wpa_group_update_count and wpa_pairwise_update_count can now be used to
set the GTK and PTK rekey retry limits (dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
and dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount). Defaults set to current
hardcoded value (4).
Some stations may suffer from frequent deauthentications due to GTK
rekey failures: EAPOL 1/2 frame is not answered during the total timeout
period of currently ~3.5 seconds. For example, a Galaxy S6 with Android
6.0.1 appears to go into power save mode for up to 5 seconds. Increasing
wpa_group_update_count to 6 fixed this issue.
Signed-off-by: Günther Kelleter <guenther.kelleter@devolo.de>
Instead of copying the struct wpa_auth_callbacks, just keep a pointer to
it, keep the context pointer separate, and let the user just provide a
static const structure. This reduces the attack surface of heap
overwrites, since the function pointers move elsewhere.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
These commnds are mesh version of PMKSA_GET/ADD commands. So the usage
and security risk is similar to them. Refer to
commit 3459381dd2 ('External persistent
storage for PMKSA cache entries') also.
The MESH_PMKSA_GET command requires peer MAC address or "any" as an
argument and outputs appropriate stored PMKSA cache. And the
MESH_PMKSA_ADD command receives an output of MESH_PMKSA_GET and re-store
the PMKSA cache into wpa_supplicant. By using re-stored PMKSA cache,
wpa_supplicant can skip commit message creation which can use
significant CPU resources.
The output of the MESH_PMKSA_GET command uses the following format:
<BSSID> <PMKID> <PMK> <expiration in seconds>
The example of MESH_PMKSA_ADD command is this.
MESH_PMKSA_ADD 02:00:00:00:03:00 231dc1c9fa2eed0354ea49e8ff2cc2dc cb0f6c9cab358a8146488566ca155421ab4f3ea4a6de2120050c149b797018fe 42930
MESH_PMKSA_ADD 02:00:00:00:04:00 d7e595916611640d3e4e8eac02909c3c eb414a33c74831275f25c2357b3c12e3d8bd2f2aab6cf781d6ade706be71321a 43180
This functionality is disabled by default and can be enabled with
CONFIG_PMKSA_CACHE_EXTERNAL=y build configuration option.
Signed-off-by: Masashi Honma <masashi.honma@gmail.com>
The previous implementation was hardcoded to use 128-bit AES key
(AEAD_AES_SIV_CMAC_256). Extend this by allowing AEAD_AES_SIV_CMAC_384
and AEAD_AES_SIV_CMAC_512 with 192-bit and 256-bit AES keys.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
REVmc/D6.0 14.5.5.2.2 (Processing Mesh Peering Open frames for AMPE)
mandates the OPN_RJCT event to be invoked if AES-SIV decryption for
received Mesh Peering Open frame fails. This allows a Mesh Peering Close
frame to be sent in such a case.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
These optional fields are supposed to be included in the Authenticated
Mesh Peering Exchange element only in Mesh Peering Open frames.
Previously, these were incorrectly included in Mesh Peering
Confirm/Close frames and also required to be present in all these
frames.
While this commit changes the receive processing to ignore the
unexpected extra fields, it should be noted that the previous
implementation required the fields to be present and as such, the fixed
implementation is not compatible with it for secure mesh.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
In mesh interface, the wpa_supplicant state was either
DISCONNECT/SCANNING in non-secured connection or AUTHENTICATING in
secured connection. The latter prevented the scan. Update the
wpa_supplicant state in mesh to be COMPLETED upon initialization. This
is similar to the P2P GO case.
Signed-off-by: Maital Hahn <maitalm@ti.com>
This moves pairwise, group, and management group ciphers to various mesh
data structures to avoid having to hardcode cipher in number of places
through the code. While CCMP and BIP are still the hardcoded ciphers,
these are now set only in one location.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The AMPE element includes number of optional and variable length fields
and those cannot really be represented by a fixed struct
ieee80211_ampe_ie. Remove the optional fields from the struct and
build/parse these fields separately.
This is also adding support for IGTKdata that was completely missing
from the previous implementation. In addition, Key RSC for MGTK is now
filled in and used when configuring the RX MGTK for a peer.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This extends the data structures to allow variable length MGTK to be
stored for RX. This is needed as an initial step towards supporting
different cipher suites.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Previous implementation was incorrectly using MGTK also as the IGTK and
doing this regardless of whether PMF was enabled. IGTK needs to be a
independent key and this commit does that at the local TX side.
The current AMPE element construction and parsing is quite broken, so
this does not get add the IGTKdata field there.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Clean up the mesh_rsn_derive_mtk() function by using proper macros and
pointer to the location within the context block.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
mesh_rsn_derive_mtk() was hardcoded to use GCMP (even though CCMP was
hardcoded elsewhere) cipher suite selector instead of the selected AKM
suite selector. This resulted in incorrect MTK getting derived. Fix this
by used the SAE AKM suite selector in the input to the KDF.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Clean up the mesh_rsn_derive_aek() function by using proper macros and
pointer to the location within the context block.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
mesh_rsn_derive_aek() was hardcoded to use GCMP (even though CCMP was
hardcoded elsewhere) cipher suite selector instead of the selected AKM
suite selector. This resulted in incorrect AEK getting derived. Fix this
by used the SAE AKM suite selector in the input to the KDF.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This is initial step in fixing issues in how PMF configuration for RSN
mesh was handled. PMF is an optional capability for mesh and it needs to
be configured consistently in both hostapd structures (to get proper
RSNE) and key configuration (not included in this commit).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
wpa_deinit() got called twice if the random_get_bytes() fails to
generate the MGTK. This resulted in double-freeing the rsn->auth
pointer. Fix this by allowing mesh_rsn_auth_init() handle freeing for
all error cases.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Previously, BLOCKED state duration slightly increased up to 3600. Though
the BLOCKED state could be canceled by ap_handle_timer(). Because the
timer timeouts in ap_max_inactivity(default=300sec) and remove STA
objects (the object retains BLOCKED state).
This patch re-designs my commit bf51f4f82b
('mesh: Fix remaining BLOCKED state after SAE auth failure') to replace
mesh_auth_block_duration by ap_max_inactivity and remove incremental
duration.
Signed-off-by: Masashi Honma <masashi.honma@gmail.com>
This patch add functionality of mesh SAE PMKSA caching. If the local STA
already has peer's PMKSA entry in the cache, skip SAE authentication and
start AMPE with the cached value.
If the peer does not support PMKSA caching or does not have the local
STA's PMKSA entry in the cache, AMPE will fail and the PMKSA cache entry
of the peer will be removed. Then STA retries with ordinary SAE
authentication.
If the peer does not support PMKSA caching and the local STA uses
no_auto_peer=1, the local STA can not retry SAE authentication because
NEW_PEER_CANDIDATE event cannot start SAE authentication when
no_auto_peer=1. So this patch extends MESH_PEER_ADD command to use
duration(sec). Throughout the duration, the local STA can start SAE
authentication triggered by NEW_PEER_CANDIDATE even though
no_auto_peer=1.
This commit requires commit 70c93963ed
('SAE: Fix PMKID calculation for PMKSA cache'). Without that commit,
chosen PMK comparison will fail.
Signed-off-by: Masashi Honma <masashi.honma@gmail.com>
From IEEE Std 802.11-2012 13.3.5:
If the incoming Mesh Peering Management frame is for AMPE and the
Chosen PMK from the received frame contains a PMKID that does not
identify a valid mesh PMKSA, the frame shall be silently discarded.
We were not checking the PMKID previously, and we also weren't parsing
it correctly, so fix both.
Signed-off-by: Bob Copeland <me@bobcopeland.com>
IEEE Std 802.11-2012 11.3.5.4 specifies the PMKID for SAE-derived keys
as:
L((commit-scalar + peer-commit-scalar) mod r, 0, 128)
This is already calculated in the SAE code when the PMK is derived, but
not saved anywhere. Later, when generating the PMKID for plink action
frames, the definition for PMKID from 11.6.1.3 is incorrectly used.
Correct this by saving the PMKID when the key is generated and use it
subsequently.
Signed-off-by: Bob Copeland <me@bobcopeland.com>
When wpa_init() in __mesh_rsn_auth_init() failed, empty rsn->auth caused
segmentation fault due to NULL pointer dereference when wpa_deinit() was
called. Fix this by checking the pointer before executing deinit steps.
Signed-off-by: Masashi Honma <masashi.honma@gmail.com>
When SAE authentication fails, wpa_supplicant retries four times. If all
the retries result in failure, SAE state machine enters BLOCKED state.
Once it enters this state, wpa_supplicant doesn't retry connection. This
commit allow connection retries even if the state machine entered
BLOCKED state.
There could be an opinion "Is this patch needed? User could know the SAE
state machine is in the BLOCKED mode by MESH-SAE-AUTH-BLOCKED event.
Then user can retry connection. By user action, SAE state machine can
change the state from BLOCKED to another.". Yes, this is a true at the
joining mesh STA. However, a STA that is already a member of existing
mesh BSS should not retry connection because if the joining mesh STA
used wrong password, all the existing STA should do something from UI to
retry connection.
Signed-off-by: Masashi Honma <masashi.honma@gmail.com>
Send MESH-SAE-AUTH-BLOCKED event if SAE authentication is blocked. The
BLOCK state will finish when a new peer notification event is sent for
the same MAC address.
Signed-off-by: Masashi Honma <masashi.honma@gmail.com>
SAE authentication fails likely with wrong password. This commit adds a
notification of the failure to the upper application (UI) so that the
application can notify suspection of a wrong password to the user. The
control interface monitor even for this is "MESH-SAE-AUTH-FAILURE
addr=<peer>".
Signed-off-by: Masashi Honma <masashi.honma@gmail.com>
The plink_state exists both wpa_supplicant and kernel. Synchronize them
with wpa_mesh_set_plink_state().
Signed-off-by: Kenzoh Nishikawa <Kenzoh.Nishikawa@jp.sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Masashi Honma <masashi.honma@gmail.com>
When performing SAE authentication in mesh, one station may
initiate authentication by sending a COMMIT as soon as a peer
candidate is discovered. Previously we did this in mesh_rsn.c,
but this left some of the state initialization in a different
part of the code from the rest of the state machine, and we may
need to add other initializations here in the future, so move
that to a more central function.
Signed-off-by: Bob Copeland <me@bobcopeland.com>
This converts most of the remaining perror() and printf() calls from
hostapd and wpa_supplicant to use wpa_printf().
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
It is possible that these location ended up getting called before mesh
startup operations had been completed and that could result in
dereferencing NULL pointers. Address those error cases by verifying that
the needed parameters are available before using them.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Add timer to do SAE re-authentication with number of tries defined
by MESH_AUTH_RETRY and timeout defined by MESH_AUTH_TIMEOUT.
Ignoring the sending of reply message on "SAE confirm before commit"
to avoid "ping-pong" issues with other mesh nodes. This is obvious when
number of mesh nodes in MBSS reaching 6.
Signed-off-by: Chun-Yeow Yeoh <yeohchunyeow@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Bob Copeland <me@bobcopeland.com>
