This resulted in an attempt to dereference a NULL pointer since sta_addr
is not known in this type of a case.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Extend the wpa_pmk_r1_to_ptk() to also derive Key Derivation
Key (KDK), which can later be used for secure LTF measurements.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
Extend the wpa_pmk_to_ptk() to also derive Key Derivation
Key (KDK), which can later be used for secure LTF measurements.
Update the wpa_supplicant and hostapd configuration and the
corresponding WPA and WPA Auth state machine, to allow enabling of KDK
derivation. For now, use a testing parameter to control whether KDK is
derived.
Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
The case where a single 0xdd octet without any 0x00 octets is used as
padding was addressed incorrectly and that ended up truncating one octet
of the actual plaintext version of the Key Data value. Fix this by
removing the unnecessary change to the p pointer before calculating the
new length since p is already pointing to one past the last octet of the
full plaintext.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
We're doing a sort of bounds check, based on the previous loop, but only
after we've already tried to read off the end.
This squashes some ASAN errors I'm seeing when running the ap_ft hwsim
test module.
Signed-off-by: Brian Norris <briannorris@chromium.org>
If no Beacon or Probe Response frame has been seen in the capture, use
the IEs from EAPOL-Key msg 3/4 to set up BSS information.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The previous implementation tried to update STA IE information based on
EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 to be able to handle captures that do not include the
(Re)Association Request frame. This was not sufficient (OSEN was not
included) and was done too late (the parsed information is needed for
PMK-to-PTK derivation).
Move the IE update step to happen before trying to derive the PTK if no
(Re)Association Request frame has been seen.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Fetch the BIGTK from EAPOL-Key msg 3/4 and use it to validate MME in
Beacon frames when the AP uses Beacon protection.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Track PMK-R0/PMK-R0-Name from the initial mobility domain association
and derive PMK-R1/PTK when the station uses FT protocol. This allows
frames from additional roaming cases to be decrypted.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
DPP allows Diffie-Hellman exchange to be used for PFS in PTK derivation.
This requires an additional Z.x (x coordinate of the DH shared secret)
to be passed to wpa_pmk_to_ptk(). This commit adds that to the function
and updates all the callers to pass NULL,0 for that part in preparation
of the DPP specific changes to start using this.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
The length of the TK is available within struct wpa_ptk, so there is no
need to try to maintain it separately in wlantest.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This new AKM is used with DPP when using the signed Connector to derive
a PMK. Since the KCK, KEK, and MIC lengths are variable within a single
AKM, this needs number of additional changes to get the PMK length
delivered to places that need to figure out the lengths of the PTK
components.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This was only written to pcapng files if both pcap and pcapng writing
was requested. Fix this for the case where only a pcapng file is being
written.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This leads to cleaner code overall, and also reduces the size
of the hostapd and wpa_supplicant binaries (in hwsim test build
on x86_64) by about 2.5 and 3.5KiB respectively.
The mechanical conversions all over the code were done with
the following spatch:
@@
expression SIZE, SRC;
expression a;
@@
-a = os_malloc(SIZE);
+a = os_memdup(SRC, SIZE);
<...
if (!a) {...}
...>
-os_memcpy(a, SRC, SIZE);
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
The new AEAD AKM option in FILS sets the MIC bit in EAPOL-Key frames to
0 for some ciphers, so the determination of EAPOL-Key frame types needs
changes to work with these cases.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Suite B 192-bit addition from IEEE Std 802.11ac-2013 replaced the
previous fixed length Key MIC field with a variable length field. That
change was addressed with an addition of a new struct defined for the
second MIC length. This is not really scalable and with FILS coming up
with a zero-length MIC case for AEAD, a more thorough change to support
variable length MIC is needed.
Remove the Key MIC and Key Data Length fields from the struct
wpa_eapol_key and find their location based on the MIC length
information (which is determined by the AKMP). This change allows the
separate struct wpa_eapol_key_192 to be removed since struct
wpa_eapol_key will now include only the fixed length fields that are
shared with all EAPOL-Key cases in IEEE Std 802.11.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This adds minimal support for deriving keys for FT-PSK to allow the
initial mobility domain association to be analyzed in more detail.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
This modifies struct wpa_ptk to allow the length of KCK and KEK to be
stored. This is needed to allow longer keys to be used, e.g., with
Suite B 192-bit level.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds support for AKM 00-0F-AC:11 to specify the integrity and
key-wrap algorithms for EAPOL-Key frames using the new design where
descriptor version is set to 0 and algorithms are determined based on
AKM.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds kek_len argument to aes_wrap() and aes_unwrap() functions and
allows AES to be initialized with 192 and 256 bit KEK in addition to
the previously supported 128 bit KEK.
The test vectors in test-aes.c are extended to cover all the test
vectors from RFC 3394.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This allows Hotspot 2.0 OSEN connection to be analyzed more
conveniently. The frames from an OSEN association can now be decrypted
using an MSK file.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
These were somewhat more hidden to avoid direct use, but there are now
numerous places where these are needed and more justification to make
the extern int declarations available from wpa_debug.h. In addition,
this avoids some warnings from sparse.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Some of the MIC validation steps were not logged in the pcapng notes.
Add these to make the entries more consistent and to provide more
information to ease debugging.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
A text file with a hexdump of PTK (KCK|KEK=TK with 48 octets for CCMP or
64 octets for TKIP or alternative 16 or 32 octet TK for CCMP/TKIP) can
now be read from a file specified with the -T command line argument. If
the current known PTK fails to decrypt a frame (or if no current PTK is
known) all listed PTKs are iterated to see if any of them matches.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds debug information from wlantest into pcapng frame comments to
make the information more convenient to use, e.g., in Wireshark.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The WPA/RSN IE in EAPOL-Key 2/4 is more reliable than the one in
(Re)Association Request frame. Update the STA info base don the
EAPOL-Key frame so that the correct cipher information is used
even if the (Re)Association Request frame is missing or corrupted
in the capture.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
KEK from TPTK needs to be used instead of from PTK when processing
rekeying case similarly to what was already done with KCK.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Use a temporary PTK buffer during 4-way handshake when rekeying PTK
so that the new EAPOL-Key frame MIC values are checked against the
new PTK and frames are decrypted using the old PTK. Take the new
PTK into use once msg 4/4 is processed and clear RSC counters at
that point (including moving of RSC update to avoid setting RSC
based on the msg 4/4).
In addition, add a workaround to handle supplicant implementations that
set Secure bit to one during PTK rekeying 4-way handshake in msg 2/4.
This was previously assumed to be msg 4/4, but the key data contents
can be used to figure out whether this is msg 2/4 even if the Secure
bit is set to one.
Signed-hostap: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Jouni Malinen
Ilan Peer
Brian Norris
Jouni Malinen
Alexander Wetzel
Jouni Malinen
Johannes Berg
Ashok Kumar Ponnaiah