Additional consistentcy checks for PTK component lengths
Verify that TK, KCK, and KEK lengths are set to consistent values within struct wpa_ptk before using them in supplicant. This is an additional layer of protection against unexpected states. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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ec765bc797
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a6ea665300
2 changed files with 26 additions and 6 deletions
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@ -106,6 +106,12 @@ int wpa_eapol_key_mic(const u8 *key, size_t key_len, int akmp, int ver,
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{
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{
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u8 hash[SHA512_MAC_LEN];
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u8 hash[SHA512_MAC_LEN];
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if (key_len == 0) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
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"WPA: KCK not set - cannot calculate MIC");
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return -1;
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}
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switch (ver) {
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switch (ver) {
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#ifndef CONFIG_FIPS
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#ifndef CONFIG_FIPS
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case WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4:
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case WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4:
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@ -726,6 +726,11 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
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alg = wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->pairwise_cipher);
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alg = wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->pairwise_cipher);
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keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->pairwise_cipher);
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keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->pairwise_cipher);
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if (keylen <= 0 || (unsigned int) keylen != sm->ptk.tk_len) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: TK length mismatch: %d != %lu",
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keylen, (long unsigned int) sm->ptk.tk_len);
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return -1;
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}
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rsclen = wpa_cipher_rsc_len(sm->pairwise_cipher);
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rsclen = wpa_cipher_rsc_len(sm->pairwise_cipher);
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if (sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN || sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_OSEN) {
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if (sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN || sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_OSEN) {
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@ -746,6 +751,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
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/* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */
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/* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */
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os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN);
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os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN);
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sm->ptk.tk_len = 0;
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sm->ptk.installed = 1;
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sm->ptk.installed = 1;
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if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) {
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if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) {
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@ -1718,9 +1724,10 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_verify_eapol_key_mic(struct wpa_sm *sm,
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os_memcpy(mic, key + 1, mic_len);
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os_memcpy(mic, key + 1, mic_len);
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if (sm->tptk_set) {
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if (sm->tptk_set) {
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os_memset(key + 1, 0, mic_len);
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os_memset(key + 1, 0, mic_len);
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wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->tptk.kck, sm->tptk.kck_len, sm->key_mgmt,
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if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->tptk.kck, sm->tptk.kck_len,
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ver, buf, len, (u8 *) (key + 1));
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sm->key_mgmt,
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if (os_memcmp_const(mic, key + 1, mic_len) != 0) {
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ver, buf, len, (u8 *) (key + 1)) < 0 ||
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os_memcmp_const(mic, key + 1, mic_len) != 0) {
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wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
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wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
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"WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key MIC "
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"WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key MIC "
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"when using TPTK - ignoring TPTK");
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"when using TPTK - ignoring TPTK");
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@ -1743,9 +1750,10 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_verify_eapol_key_mic(struct wpa_sm *sm,
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if (!ok && sm->ptk_set) {
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if (!ok && sm->ptk_set) {
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os_memset(key + 1, 0, mic_len);
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os_memset(key + 1, 0, mic_len);
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wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->ptk.kck, sm->ptk.kck_len, sm->key_mgmt,
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if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->ptk.kck, sm->ptk.kck_len,
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ver, buf, len, (u8 *) (key + 1));
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sm->key_mgmt,
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if (os_memcmp_const(mic, key + 1, mic_len) != 0) {
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ver, buf, len, (u8 *) (key + 1)) < 0 ||
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os_memcmp_const(mic, key + 1, mic_len) != 0) {
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wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
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wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
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"WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key MIC - "
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"WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key MIC - "
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"dropping packet");
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"dropping packet");
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@ -4123,6 +4131,11 @@ int fils_process_assoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *resp, size_t len)
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alg = wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->pairwise_cipher);
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alg = wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->pairwise_cipher);
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keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->pairwise_cipher);
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keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->pairwise_cipher);
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if (keylen <= 0 || (unsigned int) keylen != sm->ptk.tk_len) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: TK length mismatch: %u != %lu",
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keylen, (long unsigned int) sm->ptk.tk_len);
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goto fail;
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}
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rsclen = wpa_cipher_rsc_len(sm->pairwise_cipher);
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rsclen = wpa_cipher_rsc_len(sm->pairwise_cipher);
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Set TK to driver",
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Set TK to driver",
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sm->ptk.tk, keylen);
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sm->ptk.tk, keylen);
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@ -4139,6 +4152,7 @@ int fils_process_assoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *resp, size_t len)
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* takes care of association frame encryption/decryption. */
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* takes care of association frame encryption/decryption. */
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/* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */
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/* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */
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os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN);
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os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN);
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sm->ptk.tk_len = 0;
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sm->ptk.installed = 1;
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sm->ptk.installed = 1;
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/* FILS HLP Container */
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/* FILS HLP Container */
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