From 9c29d48725fd40a82407a89f193cf009aeef9745 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jouni Malinen Date: Mon, 19 May 2014 23:25:38 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] X.509: Fix internal TLS/X.509 validation of PKCS#1 signature Verify that there is no extra data after the hash field. This is needed to avoid potential attacks using additional data to construct a value that passes the RSA operation and allows the hash value to be forged. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen --- src/tls/x509v3.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/tls/x509v3.c b/src/tls/x509v3.c index a9483cb7f..751a268e1 100644 --- a/src/tls/x509v3.c +++ b/src/tls/x509v3.c @@ -1783,6 +1783,15 @@ skip_digest_oid: return -1; } + if (hdr.payload + hdr.length < data + data_len) { + wpa_hexdump(MSG_INFO, + "X509: Extra data after certificate signature hash", + hdr.payload + hdr.length, + data + data_len - hdr.payload - hdr.length); + os_free(data); + return -1; + } + os_free(data); wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "X509: Certificate Digest matches with "