hostap/src/crypto/tls_openssl.c

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/*
* SSL/TLS interface functions for OpenSSL
* Copyright (c) 2004-2015, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
*
* This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
* See README for more details.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifndef CONFIG_SMARTCARD
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
#ifndef ANDROID
#define OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
#endif
#endif
#endif
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
#include "common.h"
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
#include "crypto.h"
#include "sha1.h"
#include "sha256.h"
#include "tls.h"
#include "tls_openssl.h"
#if !defined(CONFIG_FIPS) && \
(defined(EAP_FAST) || defined(EAP_FAST_DYNAMIC) || \
defined(EAP_SERVER_FAST))
#define OPENSSL_NEED_EAP_FAST_PRF
#endif
#if defined(EAP_FAST) || defined(EAP_FAST_DYNAMIC) || \
defined(EAP_SERVER_FAST) || defined(EAP_TEAP) || \
defined(EAP_SERVER_TEAP)
#define EAP_FAST_OR_TEAP
#endif
#if defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
/* stack_index_t is the return type of OpenSSL's sk_XXX_num() functions. */
typedef size_t stack_index_t;
#else
typedef int stack_index_t;
#endif
#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_status_type
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
#define HAVE_OCSP
#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
#endif /* SSL_set_tlsext_status_type */
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || \
(defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x20700000L)) && \
!defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION)
/*
* SSL_get_client_random() and SSL_get_server_random() were added in OpenSSL
* 1.1.0 and newer BoringSSL revisions. Provide compatibility wrappers for
* older versions.
*/
static size_t SSL_get_client_random(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *out,
size_t outlen)
{
if (!ssl->s3 || outlen < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
return 0;
os_memcpy(out, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
return SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
}
static size_t SSL_get_server_random(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *out,
size_t outlen)
{
if (!ssl->s3 || outlen < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
return 0;
os_memcpy(out, ssl->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
return SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_NEED_EAP_FAST_PRF
static size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(const SSL_SESSION *session,
unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
{
if (!session || session->master_key_length < 0 ||
(size_t) session->master_key_length > outlen)
return 0;
if ((size_t) session->master_key_length < outlen)
outlen = session->master_key_length;
os_memcpy(out, session->master_key, outlen);
return outlen;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NEED_EAP_FAST_PRF */
#endif
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || \
(defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x20700000L)
#ifdef CONFIG_SUITEB
static int RSA_bits(const RSA *r)
{
return BN_num_bits(r->n);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SUITEB */
static const unsigned char * ASN1_STRING_get0_data(const ASN1_STRING *x)
{
return ASN1_STRING_data((ASN1_STRING *) x);
}
#endif
#ifdef ANDROID
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <keystore/keystore_get.h>
static BIO * BIO_from_keystore(const char *key)
{
BIO *bio = NULL;
uint8_t *value = NULL;
int length = keystore_get(key, strlen(key), &value);
if (length != -1 && (bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) != NULL)
BIO_write(bio, value, length);
free(value);
return bio;
}
static int tls_add_ca_from_keystore(X509_STORE *ctx, const char *key_alias)
{
BIO *bio = BIO_from_keystore(key_alias);
STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *stack = NULL;
stack_index_t i;
if (bio) {
stack = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
BIO_free(bio);
}
if (!stack) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TLS: Failed to parse certificate: %s",
key_alias);
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_INFO_num(stack); ++i) {
X509_INFO *info = sk_X509_INFO_value(stack, i);
if (info->x509)
X509_STORE_add_cert(ctx, info->x509);
if (info->crl)
X509_STORE_add_crl(ctx, info->crl);
}
sk_X509_INFO_pop_free(stack, X509_INFO_free);
return 0;
}
static int tls_add_ca_from_keystore_encoded(X509_STORE *ctx,
const char *encoded_key_alias)
{
int rc = -1;
int len = os_strlen(encoded_key_alias);
unsigned char *decoded_alias;
if (len & 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "Invalid hex-encoded alias: %s",
encoded_key_alias);
return rc;
}
decoded_alias = os_malloc(len / 2 + 1);
if (decoded_alias) {
if (!hexstr2bin(encoded_key_alias, decoded_alias, len / 2)) {
decoded_alias[len / 2] = '\0';
rc = tls_add_ca_from_keystore(
ctx, (const char *) decoded_alias);
}
os_free(decoded_alias);
}
return rc;
}
#endif /* ANDROID */
static int tls_openssl_ref_count = 0;
static int tls_ex_idx_session = -1;
struct tls_context {
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
void (*event_cb)(void *ctx, enum tls_event ev,
union tls_event_data *data);
void *cb_ctx;
int cert_in_cb;
char *ocsp_stapling_response;
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
};
static struct tls_context *tls_global = NULL;
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
struct tls_data {
SSL_CTX *ssl;
unsigned int tls_session_lifetime;
int check_crl;
int check_crl_strict;
char *ca_cert;
unsigned int crl_reload_interval;
struct os_reltime crl_last_reload;
char *check_cert_subject;
};
struct tls_connection {
struct tls_context *context;
struct tls_data *data;
SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx;
SSL *ssl;
BIO *ssl_in, *ssl_out;
#if defined(ANDROID) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE)
ENGINE *engine; /* functional reference to the engine */
EVP_PKEY *private_key; /* the private key if using engine */
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE */
char *subject_match, *altsubject_match, *suffix_match, *domain_match;
char *check_cert_subject;
int read_alerts, write_alerts, failed;
tls_session_ticket_cb session_ticket_cb;
void *session_ticket_cb_ctx;
/* SessionTicket received from OpenSSL hello_extension_cb (server) */
u8 *session_ticket;
size_t session_ticket_len;
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
2010-04-11 11:27:13 +02:00
unsigned int ca_cert_verify:1;
unsigned int cert_probe:1;
unsigned int server_cert_only:1;
unsigned int invalid_hb_used:1;
unsigned int success_data:1;
unsigned int client_hello_generated:1;
unsigned int server:1;
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
u8 srv_cert_hash[32];
unsigned int flags;
X509 *peer_cert;
X509 *peer_issuer;
X509 *peer_issuer_issuer;
char *peer_subject; /* peer subject info for authenticated peer */
unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
unsigned char server_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
u16 cipher_suite;
int server_dh_prime_len;
};
static struct tls_context * tls_context_new(const struct tls_config *conf)
{
struct tls_context *context = os_zalloc(sizeof(*context));
if (context == NULL)
return NULL;
if (conf) {
context->event_cb = conf->event_cb;
context->cb_ctx = conf->cb_ctx;
context->cert_in_cb = conf->cert_in_cb;
}
return context;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG
static void _tls_show_errors(void)
{
unsigned long err;
while ((err = ERR_get_error())) {
/* Just ignore the errors, since stdout is disabled */
}
}
#define tls_show_errors(l, f, t) _tls_show_errors()
#else /* CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG */
static void tls_show_errors(int level, const char *func, const char *txt)
{
unsigned long err;
wpa_printf(level, "OpenSSL: %s - %s %s",
func, txt, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
while ((err = ERR_get_error())) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "OpenSSL: pending error: %s",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
}
}
#endif /* CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG */
static X509_STORE * tls_crl_cert_reload(const char *ca_cert, int check_crl)
{
int flags;
X509_STORE *store;
store = X509_STORE_new();
if (!store) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"OpenSSL: %s - failed to allocate new certificate store",
__func__);
return NULL;
}
if (ca_cert && X509_STORE_load_locations(store, ca_cert, NULL) != 1) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_WARNING, __func__,
"Failed to load root certificates");
X509_STORE_free(store);
return NULL;
}
flags = check_crl ? X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK : 0;
if (check_crl == 2)
flags |= X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL;
X509_STORE_set_flags(store, flags);
return store;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_NATIVE_WINDOWS
/* Windows CryptoAPI and access to certificate stores */
#include <wincrypt.h>
#ifdef __MINGW32_VERSION
/*
* MinGW does not yet include all the needed definitions for CryptoAPI, so
* define here whatever extra is needed.
*/
#define CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_CURRENT_USER (1 << 16)
#define CERT_STORE_READONLY_FLAG 0x00008000
#define CERT_STORE_OPEN_EXISTING_FLAG 0x00004000
#endif /* __MINGW32_VERSION */
struct cryptoapi_rsa_data {
const CERT_CONTEXT *cert;
HCRYPTPROV crypt_prov;
DWORD key_spec;
BOOL free_crypt_prov;
};
static void cryptoapi_error(const char *msg)
{
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "CryptoAPI: %s; err=%u",
msg, (unsigned int) GetLastError());
}
static int cryptoapi_rsa_pub_enc(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s - not implemented", __func__);
return 0;
}
static int cryptoapi_rsa_pub_dec(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s - not implemented", __func__);
return 0;
}
static int cryptoapi_rsa_priv_enc(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
struct cryptoapi_rsa_data *priv =
(struct cryptoapi_rsa_data *) rsa->meth->app_data;
HCRYPTHASH hash;
DWORD hash_size, len, i;
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
int ret = 0;
if (priv == NULL) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,
ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,
RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
return 0;
}
if (flen != 16 /* MD5 */ + 20 /* SHA-1 */) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "%s - only MD5-SHA1 hash supported",
__func__);
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,
RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
if (!CryptCreateHash(priv->crypt_prov, CALG_SSL3_SHAMD5, 0, 0, &hash))
{
cryptoapi_error("CryptCreateHash failed");
return 0;
}
len = sizeof(hash_size);
if (!CryptGetHashParam(hash, HP_HASHSIZE, (BYTE *) &hash_size, &len,
0)) {
cryptoapi_error("CryptGetHashParam failed");
goto err;
}
if ((int) hash_size != flen) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "CryptoAPI: Invalid hash size (%u != %d)",
(unsigned) hash_size, flen);
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,
RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
if (!CryptSetHashParam(hash, HP_HASHVAL, (BYTE * ) from, 0)) {
cryptoapi_error("CryptSetHashParam failed");
goto err;
}
len = RSA_size(rsa);
buf = os_malloc(len);
if (buf == NULL) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!CryptSignHash(hash, priv->key_spec, NULL, 0, buf, &len)) {
cryptoapi_error("CryptSignHash failed");
goto err;
}
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
to[i] = buf[len - i - 1];
ret = len;
err:
os_free(buf);
CryptDestroyHash(hash);
return ret;
}
static int cryptoapi_rsa_priv_dec(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s - not implemented", __func__);
return 0;
}
static void cryptoapi_free_data(struct cryptoapi_rsa_data *priv)
{
if (priv == NULL)
return;
if (priv->crypt_prov && priv->free_crypt_prov)
CryptReleaseContext(priv->crypt_prov, 0);
if (priv->cert)
CertFreeCertificateContext(priv->cert);
os_free(priv);
}
static int cryptoapi_finish(RSA *rsa)
{
cryptoapi_free_data((struct cryptoapi_rsa_data *) rsa->meth->app_data);
os_free((void *) rsa->meth);
rsa->meth = NULL;
return 1;
}
static const CERT_CONTEXT * cryptoapi_find_cert(const char *name, DWORD store)
{
HCERTSTORE cs;
const CERT_CONTEXT *ret = NULL;
cs = CertOpenStore((LPCSTR) CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM, 0, 0,
store | CERT_STORE_OPEN_EXISTING_FLAG |
CERT_STORE_READONLY_FLAG, L"MY");
if (cs == NULL) {
cryptoapi_error("Failed to open 'My system store'");
return NULL;
}
if (strncmp(name, "cert://", 7) == 0) {
unsigned short wbuf[255];
MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, name + 7, -1, wbuf, 255);
ret = CertFindCertificateInStore(cs, X509_ASN_ENCODING |
PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING,
0, CERT_FIND_SUBJECT_STR,
wbuf, NULL);
} else if (strncmp(name, "hash://", 7) == 0) {
CRYPT_HASH_BLOB blob;
int len;
const char *hash = name + 7;
unsigned char *buf;
len = os_strlen(hash) / 2;
buf = os_malloc(len);
if (buf && hexstr2bin(hash, buf, len) == 0) {
blob.cbData = len;
blob.pbData = buf;
ret = CertFindCertificateInStore(cs,
X509_ASN_ENCODING |
PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING,
0, CERT_FIND_HASH,
&blob, NULL);
}
os_free(buf);
}
CertCloseStore(cs, 0);
return ret;
}
static int tls_cryptoapi_cert(SSL *ssl, const char *name)
{
X509 *cert = NULL;
RSA *rsa = NULL, *pub_rsa;
struct cryptoapi_rsa_data *priv;
RSA_METHOD *rsa_meth;
if (name == NULL ||
(strncmp(name, "cert://", 7) != 0 &&
strncmp(name, "hash://", 7) != 0))
return -1;
priv = os_zalloc(sizeof(*priv));
rsa_meth = os_zalloc(sizeof(*rsa_meth));
if (priv == NULL || rsa_meth == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "CryptoAPI: Failed to allocate memory "
"for CryptoAPI RSA method");
os_free(priv);
os_free(rsa_meth);
return -1;
}
priv->cert = cryptoapi_find_cert(name, CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_CURRENT_USER);
if (priv->cert == NULL) {
priv->cert = cryptoapi_find_cert(
name, CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE);
}
if (priv->cert == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "CryptoAPI: Could not find certificate "
"'%s'", name);
goto err;
}
cert = d2i_X509(NULL,
(const unsigned char **) &priv->cert->pbCertEncoded,
priv->cert->cbCertEncoded);
if (cert == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "CryptoAPI: Could not process X509 DER "
"encoding");
goto err;
}
if (!CryptAcquireCertificatePrivateKey(priv->cert,
CRYPT_ACQUIRE_COMPARE_KEY_FLAG,
NULL, &priv->crypt_prov,
&priv->key_spec,
&priv->free_crypt_prov)) {
cryptoapi_error("Failed to acquire a private key for the "
"certificate");
goto err;
}
rsa_meth->name = "Microsoft CryptoAPI RSA Method";
rsa_meth->rsa_pub_enc = cryptoapi_rsa_pub_enc;
rsa_meth->rsa_pub_dec = cryptoapi_rsa_pub_dec;
rsa_meth->rsa_priv_enc = cryptoapi_rsa_priv_enc;
rsa_meth->rsa_priv_dec = cryptoapi_rsa_priv_dec;
rsa_meth->finish = cryptoapi_finish;
rsa_meth->flags = RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK;
rsa_meth->app_data = (char *) priv;
rsa = RSA_new();
if (rsa == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl, cert)) {
RSA_free(rsa);
rsa = NULL;
goto err;
}
pub_rsa = cert->cert_info->key->pkey->pkey.rsa;
X509_free(cert);
cert = NULL;
rsa->n = BN_dup(pub_rsa->n);
rsa->e = BN_dup(pub_rsa->e);
if (!RSA_set_method(rsa, rsa_meth))
goto err;
if (!SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(ssl, rsa))
goto err;
RSA_free(rsa);
return 0;
err:
if (cert)
X509_free(cert);
if (rsa)
RSA_free(rsa);
else {
os_free(rsa_meth);
cryptoapi_free_data(priv);
}
return -1;
}
static int tls_cryptoapi_ca_cert(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx, SSL *ssl, const char *name)
{
HCERTSTORE cs;
PCCERT_CONTEXT ctx = NULL;
X509 *cert;
char buf[128];
const char *store;
#ifdef UNICODE
WCHAR *wstore;
#endif /* UNICODE */
if (name == NULL || strncmp(name, "cert_store://", 13) != 0)
return -1;
store = name + 13;
#ifdef UNICODE
wstore = os_malloc((os_strlen(store) + 1) * sizeof(WCHAR));
if (wstore == NULL)
return -1;
wsprintf(wstore, L"%S", store);
cs = CertOpenSystemStore(0, wstore);
os_free(wstore);
#else /* UNICODE */
cs = CertOpenSystemStore(0, store);
#endif /* UNICODE */
if (cs == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: failed to open system cert store "
"'%s': error=%d", __func__, store,
(int) GetLastError());
return -1;
}
while ((ctx = CertEnumCertificatesInStore(cs, ctx))) {
cert = d2i_X509(NULL,
(const unsigned char **) &ctx->pbCertEncoded,
ctx->cbCertEncoded);
if (cert == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "CryptoAPI: Could not process "
"X509 DER encoding for CA cert");
continue;
}
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), buf,
sizeof(buf));
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: Loaded CA certificate for "
"system certificate store: subject='%s'", buf);
if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ssl_ctx),
cert)) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_WARNING, __func__,
"Failed to add ca_cert to OpenSSL "
"certificate store");
}
X509_free(cert);
}
if (!CertCloseStore(cs, 0)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: failed to close system cert store "
"'%s': error=%d", __func__, name + 13,
(int) GetLastError());
}
return 0;
}
#else /* CONFIG_NATIVE_WINDOWS */
static int tls_cryptoapi_cert(SSL *ssl, const char *name)
{
return -1;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_NATIVE_WINDOWS */
static void ssl_info_cb(const SSL *ssl, int where, int ret)
{
const char *str;
int w;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SSL: (where=0x%x ret=0x%x)", where, ret);
w = where & ~SSL_ST_MASK;
if (w & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
str = "SSL_connect";
else if (w & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
str = "SSL_accept";
else
str = "undefined";
if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SSL: %s:%s",
str, SSL_state_string_long(ssl));
} else if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT) {
struct tls_connection *conn = SSL_get_app_data((SSL *) ssl);
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "SSL: SSL3 alert: %s:%s:%s",
where & SSL_CB_READ ?
"read (remote end reported an error)" :
"write (local SSL3 detected an error)",
SSL_alert_type_string_long(ret),
SSL_alert_desc_string_long(ret));
if ((ret >> 8) == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
if (where & SSL_CB_READ)
conn->read_alerts++;
else
conn->write_alerts++;
}
if (conn->context->event_cb != NULL) {
union tls_event_data ev;
struct tls_context *context = conn->context;
os_memset(&ev, 0, sizeof(ev));
ev.alert.is_local = !(where & SSL_CB_READ);
ev.alert.type = SSL_alert_type_string_long(ret);
ev.alert.description = SSL_alert_desc_string_long(ret);
context->event_cb(context->cb_ctx, TLS_ALERT, &ev);
}
} else if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT && ret <= 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SSL: %s:%s in %s",
str, ret == 0 ? "failed" : "error",
SSL_state_string_long(ssl));
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
/**
* tls_engine_load_dynamic_generic - load any openssl engine
* @pre: an array of commands and values that load an engine initialized
* in the engine specific function
* @post: an array of commands and values that initialize an already loaded
* engine (or %NULL if not required)
* @id: the engine id of the engine to load (only required if post is not %NULL
*
* This function is a generic function that loads any openssl engine.
*
* Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure
*/
static int tls_engine_load_dynamic_generic(const char *pre[],
const char *post[], const char *id)
{
ENGINE *engine;
const char *dynamic_id = "dynamic";
engine = ENGINE_by_id(id);
if (engine) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "ENGINE: engine '%s' is already "
"available", id);
/*
* If it was auto-loaded by ENGINE_by_id() we might still
* need to tell it which PKCS#11 module to use in legacy
* (non-p11-kit) environments. Do so now; even if it was
* properly initialised before, setting it again will be
* harmless.
*/
goto found;
}
ERR_clear_error();
engine = ENGINE_by_id(dynamic_id);
if (engine == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "ENGINE: Can't find engine %s [%s]",
dynamic_id,
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
return -1;
}
/* Perform the pre commands. This will load the engine. */
while (pre && pre[0]) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "ENGINE: '%s' '%s'", pre[0], pre[1]);
if (ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(engine, pre[0], pre[1], 0) == 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "ENGINE: ctrl cmd_string failed: "
"%s %s [%s]", pre[0], pre[1],
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
ENGINE_free(engine);
return -1;
}
pre += 2;
}
/*
* Free the reference to the "dynamic" engine. The loaded engine can
* now be looked up using ENGINE_by_id().
*/
ENGINE_free(engine);
engine = ENGINE_by_id(id);
if (engine == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "ENGINE: Can't find engine %s [%s]",
id, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
return -1;
}
found:
while (post && post[0]) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "ENGINE: '%s' '%s'", post[0], post[1]);
if (ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(engine, post[0], post[1], 0) == 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "ENGINE: ctrl cmd_string failed:"
" %s %s [%s]", post[0], post[1],
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
ENGINE_remove(engine);
ENGINE_free(engine);
return -1;
}
post += 2;
}
ENGINE_free(engine);
return 0;
}
/**
* tls_engine_load_dynamic_pkcs11 - load the pkcs11 engine provided by opensc
* @pkcs11_so_path: pksc11_so_path from the configuration
* @pcks11_module_path: pkcs11_module_path from the configuration
*/
static int tls_engine_load_dynamic_pkcs11(const char *pkcs11_so_path,
const char *pkcs11_module_path)
{
char *engine_id = "pkcs11";
const char *pre_cmd[] = {
"SO_PATH", NULL /* pkcs11_so_path */,
"ID", NULL /* engine_id */,
"LIST_ADD", "1",
/* "NO_VCHECK", "1", */
"LOAD", NULL,
NULL, NULL
};
const char *post_cmd[] = {
"MODULE_PATH", NULL /* pkcs11_module_path */,
NULL, NULL
};
if (!pkcs11_so_path)
return 0;
pre_cmd[1] = pkcs11_so_path;
pre_cmd[3] = engine_id;
if (pkcs11_module_path)
post_cmd[1] = pkcs11_module_path;
else
post_cmd[0] = NULL;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "ENGINE: Loading pkcs11 Engine from %s",
pkcs11_so_path);
return tls_engine_load_dynamic_generic(pre_cmd, post_cmd, engine_id);
}
/**
* tls_engine_load_dynamic_opensc - load the opensc engine provided by opensc
* @opensc_so_path: opensc_so_path from the configuration
*/
static int tls_engine_load_dynamic_opensc(const char *opensc_so_path)
{
char *engine_id = "opensc";
const char *pre_cmd[] = {
"SO_PATH", NULL /* opensc_so_path */,
"ID", NULL /* engine_id */,
"LIST_ADD", "1",
"LOAD", NULL,
NULL, NULL
};
if (!opensc_so_path)
return 0;
pre_cmd[1] = opensc_so_path;
pre_cmd[3] = engine_id;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "ENGINE: Loading OpenSC Engine from %s",
opensc_so_path);
return tls_engine_load_dynamic_generic(pre_cmd, NULL, engine_id);
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE */
static void remove_session_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess)
{
struct wpabuf *buf;
if (tls_ex_idx_session < 0)
return;
buf = SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(sess, tls_ex_idx_session);
if (!buf)
return;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"OpenSSL: Free application session data %p (sess %p)",
buf, sess);
wpabuf_free(buf);
SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(sess, tls_ex_idx_session, NULL);
}
void * tls_init(const struct tls_config *conf)
{
struct tls_data *data;
SSL_CTX *ssl;
struct tls_context *context;
const char *ciphers;
if (tls_openssl_ref_count == 0) {
tls_global = context = tls_context_new(conf);
if (context == NULL)
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
return NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_FIPS
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (conf && conf->fips_mode) {
static int fips_enabled = 0;
if (!fips_enabled && !FIPS_mode_set(1)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Failed to enable FIPS "
"mode");
ERR_load_crypto_strings();
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
os_free(tls_global);
tls_global = NULL;
return NULL;
} else {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Running in FIPS mode");
fips_enabled = 1;
}
}
#else /* OPENSSL_FIPS */
if (conf && conf->fips_mode) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "FIPS mode requested, but not "
"supported");
os_free(tls_global);
tls_global = NULL;
return NULL;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_FIPS */
#endif /* CONFIG_FIPS */
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || \
(defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x20700000L)
SSL_load_error_strings();
SSL_library_init();
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256());
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 */
/* TODO: if /dev/urandom is available, PRNG is seeded
* automatically. If this is not the case, random data should
* be added here. */
#ifdef PKCS12_FUNCS
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
/*
* 40-bit RC2 is commonly used in PKCS#12 files, so enable it.
* This is enabled by PKCS12_PBE_add() in OpenSSL 0.9.8
* versions, but it looks like OpenSSL 1.0.0 does not do that
* anymore.
*/
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_40_cbc());
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RC2 */
PKCS12_PBE_add();
#endif /* PKCS12_FUNCS */
#endif /* < 1.1.0 */
} else {
context = tls_context_new(conf);
if (context == NULL)
return NULL;
}
tls_openssl_ref_count++;
data = os_zalloc(sizeof(*data));
if (data)
ssl = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method());
else
ssl = NULL;
if (ssl == NULL) {
tls_openssl_ref_count--;
if (context != tls_global)
os_free(context);
if (tls_openssl_ref_count == 0) {
os_free(tls_global);
tls_global = NULL;
}
os_free(data);
return NULL;
}
data->ssl = ssl;
if (conf) {
data->tls_session_lifetime = conf->tls_session_lifetime;
data->crl_reload_interval = conf->crl_reload_interval;
}
SSL_CTX_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
SSL_CTX_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3);
SSL_CTX_set_mode(ssl, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);
#ifdef SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN
/* Number of deployed use cases assume the default OpenSSL behavior of
* auto chaining the local certificate is in use. BoringSSL removed this
* functionality by default, so we need to restore it here to avoid
* breaking existing use cases. */
SSL_CTX_clear_mode(ssl, SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN);
#endif /* SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN */
SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ssl, ssl_info_cb);
SSL_CTX_set_app_data(ssl, context);
if (data->tls_session_lifetime > 0) {
SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(ssl, 1);
/*
* Set default context here. In practice, this will be replaced
* by the per-EAP method context in tls_connection_set_verify().
*/
SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ssl, (u8 *) "hostapd", 7);
SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ssl, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
SSL_CTX_set_timeout(ssl, data->tls_session_lifetime);
SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(ssl, remove_session_cb);
} else {
SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ssl, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
}
if (tls_ex_idx_session < 0) {
tls_ex_idx_session = SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(
0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (tls_ex_idx_session < 0) {
tls_deinit(data);
return NULL;
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "ENGINE: Loading builtin engines");
ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
if (conf &&
(conf->opensc_engine_path || conf->pkcs11_engine_path ||
conf->pkcs11_module_path)) {
if (tls_engine_load_dynamic_opensc(conf->opensc_engine_path) ||
tls_engine_load_dynamic_pkcs11(conf->pkcs11_engine_path,
conf->pkcs11_module_path)) {
tls_deinit(data);
return NULL;
}
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE */
if (conf && conf->openssl_ciphers)
ciphers = conf->openssl_ciphers;
else
ciphers = TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERS;
if (SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ssl, ciphers) != 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
"OpenSSL: Failed to set cipher string '%s'",
ciphers);
tls_deinit(data);
return NULL;
}
return data;
}
void tls_deinit(void *ssl_ctx)
{
struct tls_data *data = ssl_ctx;
SSL_CTX *ssl = data->ssl;
struct tls_context *context = SSL_CTX_get_app_data(ssl);
if (context != tls_global)
os_free(context);
if (data->tls_session_lifetime > 0)
SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ssl, 0);
os_free(data->ca_cert);
SSL_CTX_free(ssl);
tls_openssl_ref_count--;
if (tls_openssl_ref_count == 0) {
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || \
(defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x20700000L)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
ENGINE_cleanup();
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE */
CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
ERR_free_strings();
EVP_cleanup();
#endif /* < 1.1.0 */
os_free(tls_global->ocsp_stapling_response);
tls_global->ocsp_stapling_response = NULL;
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
os_free(tls_global);
tls_global = NULL;
}
os_free(data->check_cert_subject);
os_free(data);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
/* Cryptoki return values */
#define CKR_PIN_INCORRECT 0x000000a0
#define CKR_PIN_INVALID 0x000000a1
#define CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE 0x000000a2
/* libp11 */
#define ERR_LIB_PKCS11 ERR_LIB_USER
static int tls_is_pin_error(unsigned int err)
{
return ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_PKCS11 &&
(ERR_GET_REASON(err) == CKR_PIN_INCORRECT ||
ERR_GET_REASON(err) == CKR_PIN_INVALID ||
ERR_GET_REASON(err) == CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE);
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE */
#ifdef ANDROID
/* EVP_PKEY_from_keystore comes from system/security/keystore-engine. */
EVP_PKEY * EVP_PKEY_from_keystore(const char *key_id);
#endif /* ANDROID */
static int tls_engine_init(struct tls_connection *conn, const char *engine_id,
const char *pin, const char *key_id,
const char *cert_id, const char *ca_cert_id)
{
#if defined(ANDROID) && defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE)
#error "This code depends on OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE being defined by BoringSSL."
#endif
if (!key_id)
return TLS_SET_PARAMS_ENGINE_PRV_INIT_FAILED;
conn->engine = NULL;
conn->private_key = EVP_PKEY_from_keystore(key_id);
if (!conn->private_key) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
"ENGINE: cannot load private key with id '%s' [%s]",
key_id,
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
return TLS_SET_PARAMS_ENGINE_PRV_INIT_FAILED;
}
#endif /* ANDROID && OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
int ret = -1;
if (engine_id == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "ENGINE: Engine ID not set");
return -1;
}
ERR_clear_error();
#ifdef ANDROID
ENGINE_load_dynamic();
#endif
conn->engine = ENGINE_by_id(engine_id);
if (!conn->engine) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "ENGINE: engine %s not available [%s]",
engine_id, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
goto err;
}
if (ENGINE_init(conn->engine) != 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "ENGINE: engine init failed "
"(engine: %s) [%s]", engine_id,
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
goto err;
}
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "ENGINE: engine initialized");
#ifndef ANDROID
if (pin && ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(conn->engine, "PIN", pin, 0) == 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "ENGINE: cannot set pin [%s]",
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
goto err;
}
#endif
if (key_id) {
/*
* Ensure that the ENGINE does not attempt to use the OpenSSL
* UI system to obtain a PIN, if we didn't provide one.
*/
struct {
const void *password;
const char *prompt_info;
} key_cb = { "", NULL };
/* load private key first in-case PIN is required for cert */
conn->private_key = ENGINE_load_private_key(conn->engine,
key_id, NULL,
&key_cb);
if (!conn->private_key) {
unsigned long err = ERR_get_error();
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
"ENGINE: cannot load private key with id '%s' [%s]",
key_id,
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
if (tls_is_pin_error(err))
ret = TLS_SET_PARAMS_ENGINE_PRV_BAD_PIN;
else
ret = TLS_SET_PARAMS_ENGINE_PRV_INIT_FAILED;
goto err;
}
}
/* handle a certificate and/or CA certificate */
if (cert_id || ca_cert_id) {
const char *cmd_name = "LOAD_CERT_CTRL";
/* test if the engine supports a LOAD_CERT_CTRL */
if (!ENGINE_ctrl(conn->engine, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME,
0, (void *)cmd_name, NULL)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "ENGINE: engine does not support"
" loading certificates");
ret = TLS_SET_PARAMS_ENGINE_PRV_INIT_FAILED;
goto err;
}
}
return 0;
err:
if (conn->engine) {
ENGINE_free(conn->engine);
conn->engine = NULL;
}
if (conn->private_key) {
EVP_PKEY_free(conn->private_key);
conn->private_key = NULL;
}
return ret;
#else /* OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE */
return 0;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE */
}
static void tls_engine_deinit(struct tls_connection *conn)
{
#if defined(ANDROID) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE)
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "ENGINE: engine deinit");
if (conn->private_key) {
EVP_PKEY_free(conn->private_key);
conn->private_key = NULL;
}
if (conn->engine) {
#if !defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
ENGINE_finish(conn->engine);
#endif /* !OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
conn->engine = NULL;
}
#endif /* ANDROID || !OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE */
}
int tls_get_errors(void *ssl_ctx)
{
int count = 0;
unsigned long err;
while ((err = ERR_get_error())) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TLS - SSL error: %s",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
count++;
}
return count;
}
static const char * openssl_content_type(int content_type)
{
switch (content_type) {
case 20:
return "change cipher spec";
case 21:
return "alert";
case 22:
return "handshake";
case 23:
return "application data";
case 24:
return "heartbeat";
case 256:
return "TLS header info"; /* pseudo content type */
case 257:
return "inner content type"; /* pseudo content type */
default:
return "?";
}
}
static const char * openssl_handshake_type(int content_type, const u8 *buf,
size_t len)
{
if (content_type == 257 && buf && len == 1)
return openssl_content_type(buf[0]);
if (content_type != 22 || !buf || len == 0)
return "";
switch (buf[0]) {
case 0:
return "hello request";
case 1:
return "client hello";
case 2:
return "server hello";
case 3:
return "hello verify request";
case 4:
return "new session ticket";
case 5:
return "end of early data";
case 6:
return "hello retry request";
case 8:
return "encrypted extensions";
case 11:
return "certificate";
case 12:
return "server key exchange";
case 13:
return "certificate request";
case 14:
return "server hello done";
case 15:
return "certificate verify";
case 16:
return "client key exchange";
case 20:
return "finished";
case 21:
return "certificate url";
case 22:
return "certificate status";
case 23:
return "supplemental data";
case 24:
return "key update";
case 254:
return "message hash";
default:
return "?";
}
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SUITEB
static void check_server_hello(struct tls_connection *conn,
const u8 *pos, const u8 *end)
{
size_t payload_len, id_len;
/*
* Parse ServerHello to get the selected cipher suite since OpenSSL does
* not make it cleanly available during handshake and we need to know
* whether DHE was selected.
*/
if (end - pos < 3)
return;
payload_len = WPA_GET_BE24(pos);
pos += 3;
if ((size_t) (end - pos) < payload_len)
return;
end = pos + payload_len;
/* Skip Version and Random */
if (end - pos < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
return;
pos += 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/* Skip Session ID */
if (end - pos < 1)
return;
id_len = *pos++;
if ((size_t) (end - pos) < id_len)
return;
pos += id_len;
if (end - pos < 2)
return;
conn->cipher_suite = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: Server selected cipher suite 0x%x",
conn->cipher_suite);
}
static void check_server_key_exchange(SSL *ssl, struct tls_connection *conn,
const u8 *pos, const u8 *end)
{
size_t payload_len;
u16 dh_len;
BIGNUM *p;
int bits;
if (!(conn->flags & TLS_CONN_SUITEB))
return;
/* DHE is enabled only with DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 */
if (conn->cipher_suite != 0x9f)
return;
if (end - pos < 3)
return;
payload_len = WPA_GET_BE24(pos);
pos += 3;
if ((size_t) (end - pos) < payload_len)
return;
end = pos + payload_len;
if (end - pos < 2)
return;
dh_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
pos += 2;
if ((size_t) (end - pos) < dh_len)
return;
p = BN_bin2bn(pos, dh_len, NULL);
if (!p)
return;
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
BN_free(p);
conn->server_dh_prime_len = bits;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: Server DH prime length: %d bits",
conn->server_dh_prime_len);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SUITEB */
static void tls_msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type,
const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)
{
struct tls_connection *conn = arg;
const u8 *pos = buf;
if (write_p == 2) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"OpenSSL: session ver=0x%x content_type=%d",
version, content_type);
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "OpenSSL: Data", buf, len);
return;
}
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: %s ver=0x%x content_type=%d (%s/%s)",
write_p ? "TX" : "RX", version, content_type,
openssl_content_type(content_type),
openssl_handshake_type(content_type, buf, len));
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "OpenSSL: Message", buf, len);
if (content_type == 24 && len >= 3 && pos[0] == 1) {
size_t payload_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos + 1);
if (payload_len + 3 > len) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "OpenSSL: Heartbeat attack detected");
conn->invalid_hb_used = 1;
}
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SUITEB
/*
* Need to parse these handshake messages to be able to check DH prime
* length since OpenSSL does not expose the new cipher suite and DH
* parameters during handshake (e.g., for cert_cb() callback).
*/
if (content_type == 22 && pos && len > 0 && pos[0] == 2)
check_server_hello(conn, pos + 1, pos + len);
if (content_type == 22 && pos && len > 0 && pos[0] == 12)
check_server_key_exchange(ssl, conn, pos + 1, pos + len);
#endif /* CONFIG_SUITEB */
}
struct tls_connection * tls_connection_init(void *ssl_ctx)
{
struct tls_data *data = ssl_ctx;
SSL_CTX *ssl = data->ssl;
struct tls_connection *conn;
long options;
X509_STORE *new_cert_store;
struct os_reltime now;
struct tls_context *context = SSL_CTX_get_app_data(ssl);
/* Replace X509 store if it is time to update CRL. */
if (data->crl_reload_interval > 0 && os_get_reltime(&now) == 0 &&
os_reltime_expired(&now, &data->crl_last_reload,
data->crl_reload_interval)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"OpenSSL: Flushing X509 store with ca_cert file");
new_cert_store = tls_crl_cert_reload(data->ca_cert,
data->check_crl);
if (!new_cert_store) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
"OpenSSL: Error replacing X509 store with ca_cert file");
} else {
/* Replace old store */
SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(ssl, new_cert_store);
data->crl_last_reload = now;
}
}
conn = os_zalloc(sizeof(*conn));
if (conn == NULL)
return NULL;
conn->data = data;
conn->ssl_ctx = ssl;
conn->ssl = SSL_new(ssl);
if (conn->ssl == NULL) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
"Failed to initialize new SSL connection");
os_free(conn);
return NULL;
}
conn->context = context;
SSL_set_app_data(conn->ssl, conn);
SSL_set_msg_callback(conn->ssl, tls_msg_cb);
SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(conn->ssl, conn);
options = SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 |
SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE;
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
options |= SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION;
#endif /* SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION */
SSL_set_options(conn->ssl, options);
#ifdef SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
/* Hopefully there is no need for middlebox compatibility mechanisms
* when going through EAP authentication. */
SSL_clear_options(conn->ssl, SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT);
#endif
conn->ssl_in = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if (!conn->ssl_in) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
"Failed to create a new BIO for ssl_in");
SSL_free(conn->ssl);
os_free(conn);
return NULL;
}
conn->ssl_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if (!conn->ssl_out) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
"Failed to create a new BIO for ssl_out");
SSL_free(conn->ssl);
BIO_free(conn->ssl_in);
os_free(conn);
return NULL;
}
SSL_set_bio(conn->ssl, conn->ssl_in, conn->ssl_out);
return conn;
}
void tls_connection_deinit(void *ssl_ctx, struct tls_connection *conn)
{
if (conn == NULL)
return;
if (conn->success_data) {
/*
* Make sure ssl_clear_bad_session() does not remove this
* session.
*/
SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(conn->ssl, 1);
SSL_shutdown(conn->ssl);
}
SSL_free(conn->ssl);
tls_engine_deinit(conn);
os_free(conn->subject_match);
os_free(conn->altsubject_match);
os_free(conn->suffix_match);
os_free(conn->domain_match);
os_free(conn->check_cert_subject);
os_free(conn->session_ticket);
os_free(conn->peer_subject);
os_free(conn);
}
int tls_connection_established(void *ssl_ctx, struct tls_connection *conn)
{
return conn ? SSL_is_init_finished(conn->ssl) : 0;
}
char * tls_connection_peer_serial_num(void *tls_ctx,
struct tls_connection *conn)
{
ASN1_INTEGER *ser;
char *serial_num;
size_t len;
if (!conn->peer_cert)
return NULL;
ser = X509_get_serialNumber(conn->peer_cert);
if (!ser)
return NULL;
len = ASN1_STRING_length(ser) * 2 + 1;
serial_num = os_malloc(len);
if (!serial_num)
return NULL;
wpa_snprintf_hex_uppercase(serial_num, len,
ASN1_STRING_get0_data(ser),
ASN1_STRING_length(ser));
return serial_num;
}
int tls_connection_shutdown(void *ssl_ctx, struct tls_connection *conn)
{
if (conn == NULL)
return -1;
/* Shutdown previous TLS connection without notifying the peer
* because the connection was already terminated in practice
* and "close notify" shutdown alert would confuse AS. */
SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(conn->ssl, 1);
SSL_shutdown(conn->ssl);
return SSL_clear(conn->ssl) == 1 ? 0 : -1;
}
static int tls_match_altsubject_component(X509 *cert, int type,
const char *value, size_t len)
{
GENERAL_NAME *gen;
void *ext;
int found = 0;
stack_index_t i;
ext = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
for (i = 0; ext && i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(ext); i++) {
gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(ext, i);
if (gen->type != type)
continue;
if (os_strlen((char *) gen->d.ia5->data) == len &&
os_memcmp(value, gen->d.ia5->data, len) == 0)
found++;
}
sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(ext, GENERAL_NAME_free);
return found;
}
static int tls_match_altsubject(X509 *cert, const char *match)
{
int type;
const char *pos, *end;
size_t len;
pos = match;
do {
if (os_strncmp(pos, "EMAIL:", 6) == 0) {
type = GEN_EMAIL;
pos += 6;
} else if (os_strncmp(pos, "DNS:", 4) == 0) {
type = GEN_DNS;
pos += 4;
} else if (os_strncmp(pos, "URI:", 4) == 0) {
type = GEN_URI;
pos += 4;
} else {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TLS: Invalid altSubjectName "
"match '%s'", pos);
return 0;
}
end = os_strchr(pos, ';');
while (end) {
if (os_strncmp(end + 1, "EMAIL:", 6) == 0 ||
os_strncmp(end + 1, "DNS:", 4) == 0 ||
os_strncmp(end + 1, "URI:", 4) == 0)
break;
end = os_strchr(end + 1, ';');
}
if (end)
len = end - pos;
else
len = os_strlen(pos);
if (tls_match_altsubject_component(cert, type, pos, len) > 0)
return 1;
pos = end + 1;
} while (end);
return 0;
}
#ifndef CONFIG_NATIVE_WINDOWS
static int domain_suffix_match(const u8 *val, size_t len, const char *match,
size_t match_len, int full)
{
size_t i;
/* Check for embedded nuls that could mess up suffix matching */
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if (val[i] == '\0') {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TLS: Embedded null in a string - reject");
return 0;
}
}
if (match_len > len || (full && match_len != len))
return 0;
if (os_strncasecmp((const char *) val + len - match_len, match,
match_len) != 0)
return 0; /* no match */
if (match_len == len)
return 1; /* exact match */
if (val[len - match_len - 1] == '.')
return 1; /* full label match completes suffix match */
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TLS: Reject due to incomplete label match");
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_NATIVE_WINDOWS */
struct tls_dn_field_order_cnt {
u8 cn;
u8 c;
u8 l;
u8 st;
u8 o;
u8 ou;
u8 email;
};
static int get_dn_field_index(const struct tls_dn_field_order_cnt *dn_cnt,
int nid)
{
switch (nid) {
case NID_commonName:
return dn_cnt->cn;
case NID_countryName:
return dn_cnt->c;
case NID_localityName:
return dn_cnt->l;
case NID_stateOrProvinceName:
return dn_cnt->st;
case NID_organizationName:
return dn_cnt->o;
case NID_organizationalUnitName:
return dn_cnt->ou;
case NID_pkcs9_emailAddress:
return dn_cnt->email;
default:
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
"TLS: Unknown NID '%d' in check_cert_subject",
nid);
return -1;
}
}
/**
* match_dn_field - Match configuration DN field against Certificate DN field
* @cert: Certificate
* @nid: NID of DN field
* @field: Field name
* @value DN field value which is passed from configuration
* e.g., if configuration have C=US and this argument will point to US.
* @dn_cnt: DN matching context
* Returns: 1 on success and 0 on failure
*/
static int match_dn_field(const X509 *cert, int nid, const char *field,
const char *value,
const struct tls_dn_field_order_cnt *dn_cnt)
{
int i, ret = 0, len, config_dn_field_index, match_index = 0;
X509_NAME *name;
len = os_strlen(value);
name = X509_get_subject_name((X509 *) cert);
/* Assign incremented cnt for every field of DN to check DN field in
* right order */
config_dn_field_index = get_dn_field_index(dn_cnt, nid);
if (config_dn_field_index < 0)
return 0;
/* Fetch value based on NID */
for (i = -1; (i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, nid, i)) > -1;) {
X509_NAME_ENTRY *e;
ASN1_STRING *cn;
e = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
if (!e)
continue;
cn = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(e);
if (!cn)
continue;
match_index++;
/* check for more than one DN field with same name */
if (match_index != config_dn_field_index)
continue;
/* Check wildcard at the right end side */
/* E.g., if OU=develop* mentioned in configuration, allow 'OU'
* of the subject in the client certificate to start with
* 'develop' */
if (len > 0 && value[len - 1] == '*') {
/* Compare actual certificate DN field value with
* configuration DN field value up to the specified
* length. */
ret = ASN1_STRING_length(cn) >= len - 1 &&
os_memcmp(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(cn), value,
len - 1) == 0;
} else {
/* Compare actual certificate DN field value with
* configuration DN field value */
ret = ASN1_STRING_length(cn) == len &&
os_memcmp(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(cn), value,
len) == 0;
}
if (!ret) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
"OpenSSL: Failed to match %s '%s' with certificate DN field value '%s'",
field, value, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(cn));
}
break;
}
return ret;
}
/**
* get_value_from_field - Get value from DN field
* @cert: Certificate
* @field_str: DN field string which is passed from configuration file (e.g.,
* C=US)
* @dn_cnt: DN matching context
* Returns: 1 on success and 0 on failure
*/
static int get_value_from_field(const X509 *cert, char *field_str,
struct tls_dn_field_order_cnt *dn_cnt)
{
int nid;
char *context = NULL, *name, *value;
if (os_strcmp(field_str, "*") == 0)
return 1; /* wildcard matches everything */
name = str_token(field_str, "=", &context);
if (!name)
return 0;
/* Compare all configured DN fields and assign nid based on that to
* fetch correct value from certificate subject */
if (os_strcmp(name, "CN") == 0) {
nid = NID_commonName;
dn_cnt->cn++;
} else if(os_strcmp(name, "C") == 0) {
nid = NID_countryName;
dn_cnt->c++;
} else if (os_strcmp(name, "L") == 0) {
nid = NID_localityName;
dn_cnt->l++;
} else if (os_strcmp(name, "ST") == 0) {
nid = NID_stateOrProvinceName;
dn_cnt->st++;
} else if (os_strcmp(name, "O") == 0) {
nid = NID_organizationName;
dn_cnt->o++;
} else if (os_strcmp(name, "OU") == 0) {
nid = NID_organizationalUnitName;
dn_cnt->ou++;
} else if (os_strcmp(name, "emailAddress") == 0) {
nid = NID_pkcs9_emailAddress;
dn_cnt->email++;
} else {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
"TLS: Unknown field '%s' in check_cert_subject", name);
return 0;
}
value = str_token(field_str, "=", &context);
if (!value) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
"TLS: Distinguished Name field '%s' value is not defined in check_cert_subject",
name);
return 0;
}
return match_dn_field(cert, nid, name, value, dn_cnt);
}
/**
* tls_match_dn_field - Match subject DN field with check_cert_subject
* @cert: Certificate
* @match: check_cert_subject string
* Returns: Return 1 on success and 0 on failure
*/
static int tls_match_dn_field(X509 *cert, const char *match)
{
const char *token, *last = NULL;
char field[256];
struct tls_dn_field_order_cnt dn_cnt;
os_memset(&dn_cnt, 0, sizeof(dn_cnt));
/* Maximum length of each DN field is 255 characters */
/* Process each '/' delimited field */
while ((token = cstr_token(match, "/", &last))) {
if (last - token >= (int) sizeof(field)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
"OpenSSL: Too long DN matching field value in '%s'",
match);
return 0;
}
os_memcpy(field, token, last - token);
field[last - token] = '\0';
if (!get_value_from_field(cert, field, &dn_cnt)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: No match for DN '%s'",
field);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
#ifndef CONFIG_NATIVE_WINDOWS
static int tls_match_suffix_helper(X509 *cert, const char *match,
size_t match_len, int full)
{
GENERAL_NAME *gen;
void *ext;
int i;
stack_index_t j;
int dns_name = 0;
X509_NAME *name;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TLS: Match domain against %s%s",
full ? "": "suffix ", match);
ext = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
for (j = 0; ext && j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(ext); j++) {
gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(ext, j);
if (gen->type != GEN_DNS)
continue;
dns_name++;
wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "TLS: Certificate dNSName",
gen->d.dNSName->data,
gen->d.dNSName->length);
if (domain_suffix_match(gen->d.dNSName->data,
gen->d.dNSName->length,
match, match_len, full) == 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TLS: %s in dNSName found",
full ? "Match" : "Suffix match");
sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(ext, GENERAL_NAME_free);
return 1;
}
}
sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(ext, GENERAL_NAME_free);
if (dns_name) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TLS: None of the dNSName(s) matched");
return 0;
}
name = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
i = -1;
for (;;) {
X509_NAME_ENTRY *e;
ASN1_STRING *cn;
i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, NID_commonName, i);
if (i == -1)
break;
e = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
if (e == NULL)
continue;
cn = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(e);
if (cn == NULL)
continue;
wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "TLS: Certificate commonName",
cn->data, cn->length);
if (domain_suffix_match(cn->data, cn->length,
match, match_len, full) == 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TLS: %s in commonName found",
full ? "Match" : "Suffix match");
return 1;
}
}
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TLS: No CommonName %smatch found",
full ? "": "suffix ");
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_NATIVE_WINDOWS */
static int tls_match_suffix(X509 *cert, const char *match, int full)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NATIVE_WINDOWS
/* wincrypt.h has conflicting X509_NAME definition */
return -1;
#else /* CONFIG_NATIVE_WINDOWS */
const char *token, *last = NULL;
/* Process each match alternative separately until a match is found */
while ((token = cstr_token(match, ";", &last))) {
if (tls_match_suffix_helper(cert, token, last - token, full))
return 1;
}
return 0;
#endif /* CONFIG_NATIVE_WINDOWS */
}
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
static enum tls_fail_reason openssl_tls_fail_reason(int err)
{
switch (err) {
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
return TLS_FAIL_REVOKED;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
return TLS_FAIL_NOT_YET_VALID;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
return TLS_FAIL_EXPIRED;
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
return TLS_FAIL_UNTRUSTED;
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
return TLS_FAIL_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
default:
return TLS_FAIL_UNSPECIFIED;
}
}
static struct wpabuf * get_x509_cert(X509 *cert)
{
struct wpabuf *buf;
u8 *tmp;
int cert_len = i2d_X509(cert, NULL);
if (cert_len <= 0)
return NULL;
buf = wpabuf_alloc(cert_len);
if (buf == NULL)
return NULL;
tmp = wpabuf_put(buf, cert_len);
i2d_X509(cert, &tmp);
return buf;
}
static void openssl_tls_fail_event(struct tls_connection *conn,
X509 *err_cert, int err, int depth,
const char *subject, const char *err_str,
enum tls_fail_reason reason)
{
union tls_event_data ev;
struct wpabuf *cert = NULL;
struct tls_context *context = conn->context;
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
if (context->event_cb == NULL)
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
return;
cert = get_x509_cert(err_cert);
os_memset(&ev, 0, sizeof(ev));
ev.cert_fail.reason = reason != TLS_FAIL_UNSPECIFIED ?
reason : openssl_tls_fail_reason(err);
ev.cert_fail.depth = depth;
ev.cert_fail.subject = subject;
ev.cert_fail.reason_txt = err_str;
ev.cert_fail.cert = cert;
context->event_cb(context->cb_ctx, TLS_CERT_CHAIN_FAILURE, &ev);
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
wpabuf_free(cert);
}
static int openssl_cert_tod(X509 *cert)
{
CERTIFICATEPOLICIES *ext;
stack_index_t i;
char buf[100];
int res;
int tod = 0;
ext = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_certificate_policies, NULL, NULL);
if (!ext)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < sk_POLICYINFO_num(ext); i++) {
POLICYINFO *policy;
policy = sk_POLICYINFO_value(ext, i);
res = OBJ_obj2txt(buf, sizeof(buf), policy->policyid, 0);
if (res < 0 || (size_t) res >= sizeof(buf))
continue;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: Certificate Policy %s", buf);
if (os_strcmp(buf, "1.3.6.1.4.1.40808.1.3.1") == 0)
tod = 1; /* TOD-STRICT */
else if (os_strcmp(buf, "1.3.6.1.4.1.40808.1.3.2") == 0 && !tod)
tod = 2; /* TOD-TOFU */
}
sk_POLICYINFO_pop_free(ext, POLICYINFO_free);
return tod;
}
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
static void openssl_tls_cert_event(struct tls_connection *conn,
X509 *err_cert, int depth,
const char *subject)
{
struct wpabuf *cert = NULL;
union tls_event_data ev;
struct tls_context *context = conn->context;
char *altsubject[TLS_MAX_ALT_SUBJECT];
int alt, num_altsubject = 0;
GENERAL_NAME *gen;
void *ext;
stack_index_t i;
ASN1_INTEGER *ser;
char serial_num[128];
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
#ifdef CONFIG_SHA256
u8 hash[32];
#endif /* CONFIG_SHA256 */
if (context->event_cb == NULL)
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
return;
os_memset(&ev, 0, sizeof(ev));
EAP peer: External server certificate chain validation This adds support for optional functionality to validate server certificate chain in TLS-based EAP methods in an external program. wpa_supplicant control interface is used to indicate when such validation is needed and what the result of the external validation is. This external validation can extend or replace the internal validation. When ca_cert or ca_path parameter is set, the internal validation is used. If these parameters are omitted, only the external validation is used. It needs to be understood that leaving those parameters out will disable most of the validation steps done with the TLS library and that configuration is not really recommend. By default, the external validation is not used. It can be enabled by addingtls_ext_cert_check=1 into the network profile phase1 parameter. When enabled, external validation is required through the CTRL-REQ/RSP mechanism similarly to other EAP authentication parameters through the control interface. The request to perform external validation is indicated by the following event: CTRL-REQ-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:External server certificate validation needed for SSID <ssid> Before that event, the server certificate chain is provided with the CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT events that include the cert=<hexdump> parameter. depth=# indicates which certificate is in question (0 for the server certificate, 1 for its issues, and so on). The result of the external validation is provided with the following command: CTRL-RSP-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:<good|bad> It should be noted that this is currently enabled only for OpenSSL (and BoringSSL/LibreSSL). Due to the constraints in the library API, the validation result from external processing cannot be reported cleanly with TLS alert. In other words, if the external validation reject the server certificate chain, the pending TLS handshake is terminated without sending more messages to the server. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2015-12-12 17:16:54 +01:00
if (conn->cert_probe || (conn->flags & TLS_CONN_EXT_CERT_CHECK) ||
context->cert_in_cb) {
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
cert = get_x509_cert(err_cert);
ev.peer_cert.cert = cert;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SHA256
if (cert) {
const u8 *addr[1];
size_t len[1];
addr[0] = wpabuf_head(cert);
len[0] = wpabuf_len(cert);
if (sha256_vector(1, addr, len, hash) == 0) {
ev.peer_cert.hash = hash;
ev.peer_cert.hash_len = sizeof(hash);
}
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SHA256 */
ev.peer_cert.depth = depth;
ev.peer_cert.subject = subject;
ser = X509_get_serialNumber(err_cert);
if (ser) {
wpa_snprintf_hex_uppercase(serial_num, sizeof(serial_num),
ASN1_STRING_get0_data(ser),
ASN1_STRING_length(ser));
ev.peer_cert.serial_num = serial_num;
}
ext = X509_get_ext_d2i(err_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
for (i = 0; ext && i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(ext); i++) {
char *pos;
if (num_altsubject == TLS_MAX_ALT_SUBJECT)
break;
gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(ext, i);
if (gen->type != GEN_EMAIL &&
gen->type != GEN_DNS &&
gen->type != GEN_URI)
continue;
pos = os_malloc(10 + gen->d.ia5->length + 1);
if (pos == NULL)
break;
altsubject[num_altsubject++] = pos;
switch (gen->type) {
case GEN_EMAIL:
os_memcpy(pos, "EMAIL:", 6);
pos += 6;
break;
case GEN_DNS:
os_memcpy(pos, "DNS:", 4);
pos += 4;
break;
case GEN_URI:
os_memcpy(pos, "URI:", 4);
pos += 4;
break;
}
os_memcpy(pos, gen->d.ia5->data, gen->d.ia5->length);
pos += gen->d.ia5->length;
*pos = '\0';
}
sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(ext, GENERAL_NAME_free);
for (alt = 0; alt < num_altsubject; alt++)
ev.peer_cert.altsubject[alt] = altsubject[alt];
ev.peer_cert.num_altsubject = num_altsubject;
ev.peer_cert.tod = openssl_cert_tod(err_cert);
context->event_cb(context->cb_ctx, TLS_PEER_CERTIFICATE, &ev);
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
wpabuf_free(cert);
for (alt = 0; alt < num_altsubject; alt++)
os_free(altsubject[alt]);
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
}
static void debug_print_cert(X509 *cert, const char *title)
{
#ifndef CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG
BIO *out;
size_t rlen;
char *txt;
int res;
if (wpa_debug_level > MSG_DEBUG)
return;
out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if (!out)
return;
X509_print(out, cert);
rlen = BIO_ctrl_pending(out);
txt = os_malloc(rlen + 1);
if (txt) {
res = BIO_read(out, txt, rlen);
if (res > 0) {
txt[res] = '\0';
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: %s\n%s", title, txt);
}
os_free(txt);
}
BIO_free(out);
#endif /* CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG */
}
static int tls_verify_cb(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx)
{
char buf[256];
X509 *err_cert;
int err, depth;
SSL *ssl;
struct tls_connection *conn;
struct tls_context *context;
char *match, *altmatch, *suffix_match, *domain_match;
const char *check_cert_subject;
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
const char *err_str;
err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(x509_ctx);
if (!err_cert)
return 0;
err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(x509_ctx);
depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(x509_ctx);
ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(x509_ctx,
SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
os_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Peer certificate - depth %d", depth);
debug_print_cert(err_cert, buf);
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf, sizeof(buf));
conn = SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
if (conn == NULL)
return 0;
if (depth == 0)
conn->peer_cert = err_cert;
else if (depth == 1)
conn->peer_issuer = err_cert;
else if (depth == 2)
conn->peer_issuer_issuer = err_cert;
context = conn->context;
match = conn->subject_match;
altmatch = conn->altsubject_match;
suffix_match = conn->suffix_match;
domain_match = conn->domain_match;
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
if (!preverify_ok && !conn->ca_cert_verify)
preverify_ok = 1;
if (!preverify_ok && depth > 0 && conn->server_cert_only)
preverify_ok = 1;
if (!preverify_ok && (conn->flags & TLS_CONN_DISABLE_TIME_CHECKS) &&
(err == X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED ||
err == X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: Ignore certificate validity "
"time mismatch");
preverify_ok = 1;
}
if (!preverify_ok && !conn->data->check_crl_strict &&
(err == X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED ||
err == X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"OpenSSL: Ignore certificate validity CRL time mismatch");
preverify_ok = 1;
}
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
err_str = X509_verify_cert_error_string(err);
#ifdef CONFIG_SHA256
/*
* Do not require preverify_ok so we can explicity allow otherwise
* invalid pinned server certificates.
*/
if (depth == 0 && conn->server_cert_only) {
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
struct wpabuf *cert;
cert = get_x509_cert(err_cert);
if (!cert) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: Could not fetch "
"server certificate data");
preverify_ok = 0;
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
} else {
u8 hash[32];
const u8 *addr[1];
size_t len[1];
addr[0] = wpabuf_head(cert);
len[0] = wpabuf_len(cert);
if (sha256_vector(1, addr, len, hash) < 0 ||
os_memcmp(conn->srv_cert_hash, hash, 32) != 0) {
err_str = "Server certificate mismatch";
err = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
preverify_ok = 0;
} else if (!preverify_ok) {
/*
* Certificate matches pinned certificate, allow
* regardless of other problems.
*/
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"OpenSSL: Ignore validation issues for a pinned server certificate");
preverify_ok = 1;
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
}
wpabuf_free(cert);
}
}
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
#endif /* CONFIG_SHA256 */
openssl_tls_cert_event(conn, err_cert, depth, buf);
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
if (!preverify_ok) {
if (depth > 0) {
/* Send cert event for the peer certificate so that
* the upper layers get information about it even if
* validation of a CA certificate fails. */
STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(x509_ctx);
if (chain && sk_X509_num(chain) > 0) {
char buf2[256];
X509 *cert;
cert = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert),
buf2, sizeof(buf2));
openssl_tls_cert_event(conn, cert, 0, buf2);
}
if (chain)
sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
}
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TLS: Certificate verification failed,"
" error %d (%s) depth %d for '%s'", err, err_str,
depth, buf);
openssl_tls_fail_event(conn, err_cert, err, depth, buf,
err_str, TLS_FAIL_UNSPECIFIED);
return preverify_ok;
}
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TLS: tls_verify_cb - preverify_ok=%d "
"err=%d (%s) ca_cert_verify=%d depth=%d buf='%s'",
preverify_ok, err, err_str,
conn->ca_cert_verify, depth, buf);
check_cert_subject = conn->check_cert_subject;
if (!check_cert_subject)
check_cert_subject = conn->data->check_cert_subject;
if (check_cert_subject) {
if (depth == 0 &&
!tls_match_dn_field(err_cert, check_cert_subject)) {
preverify_ok = 0;
openssl_tls_fail_event(conn, err_cert, err, depth, buf,
"Distinguished Name",
TLS_FAIL_DN_MISMATCH);
}
}
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
if (depth == 0 && match && os_strstr(buf, match) == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TLS: Subject '%s' did not "
"match with '%s'", buf, match);
preverify_ok = 0;
openssl_tls_fail_event(conn, err_cert, err, depth, buf,
"Subject mismatch",
TLS_FAIL_SUBJECT_MISMATCH);
} else if (depth == 0 && altmatch &&
!tls_match_altsubject(err_cert, altmatch)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TLS: altSubjectName match "
"'%s' not found", altmatch);
preverify_ok = 0;
openssl_tls_fail_event(conn, err_cert, err, depth, buf,
"AltSubject mismatch",
TLS_FAIL_ALTSUBJECT_MISMATCH);
} else if (depth == 0 && suffix_match &&
!tls_match_suffix(err_cert, suffix_match, 0)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TLS: Domain suffix match '%s' not found",
suffix_match);
preverify_ok = 0;
openssl_tls_fail_event(conn, err_cert, err, depth, buf,
"Domain suffix mismatch",
TLS_FAIL_DOMAIN_SUFFIX_MISMATCH);
} else if (depth == 0 && domain_match &&
!tls_match_suffix(err_cert, domain_match, 1)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TLS: Domain match '%s' not found",
domain_match);
preverify_ok = 0;
openssl_tls_fail_event(conn, err_cert, err, depth, buf,
"Domain mismatch",
TLS_FAIL_DOMAIN_MISMATCH);
}
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
if (conn->cert_probe && preverify_ok && depth == 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: Reject server certificate "
"on probe-only run");
preverify_ok = 0;
openssl_tls_fail_event(conn, err_cert, err, depth, buf,
"Server certificate chain probe",
TLS_FAIL_SERVER_CHAIN_PROBE);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SUITEB
if (conn->flags & TLS_CONN_SUITEB) {
EVP_PKEY *pk;
RSA *rsa;
int len = -1;
pk = X509_get_pubkey(err_cert);
if (pk) {
rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pk);
if (rsa) {
len = RSA_bits(rsa);
RSA_free(rsa);
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
}
if (len >= 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"OpenSSL: RSA modulus size: %d bits", len);
if (len < 3072) {
preverify_ok = 0;
openssl_tls_fail_event(
conn, err_cert, err,
depth, buf,
"Insufficient RSA modulus size",
TLS_FAIL_INSUFFICIENT_KEY_LEN);
}
}
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SUITEB */
#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
if (depth == 0 && (conn->flags & TLS_CONN_REQUEST_OCSP) &&
preverify_ok) {
enum ocsp_result res;
res = check_ocsp_resp(conn->ssl_ctx, conn->ssl, err_cert,
conn->peer_issuer,
conn->peer_issuer_issuer);
if (res == OCSP_REVOKED) {
preverify_ok = 0;
openssl_tls_fail_event(conn, err_cert, err, depth, buf,
"certificate revoked",
TLS_FAIL_REVOKED);
if (err == X509_V_OK)
X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(
x509_ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED);
} else if (res != OCSP_GOOD &&
(conn->flags & TLS_CONN_REQUIRE_OCSP)) {
preverify_ok = 0;
openssl_tls_fail_event(conn, err_cert, err, depth, buf,
"bad certificate status response",
TLS_FAIL_UNSPECIFIED);
}
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
EAP peer: External server certificate chain validation This adds support for optional functionality to validate server certificate chain in TLS-based EAP methods in an external program. wpa_supplicant control interface is used to indicate when such validation is needed and what the result of the external validation is. This external validation can extend or replace the internal validation. When ca_cert or ca_path parameter is set, the internal validation is used. If these parameters are omitted, only the external validation is used. It needs to be understood that leaving those parameters out will disable most of the validation steps done with the TLS library and that configuration is not really recommend. By default, the external validation is not used. It can be enabled by addingtls_ext_cert_check=1 into the network profile phase1 parameter. When enabled, external validation is required through the CTRL-REQ/RSP mechanism similarly to other EAP authentication parameters through the control interface. The request to perform external validation is indicated by the following event: CTRL-REQ-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:External server certificate validation needed for SSID <ssid> Before that event, the server certificate chain is provided with the CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT events that include the cert=<hexdump> parameter. depth=# indicates which certificate is in question (0 for the server certificate, 1 for its issues, and so on). The result of the external validation is provided with the following command: CTRL-RSP-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:<good|bad> It should be noted that this is currently enabled only for OpenSSL (and BoringSSL/LibreSSL). Due to the constraints in the library API, the validation result from external processing cannot be reported cleanly with TLS alert. In other words, if the external validation reject the server certificate chain, the pending TLS handshake is terminated without sending more messages to the server. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2015-12-12 17:16:54 +01:00
if (depth == 0 && preverify_ok && context->event_cb != NULL)
context->event_cb(context->cb_ctx,
TLS_CERT_CHAIN_SUCCESS, NULL);
if (depth == 0 && preverify_ok) {
os_free(conn->peer_subject);
conn->peer_subject = os_strdup(buf);
}
return preverify_ok;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
static int tls_load_ca_der(struct tls_data *data, const char *ca_cert)
{
SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = data->ssl;
X509_LOOKUP *lookup;
int ret = 0;
lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ssl_ctx),
X509_LOOKUP_file());
if (lookup == NULL) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_WARNING, __func__,
"Failed add lookup for X509 store");
return -1;
}
if (!X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, ca_cert, X509_FILETYPE_ASN1)) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
tls_show_errors(MSG_WARNING, __func__,
"Failed load CA in DER format");
if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_X509 &&
ERR_GET_REASON(err) == X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: %s - ignoring "
"cert already in hash table error",
__func__);
} else
ret = -1;
}
return ret;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_STDIO */
static int tls_connection_ca_cert(struct tls_data *data,
struct tls_connection *conn,
const char *ca_cert, const u8 *ca_cert_blob,
size_t ca_cert_blob_len, const char *ca_path)
{
SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = data->ssl;
X509_STORE *store;
/*
* Remove previously configured trusted CA certificates before adding
* new ones.
*/
store = X509_STORE_new();
if (store == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: %s - failed to allocate new "
"certificate store", __func__);
return -1;
}
SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(ssl_ctx, store);
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
SSL_set_verify(conn->ssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, tls_verify_cb);
conn->ca_cert_verify = 1;
if (ca_cert && os_strncmp(ca_cert, "probe://", 8) == 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: Probe for server certificate "
"chain");
conn->cert_probe = 1;
conn->ca_cert_verify = 0;
return 0;
}
if (ca_cert && os_strncmp(ca_cert, "hash://", 7) == 0) {
#ifdef CONFIG_SHA256
const char *pos = ca_cert + 7;
if (os_strncmp(pos, "server/sha256/", 14) != 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: Unsupported ca_cert "
"hash value '%s'", ca_cert);
return -1;
}
pos += 14;
if (os_strlen(pos) != 32 * 2) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: Unexpected SHA256 "
"hash length in ca_cert '%s'", ca_cert);
return -1;
}
if (hexstr2bin(pos, conn->srv_cert_hash, 32) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: Invalid SHA256 hash "
"value in ca_cert '%s'", ca_cert);
return -1;
}
conn->server_cert_only = 1;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: Checking only server "
"certificate match");
return 0;
#else /* CONFIG_SHA256 */
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "No SHA256 included in the build - "
"cannot validate server certificate hash");
return -1;
#endif /* CONFIG_SHA256 */
}
if (ca_cert_blob) {
X509 *cert = d2i_X509(NULL,
(const unsigned char **) &ca_cert_blob,
ca_cert_blob_len);
if (cert == NULL) {
BIO *bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(ca_cert_blob,
ca_cert_blob_len);
if (bio) {
cert = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
BIO_free(bio);
}
if (!cert) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_WARNING, __func__,
"Failed to parse ca_cert_blob");
return -1;
}
while (ERR_get_error()) {
/* Ignore errors from DER conversion. */
}
}
if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ssl_ctx),
cert)) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
tls_show_errors(MSG_WARNING, __func__,
"Failed to add ca_cert_blob to "
"certificate store");
if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_X509 &&
ERR_GET_REASON(err) ==
X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: %s - ignoring "
"cert already in hash table error",
__func__);
} else {
X509_free(cert);
return -1;
}
}
X509_free(cert);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: %s - added ca_cert_blob "
"to certificate store", __func__);
return 0;
}
#ifdef ANDROID
/* Single alias */
if (ca_cert && os_strncmp("keystore://", ca_cert, 11) == 0) {
if (tls_add_ca_from_keystore(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ssl_ctx),
&ca_cert[11]) < 0)
return -1;
SSL_set_verify(conn->ssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, tls_verify_cb);
return 0;
}
/* Multiple aliases separated by space */
if (ca_cert && os_strncmp("keystores://", ca_cert, 12) == 0) {
char *aliases = os_strdup(&ca_cert[12]);
const char *delim = " ";
int rc = 0;
char *savedptr;
char *alias;
if (!aliases)
return -1;
alias = strtok_r(aliases, delim, &savedptr);
for (; alias; alias = strtok_r(NULL, delim, &savedptr)) {
if (tls_add_ca_from_keystore_encoded(
SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ssl_ctx), alias)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING,
"OpenSSL: %s - Failed to add ca_cert %s from keystore",
__func__, alias);
rc = -1;
break;
}
}
os_free(aliases);
if (rc)
return rc;
SSL_set_verify(conn->ssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, tls_verify_cb);
return 0;
}
#endif /* ANDROID */
#ifdef CONFIG_NATIVE_WINDOWS
if (ca_cert && tls_cryptoapi_ca_cert(ssl_ctx, conn->ssl, ca_cert) ==
0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: Added CA certificates from "
"system certificate store");
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_NATIVE_WINDOWS */
if (ca_cert || ca_path) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
if (SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ssl_ctx, ca_cert, ca_path) !=
1) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_WARNING, __func__,
"Failed to load root certificates");
if (ca_cert &&
tls_load_ca_der(data, ca_cert) == 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: %s - loaded "
"DER format CA certificate",
__func__);
} else
return -1;
} else {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TLS: Trusted root "
"certificate(s) loaded");
tls_get_errors(data);
}
#else /* OPENSSL_NO_STDIO */
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: %s - OPENSSL_NO_STDIO",
__func__);
return -1;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_STDIO */
} else {
/* No ca_cert configured - do not try to verify server
* certificate */
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
conn->ca_cert_verify = 0;
}
return 0;
}
static int tls_global_ca_cert(struct tls_data *data, const char *ca_cert)
{
SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = data->ssl;
if (ca_cert) {
if (SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ssl_ctx, ca_cert, NULL) != 1)
{
tls_show_errors(MSG_WARNING, __func__,
"Failed to load root certificates");
return -1;
}
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TLS: Trusted root "
"certificate(s) loaded");
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
/* Add the same CAs to the client certificate requests */
SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ssl_ctx,
SSL_load_client_CA_file(ca_cert));
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_STDIO */
os_free(data->ca_cert);
data->ca_cert = os_strdup(ca_cert);
}
return 0;
}
int tls_global_set_verify(void *ssl_ctx, int check_crl, int strict)
{
int flags;
if (check_crl) {
struct tls_data *data = ssl_ctx;
X509_STORE *cs = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(data->ssl);
if (cs == NULL) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__, "Failed to get "
"certificate store when enabling "
"check_crl");
return -1;
}
flags = X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK;
if (check_crl == 2)
flags |= X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL;
X509_STORE_set_flags(cs, flags);
data->check_crl = check_crl;
data->check_crl_strict = strict;
os_get_reltime(&data->crl_last_reload);
}
return 0;
}
static int tls_connection_set_subject_match(struct tls_connection *conn,
const char *subject_match,
const char *altsubject_match,
const char *suffix_match,
const char *domain_match,
const char *check_cert_subject)
{
os_free(conn->subject_match);
conn->subject_match = NULL;
if (subject_match) {
conn->subject_match = os_strdup(subject_match);
if (conn->subject_match == NULL)
return -1;
}
os_free(conn->altsubject_match);
conn->altsubject_match = NULL;
if (altsubject_match) {
conn->altsubject_match = os_strdup(altsubject_match);
if (conn->altsubject_match == NULL)
return -1;
}
os_free(conn->suffix_match);
conn->suffix_match = NULL;
if (suffix_match) {
conn->suffix_match = os_strdup(suffix_match);
if (conn->suffix_match == NULL)
return -1;
}
os_free(conn->domain_match);
conn->domain_match = NULL;
if (domain_match) {
conn->domain_match = os_strdup(domain_match);
if (conn->domain_match == NULL)
return -1;
}
os_free(conn->check_cert_subject);
conn->check_cert_subject = NULL;
if (check_cert_subject) {
conn->check_cert_subject = os_strdup(check_cert_subject);
if (!conn->check_cert_subject)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SUITEB
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L
static int suiteb_cert_cb(SSL *ssl, void *arg)
{
struct tls_connection *conn = arg;
/*
* This cert_cb() is not really the best location for doing a
* constraint check for the ServerKeyExchange message, but this seems to
* be the only place where the current OpenSSL sequence can be
* terminated cleanly with an TLS alert going out to the server.
*/
if (!(conn->flags & TLS_CONN_SUITEB))
return 1;
/* DHE is enabled only with DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 */
if (conn->cipher_suite != 0x9f)
return 1;
if (conn->server_dh_prime_len >= 3072)
return 1;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"OpenSSL: Server DH prime length (%d bits) not sufficient for Suite B RSA - reject handshake",
conn->server_dh_prime_len);
return 0;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
#endif /* CONFIG_SUITEB */
static int tls_set_conn_flags(struct tls_connection *conn, unsigned int flags,
const char *openssl_ciphers)
{
SSL *ssl = conn->ssl;
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
if (flags & TLS_CONN_DISABLE_SESSION_TICKET)
SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET);
else
SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET);
#endif /* SSL_OP_NO_TICKET */
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
if (flags & TLS_CONN_DISABLE_TLSv1_0)
SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1);
else
SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1);
#endif /* SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 */
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
if (flags & TLS_CONN_DISABLE_TLSv1_1)
SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1);
else
SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1);
#endif /* SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 */
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
if (flags & TLS_CONN_DISABLE_TLSv1_2)
SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2);
else
SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2);
#endif /* SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 */
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3
if (flags & TLS_CONN_DISABLE_TLSv1_3)
SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3);
else
SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3);
#endif /* SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3 */
OpenSSL: Allow systemwide policies to be overridden Some distributions (e.g., Debian) have started introducting systemwide OpenSSL policies to disable older protocol versions and ciphers throughout all programs using OpenSSL. This can result in significant number of interoperability issues with deployed EAP implementations. Allow explicit wpa_supplicant (EAP peer) and hostapd (EAP server) parameters to be used to request systemwide policies to be overridden if older versions are needed to be able to interoperate with devices that cannot be updated to support the newer protocol versions or keys. The default behavior is not changed here, i.e., the systemwide policies will be followed if no explicit override configuration is used. The overrides should be used only if really needed since they can result in reduced security. In wpa_supplicant, tls_disable_tlsv1_?=0 value in the phase1 network profile parameter can be used to explicitly enable TLS versions that are disabled in the systemwide configuration. For example, phase1="tls_disable_tlsv1_0=0 tls_disable_tlsv1_1=0" would request TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.1 to be enabled even if the systemwide policy enforces TLS v1.2 as the minimum version. Similarly, openssl_ciphers parameter can be used to override systemwide policy, e.g., with openssl_ciphers="DEFAULT@SECLEVEL=1" to drop from security level 2 to 1 in Debian to allow shorter keys to be used. In hostapd, tls_flags parameter can be used to configure similar options. E.g., tls_flags=[ENABLE-TLSv1.0][ENABLE-TLSv1.1] Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2019-01-05 16:02:33 +01:00
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
if (flags & (TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_0 |
TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_1 |
TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_2)) {
int version = 0;
/* Explicit request to enable TLS versions even if needing to
* override systemwide policies. */
if (flags & TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_0)
OpenSSL: Allow systemwide policies to be overridden Some distributions (e.g., Debian) have started introducting systemwide OpenSSL policies to disable older protocol versions and ciphers throughout all programs using OpenSSL. This can result in significant number of interoperability issues with deployed EAP implementations. Allow explicit wpa_supplicant (EAP peer) and hostapd (EAP server) parameters to be used to request systemwide policies to be overridden if older versions are needed to be able to interoperate with devices that cannot be updated to support the newer protocol versions or keys. The default behavior is not changed here, i.e., the systemwide policies will be followed if no explicit override configuration is used. The overrides should be used only if really needed since they can result in reduced security. In wpa_supplicant, tls_disable_tlsv1_?=0 value in the phase1 network profile parameter can be used to explicitly enable TLS versions that are disabled in the systemwide configuration. For example, phase1="tls_disable_tlsv1_0=0 tls_disable_tlsv1_1=0" would request TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.1 to be enabled even if the systemwide policy enforces TLS v1.2 as the minimum version. Similarly, openssl_ciphers parameter can be used to override systemwide policy, e.g., with openssl_ciphers="DEFAULT@SECLEVEL=1" to drop from security level 2 to 1 in Debian to allow shorter keys to be used. In hostapd, tls_flags parameter can be used to configure similar options. E.g., tls_flags=[ENABLE-TLSv1.0][ENABLE-TLSv1.1] Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2019-01-05 16:02:33 +01:00
version = TLS1_VERSION;
else if (flags & TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_1)
version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
else if (flags & TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_2)
version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
OpenSSL: Allow systemwide policies to be overridden Some distributions (e.g., Debian) have started introducting systemwide OpenSSL policies to disable older protocol versions and ciphers throughout all programs using OpenSSL. This can result in significant number of interoperability issues with deployed EAP implementations. Allow explicit wpa_supplicant (EAP peer) and hostapd (EAP server) parameters to be used to request systemwide policies to be overridden if older versions are needed to be able to interoperate with devices that cannot be updated to support the newer protocol versions or keys. The default behavior is not changed here, i.e., the systemwide policies will be followed if no explicit override configuration is used. The overrides should be used only if really needed since they can result in reduced security. In wpa_supplicant, tls_disable_tlsv1_?=0 value in the phase1 network profile parameter can be used to explicitly enable TLS versions that are disabled in the systemwide configuration. For example, phase1="tls_disable_tlsv1_0=0 tls_disable_tlsv1_1=0" would request TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.1 to be enabled even if the systemwide policy enforces TLS v1.2 as the minimum version. Similarly, openssl_ciphers parameter can be used to override systemwide policy, e.g., with openssl_ciphers="DEFAULT@SECLEVEL=1" to drop from security level 2 to 1 in Debian to allow shorter keys to be used. In hostapd, tls_flags parameter can be used to configure similar options. E.g., tls_flags=[ENABLE-TLSv1.0][ENABLE-TLSv1.1] Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2019-01-05 16:02:33 +01:00
if (!version) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"OpenSSL: Invalid TLS version configuration");
return -1;
}
if (SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, version) != 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"OpenSSL: Failed to set minimum TLS version");
return -1;
}
}
#endif /* >= 1.1.0 */
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && \
!defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
!defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
if ((flags & (TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_0 | TLS_CONN_ENABLE_TLSv1_1)) &&
SSL_get_security_level(ssl) >= 2) {
/*
* Need to drop to security level 1 to allow TLS versions older
* than 1.2 to be used when explicitly enabled in configuration.
*/
SSL_set_security_level(conn->ssl, 1);
}
#endif
OpenSSL: Allow systemwide policies to be overridden Some distributions (e.g., Debian) have started introducting systemwide OpenSSL policies to disable older protocol versions and ciphers throughout all programs using OpenSSL. This can result in significant number of interoperability issues with deployed EAP implementations. Allow explicit wpa_supplicant (EAP peer) and hostapd (EAP server) parameters to be used to request systemwide policies to be overridden if older versions are needed to be able to interoperate with devices that cannot be updated to support the newer protocol versions or keys. The default behavior is not changed here, i.e., the systemwide policies will be followed if no explicit override configuration is used. The overrides should be used only if really needed since they can result in reduced security. In wpa_supplicant, tls_disable_tlsv1_?=0 value in the phase1 network profile parameter can be used to explicitly enable TLS versions that are disabled in the systemwide configuration. For example, phase1="tls_disable_tlsv1_0=0 tls_disable_tlsv1_1=0" would request TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.1 to be enabled even if the systemwide policy enforces TLS v1.2 as the minimum version. Similarly, openssl_ciphers parameter can be used to override systemwide policy, e.g., with openssl_ciphers="DEFAULT@SECLEVEL=1" to drop from security level 2 to 1 in Debian to allow shorter keys to be used. In hostapd, tls_flags parameter can be used to configure similar options. E.g., tls_flags=[ENABLE-TLSv1.0][ENABLE-TLSv1.1] Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2019-01-05 16:02:33 +01:00
#ifdef CONFIG_SUITEB
#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
/* Start with defaults from BoringSSL */
SSL_CTX_set_verify_algorithm_prefs(conn->ssl_ctx, NULL, 0);
#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L
if (flags & TLS_CONN_SUITEB_NO_ECDH) {
const char *ciphers = "DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
if (openssl_ciphers) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"OpenSSL: Override ciphers for Suite B (no ECDH): %s",
openssl_ciphers);
ciphers = openssl_ciphers;
}
if (SSL_set_cipher_list(ssl, ciphers) != 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"OpenSSL: Failed to set Suite B ciphers");
return -1;
}
} else if (flags & TLS_CONN_SUITEB) {
EC_KEY *ecdh;
const char *ciphers =
"ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
int nid[1] = { NID_secp384r1 };
if (openssl_ciphers) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"OpenSSL: Override ciphers for Suite B: %s",
openssl_ciphers);
ciphers = openssl_ciphers;
}
if (SSL_set_cipher_list(ssl, ciphers) != 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"OpenSSL: Failed to set Suite B ciphers");
return -1;
}
if (SSL_set1_curves(ssl, nid, 1) != 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"OpenSSL: Failed to set Suite B curves");
return -1;
}
ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp384r1);
if (!ecdh || SSL_set_tmp_ecdh(ssl, ecdh) != 1) {
EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"OpenSSL: Failed to set ECDH parameter");
return -1;
}
EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
}
if (flags & (TLS_CONN_SUITEB | TLS_CONN_SUITEB_NO_ECDH)) {
#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
uint16_t sigalgs[1] = { SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384 };
if (SSL_CTX_set_verify_algorithm_prefs(conn->ssl_ctx, sigalgs,
1) != 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"OpenSSL: Failed to set Suite B sigalgs");
return -1;
}
#else /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
/* ECDSA+SHA384 if need to add EC support here */
if (SSL_set1_sigalgs_list(ssl, "RSA+SHA384") != 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"OpenSSL: Failed to set Suite B sigalgs");
return -1;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1);
SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1);
SSL_set_cert_cb(ssl, suiteb_cert_cb, conn);
}
#else /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10002000L */
if (flags & (TLS_CONN_SUITEB | TLS_CONN_SUITEB_NO_ECDH)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
"OpenSSL: Suite B RSA case not supported with this OpenSSL version");
return -1;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
if (openssl_ciphers && os_strcmp(openssl_ciphers, "SUITEB192") == 0) {
uint16_t sigalgs[1] = { SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384 };
int nid[1] = { NID_secp384r1 };
if (SSL_set1_curves(ssl, nid, 1) != 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"OpenSSL: Failed to set Suite B curves");
return -1;
}
if (SSL_CTX_set_verify_algorithm_prefs(conn->ssl_ctx, sigalgs,
1) != 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"OpenSSL: Failed to set Suite B sigalgs");
return -1;
}
}
OpenSSL: Allow systemwide policies to be overridden Some distributions (e.g., Debian) have started introducting systemwide OpenSSL policies to disable older protocol versions and ciphers throughout all programs using OpenSSL. This can result in significant number of interoperability issues with deployed EAP implementations. Allow explicit wpa_supplicant (EAP peer) and hostapd (EAP server) parameters to be used to request systemwide policies to be overridden if older versions are needed to be able to interoperate with devices that cannot be updated to support the newer protocol versions or keys. The default behavior is not changed here, i.e., the systemwide policies will be followed if no explicit override configuration is used. The overrides should be used only if really needed since they can result in reduced security. In wpa_supplicant, tls_disable_tlsv1_?=0 value in the phase1 network profile parameter can be used to explicitly enable TLS versions that are disabled in the systemwide configuration. For example, phase1="tls_disable_tlsv1_0=0 tls_disable_tlsv1_1=0" would request TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.1 to be enabled even if the systemwide policy enforces TLS v1.2 as the minimum version. Similarly, openssl_ciphers parameter can be used to override systemwide policy, e.g., with openssl_ciphers="DEFAULT@SECLEVEL=1" to drop from security level 2 to 1 in Debian to allow shorter keys to be used. In hostapd, tls_flags parameter can be used to configure similar options. E.g., tls_flags=[ENABLE-TLSv1.0][ENABLE-TLSv1.1] Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2019-01-05 16:02:33 +01:00
#else /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
if (!(flags & (TLS_CONN_SUITEB | TLS_CONN_SUITEB_NO_ECDH)) &&
openssl_ciphers && SSL_set_cipher_list(ssl, openssl_ciphers) != 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"OpenSSL: Failed to set openssl_ciphers '%s'",
openssl_ciphers);
return -1;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
OpenSSL: Allow systemwide policies to be overridden Some distributions (e.g., Debian) have started introducting systemwide OpenSSL policies to disable older protocol versions and ciphers throughout all programs using OpenSSL. This can result in significant number of interoperability issues with deployed EAP implementations. Allow explicit wpa_supplicant (EAP peer) and hostapd (EAP server) parameters to be used to request systemwide policies to be overridden if older versions are needed to be able to interoperate with devices that cannot be updated to support the newer protocol versions or keys. The default behavior is not changed here, i.e., the systemwide policies will be followed if no explicit override configuration is used. The overrides should be used only if really needed since they can result in reduced security. In wpa_supplicant, tls_disable_tlsv1_?=0 value in the phase1 network profile parameter can be used to explicitly enable TLS versions that are disabled in the systemwide configuration. For example, phase1="tls_disable_tlsv1_0=0 tls_disable_tlsv1_1=0" would request TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.1 to be enabled even if the systemwide policy enforces TLS v1.2 as the minimum version. Similarly, openssl_ciphers parameter can be used to override systemwide policy, e.g., with openssl_ciphers="DEFAULT@SECLEVEL=1" to drop from security level 2 to 1 in Debian to allow shorter keys to be used. In hostapd, tls_flags parameter can be used to configure similar options. E.g., tls_flags=[ENABLE-TLSv1.0][ENABLE-TLSv1.1] Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2019-01-05 16:02:33 +01:00
#else /* CONFIG_SUITEB */
if (openssl_ciphers && SSL_set_cipher_list(ssl, openssl_ciphers) != 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"OpenSSL: Failed to set openssl_ciphers '%s'",
openssl_ciphers);
return -1;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SUITEB */
if (flags & TLS_CONN_TEAP_ANON_DH) {
#ifndef TEAP_DH_ANON_CS
#define TEAP_DH_ANON_CS \
"ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:" \
"ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:" \
"ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:" \
"DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:" \
"DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:" \
"DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:" \
"ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ADH-AES128-GCM-SHA256:" \
"ADH-AES256-SHA256:ADH-AES128-SHA256:ADH-AES256-SHA:ADH-AES128-SHA"
#endif
static const char *cs = TEAP_DH_ANON_CS;
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && \
!defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
!defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
/*
* Need to drop to security level 0 to allow anonymous
* cipher suites for EAP-TEAP.
*/
SSL_set_security_level(conn->ssl, 0);
#endif
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"OpenSSL: Enable cipher suites for anonymous EAP-TEAP provisioning: %s",
cs);
if (SSL_set_cipher_list(conn->ssl, cs) != 1) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
"Cipher suite configuration failed");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
int tls_connection_set_verify(void *ssl_ctx, struct tls_connection *conn,
int verify_peer, unsigned int flags,
const u8 *session_ctx, size_t session_ctx_len)
{
static int counter = 0;
struct tls_data *data = ssl_ctx;
if (conn == NULL)
return -1;
if (verify_peer == 2) {
conn->ca_cert_verify = 1;
SSL_set_verify(conn->ssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER |
SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE, tls_verify_cb);
} else if (verify_peer) {
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
conn->ca_cert_verify = 1;
SSL_set_verify(conn->ssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER |
SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT |
SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE, tls_verify_cb);
} else {
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
2010-02-13 10:14:23 +01:00
conn->ca_cert_verify = 0;
SSL_set_verify(conn->ssl, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL);
}
if (tls_set_conn_flags(conn, flags, NULL) < 0)
return -1;
conn->flags = flags;
SSL_set_accept_state(conn->ssl);
if (data->tls_session_lifetime == 0) {
/*
* Set session id context to a unique value to make sure
* session resumption cannot be used either through session
* caching or TLS ticket extension.
*/
counter++;
SSL_set_session_id_context(conn->ssl,
(const unsigned char *) &counter,
sizeof(counter));
} else if (session_ctx) {
SSL_set_session_id_context(conn->ssl, session_ctx,
session_ctx_len);
}
return 0;
}
static int tls_connection_client_cert(struct tls_connection *conn,
const char *client_cert,
const u8 *client_cert_blob,
size_t client_cert_blob_len)
{
if (client_cert == NULL && client_cert_blob == NULL)
return 0;
#ifdef PKCS12_FUNCS
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10002000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
/*
* Clear previously set extra chain certificates, if any, from PKCS#12
* processing in tls_parse_pkcs12() to allow OpenSSL to build a new
* chain properly.
*/
SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs(conn->ssl_ctx);
#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10002000L */
#endif /* PKCS12_FUNCS */
if (client_cert_blob &&
SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(conn->ssl, (u8 *) client_cert_blob,
client_cert_blob_len) == 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: SSL_use_certificate_ASN1 --> "
"OK");
return 0;
} else if (client_cert_blob) {
#if defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x20901000L
tls_show_errors(MSG_DEBUG, __func__,
"SSL_use_certificate_ASN1 failed");
#else
BIO *bio;
X509 *x509;
tls_show_errors(MSG_DEBUG, __func__,
"SSL_use_certificate_ASN1 failed");
bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if (!bio)
return -1;
BIO_write(bio, client_cert_blob, client_cert_blob_len);
x509 = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!x509 || SSL_use_certificate(conn->ssl, x509) != 1) {
X509_free(x509);
BIO_free(bio);
return -1;
}
X509_free(x509);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"OpenSSL: Found PEM encoded certificate from blob");
while ((x509 = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"OpenSSL: Added an additional certificate into the chain");
SSL_add0_chain_cert(conn->ssl, x509);
}
BIO_free(bio);
return 0;
#endif
}
if (client_cert == NULL)
return -1;
#ifdef ANDROID
if (os_strncmp("keystore://", client_cert, 11) == 0) {
BIO *bio = BIO_from_keystore(&client_cert[11]);
X509 *x509 = NULL;
int ret = -1;
if (bio) {
x509 = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
if (x509) {
if (SSL_use_certificate(conn->ssl, x509) == 1)
ret = 0;
X509_free(x509);
}
/* Read additional certificates into the chain. */
while (bio) {
x509 = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (x509) {
/* Takes ownership of x509 */
SSL_add0_chain_cert(conn->ssl, x509);
} else {
BIO_free(bio);
bio = NULL;
}
}
return ret;
}
#endif /* ANDROID */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
if (SSL_use_certificate_file(conn->ssl, client_cert,
SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) == 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: SSL_use_certificate_file (DER)"
" --> OK");
return 0;
}
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && \
!defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && !defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
if (SSL_use_certificate_chain_file(conn->ssl, client_cert) == 1) {
ERR_clear_error();
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: SSL_use_certificate_chain_file"
" --> OK");
return 0;
}
#else
if (SSL_use_certificate_file(conn->ssl, client_cert,
SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) == 1) {
ERR_clear_error();
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: SSL_use_certificate_file (PEM)"
" --> OK");
return 0;
}
#endif
tls_show_errors(MSG_DEBUG, __func__,
"SSL_use_certificate_file failed");
#else /* OPENSSL_NO_STDIO */
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: %s - OPENSSL_NO_STDIO", __func__);
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_STDIO */
return -1;
}
static int tls_global_client_cert(struct tls_data *data,
const char *client_cert)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = data->ssl;
if (client_cert == NULL)
return 0;
if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ssl_ctx, client_cert,
SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) != 1 &&
SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ssl_ctx, client_cert) != 1 &&
SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ssl_ctx, client_cert,
SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) != 1) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
"Failed to load client certificate");
return -1;
}
return 0;
#else /* OPENSSL_NO_STDIO */
if (client_cert == NULL)
return 0;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: %s - OPENSSL_NO_STDIO", __func__);
return -1;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_STDIO */
}
#ifdef PKCS12_FUNCS
static int tls_parse_pkcs12(struct tls_data *data, SSL *ssl, PKCS12 *p12,
const char *passwd)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
X509 *cert;
STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
int res = 0;
char buf[256];
pkey = NULL;
cert = NULL;
certs = NULL;
if (!passwd)
passwd = "";
if (!PKCS12_parse(p12, passwd, &pkey, &cert, &certs)) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_DEBUG, __func__,
"Failed to parse PKCS12 file");
PKCS12_free(p12);
return -1;
}
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TLS: Successfully parsed PKCS12 data");
if (cert) {
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), buf,
sizeof(buf));
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TLS: Got certificate from PKCS12: "
"subject='%s'", buf);
if (ssl) {
if (SSL_use_certificate(ssl, cert) != 1)
res = -1;
} else {
if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate(data->ssl, cert) != 1)
res = -1;
}
X509_free(cert);
}
if (pkey) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TLS: Got private key from PKCS12");
if (ssl) {
if (SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey) != 1)
res = -1;
} else {
if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(data->ssl, pkey) != 1)
res = -1;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
if (certs) {
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
if (ssl)
SSL_clear_chain_certs(ssl);
else
SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs(data->ssl);
while ((cert = sk_X509_pop(certs)) != NULL) {
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), buf,
sizeof(buf));
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TLS: additional certificate"
" from PKCS12: subject='%s'", buf);
if ((ssl && SSL_add1_chain_cert(ssl, cert) != 1) ||
(!ssl && SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert(data->ssl,
cert) != 1)) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_DEBUG, __func__,
"Failed to add additional certificate");
res = -1;
X509_free(cert);
break;
}
X509_free(cert);
}
if (!res) {
/* Try to continue anyway */
}
sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
#ifndef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
if (ssl)
res = SSL_build_cert_chain(
ssl,
SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK |
SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR);
else
res = SSL_CTX_build_cert_chain(
data->ssl,
SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK |
SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR);
if (!res) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_DEBUG, __func__,
"Failed to build certificate chain");
} else if (res == 2) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"TLS: Ignore certificate chain verification error when building chain with PKCS#12 extra certificates");
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
/*
* Try to continue regardless of result since it is possible for
* the extra certificates not to be required.
*/
res = 0;
#else /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L */
SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs(data->ssl);
while ((cert = sk_X509_pop(certs)) != NULL) {
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), buf,
sizeof(buf));
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TLS: additional certificate"
" from PKCS12: subject='%s'", buf);
/*
* There is no SSL equivalent for the chain cert - so
* always add it to the context...
*/
if (SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(data->ssl, cert) != 1)
{
X509_free(cert);
res = -1;
break;
}
}
sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L */
}
PKCS12_free(p12);
if (res < 0)
tls_get_errors(data);
return res;
}
#endif /* PKCS12_FUNCS */
static int tls_read_pkcs12(struct tls_data *data, SSL *ssl,
const char *private_key, const char *passwd)
{
#ifdef PKCS12_FUNCS
FILE *f;
PKCS12 *p12;
f = fopen(private_key, "rb");
if (f == NULL)
return -1;
p12 = d2i_PKCS12_fp(f, NULL);
fclose(f);
if (p12 == NULL) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
"Failed to use PKCS#12 file");
return -1;
}
return tls_parse_pkcs12(data, ssl, p12, passwd);
#else /* PKCS12_FUNCS */
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TLS: PKCS12 support disabled - cannot read "
"p12/pfx files");
return -1;
#endif /* PKCS12_FUNCS */
}
static int tls_read_pkcs12_blob(struct tls_data *data, SSL *ssl,
const u8 *blob, size_t len, const char *passwd)
{
#ifdef PKCS12_FUNCS
PKCS12 *p12;
p12 = d2i_PKCS12(NULL, (const unsigned char **) &blob, len);
if (p12 == NULL) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
"Failed to use PKCS#12 blob");
return -1;
}
return tls_parse_pkcs12(data, ssl, p12, passwd);
#else /* PKCS12_FUNCS */
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TLS: PKCS12 support disabled - cannot parse "
"p12/pfx blobs");
return -1;
#endif /* PKCS12_FUNCS */
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
static int tls_engine_get_cert(struct tls_connection *conn,
const char *cert_id,
X509 **cert)
{
/* this runs after the private key is loaded so no PIN is required */
struct {
const char *cert_id;
X509 *cert;
} params;
params.cert_id = cert_id;
params.cert = NULL;
if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(conn->engine, "LOAD_CERT_CTRL",
0, &params, NULL, 1)) {
unsigned long err = ERR_get_error();
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "ENGINE: cannot load client cert with id"
" '%s' [%s]", cert_id,
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
if (tls_is_pin_error(err))
return TLS_SET_PARAMS_ENGINE_PRV_BAD_PIN;
return TLS_SET_PARAMS_ENGINE_PRV_INIT_FAILED;
}
if (!params.cert) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "ENGINE: did not properly cert with id"
" '%s'", cert_id);
return TLS_SET_PARAMS_ENGINE_PRV_INIT_FAILED;
}
*cert = params.cert;
return 0;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE */
static int tls_connection_engine_client_cert(struct tls_connection *conn,
const char *cert_id)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
X509 *cert;
if (tls_engine_get_cert(conn, cert_id, &cert))
return -1;
if (!SSL_use_certificate(conn->ssl, cert)) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_ERROR, __func__,
"SSL_use_certificate failed");
X509_free(cert);
return -1;
}
X509_free(cert);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "ENGINE: SSL_use_certificate --> "
"OK");
return 0;
#else /* OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE */
return -1;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE */
}
static int tls_connection_engine_ca_cert(struct tls_data *data,
struct tls_connection *conn,
const char *ca_cert_id)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
X509 *cert;
SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = data->ssl;
X509_STORE *store;
if (tls_engine_get_cert(conn, ca_cert_id, &cert))
return -1;
/* start off the same as tls_connection_ca_cert */
store = X509_STORE_new();
if (store == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: %s - failed to allocate new "
"certificate store", __func__);
X509_free(cert);
return -1;
}
SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(ssl_ctx, store);
if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(store, cert)) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
tls_show_errors(MSG_WARNING, __func__,
"Failed to add CA certificate from engine "
"to certificate store");
if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_X509 &&
ERR_GET_REASON(err) == X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: %s - ignoring cert"
" already in hash table error",
__func__);
} else {
X509_free(cert);
return -1;
}
}
X509_free(cert);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: %s - added CA certificate from engine "
"to certificate store", __func__);
SSL_set_verify(conn->ssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, tls_verify_cb);
conn->ca_cert_verify = 1;
return 0;
#else /* OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE */
return -1;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE */
}
static int tls_connection_engine_private_key(struct tls_connection *conn)
{
#if defined(ANDROID) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE)
if (SSL_use_PrivateKey(conn->ssl, conn->private_key) != 1) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_ERROR, __func__,
"ENGINE: cannot use private key for TLS");
return -1;
}
if (!SSL_check_private_key(conn->ssl)) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
"Private key failed verification");
return -1;
}
return 0;
#else /* OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE */
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "SSL: Configuration uses engine, but "
"engine support was not compiled in");
return -1;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE */
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
static int tls_passwd_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *password)
{
if (!password)
return 0;
os_strlcpy(buf, (const char *) password, size);
return os_strlen(buf);
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_STDIO */
static int tls_use_private_key_file(struct tls_data *data, SSL *ssl,
const char *private_key,
const char *private_key_passwd)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
BIO *bio;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
int ret;
/* First try ASN.1 (DER). */
bio = BIO_new_file(private_key, "r");
if (!bio)
return -1;
pkey = d2i_PrivateKey_bio(bio, NULL);
BIO_free(bio);
if (pkey) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: %s (DER) --> loaded", __func__);
} else {
/* Try PEM with the provided password. */
bio = BIO_new_file(private_key, "r");
if (!bio)
return -1;
pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio, NULL, tls_passwd_cb,
(void *) private_key_passwd);
BIO_free(bio);
if (!pkey)
return -1;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: %s (PEM) --> loaded", __func__);
/* Clear errors from the previous failed load. */
ERR_clear_error();
}
if (ssl)
ret = SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey);
else
ret = SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(data->ssl, pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return ret == 1 ? 0 : -1;
#else /* OPENSSL_NO_STDIO */
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: %s - OPENSSL_NO_STDIO", __func__);
return -1;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_STDIO */
}
static int tls_connection_private_key(struct tls_data *data,
struct tls_connection *conn,
const char *private_key,
const char *private_key_passwd,
const u8 *private_key_blob,
size_t private_key_blob_len)
{
BIO *bio;
int ok;
if (private_key == NULL && private_key_blob == NULL)
return 0;
ok = 0;
while (private_key_blob) {
if (SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(EVP_PKEY_RSA, conn->ssl,
(u8 *) private_key_blob,
private_key_blob_len) == 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: SSL_use_PrivateKey_"
"ASN1(EVP_PKEY_RSA) --> OK");
ok = 1;
break;
}
if (SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(EVP_PKEY_DSA, conn->ssl,
(u8 *) private_key_blob,
private_key_blob_len) == 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: SSL_use_PrivateKey_"
"ASN1(EVP_PKEY_DSA) --> OK");
ok = 1;
break;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(EVP_PKEY_EC, conn->ssl,
(u8 *) private_key_blob,
private_key_blob_len) == 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"OpenSSL: SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(EVP_PKEY_EC) --> OK");
ok = 1;
break;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
if (SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(conn->ssl,
(u8 *) private_key_blob,
private_key_blob_len) == 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: "
"SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1 --> OK");
ok = 1;
break;
}
bio = BIO_new_mem_buf((u8 *) private_key_blob,
private_key_blob_len);
if (bio) {
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(
bio, NULL, tls_passwd_cb,
(void *) private_key_passwd);
if (pkey) {
if (SSL_use_PrivateKey(conn->ssl, pkey) == 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"OpenSSL: SSL_use_PrivateKey --> OK");
ok = 1;
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
BIO_free(bio);
break;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
BIO_free(bio);
}
if (tls_read_pkcs12_blob(data, conn->ssl, private_key_blob,
private_key_blob_len,
private_key_passwd) == 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: PKCS#12 as blob --> "
"OK");
ok = 1;
break;
}
break;
}
while (!ok && private_key) {
if (tls_use_private_key_file(data, conn->ssl, private_key,
private_key_passwd) == 0) {
ok = 1;
break;
}
if (tls_read_pkcs12(data, conn->ssl, private_key,
private_key_passwd) == 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: Reading PKCS#12 file "
"--> OK");
ok = 1;
break;
}
if (tls_cryptoapi_cert(conn->ssl, private_key) == 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: Using CryptoAPI to "
"access certificate store --> OK");
ok = 1;
break;
}
break;
}
if (!ok) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
"Failed to load private key");
return -1;
}
ERR_clear_error();
if (!SSL_check_private_key(conn->ssl)) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__, "Private key failed "
"verification");
return -1;
}
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SSL: Private key loaded successfully");
return 0;
}
static int tls_global_private_key(struct tls_data *data,
const char *private_key,
const char *private_key_passwd)
{
SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = data->ssl;
if (private_key == NULL)
return 0;
if (tls_use_private_key_file(data, NULL, private_key,
private_key_passwd) &&
tls_read_pkcs12(data, NULL, private_key, private_key_passwd)) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
"Failed to load private key");
ERR_clear_error();
return -1;
}
ERR_clear_error();
if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ssl_ctx)) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
"Private key failed verification");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static int tls_connection_dh(struct tls_connection *conn, const char *dh_file)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (dh_file == NULL)
return 0;
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "TLS: openssl does not include DH support, but "
"dh_file specified");
return -1;
#else /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
DH *dh;
BIO *bio;
/* TODO: add support for dh_blob */
if (dh_file == NULL)
return 0;
if (conn == NULL)
return -1;
bio = BIO_new_file(dh_file, "r");
if (bio == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TLS: Failed to open DH file '%s': %s",
dh_file, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
return -1;
}
dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
BIO_free(bio);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
while (dh == NULL) {
DSA *dsa;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TLS: Failed to parse DH file '%s': %s -"
" trying to parse as DSA params", dh_file,
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
bio = BIO_new_file(dh_file, "r");
if (bio == NULL)
break;
dsa = PEM_read_bio_DSAparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
BIO_free(bio);
if (!dsa) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TLS: Failed to parse DSA file "
"'%s': %s", dh_file,
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
break;
}
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TLS: DH file in DSA param format");
dh = DSA_dup_DH(dsa);
DSA_free(dsa);
if (dh == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TLS: Failed to convert DSA "
"params into DH params");
break;
}
break;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
if (dh == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TLS: Failed to read/parse DH/DSA file "
"'%s'", dh_file);
return -1;
}
if (SSL_set_tmp_dh(conn->ssl, dh) != 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TLS: Failed to set DH params from '%s': "
"%s", dh_file,
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
DH_free(dh);
return -1;
}
DH_free(dh);
return 0;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
}
static int tls_global_dh(struct tls_data *data, const char *dh_file)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (dh_file == NULL)
return 0;
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "TLS: openssl does not include DH support, but "
"dh_file specified");
return -1;
#else /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = data->ssl;
DH *dh;
BIO *bio;
/* TODO: add support for dh_blob */
if (dh_file == NULL)
return 0;
if (ssl_ctx == NULL)
return -1;
bio = BIO_new_file(dh_file, "r");
if (bio == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TLS: Failed to open DH file '%s': %s",
dh_file, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
return -1;
}
dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
BIO_free(bio);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
while (dh == NULL) {
DSA *dsa;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TLS: Failed to parse DH file '%s': %s -"
" trying to parse as DSA params", dh_file,
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
bio = BIO_new_file(dh_file, "r");
if (bio == NULL)
break;
dsa = PEM_read_bio_DSAparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
BIO_free(bio);
if (!dsa) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TLS: Failed to parse DSA file "
"'%s': %s", dh_file,
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
break;
}
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TLS: DH file in DSA param format");
dh = DSA_dup_DH(dsa);
DSA_free(dsa);
if (dh == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TLS: Failed to convert DSA "
"params into DH params");
break;
}
break;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
if (dh == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TLS: Failed to read/parse DH/DSA file "
"'%s'", dh_file);
return -1;
}
if (SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ssl_ctx, dh) != 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TLS: Failed to set DH params from '%s': "
"%s", dh_file,
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
DH_free(dh);
return -1;
}
DH_free(dh);
return 0;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
}
int tls_connection_get_random(void *ssl_ctx, struct tls_connection *conn,
struct tls_random *keys)
{
SSL *ssl;
if (conn == NULL || keys == NULL)
return -1;
ssl = conn->ssl;
if (ssl == NULL)
return -1;
os_memset(keys, 0, sizeof(*keys));
keys->client_random = conn->client_random;
keys->client_random_len = SSL_get_client_random(
ssl, conn->client_random, sizeof(conn->client_random));
keys->server_random = conn->server_random;
keys->server_random_len = SSL_get_server_random(
ssl, conn->server_random, sizeof(conn->server_random));
return 0;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_NEED_EAP_FAST_PRF
static int openssl_get_keyblock_size(SSL *ssl)
{
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || \
(defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x20700000L)
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
const EVP_MD *h;
int md_size;
if (ssl->enc_read_ctx == NULL || ssl->enc_read_ctx->cipher == NULL ||
ssl->read_hash == NULL)
return -1;
c = ssl->enc_read_ctx->cipher;
h = EVP_MD_CTX_md(ssl->read_hash);
if (h)
md_size = EVP_MD_size(h);
else if (ssl->s3)
md_size = ssl->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
else
return -1;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: keyblock size: key_len=%d MD_size=%d "
"IV_len=%d", EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c), md_size,
EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c));
return 2 * (EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) +
md_size +
EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c));
#else
const SSL_CIPHER *ssl_cipher;
int cipher, digest;
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
const EVP_MD *h;
int mac_key_len, enc_key_len, fixed_iv_len;
ssl_cipher = SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl);
if (!ssl_cipher)
return -1;
cipher = SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid(ssl_cipher);
digest = SSL_CIPHER_get_digest_nid(ssl_cipher);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: cipher nid %d digest nid %d",
cipher, digest);
if (cipher < 0 || digest < 0)
return -1;
if (cipher == NID_undef) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: no cipher in use?!");
return -1;
}
c = EVP_get_cipherbynid(cipher);
if (!c)
return -1;
enc_key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE ||
EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
fixed_iv_len = 4; /* only part of IV from PRF */
else
fixed_iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
if (digest == NID_undef) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: no digest in use (e.g., AEAD)");
mac_key_len = 0;
} else {
h = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest);
if (!h)
return -1;
mac_key_len = EVP_MD_size(h);
}
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"OpenSSL: keyblock size: mac_key_len=%d enc_key_len=%d fixed_iv_len=%d",
mac_key_len, enc_key_len, fixed_iv_len);
return 2 * (mac_key_len + enc_key_len + fixed_iv_len);
#endif
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NEED_EAP_FAST_PRF */
int tls_connection_export_key(void *tls_ctx, struct tls_connection *conn,
const char *label, const u8 *context,
size_t context_len, u8 *out, size_t out_len)
{
if (!conn ||
SSL_export_keying_material(conn->ssl, out, out_len, label,
os_strlen(label), context, context_len,
context != NULL) != 1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
int tls_connection_get_eap_fast_key(void *tls_ctx, struct tls_connection *conn,
u8 *out, size_t out_len)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_NEED_EAP_FAST_PRF
SSL *ssl;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
u8 *rnd;
int ret = -1;
int skip = 0;
u8 *tmp_out = NULL;
u8 *_out = out;
unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
unsigned char server_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
unsigned char master_key[64];
size_t master_key_len;
const char *ver;
/*
* TLS library did not support EAP-FAST key generation, so get the
* needed TLS session parameters and use an internal implementation of
* TLS PRF to derive the key.
*/
if (conn == NULL)
return -1;
ssl = conn->ssl;
if (ssl == NULL)
return -1;
ver = SSL_get_version(ssl);
sess = SSL_get_session(ssl);
if (!ver || !sess)
return -1;
skip = openssl_get_keyblock_size(ssl);
if (skip < 0)
return -1;
tmp_out = os_malloc(skip + out_len);
if (!tmp_out)
return -1;
_out = tmp_out;
rnd = os_malloc(2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
if (!rnd) {
os_free(tmp_out);
return -1;
}
SSL_get_client_random(ssl, client_random, sizeof(client_random));
SSL_get_server_random(ssl, server_random, sizeof(server_random));
master_key_len = SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(sess, master_key,
sizeof(master_key));
os_memcpy(rnd, server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
os_memcpy(rnd + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
if (os_strcmp(ver, "TLSv1.2") == 0) {
tls_prf_sha256(master_key, master_key_len,
"key expansion", rnd, 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
_out, skip + out_len);
ret = 0;
} else if (tls_prf_sha1_md5(master_key, master_key_len,
"key expansion", rnd, 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
_out, skip + out_len) == 0) {
ret = 0;
}
forced_memzero(master_key, sizeof(master_key));
os_free(rnd);
if (ret == 0)
os_memcpy(out, _out + skip, out_len);
bin_clear_free(tmp_out, skip);
return ret;
#else /* OPENSSL_NEED_EAP_FAST_PRF */
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
"OpenSSL: EAP-FAST keys cannot be exported in FIPS mode");
return -1;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NEED_EAP_FAST_PRF */
}
static struct wpabuf *
openssl_handshake(struct tls_connection *conn, const struct wpabuf *in_data)
{
int res;
struct wpabuf *out_data;
/*
* Give TLS handshake data from the server (if available) to OpenSSL
* for processing.
*/
if (in_data && wpabuf_len(in_data) > 0 &&
BIO_write(conn->ssl_in, wpabuf_head(in_data), wpabuf_len(in_data))
< 0) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
"Handshake failed - BIO_write");
return NULL;
}
/* Initiate TLS handshake or continue the existing handshake */
if (conn->server)
res = SSL_accept(conn->ssl);
else
res = SSL_connect(conn->ssl);
if (res != 1) {
int err = SSL_get_error(conn->ssl, res);
if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SSL: SSL_connect - want "
"more data");
else if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE)
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SSL: SSL_connect - want to "
"write");
else {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__, "SSL_connect");
conn->failed++;
if (!conn->server && !conn->client_hello_generated) {
/* The server would not understand TLS Alert
* before ClientHello, so simply terminate
* handshake on this type of error case caused
* by a likely internal error like no ciphers
* available. */
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"OpenSSL: Could not generate ClientHello");
conn->write_alerts++;
return NULL;
}
}
}
if (!conn->server && !conn->failed)
conn->client_hello_generated = 1;
#ifdef CONFIG_SUITEB
if ((conn->flags & TLS_CONN_SUITEB) && !conn->server &&
os_strncmp(SSL_get_cipher(conn->ssl), "DHE-", 4) == 0 &&
conn->server_dh_prime_len < 3072) {
struct tls_context *context = conn->context;
/*
* This should not be reached since earlier cert_cb should have
* terminated the handshake. Keep this check here for extra
* protection if anything goes wrong with the more low-level
* checks based on having to parse the TLS handshake messages.
*/
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"OpenSSL: Server DH prime length: %d bits",
conn->server_dh_prime_len);
if (context->event_cb) {
union tls_event_data ev;
os_memset(&ev, 0, sizeof(ev));
ev.alert.is_local = 1;
ev.alert.type = "fatal";
ev.alert.description = "insufficient security";
context->event_cb(context->cb_ctx, TLS_ALERT, &ev);
}
/*
* Could send a TLS Alert to the server, but for now, simply
* terminate handshake.
*/
conn->failed++;
conn->write_alerts++;
return NULL;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SUITEB */
/* Get the TLS handshake data to be sent to the server */
res = BIO_ctrl_pending(conn->ssl_out);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SSL: %d bytes pending from ssl_out", res);
out_data = wpabuf_alloc(res);
if (out_data == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SSL: Failed to allocate memory for "
"handshake output (%d bytes)", res);
if (BIO_reset(conn->ssl_out) < 0) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
"BIO_reset failed");
}
return NULL;
}
res = res == 0 ? 0 : BIO_read(conn->ssl_out, wpabuf_mhead(out_data),
res);
if (res < 0) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
"Handshake failed - BIO_read");
if (BIO_reset(conn->ssl_out) < 0) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
"BIO_reset failed");
}
wpabuf_free(out_data);
return NULL;
}
wpabuf_put(out_data, res);
return out_data;
}
static struct wpabuf *
openssl_get_appl_data(struct tls_connection *conn, size_t max_len)
{
struct wpabuf *appl_data;
int res;
appl_data = wpabuf_alloc(max_len + 100);
if (appl_data == NULL)
return NULL;
res = SSL_read(conn->ssl, wpabuf_mhead(appl_data),
wpabuf_size(appl_data));
if (res < 0) {
int err = SSL_get_error(conn->ssl, res);
if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ ||
err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SSL: No Application Data "
"included");
} else {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
"Failed to read possible "
"Application Data");
}
wpabuf_free(appl_data);
return NULL;
}
wpabuf_put(appl_data, res);
wpa_hexdump_buf_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "SSL: Application Data in Finished "
"message", appl_data);
return appl_data;
}
static struct wpabuf *
openssl_connection_handshake(struct tls_connection *conn,
const struct wpabuf *in_data,
struct wpabuf **appl_data)
{
struct wpabuf *out_data;
if (appl_data)
*appl_data = NULL;
out_data = openssl_handshake(conn, in_data);
if (out_data == NULL)
return NULL;
if (conn->invalid_hb_used) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TLS: Heartbeat attack detected - do not send response");
wpabuf_free(out_data);
return NULL;
}
if (SSL_is_init_finished(conn->ssl)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"OpenSSL: Handshake finished - resumed=%d",
tls_connection_resumed(conn->ssl_ctx, conn));
if (conn->server) {
char *buf;
size_t buflen = 2000;
buf = os_malloc(buflen);
if (buf) {
if (SSL_get_shared_ciphers(conn->ssl, buf,
buflen)) {
buf[buflen - 1] = '\0';
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"OpenSSL: Shared ciphers: %s",
buf);
}
os_free(buf);
}
}
if (appl_data && in_data)
*appl_data = openssl_get_appl_data(conn,
wpabuf_len(in_data));
}
if (conn->invalid_hb_used) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TLS: Heartbeat attack detected - do not send response");
if (appl_data) {
wpabuf_free(*appl_data);
*appl_data = NULL;
}
wpabuf_free(out_data);
return NULL;
}
return out_data;
}
struct wpabuf *
tls_connection_handshake(void *ssl_ctx, struct tls_connection *conn,
const struct wpabuf *in_data,
struct wpabuf **appl_data)
{
return openssl_connection_handshake(conn, in_data, appl_data);
}
struct wpabuf * tls_connection_server_handshake(void *tls_ctx,
struct tls_connection *conn,
const struct wpabuf *in_data,
struct wpabuf **appl_data)
{
conn->server = 1;
return openssl_connection_handshake(conn, in_data, appl_data);
}
struct wpabuf * tls_connection_encrypt(void *tls_ctx,
struct tls_connection *conn,
const struct wpabuf *in_data)
{
int res;
struct wpabuf *buf;
if (conn == NULL)
return NULL;
/* Give plaintext data for OpenSSL to encrypt into the TLS tunnel. */
if ((res = BIO_reset(conn->ssl_in)) < 0 ||
(res = BIO_reset(conn->ssl_out)) < 0) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__, "BIO_reset failed");
return NULL;
}
res = SSL_write(conn->ssl, wpabuf_head(in_data), wpabuf_len(in_data));
if (res < 0) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
"Encryption failed - SSL_write");
return NULL;
}
/* Read encrypted data to be sent to the server */
buf = wpabuf_alloc(wpabuf_len(in_data) + 300);
if (buf == NULL)
return NULL;
res = BIO_read(conn->ssl_out, wpabuf_mhead(buf), wpabuf_size(buf));
if (res < 0) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
"Encryption failed - BIO_read");
wpabuf_free(buf);
return NULL;
}
wpabuf_put(buf, res);
return buf;
}
struct wpabuf * tls_connection_decrypt(void *tls_ctx,
struct tls_connection *conn,
const struct wpabuf *in_data)
{
int res;
struct wpabuf *buf;
/* Give encrypted data from TLS tunnel for OpenSSL to decrypt. */
res = BIO_write(conn->ssl_in, wpabuf_head(in_data),
wpabuf_len(in_data));
if (res < 0) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
"Decryption failed - BIO_write");
return NULL;
}
if (BIO_reset(conn->ssl_out) < 0) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__, "BIO_reset failed");
return NULL;
}
/* Read decrypted data for further processing */
/*
* Even though we try to disable TLS compression, it is possible that
* this cannot be done with all TLS libraries. Add extra buffer space
* to handle the possibility of the decrypted data being longer than
* input data.
*/
buf = wpabuf_alloc((wpabuf_len(in_data) + 500) * 3);
if (buf == NULL)
return NULL;
res = SSL_read(conn->ssl, wpabuf_mhead(buf), wpabuf_size(buf));
if (res < 0) {
int err = SSL_get_error(conn->ssl, res);
if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"SSL: SSL_connect - want more data");
res = 0;
} else {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
"Decryption failed - SSL_read");
wpabuf_free(buf);
return NULL;
}
}
wpabuf_put(buf, res);
if (conn->invalid_hb_used) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TLS: Heartbeat attack detected - do not send response");
wpabuf_free(buf);
return NULL;
}
return buf;
}
int tls_connection_resumed(void *ssl_ctx, struct tls_connection *conn)
{
return conn ? SSL_session_reused(conn->ssl) : 0;
}
int tls_connection_set_cipher_list(void *tls_ctx, struct tls_connection *conn,
u8 *ciphers)
{
char buf[500], *pos, *end;
u8 *c;
int ret;
if (conn == NULL || conn->ssl == NULL || ciphers == NULL)
return -1;
buf[0] = '\0';
pos = buf;
end = pos + sizeof(buf);
c = ciphers;
while (*c != TLS_CIPHER_NONE) {
const char *suite;
switch (*c) {
case TLS_CIPHER_RC4_SHA:
suite = "RC4-SHA";
break;
case TLS_CIPHER_AES128_SHA:
suite = "AES128-SHA";
break;
case TLS_CIPHER_RSA_DHE_AES128_SHA:
suite = "DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA";
break;
case TLS_CIPHER_ANON_DH_AES128_SHA:
suite = "ADH-AES128-SHA";
break;
case TLS_CIPHER_RSA_DHE_AES256_SHA:
suite = "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA";
break;
case TLS_CIPHER_AES256_SHA:
suite = "AES256-SHA";
break;
default:
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TLS: Unsupported "
"cipher selection: %d", *c);
return -1;
}
ret = os_snprintf(pos, end - pos, ":%s", suite);
if (os_snprintf_error(end - pos, ret))
break;
pos += ret;
c++;
}
if (!buf[0]) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: No ciphers listed");
return -1;
}
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: cipher suites: %s", buf + 1);
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
#ifdef EAP_FAST_OR_TEAP
if (os_strstr(buf, ":ADH-")) {
/*
* Need to drop to security level 0 to allow anonymous
* cipher suites for EAP-FAST.
*/
SSL_set_security_level(conn->ssl, 0);
} else if (SSL_get_security_level(conn->ssl) == 0) {
/* Force at least security level 1 */
SSL_set_security_level(conn->ssl, 1);
}
#endif /* EAP_FAST_OR_TEAP */
#endif
if (SSL_set_cipher_list(conn->ssl, buf + 1) != 1) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
"Cipher suite configuration failed");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int tls_get_version(void *ssl_ctx, struct tls_connection *conn,
char *buf, size_t buflen)
{
const char *name;
if (conn == NULL || conn->ssl == NULL)
return -1;
name = SSL_get_version(conn->ssl);
if (name == NULL)
return -1;
os_strlcpy(buf, name, buflen);
return 0;
}
int tls_get_cipher(void *ssl_ctx, struct tls_connection *conn,
char *buf, size_t buflen)
{
const char *name;
if (conn == NULL || conn->ssl == NULL)
return -1;
name = SSL_get_cipher(conn->ssl);
if (name == NULL)
return -1;
os_strlcpy(buf, name, buflen);
return 0;
}
int tls_connection_enable_workaround(void *ssl_ctx,
struct tls_connection *conn)
{
SSL_set_options(conn->ssl, SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS);
return 0;
}
#ifdef EAP_FAST_OR_TEAP
/* ClientHello TLS extensions require a patch to openssl, so this function is
* commented out unless explicitly needed for EAP-FAST in order to be able to
* build this file with unmodified openssl. */
int tls_connection_client_hello_ext(void *ssl_ctx, struct tls_connection *conn,
int ext_type, const u8 *data,
size_t data_len)
{
if (conn == NULL || conn->ssl == NULL || ext_type != 35)
return -1;
if (SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(conn->ssl, (void *) data,
data_len) != 1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
#endif /* EAP_FAST_OR_TEAP */
int tls_connection_get_failed(void *ssl_ctx, struct tls_connection *conn)
{
if (conn == NULL)
return -1;
return conn->failed;
}
int tls_connection_get_read_alerts(void *ssl_ctx, struct tls_connection *conn)
{
if (conn == NULL)
return -1;
return conn->read_alerts;
}
int tls_connection_get_write_alerts(void *ssl_ctx, struct tls_connection *conn)
{
if (conn == NULL)
return -1;
return conn->write_alerts;
}
#ifdef HAVE_OCSP
static void ocsp_debug_print_resp(OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp)
{
#ifndef CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG
BIO *out;
size_t rlen;
char *txt;
int res;
if (wpa_debug_level > MSG_DEBUG)
return;
out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if (!out)
return;
OCSP_RESPONSE_print(out, rsp, 0);
rlen = BIO_ctrl_pending(out);
txt = os_malloc(rlen + 1);
if (!txt) {
BIO_free(out);
return;
}
res = BIO_read(out, txt, rlen);
if (res > 0) {
txt[res] = '\0';
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: OCSP Response\n%s", txt);
}
os_free(txt);
BIO_free(out);
#endif /* CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG */
}
static int ocsp_resp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
{
struct tls_connection *conn = arg;
const unsigned char *p;
int len, status, reason, res;
OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp;
OCSP_BASICRESP *basic;
OCSP_CERTID *id;
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *produced_at, *this_update, *next_update;
X509_STORE *store;
STACK_OF(X509) *certs = NULL;
len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, &p);
if (!p) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: No OCSP response received");
return (conn->flags & TLS_CONN_REQUIRE_OCSP) ? 0 : 1;
}
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: OCSP response", p, len);
rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len);
if (!rsp) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "OpenSSL: Failed to parse OCSP response");
return 0;
}
ocsp_debug_print_resp(rsp);
status = OCSP_response_status(rsp);
if (status != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "OpenSSL: OCSP responder error %d (%s)",
status, OCSP_response_status_str(status));
return 0;
}
basic = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp);
if (!basic) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "OpenSSL: Could not find BasicOCSPResponse");
return 0;
}
store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(conn->ssl_ctx);
if (conn->peer_issuer) {
debug_print_cert(conn->peer_issuer, "Add OCSP issuer");
if (X509_STORE_add_cert(store, conn->peer_issuer) != 1) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
"OpenSSL: Could not add issuer to certificate store");
}
certs = sk_X509_new_null();
if (certs) {
X509 *cert;
cert = X509_dup(conn->peer_issuer);
if (cert && !sk_X509_push(certs, cert)) {
tls_show_errors(
MSG_INFO, __func__,
"OpenSSL: Could not add issuer to OCSP responder trust store");
X509_free(cert);
sk_X509_free(certs);
certs = NULL;
}
if (certs && conn->peer_issuer_issuer) {
cert = X509_dup(conn->peer_issuer_issuer);
if (cert && !sk_X509_push(certs, cert)) {
tls_show_errors(
MSG_INFO, __func__,
"OpenSSL: Could not add issuer's issuer to OCSP responder trust store");
X509_free(cert);
}
}
}
}
status = OCSP_basic_verify(basic, certs, store, OCSP_TRUSTOTHER);
sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
if (status <= 0) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
"OpenSSL: OCSP response failed verification");
OCSP_BASICRESP_free(basic);
OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
return 0;
}
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: OCSP response verification succeeded");
if (!conn->peer_cert) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: Peer certificate not available for OCSP status check");
OCSP_BASICRESP_free(basic);
OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
return 0;
}
if (!conn->peer_issuer) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: Peer issuer certificate not available for OCSP status check");
OCSP_BASICRESP_free(basic);
OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
return 0;
}
id = OCSP_cert_to_id(EVP_sha256(), conn->peer_cert, conn->peer_issuer);
if (!id) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"OpenSSL: Could not create OCSP certificate identifier (SHA256)");
OCSP_BASICRESP_free(basic);
OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
return 0;
}
res = OCSP_resp_find_status(basic, id, &status, &reason, &produced_at,
&this_update, &next_update);
if (!res) {
OCSP_CERTID_free(id);
id = OCSP_cert_to_id(NULL, conn->peer_cert, conn->peer_issuer);
if (!id) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"OpenSSL: Could not create OCSP certificate identifier (SHA1)");
OCSP_BASICRESP_free(basic);
OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
return 0;
}
res = OCSP_resp_find_status(basic, id, &status, &reason,
&produced_at, &this_update,
&next_update);
}
if (!res) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "OpenSSL: Could not find current server certificate from OCSP response%s",
(conn->flags & TLS_CONN_REQUIRE_OCSP) ? "" :
" (OCSP not required)");
OCSP_CERTID_free(id);
OCSP_BASICRESP_free(basic);
OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
return (conn->flags & TLS_CONN_REQUIRE_OCSP) ? 0 : 1;
}
OCSP_CERTID_free(id);
if (!OCSP_check_validity(this_update, next_update, 5 * 60, -1)) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
"OpenSSL: OCSP status times invalid");
OCSP_BASICRESP_free(basic);
OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
return 0;
}
OCSP_BASICRESP_free(basic);
OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: OCSP status for server certificate: %s",
OCSP_cert_status_str(status));
if (status == V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD)
return 1;
if (status == V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED)
return 0;
if (conn->flags & TLS_CONN_REQUIRE_OCSP) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: OCSP status unknown, but OCSP required");
return 0;
}
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: OCSP status unknown, but OCSP was not required, so allow connection to continue");
return 1;
}
static int ocsp_status_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
{
char *tmp;
char *resp;
size_t len;
if (tls_global->ocsp_stapling_response == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: OCSP status callback - no response configured");
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
}
resp = os_readfile(tls_global->ocsp_stapling_response, &len);
if (resp == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: OCSP status callback - could not read response file");
/* TODO: Build OCSPResponse with responseStatus = internalError
*/
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
}
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: OCSP status callback - send cached response");
tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if (tmp == NULL) {
os_free(resp);
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
}
os_memcpy(tmp, resp, len);
os_free(resp);
SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, tmp, len);
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
}
#endif /* HAVE_OCSP */
static size_t max_str_len(const char **lines)
{
const char **p;
size_t max_len = 0;
for (p = lines; *p; p++) {
size_t len = os_strlen(*p);
if (len > max_len)
max_len = len;
}
return max_len;
}
static int match_lines_in_file(const char *path, const char **lines)
{
FILE *f;
char *buf;
size_t bufsize;
int found = 0, is_linestart = 1;
bufsize = max_str_len(lines) + sizeof("\r\n");
buf = os_malloc(bufsize);
if (!buf)
return 0;
f = fopen(path, "r");
if (!f) {
os_free(buf);
return 0;
}
while (!found && fgets(buf, bufsize, f)) {
int is_lineend;
size_t len;
const char **p;
len = strcspn(buf, "\r\n");
is_lineend = buf[len] != '\0';
buf[len] = '\0';
if (is_linestart && is_lineend) {
for (p = lines; !found && *p; p++)
found = os_strcmp(buf, *p) == 0;
}
is_linestart = is_lineend;
}
fclose(f);
bin_clear_free(buf, bufsize);
return found;
}
static int is_tpm2_key(const char *path)
{
/* Check both new and old format of TPM2 PEM guard tag */
static const char *tpm2_tags[] = {
"-----BEGIN TSS2 PRIVATE KEY-----",
"-----BEGIN TSS2 KEY BLOB-----",
NULL
};
return match_lines_in_file(path, tpm2_tags);
}
int tls_connection_set_params(void *tls_ctx, struct tls_connection *conn,
const struct tls_connection_params *params)
{
struct tls_data *data = tls_ctx;
int ret;
unsigned long err;
int can_pkcs11 = 0;
const char *key_id = params->key_id;
const char *cert_id = params->cert_id;
const char *ca_cert_id = params->ca_cert_id;
const char *engine_id = params->engine ? params->engine_id : NULL;
const char *ciphers;
if (conn == NULL)
return -1;
if (params->flags & TLS_CONN_REQUIRE_OCSP_ALL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"OpenSSL: ocsp=3 not supported");
return -1;
}
/*
* If the engine isn't explicitly configured, and any of the
* cert/key fields are actually PKCS#11 URIs, then automatically
* use the PKCS#11 ENGINE.
*/
if (!engine_id || os_strcmp(engine_id, "pkcs11") == 0)
can_pkcs11 = 1;
if (!key_id && params->private_key && can_pkcs11 &&
os_strncmp(params->private_key, "pkcs11:", 7) == 0) {
can_pkcs11 = 2;
key_id = params->private_key;
}
if (!cert_id && params->client_cert && can_pkcs11 &&
os_strncmp(params->client_cert, "pkcs11:", 7) == 0) {
can_pkcs11 = 2;
cert_id = params->client_cert;
}
if (!ca_cert_id && params->ca_cert && can_pkcs11 &&
os_strncmp(params->ca_cert, "pkcs11:", 7) == 0) {
can_pkcs11 = 2;
ca_cert_id = params->ca_cert;
}
/* If we need to automatically enable the PKCS#11 ENGINE, do so. */
if (can_pkcs11 == 2 && !engine_id)
engine_id = "pkcs11";
/* If private_key points to a TPM2-wrapped key, automatically enable
* tpm2 engine and use it to unwrap the key. */
if (params->private_key &&
(!engine_id || os_strcmp(engine_id, "tpm2") == 0) &&
is_tpm2_key(params->private_key)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: Found TPM2 wrapped key %s",
params->private_key);
key_id = key_id ? key_id : params->private_key;
engine_id = engine_id ? engine_id : "tpm2";
}
#if defined(EAP_FAST) || defined(EAP_FAST_DYNAMIC) || defined(EAP_SERVER_FAST)
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
if (params->flags & TLS_CONN_EAP_FAST) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"OpenSSL: Use TLSv1_method() for EAP-FAST");
if (SSL_set_ssl_method(conn->ssl, TLSv1_method()) != 1) {
tls_show_errors(MSG_INFO, __func__,
"Failed to set TLSv1_method() for EAP-FAST");
return -1;
}
}
#endif
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3
if (params->flags & TLS_CONN_EAP_FAST) {
/* Need to disable TLS v1.3 at least for now since OpenSSL 1.1.1
* refuses to start the handshake with the modified ciphersuite
* list (no TLS v1.3 ciphersuites included) for EAP-FAST. */
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: Disable TLSv1.3 for EAP-FAST");
SSL_set_options(conn->ssl, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3);
}
#endif /* SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3 */
#endif
#endif /* EAP_FAST || EAP_FAST_DYNAMIC || EAP_SERVER_FAST */
while ((err = ERR_get_error())) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "%s: Clearing pending SSL error: %s",
__func__, ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
}
if (engine_id) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SSL: Initializing TLS engine %s",
engine_id);
ret = tls_engine_init(conn, engine_id, params->pin,
key_id, cert_id, ca_cert_id);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
if (tls_connection_set_subject_match(conn,
params->subject_match,
params->altsubject_match,
params->suffix_match,
params->domain_match,
params->check_cert_subject))
return -1;
if (engine_id && ca_cert_id) {
if (tls_connection_engine_ca_cert(data, conn, ca_cert_id))
return TLS_SET_PARAMS_ENGINE_PRV_VERIFY_FAILED;
} else if (tls_connection_ca_cert(data, conn, params->ca_cert,
params->ca_cert_blob,
params->ca_cert_blob_len,
params->ca_path))
return -1;
if (engine_id && cert_id) {
if (tls_connection_engine_client_cert(conn, cert_id))
return TLS_SET_PARAMS_ENGINE_PRV_VERIFY_FAILED;
} else if (tls_connection_client_cert(conn, params->client_cert,
params->client_cert_blob,
params->client_cert_blob_len))
return -1;
if (engine_id && key_id) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TLS: Using private key from engine");
if (tls_connection_engine_private_key(conn))
return TLS_SET_PARAMS_ENGINE_PRV_VERIFY_FAILED;
} else if (tls_connection_private_key(data, conn,
params->private_key,
params->private_key_passwd,
params->private_key_blob,
params->private_key_blob_len)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TLS: Failed to load private key '%s'",
params->private_key);
return -1;
}
if (tls_connection_dh(conn, params->dh_file)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TLS: Failed to load DH file '%s'",
params->dh_file);
return -1;
}
ciphers = params->openssl_ciphers;
#ifdef CONFIG_SUITEB
#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
if (ciphers && os_strcmp(ciphers, "SUITEB192") == 0) {
/* BoringSSL removed support for SUITEB192, so need to handle
* this with hardcoded ciphersuite and additional checks for
* other parameters. */
ciphers = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
#endif /* CONFIG_SUITEB */
if (ciphers && SSL_set_cipher_list(conn->ssl, ciphers) != 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"OpenSSL: Failed to set cipher string '%s'",
ciphers);
return -1;
}
if (!params->openssl_ecdh_curves) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L) && \
(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L)
if (SSL_set_ecdh_auto(conn->ssl, 1) != 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"OpenSSL: Failed to set ECDH curves to auto");
return -1;
}
#endif /* >= 1.0.2 && < 1.1.0 */
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
} else if (params->openssl_ecdh_curves[0]) {
#if defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) || (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10002000L)
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"OpenSSL: ECDH configuration nnot supported");
return -1;
#else /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL || < 1.0.2 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (SSL_set1_curves_list(conn->ssl,
params->openssl_ecdh_curves) != 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"OpenSSL: Failed to set ECDH curves '%s'",
params->openssl_ecdh_curves);
return -1;
}
#else /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "OpenSSL: ECDH not supported");
return -1;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
}
if (tls_set_conn_flags(conn, params->flags,
params->openssl_ciphers) < 0)
return -1;
#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
if (params->flags & TLS_CONN_REQUEST_OCSP) {
SSL_enable_ocsp_stapling(conn->ssl);
}
#else /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
#ifdef HAVE_OCSP
if (params->flags & TLS_CONN_REQUEST_OCSP) {
SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = data->ssl;
SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(conn->ssl, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp);
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ssl_ctx, ocsp_resp_cb);
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ssl_ctx, conn);
}
#else /* HAVE_OCSP */
if (params->flags & TLS_CONN_REQUIRE_OCSP) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"OpenSSL: No OCSP support included - reject configuration");
return -1;
}
if (params->flags & TLS_CONN_REQUEST_OCSP) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"OpenSSL: No OCSP support included - allow optional OCSP case to continue");
}
#endif /* HAVE_OCSP */
#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
conn->flags = params->flags;
tls_get_errors(data);
return 0;
}
static void openssl_debug_dump_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx)
{
SSL *ssl;
int i;
ssl = SSL_new(ssl_ctx);
if (!ssl)
return;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"OpenSSL: Enabled cipher suites in priority order");
for (i = 0; ; i++) {
const char *cipher;
cipher = SSL_get_cipher_list(ssl, i);
if (!cipher)
break;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Cipher %d: %s", i, cipher);
}
SSL_free(ssl);
}
#if !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && !defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION)
static const char * openssl_pkey_type_str(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
if (!pkey)
return "NULL";
switch (EVP_PKEY_type(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey))) {
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
return "RSA";
case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
return "DSA";
case EVP_PKEY_DH:
return "DH";
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
return "EC";
}
return "?";
}
static void openssl_debug_dump_certificate(int i, X509 *cert)
{
char buf[256];
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
ASN1_INTEGER *ser;
char serial_num[128];
if (!cert)
return;
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), buf, sizeof(buf));
ser = X509_get_serialNumber(cert);
if (ser)
wpa_snprintf_hex_uppercase(serial_num, sizeof(serial_num),
ASN1_STRING_get0_data(ser),
ASN1_STRING_length(ser));
else
serial_num[0] = '\0';
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%d: %s (%s) %s", i, buf,
openssl_pkey_type_str(pkey), serial_num);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
static void openssl_debug_dump_certificates(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx)
{
STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: Configured certificate chain");
if (SSL_CTX_get0_chain_certs(ssl_ctx, &certs) == 1) {
int i;
for (i = sk_X509_num(certs); i > 0; i--)
openssl_debug_dump_certificate(i, sk_X509_value(certs,
i - 1));
}
openssl_debug_dump_certificate(0, SSL_CTX_get0_certificate(ssl_ctx));
}
#endif
static void openssl_debug_dump_certificate_chains(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx)
{
#if !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && !defined(BORINGSSL_API_VERSION)
int res;
for (res = SSL_CTX_set_current_cert(ssl_ctx, SSL_CERT_SET_FIRST);
res == 1;
res = SSL_CTX_set_current_cert(ssl_ctx, SSL_CERT_SET_NEXT))
openssl_debug_dump_certificates(ssl_ctx);
SSL_CTX_set_current_cert(ssl_ctx, SSL_CERT_SET_FIRST);
#endif
}
static void openssl_debug_dump_ctx(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx)
{
openssl_debug_dump_cipher_list(ssl_ctx);
openssl_debug_dump_certificate_chains(ssl_ctx);
}
int tls_global_set_params(void *tls_ctx,
const struct tls_connection_params *params)
{
struct tls_data *data = tls_ctx;
SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = data->ssl;
unsigned long err;
while ((err = ERR_get_error())) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "%s: Clearing pending SSL error: %s",
__func__, ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
}
os_free(data->check_cert_subject);
data->check_cert_subject = NULL;
if (params->check_cert_subject) {
data->check_cert_subject =
os_strdup(params->check_cert_subject);
if (!data->check_cert_subject)
return -1;
}
if (tls_global_ca_cert(data, params->ca_cert) ||
tls_global_client_cert(data, params->client_cert) ||
tls_global_private_key(data, params->private_key,
params->private_key_passwd) ||
tls_global_client_cert(data, params->client_cert2) ||
tls_global_private_key(data, params->private_key2,
params->private_key_passwd2) ||
tls_global_dh(data, params->dh_file)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TLS: Failed to set global parameters");
return -1;
}
if (params->openssl_ciphers &&
SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ssl_ctx, params->openssl_ciphers) != 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"OpenSSL: Failed to set cipher string '%s'",
params->openssl_ciphers);
return -1;
}
if (!params->openssl_ecdh_curves) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L) && \
(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L)
if (SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(ssl_ctx, 1) != 1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"OpenSSL: Failed to set ECDH curves to auto");
return -1;
}
#endif /* >= 1.0.2 && < 1.1.0 */
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
} else if (params->openssl_ecdh_curves[0]) {
#if defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) || (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10002000L)
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"OpenSSL: ECDH configuration nnot supported");
return -1;
#else /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL || < 1.0.2 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(ssl_ctx, 1);
#endif
if (SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list(ssl_ctx,
params->openssl_ecdh_curves) !=
1) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
"OpenSSL: Failed to set ECDH curves '%s'",
params->openssl_ecdh_curves);
return -1;
}
#else /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "OpenSSL: ECDH not supported");
return -1;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
}
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
if (params->flags & TLS_CONN_DISABLE_SESSION_TICKET)
SSL_CTX_set_options(ssl_ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET);
else
SSL_CTX_clear_options(ssl_ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET);
#endif /* SSL_OP_NO_TICKET */
#ifdef HAVE_OCSP
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ssl_ctx, ocsp_status_cb);
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ssl_ctx, ssl_ctx);
os_free(tls_global->ocsp_stapling_response);
if (params->ocsp_stapling_response)
tls_global->ocsp_stapling_response =
os_strdup(params->ocsp_stapling_response);
else
tls_global->ocsp_stapling_response = NULL;
#endif /* HAVE_OCSP */
openssl_debug_dump_ctx(ssl_ctx);
return 0;
}
#ifdef EAP_FAST_OR_TEAP
/* Pre-shared secred requires a patch to openssl, so this function is
* commented out unless explicitly needed for EAP-FAST in order to be able to
* build this file with unmodified openssl. */
#if (defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
static int tls_sess_sec_cb(SSL *s, void *secret, int *secret_len,
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers,
const SSL_CIPHER **cipher, void *arg)
#else /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
static int tls_sess_sec_cb(SSL *s, void *secret, int *secret_len,
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers,
SSL_CIPHER **cipher, void *arg)
#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
{
struct tls_connection *conn = arg;
int ret;
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || \
(defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x20700000L)
if (conn == NULL || conn->session_ticket_cb == NULL)
return 0;
ret = conn->session_ticket_cb(conn->session_ticket_cb_ctx,
conn->session_ticket,
conn->session_ticket_len,
s->s3->client_random,
s->s3->server_random, secret);
#else
unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
unsigned char server_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
if (conn == NULL || conn->session_ticket_cb == NULL)
return 0;
SSL_get_client_random(s, client_random, sizeof(client_random));
SSL_get_server_random(s, server_random, sizeof(server_random));
ret = conn->session_ticket_cb(conn->session_ticket_cb_ctx,
conn->session_ticket,
conn->session_ticket_len,
client_random,
server_random, secret);
#endif
os_free(conn->session_ticket);
conn->session_ticket = NULL;
if (ret <= 0)
return 0;
*secret_len = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
return 1;
}
static int tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
int len, void *arg)
{
struct tls_connection *conn = arg;
if (conn == NULL || conn->session_ticket_cb == NULL)
return 0;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: %s: length=%d", __func__, len);
os_free(conn->session_ticket);
conn->session_ticket = NULL;
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: ClientHello SessionTicket "
"extension", data, len);
conn->session_ticket = os_memdup(data, len);
if (conn->session_ticket == NULL)
return 0;
conn->session_ticket_len = len;
return 1;
}
#endif /* EAP_FAST_OR_TEAP */
int tls_connection_set_session_ticket_cb(void *tls_ctx,
struct tls_connection *conn,
tls_session_ticket_cb cb,
void *ctx)
{
#ifdef EAP_FAST_OR_TEAP
conn->session_ticket_cb = cb;
conn->session_ticket_cb_ctx = ctx;
if (cb) {
if (SSL_set_session_secret_cb(conn->ssl, tls_sess_sec_cb,
conn) != 1)
return -1;
SSL_set_session_ticket_ext_cb(conn->ssl,
tls_session_ticket_ext_cb, conn);
} else {
if (SSL_set_session_secret_cb(conn->ssl, NULL, NULL) != 1)
return -1;
SSL_set_session_ticket_ext_cb(conn->ssl, NULL, NULL);
}
return 0;
#else /* EAP_FAST_OR_TEAP */
return -1;
#endif /* EAP_FAST_OR_TEAP */
}
int tls_get_library_version(char *buf, size_t buf_len)
{
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
return os_snprintf(buf, buf_len, "OpenSSL build=%s run=%s",
OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT,
OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION));
#else
return os_snprintf(buf, buf_len, "OpenSSL build=%s run=%s",
OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT,
SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
#endif
}
void tls_connection_set_success_data(struct tls_connection *conn,
struct wpabuf *data)
{
SSL_SESSION *sess;
struct wpabuf *old;
if (tls_ex_idx_session < 0)
goto fail;
sess = SSL_get_session(conn->ssl);
if (!sess)
goto fail;
old = SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(sess, tls_ex_idx_session);
if (old) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: Replacing old success data %p",
old);
wpabuf_free(old);
}
if (SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(sess, tls_ex_idx_session, data) != 1)
goto fail;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: Stored success data %p", data);
conn->success_data = 1;
return;
fail:
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "OpenSSL: Failed to store success data");
wpabuf_free(data);
}
void tls_connection_set_success_data_resumed(struct tls_connection *conn)
{
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"OpenSSL: Success data accepted for resumed session");
conn->success_data = 1;
}
const struct wpabuf *
tls_connection_get_success_data(struct tls_connection *conn)
{
SSL_SESSION *sess;
if (tls_ex_idx_session < 0 ||
!(sess = SSL_get_session(conn->ssl)))
return NULL;
return SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(sess, tls_ex_idx_session);
}
void tls_connection_remove_session(struct tls_connection *conn)
{
SSL_SESSION *sess;
sess = SSL_get_session(conn->ssl);
if (!sess)
return;
if (SSL_CTX_remove_session(conn->ssl_ctx, sess) != 1)
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"OpenSSL: Session was not cached");
else
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"OpenSSL: Removed cached session to disable session resumption");
}
int tls_get_tls_unique(struct tls_connection *conn, u8 *buf, size_t max_len)
{
size_t len;
int reused;
reused = SSL_session_reused(conn->ssl);
if ((conn->server && !reused) || (!conn->server && reused))
len = SSL_get_peer_finished(conn->ssl, buf, max_len);
else
len = SSL_get_finished(conn->ssl, buf, max_len);
if (len == 0 || len > max_len)
return -1;
return len;
}
u16 tls_connection_get_cipher_suite(struct tls_connection *conn)
{
const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
cipher = SSL_get_current_cipher(conn->ssl);
if (!cipher)
return 0;
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
return SSL_CIPHER_get_protocol_id(cipher);
#else
return SSL_CIPHER_get_id(cipher) & 0xFFFF;
#endif
}
const char * tls_connection_get_peer_subject(struct tls_connection *conn)
{
if (conn)
return conn->peer_subject;
return NULL;
}
bool tls_connection_get_own_cert_used(struct tls_connection *conn)
{
if (conn)
return SSL_get_certificate(conn->ssl) != NULL;
return false;
}