When ERP initialization was moved from the METHOD state to the SUCCESS
state, the conditions for checking against EAP state being cleared was
missed. The METHOD state verified that sm->m is not NULL while the
SUCCESS state did not have such a check. This opened a window for a race
condition where processing of deauthentication event and EAPOL RX events
could end up delivering an EAP-Success to the EAP peer state machine
after the state had been cleared. This issue has now been worked around
in another manner, but the root cause for this regression should be
fixed as well.
Check that the EAP state machine is properly configured before trying to
initialize ERP in the SUCCESS state.
Fixes: 2a71673e27 ("ERP: Derive ERP key only after successful EAP authentication")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Build eap_*.so into the wpa_supplicant similarly with the wpa_supplicant
binary and include the shared helper functions from additional files
into the builds. This got broken at some point with the build system
changes.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Recognize the explicitly defined Commitment Message per
draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-13 at the conclusion of the EAP-TTLS with TLS
1.3.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Clouter <alex@digriz.org.uk>
Recognize the explicitly defined Commitment Message per
draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-13 at the conclusion of the EAP-TLS with TLS
1.3.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Clouter <alex@digriz.org.uk>
This newer Session-Id/Method-Id derivation is used with PEAP and
EAP-TTLS when using TLS 1.3 per draft-ietf-emu-tls-eap-types-00, so do
not limit this to only EAP-TLS.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Clouter <alex@digriz.org.uk>
Use the TLS-Exporter with the label and context as defined in
draft-ietf-emu-tls-eap-types-00 when deriving keys for EAP-TTLS with TLS
1.3.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Clouter <alex@digriz.org.uk>
Use the TLS-Exporter with the label and context as defined in
draft-ietf-emu-tls-eap-types-00 when deriving keys for PEAP with TLS
1.3.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Clouter <alex@digriz.org.uk>
EAP peer does not expect data present when beginning the Phase 2 in
EAP-{TTLS,PEAP} but in TLS 1.3 session tickets are sent after the
handshake completes.
There are several strategies that can be used to handle this, but this
patch picks up from the discussion[1] and implements the proposed use of
SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY. SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY has already been enabled by
default in OpenSSL 1.1.1, but it needs to be enabled for older versions.
The main OpenSSL wrapper change in tls_connection_decrypt() takes care
of the new possible case with SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY for
SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ to indicate that a non-application_data was
processed. That is not really an error case with TLS 1.3, so allow it to
complete and return an empty decrypted application data buffer.
EAP-PEAP/TTLS processing can then use this to move ahead with starting
Phase 2.
[1] https://www.spinics.net/lists/hostap/msg05376.html
Signed-off-by: Alexander Clouter <alex@digriz.org.uk>
This could fail in theory if running out of memory, so better check for
this explicitly instead of allowing the exchange to continue and fail
later due to checkcode mismatch.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Use a local variable to try to make ikev2_parse_proposal() easier for
static analyzers to understand. Bounds checking in the loop is really
done by the ikev2_parse_transform() function, so the p->num_transforms
value itself is of no importance for that part and even that was already
implicitly limited in range.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
For EAP-SIM connections, reorder the order of the attributes in
EAP-Response/SIM/Start message: Send AT_IDENTITY first, then
AT_NONCE and AT_VERSION instead of AT_IDENTITY last. Even though there
is no order requirements in the RFC, some implementations expect the
order of the attributes to be exactly as described in the RFC figures.
Peer Authenticator
| |
| +------------------------------+
| | Server does not have a |
| | Subscriber identity available|
| | When starting EAP-SIM |
| +------------------------------+
| |
| EAP-Request/SIM/Start |
| (AT_ANY_ID_REQ, AT_VERSION_LIST) |
|<------------------------------------------------|
| |
| |
| EAP-Response/SIM/Start |
| (AT_IDENTITY, AT_NONCE_MT, |
| AT_SELECTED_VERSION) |
|------------------------------------------------>|
| |
Signed-off-by: Hai Shalom <haishalom@google.com>
If wpa_supplicant is built with dynamic EAP methods,
the *.so files land here. Add them to .gitignore.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
The install target at the beginning of src/eap_peer/Makefile was
confusing make about the build rules for libeap_peer.a and overriding of
the install target between src/eap_peer/Makefile and src/lib.rules was
breaking installation of dynamic EAP peer *.so files.
Fix this by lib.rules defining a default for the install target so that
src/*/Makefile can override that and by moving the install target for
eap_peer to the end of the Makefile.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
We don't really need to duplicate more of this, so just
move the lib.rules include to the end and do more of the
stuff that's common anyway there.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Derive the library name from the directory name, and let each
library Makefile only declare the objects that are needed.
This reduces duplicate code for the ar call. While at it, also
pretty-print that call.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
This is something I hadn't previously done, but there are
cases where it's needed, e.g., building 'wlantest' and then
one of the tests/fuzzing/*/ projects, they use a different
configuration (fuzzing vs. not fuzzing).
Perhaps more importantly, this gets rid of the last thing
that was dumped into the source directories, apart from
the binaries themselves.
Note that due to the use of thin archives, this required
building with absolute paths.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Instead of building in the source tree, put most object
files into the build/ folder at the root, and put each
thing that's being built into a separate folder.
This then allows us to build hostapd and wpa_supplicant
(or other combinations) without "make clean" inbetween.
For the tests keep the objects in place for now (and to
do that, add the build rule) so that we don't have to
rewrite all of that with $(call BUILDOBJS,...) which is
just noise there.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
The EAP-TEAP server may skip Phase 2 if the client authentication could
be completed during Phase 1 based on client certificate. Handle this
similarly to the case of PAC use.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
EAP-SIM full authentication starts with one or more SIM/Start rounds, so
reject an unexpected SIM/Challenge round without any preceeding
SIM/Start rounds to avoid unexpected behavior. In practice, an attempt
to start with SIM/Challenge would have resulted in different MK being
derived and the Challenge message getting rejected due to mismatching
AT_MAC unless the misbehaving server has access to valid Kc, so the end
result is identical, but it is cleaner to reject the unexpected message
explicitly to avoid any risk of trying to proceed without NONCE_MT.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Allow any pointer to be used as source for encoding and use char * as
the return value from encoding and input value for decoding to reduce
number of type casts needed in the callers.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
This code block with dependency on PCSC_FUNCS was missed when conf->pin
was moved to conf->cert.pin. Fix this to get rid of compilation issues
with CONFIG_PCSC=y builds.
Fixes: b99c4cadb7 ("EAP peer: Move certificate configuration params into shared struct")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
This is needed to allow clean transition from one inner EAP
authentication method to another one if EAP method negotiation is needed
within Phase 2.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This allows EAP-TLS to be used within an EAP-TEAP tunnel when there is
an explicit request for machine credentials. The network profile
parameters are otherwise same as the Phase 1 parameters, but each one
uses a "machine_" prefix for the parameter name.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
OCSP configuration is applicable to each instance of TLS-based
authentication and as such, the configuration might need to be different
for Phase 1 and Phase 2. Move ocsp into struct eap_peer_cert_config and
add a separate ocsp2 network profile parameter to set this for Phase 2.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
These parameters for certificate authentication are identical for the
Phase 1 (EAP-TLS alone) and Phase 2 (EAP-TLS inside a TLS tunnel).
Furthermore, yet another copy would be needed to support separate
machine credential in Phase 2. Clean this up by moving the shared
parameters into a separate data struct that can then be used for each
need without having to define separate struct members for each use.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Need to leave EAP-TEAP methodState == MAY_CONT when marking decision =
FAIL based on inner EAP method failure since this message will be
followed by protected failure indication.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This allows a separate machine credential to be used for authentication
if the server requests Identity-Type = 2 (machine).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This is an initial step in adding support for configuring separate user
and machine credentials. The new wpa_supplicant network profile
parameters machine_identity and machine_password are similar to the
existing identity and password, but explicitly assigned for the purpose
of machine authentication.
This commit alone does not change actual EAP peer method behavior as
separate commits are needed to determine when there is an explicit
request for machine authentication. Furthermore, this is only addressing
the username/password credential type, i.e., additional changes
following this design approach will be needed for certificate
credentials.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Parse the received Identity-Type TLV and report the used Identity-Type
in response if the request included this TLV. For now, only the
Identity-Type 1 (User) is supported.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Allow 100 rounds of EAP messages if there is data being transmitted.
Keep the old 50 round limit for cases where only short EAP messages are
sent (i.e., the likely case of getting stuck in ACK loop).
This allows larger EAP data (e.g., large certificates) to be exchanged
without breaking the workaround for ACK loop interop issues.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The implementation was previously hardcoded to use only the non-expanded
IETF EAP methods in Phase 2. Extend that to allow vendor EAP methods
with expanded header to be used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The implementation was previously hardcoded to use only the non-expanded
IETF EAP methods in Phase 2. Extend that to allow vendor EAP methods
with expanded header to be used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The implementation was previously hardcoded to allow only the Microsoft
SoH expanded EAP method in Phase 2 in addition to non-expanded EAP
methods. Extend that to allow any vendor EAP method with an expanded
header to be used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The implementation was previously hardcoded to use only the non-expanded
IETF EAP methods in Phase 2. Extend that to allow vendor EAP methods
with expanded header to be used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This cleans up coding style of the EAP implementation by avoiding
typedef of an enum hiding the type of the variables.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
If the Crypto-Binding TLV for the last EAP method has been validated
successfully in a previous message exchange with Intermediate-Result TLV
and no new EAP method has been started, Result TLV can be accepted
without an additional Crypto-Binding TLV. This allows the server to go
through additional message exchanges after inner EAP method, if needed.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Previously, only the Result TLV was added when writing Crypto-Binding
TLV response. This is not sufficient, since RFC 7170 require
Intermediate-Result TLV response to be included from the peer if the
server included Intermediate-Result TLV.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Need to update methodState/decision when completing transmission of
fragmented last Phase 2 message.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
If the EAP-SIM/AKA server does not provide a new pseudonym and the
locally configured "pseudonym" in anonymous_identity is actually an
anonymous identitity instead of a real EAP-SIM/AKA pseudonym, do not
clear the anonymous_identity network profile parameter. This is needed
to avoid forgetting the anonymous identity when going through
EAP-SIM/AKA authentication and then reverting back to using IMSI-based
(e.g., encrypted) identity.
Fixes: 4df4133917 ("EAP-SIM/AKA: Add support for anonymous@realm")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Make the EAP-pwd peer use same default set of allowed groups as the SAE
implementation in wpa_supplicant uses, i.e., the groups 19-21 using NIST
curves P-256, P-384, and P-521. Previously, all groups that were
supported by the crypto library were allowed. In practice, this change
disables use of the Brainpool curves (groups 28-30) with recent OpenSSL
versions.
The default set of groups can be overridden with a new phase1 network
profile parameter, eap_pwd_groups=<list of allowed ranges>. For example,
phase1="eap_pwd_groups=0-65535" would restore previous behavior of
allowing all implemented groups to be used while eap_pwd_groups=19,20
would enable only the groups using NIST curves P-256 and P-384 to be
used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 uses an empty application data record from the
server to indicate end of the exchange, so EAP-TLS peer will need to
check for this special case and finish the exchange with an empty
EAP-TLS (ACK) so that the server can send out EAP-Success.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds support for a new EAP method: EAP-TEAP (Tunnel Extensible
Authentication Protocol). This should be considered experimental since
RFC 7170 has number of conflicting statements and missing details to
allow unambiguous interpretation. As such, there may be interoperability
issues with other implementations and this version should not be
deployed for production purposes until those unclear areas are resolved.
This does not yet support use of NewSessionTicket message to deliver a
new PAC (either in the server or peer implementation). In other words,
only the in-tunnel distribution of PAC-Opaque is supported for now. Use
of the NewSessionTicket mechanism would require TLS library support to
allow arbitrary data to be specified as the contents of the message.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This makes it easier to add new information to the callbacks without
having to modify each callback function type in EAPOL and EAP code every
time.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Jouni Malinen
Alexander Clouter
Jouni Malinen
Hai Shalom
Johannes Berg
Ervin Oro