PKCS #1: Allow only BT=01 for signature in internal TLS
Based on PKCS #1, v1.5, 10.1.3, the block type shall be 01 for a signature. This avoids a potential attack vector for internal TLS/X.509 implementation. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
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1 changed files with 10 additions and 19 deletions
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@ -142,35 +142,26 @@ int pkcs1_decrypt_public_key(struct crypto_rsa_key *key,
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* BT = 00 or 01
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* PS = k-3-||D|| times (00 if BT=00) or (FF if BT=01)
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* k = length of modulus in octets
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*
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* Based on 10.1.3, "The block type shall be 01" for a signature.
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*/
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if (len < 3 + 8 + 16 /* min hash len */ ||
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plain[0] != 0x00 || (plain[1] != 0x00 && plain[1] != 0x01)) {
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plain[0] != 0x00 || plain[1] != 0x01) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "LibTomCrypt: Invalid signature EB "
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"structure");
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return -1;
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}
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pos = plain + 3;
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if (plain[1] == 0x00) {
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/* BT = 00 */
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if (plain[2] != 0x00) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "LibTomCrypt: Invalid signature "
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"PS (BT=00)");
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return -1;
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}
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while (pos + 1 < plain + len && *pos == 0x00 && pos[1] == 0x00)
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pos++;
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} else {
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/* BT = 01 */
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if (plain[2] != 0xff) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "LibTomCrypt: Invalid signature "
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"PS (BT=01)");
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return -1;
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}
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while (pos < plain + len && *pos == 0xff)
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pos++;
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/* BT = 01 */
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if (plain[2] != 0xff) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "LibTomCrypt: Invalid signature "
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"PS (BT=01)");
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return -1;
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}
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while (pos < plain + len && *pos == 0xff)
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pos++;
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if (pos - plain - 2 < 8) {
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/* PKCS #1 v1.5, 8.1: At least eight octets long PS */
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