Commit 03abb6b541 ('DPP: Reject unexpected
Req/Resp message based on Auth/PKEX role') used incorrect type of error
value (NULL vs. -1). Fix that.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
With the AP proto configured being WPA/RSN and SME in the
driver, the previous implementation in hostapd is to not
process hostapd_notif_assoc() due to "No WPA/RSN IE from STA",
if the (Re)Association Request frame is without the WPA/RSN IEs.
Enhance that to disassociate such station provided the AP is not using
WPS.
Signed-off-by: Hu Wang <huw@codeaurora.org>
This allows external applications to get event indication for Probe
Request frames. Extend ctrl iface cmd "ATTACH" to enable this event on
per-request basis. For example, user has to send ctrl iface cmd "ATTACH
probe_rx_events=1" to enable the Probe Request frame events.
Signed-off-by: bhagavathi perumal s <bperumal@qti.qualcomm.com>
Previous implementation did not handle number of sequences correctly.
Make sure the iteration continues in both unicast and broadcast cases
until the five attempts have been made. In addition, improve timing by
checking 10 second time from the beginning of each iteration round and
not the last channel on which the Auth Req frame has been transmitted.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Previously, the Authentication Request frame was retried after 2+10 = 12
seconds since the wait for the response was not accounted for. Substract
that wait from the 10 second wait time to start the retries more quickly
based on the 10 second timer described in the tech spec.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
If unicast Authentication Request frame is used and the peer ACKs such a
frame, but does not reply within the two second limit, there is no need
to continue trying to retransmit the request frames since the peer was
found, but not responsive.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
The new conf={sta,ap}-{sae,psk-sae} parameter values can now be used to
specify that the legacy configuration object is for SAE.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This allows DPP to be used for enrolling credentials for SAE networks in
addition to the legacy PSK (WPA-PSK) case. In addition, enable FT-PSK
and FT-SAE cases automatically.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Retransmit the PKEX Exchange Request frame if no response from a peer is
received. This makes the exchange more robust since this frame is sent
to a broadcast address and has no link layer retries.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Extend dpp_test to allow more invalid attribute values to be written
into Peer Discovery Request/Response frames.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
hostapd implementation was changed to use a valid Status Code when
rejecting the connection. This test case was forgotten at the time, but
it needs a matching change to allow the new value (1 instead of 14).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Extend dpp_test to cover a case where Config Attrib Object value is
invalid in Configuration Request frame.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Extend dpp_test to cover cases where DPP Status value is invalid in
Authentication Response/Confirm frames.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Extend dpp_test to cover cases where Initiator/Responder Bootstrap Key
Hash value in DPP Authentication frames is invalid (flip one bit).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This extends dpp_test to allow invalid Initiator/Responder Protocol Key
to be written into the Authentication Request/Response frame.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
If the build include SHA384, use that to derive GTK from GMK. In
addition, add more random bytes bytes to the PRF-X() context data for
longer GTK to reduce dependency on the randomness of the GMK.
GMK is 256 bits of random data and it was used with SHA256, so the
previous design was likely sufficient for all needs even with 128 bits
of additional randomness in GTK derivation. Anyway, adding up to 256
bits of new randomness and using SHA384 can be helpful extra protection
particularly for the cases using GCMP-256 or CCMP-256 as the group
cipher.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This allows mesh_sae_groups_invalid and
wpas_mesh_secure_sae_group_negotiation to be run with BoringSSL (group
25 not available anymore).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Unlike OpenSSL, BoringSSL returns an error from
EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp() is not on the curve. As such, need
to behave differently here depending on which library is used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
While the OpenSSL version of i2d_EC_PUBKEY() seemed to be able to use
the POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED setting on the EC key, that did not seem
to work with BoringSSL. Since this is not exactly robust design, replace
use of i2d_EC_PUBKEY() with a custom routine that enforces the DPP rules
on SubjectPublicKeyInfo (compressed format of the public key,
ecPublicKey OID, parameters present and indicating the curve by OID).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This routine was previously implemented twice using i2d_EC_PUBKEY().
There is no need to duplicate that implementation and especially since
it looks like this implementation needs to be replaced for BoringSSL,
start by using a shared helper function for both locations so that there
is only a single place that uses i2d_EC_PUBKEY() to build the special
DPP bootstrapping key DER encoding.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
BoringSSL restored the previously removed AES-192 ECB support in ("Add
AES-192 ECB.") commit. Since this is needed for DPP with the P-384
curve, restore support for this through EVP_aes_192_ecb().
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This makes it clearer why some AES operations fail especially with
BoringSSL where the 192-bit case is not supported.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
