Reject the initial 4-way handshake if initial GTK setup fails
This makes the AP/Authenticator design more robust against unexpected failures in random number generation. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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1 changed files with 7 additions and 3 deletions
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@ -1841,9 +1841,13 @@ static void wpa_group_ensure_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy = FALSE;
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group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy = FALSE;
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}
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}
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wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth, group);
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if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth, group) < 0 ||
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wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group);
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wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group) < 0 ||
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wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth, group);
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wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth, group) < 0) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPA: GMK/GTK setup failed");
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group->first_sta_seen = FALSE;
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group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy = TRUE;
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}
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}
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}
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