended-for: hostap-1
This fixes a corner case where a STA that has PMKSA cache entry (or
valid FT keys) could try to use full EAPOL/EAP authentication and fail.
If the STA will then try to use the still valid PMKSA cache entry (or
FT) before the STA entry has been cleared, authFail could have been left
to TRUE. That will make EAPOL authenticator PAE state machine enter HELD
state even though authSuccess was already forced to TRUE. This results
in the STA getting disconnected even though it should be allowed to
continue with 4-way handshake. While this is unlikely to happen in
practice, it is better to get this fixed by clearing authFail when
setting authSuccess.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
intended-for: hostap-1
This previously helped when debugging some auth issues when hitting the
AP with 128 association attempts all at once.
Signed-off-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com>
Commit 940a0ce970 moved the STA associated
check from driver_*.c into ieee802_1x_receive(), but failed to take into
account that wired networks and driver_wired.c do not mark the STA entry
associated. Fix this by skipping the check if the driver wrapper is
using a wired network.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new event can be used when EAPOL TX status can't be reported as a
complete 802.11 frame but is instead reported as just the EAPOL data as
originally passed to hapd_send_eapol().
Signed-hostap: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
This cleans up the code a bit by not having to deal with theoretical
possibility of maximum number of EAP methods to be different between
various components in hostapd.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Instead of trying to remember to add wpa_msg() calls for every possible
path where a STA becomes authorized or unauthorized, use
ap_sta_set_authorized() to send these events more consistently.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
For P2P, the p2p_connect takes in device address argument to make a
connection. However the connected event AP-STA-CONNECTED comes with
interface address. The application listening on events would find it
difficult to map interface address to the p2p device address which is
provided for connection.
Append P2P Device Address to AP-STA-CONNECTED event for P2P Client
connection. This will help applications to easily map the P2P Interface
Address to P2P Device Address on CONNECTED event. For non-P2P case, it
will just print the usual STA MAC address alone.
Signed-off-by: Jithu Jance <jithu@broadcom.com>
The password_hash parameter was not copied in case of the integrated
authentication server (but was for RADIUS server). This broke EAP
authentication when the user entry used NT-hash.
The EAPOL authenticator was previously forcing disconnection in the WPS
use case. However, this can be benefitial operation with any IEEE 802.1X
authentication mechanism and need not be limited to WPS. This helps some
use cases like EAP-FAST where provisioning may require two
authentication runs if the authentication server does not allow the PAC
provisioning step to be used for normal data connection. While the
station would be free to decide to re-associate in such a case, not all
stations do and as such, it helps if the AP does that instead of leaving
the association up with EAPOL state machine in HELD state for 60
seconds.
Extend the code that waits for the station to send EAPOL-Start before
initiating EAPOL authenticator operations to cover the case where the
station includes WPS IE in (Re)Association Request frame if that IE
does not include support for WPS 2.0. While this should not really
be needed, this may help with some deployed WPS 1.0 stations that do
not support EAPOL operations correctly and may get confused of the
EAP-Request/Identity packets that would show up twice if EAPOL-Start
is transmitted.
Windows 7 uses incorrect way of figuring out AP's WPS capabilities by
acting as a Registrar and using M1 from the AP. The config methods
attribute in that message is supposed to indicate only the configuration
method supported by the AP in Enrollee role, i.e., to add an external
Registrar. For that case, PBC shall not be used and as such, the
PushButton config method is removed from M1 by default. If pbc_in_m1=1
is included in the configuration file, the PushButton config method is
left in M1 (if included in config_methods parameter) to allow Windows 7
to use PBC instead of PIN (e.g., from a label in the AP).
Commit 03d3f28a69 broke initialization of
EAPOL authenticator state machines since an error value from
wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt() (-1) was not handled properly and the fixed
wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk() identified the value as a PSK-based AKM because
of all bits being set to 1. The special error value needs to handled
separately to avoid skipping EAPOL state machine initialization.
This should fix EAPOL reauthentication and rekeying timeout issues
with Intel clients when using WMM (e.g., with IEEE 802.11n). These
stations do not seem to be able to handle EAPOL data frames as
non-QoS Data frames after the initial setup.
This adds STA flags to hapd_send_eapol() driver op to allow
driver_nl80211.c to mark the EAPOL frames as QoS Data frame
when injecting it through the monitor interface.
Some deployed supplicants update their SNonce for every receive
EAPOL-Key message 1/4 even when these messages happen during the
same 4-way handshake. Furthermore, some of these supplicants fail
to use the first SNonce that they sent and derive an incorrect PTK
using another SNonce that does not match with what the authenticator
is using from the first received message 2/4. This results in
failed 4-way handshake whenever the EAPOL-Key 1/4 retransmission
timeout is reached. The timeout for the first retry is fixed to
100 ms in the IEEE 802.11 standard and that seems to be short
enough to make it difficult for some stations to get the response
out before retransmission.
Work around this issue by increasing the initial EAPOL-Key 1/4
timeout by 1000 ms (i.e., total timeout of 1100 ms) if the station
acknowledges reception of the EAPOL-Key frame. If the driver does
not indicate TX status for EAPOL frames, use longer initial
timeout (1000 ms) unconditionally.
To enable making state change notifications on the WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED
flag, introduce ap_sta_set_authorized(), and to reduce use of the flag
itself also add a wrapper for testing the flag: ap_sta_is_authorized().
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Previously, both NULL and ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff addr were used in various
places to indicate default/broadcast keys. Make this more consistent
and useful by defining NULL to mean default key (i.e., used both for
unicast and broadcast) and ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff to indicate broadcast
key (i.e., used only with broadcast).
This is not needed anymore and just makes things more difficult
to understand, so move the remaining function pointers to direct
function calls and get rid of the struct hostapd_driver_ops.
send_eapol, set_key, read_sta_data, sta_clear_stats,
set_radius_acl_auth, set_radius_acl_expire, and set_beacon
to use inline functions instead of extra abstraction.
wlan0: RADIUS No authentication server configured
MEMLEAK[0x999feb8]: len 1040
WPA_TRACE: memleak - START
[3]: ./hostapd(radius_msg_new+0x33) [0x8074f43]
radius_msg_new() ../src/radius/radius.c:117
[4]: ./hostapd() [0x806095e]
ieee802_1x_encapsulate_radius() ../src/ap/ieee802_1x.c:439
ieee802_1x_aaa_send() ../src/ap/ieee802_1x.c:1496
For example, this error occured when I used WPS hostapd without
"eap_server=1" definition in configuration file.
This commit adds a new wrapper, random_get_bytes(), that is currently
defined to use os_get_random() as is. The places using
random_get_bytes() depend on the returned value being strong random
number, i.e., something that is infeasible for external device to
figure out. These values are used either directly as a key or as
nonces/challenges that are used as input for key derivation or
authentication.
The remaining direct uses of os_get_random() do not need as strong
random numbers to function correctly.
Commit c3fc47ea8e fixed EAP passthrough
server to allow Logoff/Re-authentication to be used. However, it
broke EAP standalone server while doing that. Fix this by reverting
the earlier fix and by clearing the EAP Identity information in the
EAP server code whenever an EAPOL-Start or EAPOL-Logoff packet is
received.
If the station does not include WSC IE in Association Request, it
is marked with WLAN_STA_MAYBE_WPS flag. We can update that to
WLAN_STA_WPS if the station uses either of the WPS identity strings.
This enables some workarounds for WPS stations.
Commit c02d52b405 removed direct calls
to the WPA authenticator, but the change here was incorrect.
EAPOL_SM_USES_WPA was supposed to be set based on sta->wpa_sm being
set, i.e., no need to check for PMKSA entries for that.
While this could potentially change EAPOL Key TX state machine behavior,
no clear problems have been identified so far. Anyway, better fix this
to get the correct flags set for EAPOL authenticator state machine.
