The PMKSA caching and RSN pre-authentication components were marked as
conditional on IEEE8021X_EAPOL. However, the empty wrappers are needed
also in a case IEEE8021X_EAPOL is defined with CONFIG_NO_WPA.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This message is sent at MSG_INFO level and it is supposed to go out even
even debug messages were to be removed from the build. As such, use
wpa_msg() instead of wpa_dbg() for it.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
When AES-WRAP was used to protect the EAPOL-Key Key Data field, this was
decrypted using a temporary heap buffer with aes_unwrap(). That buffer
was not explicitly cleared, so it was possible for the group keys to
remain in memory unnecessarily until the allocated area was reused.
Clean this up by clearing the temporary allocation explicitly before
freeing it.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The Setup Response timer is relatively fast (500 ms) and there are
instances where it fires on the responder side after the initiator has
already sent out the TDLS Setup Confirm frame. Prevent the processing of
this stale TDLS Setup Response frame on the initiator side.
Signed-off-by: Arik Nemtsov <arikx.nemtsov@intel.com>
wpa_insert_pmkid() did not support cases where the original RSN IE
included any PMKIDs. That case can happen when PTK rekeying through
4-way handshake is used after FT protocol run. Such a 4-way handshake
used to fail with wpa_supplicant being unable to build the EAPOL-Key msg
2/4.
Fix this by extending wpa_insert_pmkid() to support removal of the old
PMKIDs, if needed.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The new wpa_supplicant control interface command "TEST_ASSOC_IE
<hexdump>" can now be used to override the WPA/RSN IE for Association
Request frame and following 4-way handshake to allow protocol testing of
AP side processing of WPA/RSN IE.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Number of places were calling functions that are not included in
CONFIG_NO_WPA=y build anymore. Comment out such calls. In addition, pull
in SHA1 and MD5 for config_internal.c, if needed.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
wpa_sm_key_mgmt_set_pmk() was checking for proactive_key_caching to be
enabled before setting the PMK to the driver. This check is not required
and would mandate configuration setting of okc or proactive_key_caching
for cases which were not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Amarnath Hullur Subramanyam <amarnath@qca.qualcomm.com>
Some APs may send RSC octets in EAPOL-Key message 3 of 4-Way Handshake
or in EAPOL-Key message 1 of Group Key Handshake in the opposite byte
order (or by some other corrupted way). Thus, after a successful
EAPOL-Key exchange the TSC values of received multicast packets, such as
DHCP, don't match the RSC one and as a result these packets are dropped
on replay attack TSC verification. An example of such AP is Sapido
RB-1732.
Work around this by setting RSC octets to 0 on GTK installation if the
AP RSC value is identified as a potentially having the byte order issue.
This may open a short window during which older (but valid)
group-addressed frames could be replayed. However, the local receive
counter will be updated on the first received group-addressed frame and
the workaround is enabled only if the common invalid cases are detected,
so this workaround is acceptable as not decreasing security
significantly. The wpa_rsc_relaxation global configuration property
allows the GTK RSC workaround to be disabled if it's not needed.
Signed-off-by: Max Stepanov <Max.Stepanov@intel.com>
Provide information on whether EAPOL-Key frame was sent successfully to
kernel for transmittion. wpa_eapol_key_send() will return
>= 0 on success and < 0 on failure. After receiving EAPOL-Key msg 3/4,
wpa_supplicant sends EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 and shows CTRL-EVENT-CONNECTED
only after verifying that the msg 4/4 was sent to kernel for
transmission successfully.
Signed-off-by: Avichal Agarwal <avichal.a@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Kyeong-Chae Lim <kcya.lim@samsung.com>
There is no point in sending TPK M3 (TDLS Setup Confirm) with a failure
status if the first transmission attempt fails. Instead, just return a
failure by disabling the link rather than retransmitting the TPK M3
frame with an error status.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Reorder terms in a way that no invalid pointers are generated with
pos+len operations. end-pos is always defined (with a valid pos pointer)
while pos+len could end up pointing beyond the end pointer which would
be undefined behavior.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
On TPK lifetime expiration, tear down the direct link before renewing
the link in the case of TDLS initiator processing. The expired key
cannot be used anymore, so it is better to explicitly tear down the old
link first.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
In addition to the PTK length increasing, the length of the PMK was
increased (from 256 to 384 bits) for the 00-0f-ac:12 AKM. This part was
missing from the initial implementation and a fixed length (256-bit) PMK
was used for all AKMs.
Fix this by adding more complete support for variable length PMK and use
384 bits from MSK instead of 256 bits when using this AKM. This is not
backwards compatible with the earlier implementations.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Commit 7d711541dc ('Clear TK part of PTK
after driver key configuration') started clearing TK from memory
immediately after having configured it to the driver when processing
EAPOL-Key message 3/4. While this covered the most common case, it did
not take into account the possibility of the authenticator having to
retry EAPOL-Key message 3/4 in case the first EAPOL-Key message 4/4
response is lost. That case ended up trying to reinstall the same TK to
the driver, but the key was not available anymore.
Fix the EAPOL-Key message 3/4 retry case by configuring TK to the driver
only once. There was no need to try to set the same key after each
EAPOL-Key message 3/4 since TK could not change. If actual PTK rekeying
is used, the new TK will be configured once when processing the new
EAPOL-Key message 3/4 for the first time.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The GTK value received in RSN (WPA2) group rekeying did not use the
wpa_hexdump_key() version of debug printing that is conditional on -K
being included on the command line.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
wpa_supplicant_parse_ies() was never supposed to be used as a generic IE
parser, i.e., it is for the specific purpose of parsing EAPOL-Key Key
Data IEs and KDEs. TDLS used this function for parsing generic AP IEs
and while that works, it resulted in confusing "WPA: Unrecognized
EAPOL-Key Key Data IE" debug messages. Clean this up by using
ieee802_11_parse_elems() for the cases where generic IEs are being
parsed.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new CONFIG_NO_RC4=y build option can be used to remove all internal
hostapd and wpa_supplicant uses of RC4. It should be noted that external
uses (e.g., within a TLS library) do not get disabled when doing this.
This removes capability of supporting WPA/TKIP, dynamic WEP keys with
IEEE 802.1X, WEP shared key authentication, and MSCHAPv2 password
changes.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If WPA2-Enterprise connection with full EAP authentication (i.e., no
PMKSA caching used) results in a PMKID that does not match the one the
AP/Authenticator indicates in EAPOL-Key msg 1/4, there is not much point
in trying to trigger full EAP authentication by sending EAPOL-Start
since this sequence was immediately after such full authentication
attempt.
There are known examples of authentication servers with incorrect MSK
derivation when TLS v1.2 is used (e.g., FreeRADIUS 2.2.6 or 3.0.7 when
built with OpenSSL 1.0.2). Write a clear debug log entry and also send
it to control interface monitors when it looks likely that this case has
been hit. After doing that, stop the connection attempt by
disassociating instead of trying to send out EAPOL-Start to trigger new
EAP authentication round (such another try can be tried with a new
association).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The FT-specific check for valid group cipher in wpa_ft_gen_req_ies() was
not up-to-date with the current list of supported ciphers. Fix this by
using a generic function to determine validity of the cipher. In
practice, this adds support for using CCMP-256 and GCMP-256 as the group
cipher with FT.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Check the element length in the parser and remove the length field from
struct ieee802_11_elems since the element is of fixed length.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Check the element length in the parser and remove the length field from
struct ieee802_11_elems since the element is of fixed length.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
All the existing users of these elements were already validating the
element length. However, it is clearer to validate this already at the
parser for extra layer of protection for any future changes.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This program can be used to run fuzzing tests for areas related to EAPOL
frame parsing and processing on the supplicant side.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Old code defaulted to WEP for an AP advertising OSEN. Show as OSEN
instead. Re-use most of the RSN parsing logic since all but the header
is the same.
Example output:
[root@ath9k-f lanforge]# ./local/bin/wpa_cli -i sta0 scan_results
bssid / frequency / signal level / flags / ssid
00:0e:8e:6f:40:49 2462 -23 [OSEN-OSEN-CCMP][ESS] ben-138
Signed-off-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com>
Previously, it would have been possible to complete RSN connection by
skipping the msg 3/4 and 4/4 completely. This would have resulted in
pairwise key not being configured. This is obviously not supposed to
happen in practice and could result in unexpected behavior, so reject
group key message before the initial 4-way handshake has been completed.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Previously, it was possible for the wpa_sm_start_preauth() and
wpa_sm_rekey_ptk() eloop callbacks to remain active after disconnection
and potentially continue to be used for the next association. This is
not correct behavior, so explicitly cancel these timeouts to avoid
unexpected attempts to complete RSN preauthentication or to request PTK
to be rekeyed.
It was possible to trigger this issue, e.g., by running the following
hwsim test case sequence: ap_wpa2_ptk_rekey ap_ft_sae_over_ds
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Some APs (e.g., Cisco 1260) sometimes add padding to the end of short
TDLS management packets and that can look like invalid IEs. This was
allowed on M3 and discovery packets, but not in others. Allow it for the
other packets as well, since required IEs are verified in the code
anyway.
Signed-off-by: Arik Nemtsov <arikx.nemtsov@intel.com>
This modifies struct wpa_ptk to allow the length of KCK and KEK to be
stored. This is needed to allow longer keys to be used, e.g., with
Suite B 192-bit level.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
It is possible for wpa_tdls_teardown_peers() to be called with sm ==
NULL in case interface addition fails before the WPA state machine is
initialized.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The supplicant code does not try to control the actual channel of the
radio at any point. It simply passes the target peer and channel
parameters to the driver. It's the driver's responsibility to
periodically initiate TDLS channel-switch operations when TDLS
channel-switching is enabled.
Allow enable/disable operations to be invoked via the control interface.
Signed-off-by: Arik Nemtsov <arikx.nemtsov@intel.com>
Mark an appropriate sm flag when TDLS switch is prohibited by the AP.
Populate the flag upon association with the AP.
Signed-off-by: Arik Nemtsov <arikx.nemtsov@intel.com>
It was possible for the decrypted EAPOL-Key Key Data field to remain in
heap after the temporary buffer was freed. Explicitly clear that buffer
before freeing it to minimize the time GTK remains in memory.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
There is no need for wpa_supplicant to maintain a copy of the TK part of
PTK after this has been configured to the driver, so clear that from
heap memory and only maintain KEK and KCK during association to allow
additional EAPOL-Key handshakes.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
PMK and PTK are not needed in the supplicant state machine after
disassociation since core wpa_supplicant will reconfigure them for the
next association. As such, clear these from heap in
wpa_sm_notify_disassoc() to reduce time and number of places storing key
material in memory. In addition, clear FT keys in case of
CONFIG_IEEE80211R=y build (sm->xxkey stored a copy of PSK in case of
FT-PSK).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This converts os_snprintf() result validation cases to use
os_snprintf_error() for cases that were note covered by spatch and
semantic patches.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Bounds checking for gd->gtk_len in wpa_supplicant_check_group_cipher()
was apparently too complex for some static analyzers. Use a local
variable and a more explicit validation step to avoid false report.
(CID 62864)
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds support for AKM 00-0F-AC:11 to specify the integrity and
key-wrap algorithms for EAPOL-Key frames using the new design where
descriptor version is set to 0 and algorithms are determined based on
AKM.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The new AKM uses a different mechanism of deriving the PMKID based on
KCK instead of PMK. hostapd was already doing this after the KCK had
been derived, but wpa_supplicant functionality needs to be moved from
processing of EAPOL-Key frame 1/4 to 3/4 to have the KCK available.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds definitions for the 128-bit level Suite B AKM 00-0F-AC:11. The
functionality itself is not yet complete, i.e., this commit only
includes parts to negotiate the new AKM.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
It looks like some APs are incorrectly selecting descriptor version 3
(AES-128-CMAC) for EAPOL-Key frames when version 2 (HMAC-SHA1) was
expected to be used. This is likely triggered by an attempt to negotiate
PMF with SHA1-based AKM.
Since AES-128-CMAC is considered stronger than HMAC-SHA1, allow the
incorrect, but stronger, option to be used in these cases to avoid
interoperability issues with deployed APs.
This issue shows up with "WPA: CCMP is used, but EAPOL-Key descriptor
version (3) is not 2" in debug log. With the new workaround, this issue
is ignored and "WPA: Interoperability workaround: allow incorrect
(should have been HMAC-SHA1), but stronger (is AES-128-CMAC), descriptor
version to be used" is written to the log.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This commit introduces a QCA vendor command and event to provide an
option to use extended versions of the nl80211 connect/roam operations
in a way that allows drivers to offload key management operations to the
driver/firmware.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This makes wpa_supplicant SME create PMKSA cache entries from SAE
authentication and try to use PMKSA caching if an entry is found for the
AP. If the AP rejects the attempt, fall back to SAE authentication is
used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
dl_list_del() followed by dl_list_add() seemed to confuse clang static
analyzer somehow, so explicitly check for the prev pointer to be
non-NULL to avoid an incorrect warning.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds kek_len argument to aes_wrap() and aes_unwrap() functions and
allows AES to be initialized with 192 and 256 bit KEK in addition to
the previously supported 128 bit KEK.
The test vectors in test-aes.c are extended to cover all the test
vectors from RFC 3394.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
