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WPA: Support deriving KDK based on capabilities (Authenticator)

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Derive the KDK as part of PMK to PTK derivation if forced by
configuration or in case both the local AP and the peer station declare
support for secure LTF.

Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com>
This commit is contained in:
Ilan Peer 2020-12-16 13:01:40 +02:00 committed by Jouni Malinen
parent dccb6cde03
commit 24f0507af4
4 changed files with 34 additions and 15 deletions
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29
src/ap/wpa_auth.c
View file

@ -2278,9 +2278,17 @@ static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *snonce,
struct wpa_ptk *ptk, int force_sha256)
{
const u8 *z = NULL;
size_t z_len = 0;
size_t z_len = 0, kdk_len;
int akmp;
if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.force_kdk_derivation ||
(sm->wpa_auth->conf.secure_ltf &&
sm->rsnxe && sm->rsnxe_len >= 4 &&
sm->rsnxe[3] & BIT(WLAN_RSNX_CAPAB_SECURE_LTF - 8)))
kdk_len = WPA_KDK_MAX_LEN;
else
kdk_len = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
if (sm->ft_completed) {
@ -2293,8 +2301,7 @@ static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *snonce,
ptk, ptk_name,
sm->wpa_key_mgmt,
sm->pairwise,
sm->wpa_auth->conf.kdk ?
WPA_KDK_MAX_LEN : 0);
kdk_len);
}
return wpa_auth_derive_ptk_ft(sm, ptk);
}
@ -2312,8 +2319,7 @@ static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *snonce,
akmp |= WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK_SHA256;
return wpa_pmk_to_ptk(pmk, pmk_len, "Pairwise key expansion",
sm->wpa_auth->addr, sm->addr, sm->ANonce, snonce,
ptk, akmp, sm->pairwise, z, z_len,
sm->wpa_auth->conf.kdk ? WPA_KDK_MAX_LEN : 0);
ptk, akmp, sm->pairwise, z, z_len, kdk_len);
}
@ -2328,14 +2334,21 @@ int fils_auth_pmk_to_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *pmk,
size_t ick_len;
int res;
u8 fils_ft[FILS_FT_MAX_LEN];
size_t fils_ft_len = 0;
size_t fils_ft_len = 0, kdk_len;
if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.force_kdk_derivation ||
(sm->wpa_auth->conf.secure_ltf &&
sm->rsnxe && sm->rsnxe_len >= 4 &&
sm->rsnxe[3] & BIT(WLAN_RSNX_CAPAB_SECURE_LTF - 8)))
kdk_len = WPA_KDK_MAX_LEN;
else
kdk_len = 0;
res = fils_pmk_to_ptk(pmk, pmk_len, sm->addr, sm->wpa_auth->addr,
snonce, anonce, dhss, dhss_len,
&sm->PTK, ick, &ick_len,
sm->wpa_key_mgmt, sm->pairwise,
fils_ft, &fils_ft_len,
sm->wpa_auth->conf.kdk ? WPA_KDK_MAX_LEN : 0);
fils_ft, &fils_ft_len, kdk_len);
if (res < 0)
return res;
sm->PTK_valid = true;

4
src/ap/wpa_auth.h
View file

@ -270,9 +270,9 @@ struct wpa_auth_config {
/*
* If set Key Derivation Key should be derived as part of PMK to
* PTK derivation.
* PTK derivation regardless of advertised capabilities.
*/
bool kdk;
bool force_kdk_derivation;
};
typedef enum {

14
src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
View file

@ -3066,7 +3066,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
const u8 *identity, *radius_cui;
size_t identity_len = 0, radius_cui_len = 0;
int use_sha384;
size_t pmk_r1_len;
size_t pmk_r1_len, kdk_len;
*resp_ies = NULL;
*resp_ies_len = 0;
@ -3196,12 +3196,18 @@ pmk_r1_derived:
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Generated ANonce",
sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.force_kdk_derivation ||
(sm->wpa_auth->conf.secure_ltf &&
sm->rsnxe && sm->rsnxe_len >= 4 &&
sm->rsnxe[3] & BIT(WLAN_RSNX_CAPAB_SECURE_LTF - 8)))
kdk_len = WPA_KDK_MAX_LEN;
else
kdk_len = 0;
if (wpa_pmk_r1_to_ptk(pmk_r1, pmk_r1_len, sm->SNonce, sm->ANonce,
sm->addr, sm->wpa_auth->addr, pmk_r1_name,
&sm->PTK, ptk_name, sm->wpa_key_mgmt,
pairwise,
sm->wpa_auth->conf.kdk ?
WPA_KDK_MAX_LEN : 0) < 0)
pairwise, kdk_len) < 0)
return WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE;
sm->pairwise = pairwise;

2
src/ap/wpa_auth_glue.c
View file

@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ static void hostapd_wpa_auth_conf(struct hostapd_bss_config *conf,
#endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
#ifdef CONFIG_PASN
#ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
wconf->kdk = conf->force_kdk_derivation;
wconf->force_kdk_derivation = conf->force_kdk_derivation;
#endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
#endif /* CONFIG_PASN */
}