Most of the time is spent in the CP state machine RETIRE state where LKI
is not set and OKI is the currently used SAK so OLPN needs to be checked
for PN exhaustion.
hostapd/wpa_supplicant implemented an interpretation of the standard as
described in a proposed amendment titled "MKA pending PN exhastion"
which was deemed to be wrong. This amendment was included in IEEE Std
802.1Xck-2018.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Winter <Thomas.Winter@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
Most of the time is spent in the CP state machine RETIRE state where LKI
is not set and OKI is the currently used SAK, so OLPN needs to be
checked for PN exhaustion.
hostapd/wpa_supplicant implemented an interpretation of the standard as
described in a proposed amendment titled "MKA pending PN exhastion"
which was deemed to be wrong. This amendment was included in IEEE Std
802.1Xck-2018.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Winter <Thomas.Winter@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
The associated SAs have been deleted and the key server has changed so
there's no point in keeping the key values.
Note that this isn't specified in IEEE Std 802.1X-2010.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Winter <Thomas.Winter@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
Previously the ABANDON->RECEIVE state change was impossible and did not
match the CP state machine in IEEE Std 802.1X-2010 Figure 12-2.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Winter <Thomas.Winter@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
The RECEIVE and RETIRE states were incorrect which can result in
incorrect information being advertised in SAKuse MKPDUs. Change these to
match IEEE Std 802.1X-2010, Figure 12-2 (CP state machine).
hostapd/wpa_supplicant implemented an interpretation of the standard as
described in a proposed amendment titled "MKA pending PN exhastion"
which was deemed to be wrong. This amendment was included in IEEE Std
802.1Xck-2018.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Winter <Thomas.Winter@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
Previously, check for local MI,MN in a peer's Peers List accepted only
the cases that include the last used MN from an MKPDU sent by the local
device. This was problematic since it was possible to synchronize MKPDU
transmission between two devices in a way that made them always miss the
last MKPDU from the other device before filling in the Peers List.
Relax this matching requirement of "acceptably recent MN" to mean both
the last used MN and the one used just before it (i.e., copied from
either of the last two MKPDUs sent by the local device) are accepted.
While this might help in some real world scenarios in making the
protocol converge more quickly, the main help from this is to fix
consistent hwsim test cases failures in macsec_psk_ns when using UML
with time travel option which happened to practically guarantee the
inconvenient timing of MKPDU transmission/reception that ended up with
the MKPDU processing to see MI,MN with MN being the last used MN minus
1.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
It looks like it is possible for the RECEIVE state to leak memory where
a previously allocated sm->lki is moved to sm->oki while sm->oki is
pointing to not yet freed entry. It is not clear how this can be
triggered, but it has come up in hwsim testing under heavy load.
Free sm->oki if it is still set in RECEIVE before replacing it with
sm->lki to avoid this memory leak.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
This is needed to avoid an UBSan warning and since this struct is used
as part of a message construction, it needs to be packed anyway to
guarantee correct functionality.
ieee802_1x_kay.c:1021:3: runtime error: member access within misaligned address 0x0000031921e2 for type 'struct ieee802_1x_mka_peer_id', which requires 4 byte alignment
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Two recent changes to MKA create a situation where a new MI is generated
every time a SAK Use parameter set is decoded. The first change moved
invalid key detection from ieee802_1x_decode_basic_body() to
ieee802_1x_kay_decode_mpkdu():
commit db9ca18bbf ("mka: Do not ignore MKPDU parameter set decoding failures")
The second change forces the KaY to generate a new MI when an invalid
key is detected:
commit a8aeaf41df ("mka: Change MI if key invalid")
The fix is to move generation of a new MI from the old invalid key
detection location to the new location.
Fixes: a8aeaf41df ("mka: Change MI if key invalid")
Signed-off-by: Michael Siedzik <msiedzik@extremenetworks.com>
One of the reset_participant_mi() callers did not log the error. Make
this more consistent with the other callers.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
IEEE Std 802.1X-2010, 11.11 describes that the ICV is separate from the
parameter sets before it. Due to its convenient layout the ICV Indicator
'body part' is used to encode the ICV as well.
IEEE Std 802.1X-2010, 11.11.3 describes the encoding of MKPDUs. In
bullet e) is desribed that the ICV Indicator itself is encoded when the
ICV is not 16 octets in length. IEEE Std 802.1Xbx-2014, Table 11-7 note
e) states that it will not be encoded unless the Algorithm Agility
parameter specifies the use of an ICV that is not 16 octets in length.
Therefore the length calculation for the ICV indicator body part must
take into account if the ICV Indicator is to be encoded or not. The
actual encoder of the ICV body already takes care of the rest.
In practice, this change will remove the ICV Indicator parameter set (4
octets before the ICV value itself) since the only defined algorithm
agility value uses an ICV of 16 octets. IEEE Std 802.1X-2010 MKPDU
validation and decoding rules in 11.11.2 and 11.11.4 require the
receipient to handle both cases of ICV Indicator being included or not.
Signed-off-by: Jaap Keuter <jaap.keuter@xs4all.nl>
It was possible for a participant to first be elected as a key server
and schedule a new SAK to be generated and distributed just to be
followed by another participant being elected as the key server. That
did not stop the participant that disabled key server functionality to
stop generating the new SAK and then trying to distribute it. That is
not correct behavior, so make these steps conditional on the participant
still being a key server when going through the timer.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This pointer needs to be cleared when the matching SAK is being removed
from the SAK list. The previous implementation was doing something
pretty strange in the loop by clearing the pointer for any non-matching
key that happened to be iterated through before finding the matching
key. This could probably result in incorrect behavior, but not clearing
the pointer for the matching key could do more harm by causing freed
memory to be referenced.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Instead of using a specifically set index value from table definition,
use the actual real index of the table entry. This removes need for
maintaining these index values separately. Furthermore, the
mka_alg_tbl[] index was already off-by-one (but not used anywhere).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
When running wpa_supplicant (with logging for testing) the log output is
somewhat disorganized for KaY related items. E.g., items are not
aligned, inconsistent type handling, wrong wording, missing labels, etc.
This change tries to clean up the log output, so it is somewhat more
accessible.
Signed-off-by: Jaap Keuter <jaap.keuter@xs4all.nl>
Go through the SM_STEP_RUN() global transition to get into the INIT
state to follow the state machine design more closely.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
While IEEE Std 802.1X-2010 talks about arbitrary authorization data that
could be passed to the CP from sources like RADIUS server, there is not
much point in trying to implement this as an arbitrary memory buffer in
wpa_supplicant. Should such data be supported in the future, it would
much more likely use more detailed data structures that encode the
received data in easier to use form.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This can be used to allow 256-bit key hierarchy to be derived from
EAP-based authentication. For now, the MSK length is hardcoded to 128
bits, so the previous behavior is maintained.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The CAK length is not hardcoded in the algorithm agility parameter, so
remove that from the table. Instead, allow both 16 (128-bit) and 32
(256-bit) CAK to be used so that the following key derivations use
appropriate key lengths based on the configured/derived CAK.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The ICK and KEK are derived from a CAK and the length of the CAK
determines the length of the KCK/ICK. Remove the separate ICK/KEK length
parameters from the algorithm agility table.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Extend the previously implemented KDF (IEEE Std 802.1X-2010, 6.2.1) to
support 256-bit input key and AES-CMAC-256. This does not change any
actual key derivation functionality yet, but is needed as a step towards
supporting 256-bit CAK.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
It is possible to get a situation where a peer removes the Key Server
from its live peers list but the server still thinks that the peer is
alive (e.g., high packet loss in one direction). In such a case, the Key
Server will continue to advertise Last Key but this peer will not be
able to set up SA as it has already deleted its key.
Change the peer MI which will force the Key Server to distribute a new
SAK.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Kartashev <andrey.kartashev@afconsult.com>
Decrease timeout for a peer with duplicated SCI to speed up process in
case it is a valid peer after MI change.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Kartashev <andrey.kartashev@afconsult.com>
There is already partial support of GCM-AES-256. It is possible to
enable this mode by setting 'kay->macsec_csindex = 1;' in
ieee802_1x_kay_init() function, but the generated key contained only 128
bits of data while other 128 bits are in 0.
Enables KaY to generate full 256-bit SAK from the same 128-bit CAK. Note
that this does not support 256-bit CAK or AES-CMAC-256 -based KDF.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Kartashev <andrey.kartashev@afconsult.com>
According IEEE Std 802.1X-2010, 9.8 each participant shall record the
values of NextPN for last SAK accepted from each Key Server to use it in
case of a switch from one Key Server to another and back. Add LPN
recording and set saved value as the initial PN for the created channel.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Kartashev <andrey.kartashev@afconsult.com>
It is possible that the driver fails to create Secure Channel (due to
hardware limitations for example). Add checks of create_*_sc() result
codes and abort procedure in case of failure.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Kartashev <andrey.kartashev@afconsult.com>
Fix a minor memory leak in ieee802_1x_kay_create_mka() in
case of KEK/ICK derivation failure.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Kartashev <andrey.kartashev@afconsult.com>
Add new configuration parameters macsec_replay_protect and
macsec_replay_window to allow user to set up MACsec replay protection
feature. Note that according to IEEE Std 802.1X-2010 replay protection
and delay protection are different features: replay protection is
related only to SecY and does not appear on MKA level while delay
protection is something that KaY can use to manage SecY state.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Kartashev <andrey.kartashev@afconsult.com>
To prevent a remote peer from getting stuck in a perpetual 'potential
peer' state, only update the peer liveness timer 'peer->expire' for live
peers and not for potential peers.
Per IEEE Std 802.1X-2010, 9.4.3 (Determining liveness), potential peers
need to show liveness by including our MI/MN in their transmitted MKPDU
(within potential or live parameter sets).
When a potential peer does include our MI/MN in an MKPDU, we respond by
moving the peer from 'potential_peers' to 'live_peers'.
If a potential peer does not include our MI/MN in an MKPDU within
MKPDU_LIFE_TIME, let the peer expire to facilitate getting back in sync
with the remote peer.
Signed-off-by: Michael Siedzik <msiedzik@extremenetworks.com>
The previous commit introduced parameter set error checking. This commit
extends upon that by considering missing parameter sets a failure.
Two checks are added by this commit. First, verify that live peers start
encoding MKA_SAK_USE within a reasonable amount of time after going live
(10 MKPDUs). Second, verify that once a live peer starts encoding
MKA_SAK_USE it continues to do so indefinitely.
Signed-off-by: Michael Siedzik <msiedzik@extremenetworks.com>
The status values returned by mka_param_body_handler.body_rx functions
are currently ignored by ieee802_1x_kay_decode_mkpdu(). If a failure is
detected the KaY should (a) stop processing the MKDPU and (b) do not
update the associated peer's liveliness.
IEEE Std 802.1X-2010, Table 11-7 (MKPDU parameter sets) and 11.11.3
(Encoding MKPDUs) dictate that MKA_SAK_USE (set type 3) will always be
encoded before MKA_DISTRIBUTED_SAK (set type 4) in MKPDUs. Due to
implementation of mka_param_body_handler, the code will always decode
MKA_SAK_USE before MKA_DISTRIBUTED_SAK. When MKA_DISTRUBUTED_SAK
contains a new SAK the code should decode MKA_DISTRUBUTED_SAK first so
that the latest SAK is in known before decoding MKA_SAK_USE.
The ideal solution would be to make two passes at MKDPU decoding: the
first pass decodes MKA_DISTRIBUTED_SAK, the second pass decodes all
other parameter sets.
A simpler and less risky solution is presented here: ignore MKA_SAK_USE
failures if MKA_DISTRIBUTED_SAK is also present. The new SAK will be
saved so that the next MKPDU's MKA_SAK_USE can be properly decoded. This
is basically what the code prior to this commit was doing (by ignoring
all errors).
Also, the only real recourse the KaY has when detecting any bad
parameter set is to ignore the MKPDU by not updating the corresponding
peer's liveliness timer, 'peer->expire'.
Signed-off-by: Michael Siedzik <msiedzik@extremenetworks.com>
If a live peer ever changes its Member Identifier (MI), the KaY
correctly detects a "duplicated SCI" but then proceeds to delete the
peer without deleting the peer's resources (i.e., RxSC, RxSAs, TxSAs).
Note that a remote peer's MI will change if and when an
ieee8021XPaePortInitialize is executed on the remote port.
The solution here is to ignore all MKPDUs containing the new MI until
after the peer (that corresponds to the old MI) expires and cleans up
its resources. After the old peer is removed reception of the next MKPDU
containing the new MI will result in the creation of a new peer with the
new MI.
Signed-off-by: Michael Siedzik <msiedzik@extremenetworks.com>
Per IEEE Std 802.1X-2010, Figure 12-2 (CP state machine), READY to
TRANSMIT transition includes !controlledPortEnabled condition.
Signed-off-by: Michael Siedzik <msiedzik@extremenetworks.com>
Per IEEE Std 802.1X-2010, Figure 12-2 (CP state machine), READY should
move to ABANDON (not RECEIVE) when new_sak or changed_connect is true.
Signed-off-by: Michael Siedzik <msiedzik@extremenetworks.com>
Per IEEE Std 802.1X-2010, Figure 12-2 (CP state machine), RECEIVING to
TRANSMIT transition includes !controlledPortEnabled condition.
Signed-off-by: Michael Siedzik <msiedzik@extremenetworks.com>
Per IEEE Std 802.1X-2010, Figure 12-2 (CP state machine), deleteSAs(oki)
is used upon entering RETIRE. Do that in addition to freeing sm->oki.
Signed-off-by: Michael Siedzik <msiedzik@extremenetworks.com>
The purpose of the Lowest Acceptable PN (lpn) parameters in the MACsec
SAK Use parameter set is to enforce delay protection. Per IEEE Std
802.1X-2010, Clause 9, "Each SecY uses MKA to communicate the lowest PN
used for transmission with the SAK within the last two seconds, allowing
receivers to bound transmission delays."
When encoding the SAK Use parameter set the KaY should set llpn and olpn
to the lowest PN transmitted by the latest SAK and oldest SAK (if
active) within the last two seconds. Because MKPDUs are transmitted
every 2 seconds (MKA_HELLO_TIME), the solution implemented here
calculates lpn based on the txsc->next_pn read during the previous MKPDU
transmit.
Upon receiving and decoding a SAK Use parameter set with delay
protection enabled, the KaY will update the SecY's lpn if the delay
protect lpn is greater than the SecY's current lpn (which is a product
of last PN received and replay protection and window size).
Signed-off-by: Michael Siedzik <msiedzik@extremenetworks.com>
Delay Protect and Replay Protect are two separate and distinct features
of MKA. Per IEEE Std 802.1X-2010, 9.10.1 "Delay Protect, TRUE if LPNs
are being reported sufficiently frequently to allow the recipient to
provide data delay protection. If FALSE, the LPN can be reported as
zero", and per 9.10 "NOTE--Enforcement of bounded received delay
necessitates transmission of MKPDUs at frequent (0.5 s) intervals, to
meet a maximum data delay of 2 s while minimizing connectivity
interruption due to the possibility of lost or delayed MKPDUs."
This means struct ieee802_1x_mka_sak_use_body::delay_protect should only
be set TRUE when MKPDUs are being transmitted every 0.5 s (or faster).
By default the KaY sends MKPDUs every MKA_HELLO_TIME (2.0 s), so by
default delay_protect should be FALSE.
Add a new 'u32 mka_hello_time' parameter to struct ieee802_1x_kay. If
delay protection is desired, the KaY initialization code should set
kay->mka_hello_time to MKA_BOUNDED_HELLO_TIME (500 ms).
Signed-off-by: Michael Siedzik <msiedzik@extremenetworks.com>
Commit 7b4d546e ("wpa_supplicant: Add macsec_integ_only setting for
MKA") introduced policy setting SHOULD_ENCRYPT (MACsec provides
integrity+confidentiality) in addition to SHOULD_SECURE (MACsec provides
integrity only). In both cases the KaY is populating the
"Confidentiality Offset" parameter within the "Distributed SAK parameter
set" with CONFIDENTIALITY_OFFSET_0=1. In the case of SHOULD_SECURE the
parameter should be populated with CONFIDENTIALITY_NONE=0.
IEEE Std 802.1X-2010, Table 11-6 and Figure 11-11 define how the two
Confidentiality Offset bits in the "Distributed SAK parameter set" must
be set: "0 if confidentiality not used" and "1 if confidentiality with
no offset". When policy is SHOULD_SECURE KaY should to send the former,
and when policy is SHOULD_ENCRYPT KaY should send the latter.
Fixes: 7b4d546e3d ("wpa_supplicant: Add macsec_integ_only setting for MKA")
Signed-off-by: Michael Siedzik <msiedzik@extremenetworks.com>
IEEE Std 802.1X-2010, Figure 11-7 explains that "Parameter set body
length" is exclusive of the suffix padding.
Fix variable length encoding and decoding when CKN length is not a
multiple of 4 bytes.
Signed-off-by: Michael Braun <michael-dev@fami-braun.de>
Mark the data structures used in construction/parsing frames packed to
prevent compiler from being able to pad them.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
GCM-AES-256 cipher suite is defined in IEEE Std 802.1AEbn-2011.
If authenticator configured as GCM-AES-256, the distributed SAK will be
256 bits indicated by the GCM-AES-256 ID in the MKA packet.
This patch will make AES Key Unwrap to 32 bytes of SAK when identify the
ID.
Signed-off-by: xiaofeis <xiaofeis@codeaurora.org>
