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hostap/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf

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##### Example wpa_supplicant configuration file ###############################
#
# This file describes configuration file format and lists all available option.
# Please also take a look at simpler configuration examples in 'examples'
# subdirectory.
#
# Empty lines and lines starting with # are ignored
# NOTE! This file may contain password information and should probably be made
# readable only by root user on multiuser systems.
# Note: All file paths in this configuration file should use full (absolute,
# not relative to working directory) path in order to allow working directory
# to be changed. This can happen if wpa_supplicant is run in the background.
# Whether to allow wpa_supplicant to update (overwrite) configuration
#
# This option can be used to allow wpa_supplicant to overwrite configuration
# file whenever configuration is changed (e.g., new network block is added with
# wpa_cli or wpa_gui, or a password is changed). This is required for
# wpa_cli/wpa_gui to be able to store the configuration changes permanently.
# Please note that overwriting configuration file will remove the comments from
# it.
#update_config=1
# global configuration (shared by all network blocks)
#
# Parameters for the control interface. If this is specified, wpa_supplicant
# will open a control interface that is available for external programs to
# manage wpa_supplicant. The meaning of this string depends on which control
# interface mechanism is used. For all cases, the existence of this parameter
# in configuration is used to determine whether the control interface is
# enabled.
#
# For UNIX domain sockets (default on Linux and BSD): This is a directory that
# will be created for UNIX domain sockets for listening to requests from
# external programs (CLI/GUI, etc.) for status information and configuration.
# The socket file will be named based on the interface name, so multiple
# wpa_supplicant processes can be run at the same time if more than one
# interface is used.
# /var/run/wpa_supplicant is the recommended directory for sockets and by
# default, wpa_cli will use it when trying to connect with wpa_supplicant.
#
# Access control for the control interface can be configured by setting the
# directory to allow only members of a group to use sockets. This way, it is
# possible to run wpa_supplicant as root (since it needs to change network
# configuration and open raw sockets) and still allow GUI/CLI components to be
# run as non-root users. However, since the control interface can be used to
# change the network configuration, this access needs to be protected in many
# cases. By default, wpa_supplicant is configured to use gid 0 (root). If you
# want to allow non-root users to use the control interface, add a new group
# and change this value to match with that group. Add users that should have
# control interface access to this group. If this variable is commented out or
# not included in the configuration file, group will not be changed from the
# value it got by default when the directory or socket was created.
#
# When configuring both the directory and group, use following format:
# DIR=/var/run/wpa_supplicant GROUP=wheel
# DIR=/var/run/wpa_supplicant GROUP=0
# (group can be either group name or gid)
#
# For UDP connections (default on Windows): The value will be ignored. This
# variable is just used to select that the control interface is to be created.
# The value can be set to, e.g., udp (ctrl_interface=udp)
#
# For Windows Named Pipe: This value can be used to set the security descriptor
# for controlling access to the control interface. Security descriptor can be
# set using Security Descriptor String Format (see http://msdn.microsoft.com/
# library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/secauthz/security/
# security_descriptor_string_format.asp). The descriptor string needs to be
# prefixed with SDDL=. For example, ctrl_interface=SDDL=D: would set an empty
# DACL (which will reject all connections). See README-Windows.txt for more
# information about SDDL string format.
#
ctrl_interface=/var/run/wpa_supplicant
# IEEE 802.1X/EAPOL version
# wpa_supplicant is implemented based on IEEE Std 802.1X-2004 which defines
# EAPOL version 2. However, there are many APs that do not handle the new
# version number correctly (they seem to drop the frames completely). In order
# to make wpa_supplicant interoperate with these APs, the version number is set
# to 1 by default. This configuration value can be used to set it to the new
# version (2).
# Note: When using MACsec, eapol_version shall be set to 3, which is
# defined in IEEE Std 802.1X-2010.
eapol_version=1
# AP scanning/selection
# By default, wpa_supplicant requests driver to perform AP scanning and then
# uses the scan results to select a suitable AP. Another alternative is to
# allow the driver to take care of AP scanning and selection and use
# wpa_supplicant just to process EAPOL frames based on IEEE 802.11 association
# information from the driver.
# 1: wpa_supplicant initiates scanning and AP selection; if no APs matching to
# the currently enabled networks are found, a new network (IBSS or AP mode
# operation) may be initialized (if configured) (default)
# 0: This mode must only be used when using wired Ethernet drivers
# (including MACsec).
# 2: like 0, but associate with APs using security policy and SSID (but not
# BSSID); this can be used, e.g., with ndiswrapper and NDIS drivers to
# enable operation with hidden SSIDs and optimized roaming; in this mode,
# the network blocks in the configuration file are tried one by one until
# the driver reports successful association; each network block should have
# explicit security policy (i.e., only one option in the lists) for
# key_mgmt, pairwise, group, proto variables
# Note: ap_scan=0/2 should not be used with the nl80211 driver interface (the
# current Linux interface). ap_scan=1 is the only option working with nl80211.
# For finding networks using hidden SSID, scan_ssid=1 in the network block can
# be used with nl80211.
# When using IBSS or AP mode, ap_scan=2 mode can force the new network to be
# created immediately regardless of scan results. ap_scan=1 mode will first try
# to scan for existing networks and only if no matches with the enabled
# networks are found, a new IBSS or AP mode network is created.
ap_scan=1
# Whether to force passive scan for network connection
#
# By default, scans will send out Probe Request frames on channels that allow
# active scanning. This advertise the local station to the world. Normally this
# is fine, but users may wish to do passive scanning where the radio should only
# listen quietly for Beacon frames and not send any Probe Request frames. Actual
# functionality may be driver dependent.
#
# This parameter can be used to force only passive scanning to be used
# for network connection cases. It should be noted that this will slow
# down scan operations and reduce likelihood of finding the AP. In
# addition, some use cases will override this due to functional
# requirements, e.g., for finding an AP that uses hidden SSID
# (scan_ssid=1) or P2P device discovery.
#
# 0: Do normal scans (allow active scans) (default)
# 1: Do passive scans.
#passive_scan=0
# MPM residency
# By default, wpa_supplicant implements the mesh peering manager (MPM) for an
# open mesh. However, if the driver can implement the MPM, you may set this to
# 0 to use the driver version. When AMPE is enabled, the wpa_supplicant MPM is
# always used.
# 0: MPM lives in the driver
# 1: wpa_supplicant provides an MPM which handles peering (default)
#user_mpm=1
# Maximum number of peer links (0-255; default: 99)
# Maximum number of mesh peering currently maintained by the STA.
#max_peer_links=99
# Timeout in seconds to detect STA inactivity (default: 300 seconds)
#
# This timeout value is used in mesh STA to clean up inactive stations.
#mesh_max_inactivity=300
# cert_in_cb - Whether to include a peer certificate dump in events
# This controls whether peer certificates for authentication server and
# its certificate chain are included in EAP peer certificate events. This is
# enabled by default.
#cert_in_cb=1
# EAP fast re-authentication
# By default, fast re-authentication is enabled for all EAP methods that
# support it. This variable can be used to disable fast re-authentication.
# Normally, there is no need to disable this.
fast_reauth=1
# OpenSSL Engine support
# These options can be used to load OpenSSL engines in special or legacy
# modes.
# The two engines that are supported currently are shown below:
# They are both from the opensc project (http://www.opensc.org/)
# By default the PKCS#11 engine is loaded if the client_cert or
# private_key option appear to be a PKCS#11 URI, and these options
# should not need to be used explicitly.
# make the opensc engine available
#opensc_engine_path=/usr/lib/opensc/engine_opensc.so
# make the pkcs11 engine available
#pkcs11_engine_path=/usr/lib/opensc/engine_pkcs11.so
# configure the path to the pkcs11 module required by the pkcs11 engine
#pkcs11_module_path=/usr/lib/pkcs11/opensc-pkcs11.so
# OpenSSL cipher string
#
# This is an OpenSSL specific configuration option for configuring the default
# ciphers. If not set, the value configured at build time ("DEFAULT:!EXP:!LOW"
# by default) is used.
# See https://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/ciphers.html for OpenSSL documentation
# on cipher suite configuration. This is applicable only if wpa_supplicant is
# built to use OpenSSL.
#openssl_ciphers=DEFAULT:!EXP:!LOW
# Dynamic EAP methods
# If EAP methods were built dynamically as shared object files, they need to be
# loaded here before being used in the network blocks. By default, EAP methods
# are included statically in the build, so these lines are not needed
#load_dynamic_eap=/usr/lib/wpa_supplicant/eap_tls.so
#load_dynamic_eap=/usr/lib/wpa_supplicant/eap_md5.so
# Driver interface parameters
# This field can be used to configure arbitrary driver interface parameters. The
# format is specific to the selected driver interface. This field is not used
# in most cases.
#driver_param="field=value"
# Country code
# The ISO/IEC alpha2 country code for the country in which this device is
# currently operating.
#country=US
# Maximum lifetime for PMKSA in seconds; default 43200
#dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime=43200
# Threshold for reauthentication (percentage of PMK lifetime); default 70
#dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold=70
# Timeout for security association negotiation in seconds; default 60
#dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout=60
# Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) parameters
# Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID; see RFC 4122) of the device
# If not configured, UUID will be generated based on the mechanism selected with
# the auto_uuid parameter.
#uuid=12345678-9abc-def0-1234-56789abcdef0
# Automatic UUID behavior
# 0 = generate static value based on the local MAC address (default)
# 1 = generate a random UUID every time wpa_supplicant starts
#auto_uuid=0
# Device Name
# User-friendly description of device; up to 32 octets encoded in UTF-8
#device_name=Wireless Client
# Manufacturer
# The manufacturer of the device (up to 64 ASCII characters)
#manufacturer=Company
# Model Name
# Model of the device (up to 32 ASCII characters)
#model_name=cmodel
# Model Number
# Additional device description (up to 32 ASCII characters)
#model_number=123
# Serial Number
# Serial number of the device (up to 32 characters)
#serial_number=12345
# Primary Device Type
# Used format: <categ>-<OUI>-<subcateg>
# categ = Category as an integer value
# OUI = OUI and type octet as a 4-octet hex-encoded value; 0050F204 for
# default WPS OUI
# subcateg = OUI-specific Sub Category as an integer value
# Examples:
# 1-0050F204-1 (Computer / PC)
# 1-0050F204-2 (Computer / Server)
# 5-0050F204-1 (Storage / NAS)
# 6-0050F204-1 (Network Infrastructure / AP)
#device_type=1-0050F204-1
# OS Version
# 4-octet operating system version number (hex string)
#os_version=01020300
# Config Methods
# List of the supported configuration methods
# Available methods: usba ethernet label display ext_nfc_token int_nfc_token
# nfc_interface push_button keypad virtual_display physical_display
# virtual_push_button physical_push_button
# For WSC 1.0:
#config_methods=label display push_button keypad
# For WSC 2.0:
#config_methods=label virtual_display virtual_push_button keypad
# Credential processing
# 0 = process received credentials internally (default)
# 1 = do not process received credentials; just pass them over ctrl_iface to
# external program(s)
# 2 = process received credentials internally and pass them over ctrl_iface
# to external program(s)
#wps_cred_processing=0
# Whether to enable SAE (WPA3-Personal transition mode) automatically for
# WPA2-PSK credentials received using WPS.
# 0 = only add the explicitly listed WPA2-PSK configuration (default)
# 1 = add both the WPA2-PSK and SAE configuration and enable PMF so that the
# station gets configured in WPA3-Personal transition mode (supports both
# WPA2-Personal (PSK) and WPA3-Personal (SAE) APs).
#wps_cred_add_sae=0
# Vendor attribute in WPS M1, e.g., Windows 7 Vertical Pairing
# The vendor attribute contents to be added in M1 (hex string)
#wps_vendor_ext_m1=000137100100020001
# NFC password token for WPS
# These parameters can be used to configure a fixed NFC password token for the
# station. This can be generated, e.g., with nfc_pw_token. When these
# parameters are used, the station is assumed to be deployed with a NFC tag
# that includes the matching NFC password token (e.g., written based on the
# NDEF record from nfc_pw_token).
#
#wps_nfc_dev_pw_id: Device Password ID (16..65535)
#wps_nfc_dh_pubkey: Hexdump of DH Public Key
#wps_nfc_dh_privkey: Hexdump of DH Private Key
#wps_nfc_dev_pw: Hexdump of Device Password
# Priority for the networks added through WPS
# This priority value will be set to each network profile that is added
# by executing the WPS protocol.
#wps_priority=0
# Device Provisioning Protocol (DPP) parameters
#
# How to process DPP configuration
# 0 = report received configuration to an external program for
# processing; do not generate any network profile internally (default)
# 1 = report received configuration to an external program and generate
# a network profile internally, but do not automatically connect
# to the created (disabled) profile; the network profile id is
# reported to external programs
# 2 = report received configuration to an external program, generate
# a network profile internally, try to connect to the created
# profile automatically
#dpp_config_processing=0
#
# Name for Enrollee's DPP Configuration Request
#dpp_name=Test
#
# MUD URL for Enrollee's DPP Configuration Request (optional)
#dpp_mud_url=https://example.com/mud
# Maximum number of BSS entries to keep in memory
# Default: 200
# This can be used to limit memory use on the BSS entries (cached scan
# results). A larger value may be needed in environments that have huge number
# of APs when using ap_scan=1 mode.
#bss_max_count=200
# BSS expiration age in seconds. A BSS will be removed from the local cache
# if it is not in use and has not been seen for this time. Default is 180.
#bss_expiration_age=180
# BSS expiration after number of scans. A BSS will be removed from the local
# cache if it is not seen in this number of scans.
# Default is 2.
#bss_expiration_scan_count=2
# Automatic scan
# This is an optional set of parameters for automatic scanning
# within an interface in following format:
#autoscan=<autoscan module name>:<module parameters>
# autoscan is like bgscan but on disconnected or inactive state.
# For instance, on exponential module parameters would be <base>:<limit>
#autoscan=exponential:3:300
# Which means a delay between scans on a base exponential of 3,
# up to the limit of 300 seconds (3, 9, 27 ... 300)
# For periodic module, parameters would be <fixed interval>
#autoscan=periodic:30
# So a delay of 30 seconds will be applied between each scan.
# Note: If sched_scan_plans are configured and supported by the driver,
# autoscan is ignored.
# filter_ssids - SSID-based scan result filtering
# 0 = do not filter scan results (default)
# 1 = only include configured SSIDs in scan results/BSS table
#filter_ssids=0
# Password (and passphrase, etc.) backend for external storage
# format: <backend name>[:<optional backend parameters>]
ext_password: Implement new file-based backend It was not easily possible to separate configuration of an interface and credentials when using the configuration file instead of the control interface or D-Bus interface for setting up the network profiles. This makes it hard to distribute configuration across a set of nodes which use wpa_supplicant without also having to store credentials in the same file. While this can be solved via scripting, having a native way to achieve this would be preferable. Turns out there already is a framework to have external password storages. It only had a single "test" backend though, which is kind of an in-memory store which gets initialized with all passwords up front and is mainly for testing purposes. This isn't really suitable for the above use case: the backend cannot be initialized as part of the central configuration given that it needs the credentials, and we want to avoid scripting. This commit thus extends the infrastructure to implement a new backend, which instead uses a simple configuration file containing key-value pairs. The file follows the format which wpa_supplicant.conf(5) uses: empty lines and comments are ignored, while passwords can be specified with simple `password-name=password-value` assignments. With this new backend, splitting up credentials and configuration becomes trivial: # /etc/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf ext_password_backend=file:/etc/wpa_supplicant/psk.conf network={ ssid="foobar" psk=ext:foobar } # /etc/wpa_supplicant/psk.conf foobar=ecdabff9c80632ec6fcffc4a8875e95d45cf93376d3b99da6881298853dc686b Alternative approaches would be to support including other configuration files in the main configuration, such that common configuration and network declarations including credentials are split up into separate files. But the implementation would probably have been more complex compared to reusing the already-existing framework for external password backends. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
3 years ago
# Test backend which stores passwords in memory. Should only be used for
# development purposes.
#ext_password_backend=test:pw1=password|pw2=testing
ext_password: Implement new file-based backend It was not easily possible to separate configuration of an interface and credentials when using the configuration file instead of the control interface or D-Bus interface for setting up the network profiles. This makes it hard to distribute configuration across a set of nodes which use wpa_supplicant without also having to store credentials in the same file. While this can be solved via scripting, having a native way to achieve this would be preferable. Turns out there already is a framework to have external password storages. It only had a single "test" backend though, which is kind of an in-memory store which gets initialized with all passwords up front and is mainly for testing purposes. This isn't really suitable for the above use case: the backend cannot be initialized as part of the central configuration given that it needs the credentials, and we want to avoid scripting. This commit thus extends the infrastructure to implement a new backend, which instead uses a simple configuration file containing key-value pairs. The file follows the format which wpa_supplicant.conf(5) uses: empty lines and comments are ignored, while passwords can be specified with simple `password-name=password-value` assignments. With this new backend, splitting up credentials and configuration becomes trivial: # /etc/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf ext_password_backend=file:/etc/wpa_supplicant/psk.conf network={ ssid="foobar" psk=ext:foobar } # /etc/wpa_supplicant/psk.conf foobar=ecdabff9c80632ec6fcffc4a8875e95d45cf93376d3b99da6881298853dc686b Alternative approaches would be to support including other configuration files in the main configuration, such that common configuration and network declarations including credentials are split up into separate files. But the implementation would probably have been more complex compared to reusing the already-existing framework for external password backends. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
3 years ago
# File-based backend which reads passwords from a file. The parameter
# identifies the file to read passwords from. The password file follows the
# format of wpa_supplicant.conf and accepts simple `key=passphrase` formatted
# passwords.
#ext_password_backend=file:/path/to/passwords.conf
# Disable P2P functionality
# p2p_disabled=1
# Timeout in seconds to detect STA inactivity (default: 300 seconds)
#
# This timeout value is used in P2P GO mode to clean up
# inactive stations.
#p2p_go_max_inactivity=300
# Passphrase length (8..63) for P2P GO
#
# This parameter controls the length of the random passphrase that is
# generated at the GO. Default: 8.
#p2p_passphrase_len=8
# Extra delay between concurrent P2P search iterations
#
# This value adds extra delay in milliseconds between concurrent search
# iterations to make p2p_find friendlier to concurrent operations by avoiding
# it from taking 100% of radio resources. The default value is 500 ms.
#p2p_search_delay=500
# Opportunistic Key Caching (also known as Proactive Key Caching) default
# This parameter can be used to set the default behavior for the
# proactive_key_caching parameter. By default, OKC is disabled unless enabled
# with the global okc=1 parameter or with the per-network
# proactive_key_caching=1 parameter. With okc=1, OKC is enabled by default, but
# can be disabled with per-network proactive_key_caching=0 parameter.
#okc=0
# Protected Management Frames default
# This parameter can be used to set the default behavior for the ieee80211w
# parameter for RSN networks. By default, PMF is disabled unless enabled with
# the global pmf=1/2 parameter or with the per-network ieee80211w=1/2 parameter.
# With pmf=1/2, PMF is enabled/required by default, but can be disabled with the
# per-network ieee80211w parameter. This global default value does not apply
# for non-RSN networks (key_mgmt=NONE) since PMF is available only when using
# RSN.
#pmf=0
# Enabled SAE finite cyclic groups in preference order
# By default (if this parameter is not set), the mandatory group 19 (ECC group
# defined over a 256-bit prime order field, NIST P-256) is preferred and groups
# 20 (NIST P-384) and 21 (NIST P-521) are also enabled. If this parameter is
# set, the groups will be tried in the indicated order.
# The group values are listed in the IANA registry:
# http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipsec-registry/ipsec-registry.xml#ipsec-registry-9
# Note that groups 1, 2, 5, 22, 23, and 24 should not be used in production
# purposes due limited security (see RFC 8247). Groups that are not as strong as
# group 19 (ECC, NIST P-256) are unlikely to be useful for production use cases
# since all implementations are required to support group 19.
#sae_groups=19 20 21
# SAE mechanism for PWE derivation
# 0 = hunting-and-pecking loop only (default without password identifier)
# 1 = hash-to-element only (default with password identifier)
# 2 = both hunting-and-pecking loop and hash-to-element enabled
# Note: The default value is likely to change from 0 to 2 once the new
# hash-to-element mechanism has received more interoperability testing.
# When using SAE password identifier, the hash-to-element mechanism is used
# regardless of the sae_pwe parameter value.
#sae_pwe=0
# Default value for DTIM period (if not overridden in network block)
#dtim_period=2
# Default value for Beacon interval (if not overridden in network block)
#beacon_int=100
# Additional vendor specific elements for Beacon and Probe Response frames
# This parameter can be used to add additional vendor specific element(s) into
# the end of the Beacon and Probe Response frames. The format for these
# element(s) is a hexdump of the raw information elements (id+len+payload for
# one or more elements). This is used in AP and P2P GO modes.
#ap_vendor_elements=dd0411223301
# Ignore scan results older than request
#
# The driver may have a cache of scan results that makes it return
# information that is older than our scan trigger. This parameter can
# be used to configure such old information to be ignored instead of
# allowing it to update the internal BSS table.
#ignore_old_scan_res=0
# scan_cur_freq: Whether to scan only the current frequency
# 0: Scan all available frequencies. (Default)
# 1: Scan current operating frequency if another VIF on the same radio
# is already associated.
# Seconds to consider old scan results valid for association (default: 5)
#scan_res_valid_for_connect=5
Add support for using random local MAC address This adds experimental support for wpa_supplicant to assign random local MAC addresses for both pre-association cases (scan, GAS/ANQP) and for connections. MAC address policy for each part can be controlled separately and the connection part can be set per network block. This requires support from the driver to allow local MAC address to be changed if random address policy is enabled. It should also be noted that number of drivers would not support concurrent operations (e.g., P2P and station association) with random addresses in use for one or both. This functionality can be controlled with the global configuration parameters mac_addr and preassoc_mac_addr which set the default MAC address policies for connections and pre-association operations (scan and GAS/ANQP while not connected). The global rand_addr_lifetime parameter can be used to set the lifetime of a random MAC address in seconds (default: 60 seconds). This is used to avoid unnecessarily frequent MAC address changes since those are likely to result in driver clearing most of its state. It should be noted that the random MAC address does not expire during an ESS connection, i.e., this lifetime is only for the case where the device is disconnected. The mac_addr parameter can also be set in the network blocks to define different behavior per network. For example, the global mac_addr=1 and preassoc_mac_addr=1 settings and mac_addr=0 in a home network profile would result in behavior where all scanning is performed using a random MAC address while connections to new networks (e.g., Interworking/Hotspot 2.0) would use random address and connections to the home network would use the permanent MAC address. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
10 years ago
# MAC address policy default
# 0 = use permanent MAC address
# 1 = use random MAC address for each ESS connection
# 2 = like 1, but maintain OUI (with local admin bit set)
Add support for using random local MAC address This adds experimental support for wpa_supplicant to assign random local MAC addresses for both pre-association cases (scan, GAS/ANQP) and for connections. MAC address policy for each part can be controlled separately and the connection part can be set per network block. This requires support from the driver to allow local MAC address to be changed if random address policy is enabled. It should also be noted that number of drivers would not support concurrent operations (e.g., P2P and station association) with random addresses in use for one or both. This functionality can be controlled with the global configuration parameters mac_addr and preassoc_mac_addr which set the default MAC address policies for connections and pre-association operations (scan and GAS/ANQP while not connected). The global rand_addr_lifetime parameter can be used to set the lifetime of a random MAC address in seconds (default: 60 seconds). This is used to avoid unnecessarily frequent MAC address changes since those are likely to result in driver clearing most of its state. It should be noted that the random MAC address does not expire during an ESS connection, i.e., this lifetime is only for the case where the device is disconnected. The mac_addr parameter can also be set in the network blocks to define different behavior per network. For example, the global mac_addr=1 and preassoc_mac_addr=1 settings and mac_addr=0 in a home network profile would result in behavior where all scanning is performed using a random MAC address while connections to new networks (e.g., Interworking/Hotspot 2.0) would use random address and connections to the home network would use the permanent MAC address. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
10 years ago
#
# By default, permanent MAC address is used unless policy is changed by
# the per-network mac_addr parameter. Global mac_addr=1 can be used to
# change this default behavior.
#mac_addr=0
# Lifetime of random MAC address in seconds (default: 60)
#rand_addr_lifetime=60
# MAC address policy for pre-association operations (scanning, ANQP)
# 0 = use permanent MAC address
# 1 = use random MAC address
# 2 = like 1, but maintain OUI (with local admin bit set)
Add support for using random local MAC address This adds experimental support for wpa_supplicant to assign random local MAC addresses for both pre-association cases (scan, GAS/ANQP) and for connections. MAC address policy for each part can be controlled separately and the connection part can be set per network block. This requires support from the driver to allow local MAC address to be changed if random address policy is enabled. It should also be noted that number of drivers would not support concurrent operations (e.g., P2P and station association) with random addresses in use for one or both. This functionality can be controlled with the global configuration parameters mac_addr and preassoc_mac_addr which set the default MAC address policies for connections and pre-association operations (scan and GAS/ANQP while not connected). The global rand_addr_lifetime parameter can be used to set the lifetime of a random MAC address in seconds (default: 60 seconds). This is used to avoid unnecessarily frequent MAC address changes since those are likely to result in driver clearing most of its state. It should be noted that the random MAC address does not expire during an ESS connection, i.e., this lifetime is only for the case where the device is disconnected. The mac_addr parameter can also be set in the network blocks to define different behavior per network. For example, the global mac_addr=1 and preassoc_mac_addr=1 settings and mac_addr=0 in a home network profile would result in behavior where all scanning is performed using a random MAC address while connections to new networks (e.g., Interworking/Hotspot 2.0) would use random address and connections to the home network would use the permanent MAC address. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
10 years ago
#preassoc_mac_addr=0
# MAC address policy for GAS operations
# 0 = use permanent MAC address
# 1 = use random MAC address
# 2 = like 1, but maintain OUI (with local admin bit set)
# Note that this setting is ignored when a specific MAC address is needed for
# a full protocol exchange that includes GAS, e.g., when going through a DPP
# exchange that exposes the configured interface address as part of the DP
# Public Action frame exchanges before using GAS. That same address is then used
# during the GAS exchange as well to avoid breaking the protocol expectations.
#gas_rand_mac_addr=0
# Lifetime of GAS random MAC address in seconds (default: 60)
#gas_rand_addr_lifetime=60
# Interworking (IEEE 802.11u)
# Enable Interworking
# interworking=1
# Enable P2P GO advertisement of Interworking
# go_interworking=1
# P2P GO Interworking: Access Network Type
# 0 = Private network
# 1 = Private network with guest access
# 2 = Chargeable public network
# 3 = Free public network
# 4 = Personal device network
# 5 = Emergency services only network
# 14 = Test or experimental
# 15 = Wildcard
#go_access_network_type=0
# P2P GO Interworking: Whether the network provides connectivity to the Internet
# 0 = Unspecified
# 1 = Network provides connectivity to the Internet
#go_internet=1
# P2P GO Interworking: Group Venue Info (optional)
# The available values are defined in IEEE Std 802.11-2016, 9.4.1.35.
# Example values (group,type):
# 0,0 = Unspecified
# 1,7 = Convention Center
# 1,13 = Coffee Shop
# 2,0 = Unspecified Business
# 7,1 Private Residence
#go_venue_group=7
#go_venue_type=1
# Homogeneous ESS identifier
# If this is set, scans will be used to request response only from BSSes
# belonging to the specified Homogeneous ESS. This is used only if interworking
# is enabled.
# hessid=00:11:22:33:44:55
# Automatic network selection behavior
# 0 = do not automatically go through Interworking network selection
# (i.e., require explicit interworking_select command for this; default)
# 1 = perform Interworking network selection if one or more
# credentials have been configured and scan did not find a
# matching network block
#auto_interworking=0
# GAS Address3 field behavior
# 0 = P2P specification (Address3 = AP BSSID); default
# 1 = IEEE 802.11 standard compliant (Address3 = Wildcard BSSID when
# sent to not-associated AP; if associated, AP BSSID)
#gas_address3=0
# Publish fine timing measurement (FTM) responder functionality in
# the Extended Capabilities element bit 70.
# Controls whether FTM responder functionality will be published by AP/STA.
# Note that actual FTM responder operation is managed outside wpa_supplicant.
# 0 = Do not publish; default
# 1 = Publish
#ftm_responder=0
# Publish fine timing measurement (FTM) initiator functionality in
# the Extended Capabilities element bit 71.
# Controls whether FTM initiator functionality will be published by AP/STA.
# Note that actual FTM initiator operation is managed outside wpa_supplicant.
# 0 = Do not publish; default
# 1 = Publish
#ftm_initiator=0
# credential block
#
# Each credential used for automatic network selection is configured as a set
# of parameters that are compared to the information advertised by the APs when
# interworking_select and interworking_connect commands are used.
#
# credential fields:
#
# temporary: Whether this credential is temporary and not to be saved
#
# priority: Priority group
# By default, all networks and credentials get the same priority group
# (0). This field can be used to give higher priority for credentials
# (and similarly in struct wpa_ssid for network blocks) to change the
# Interworking automatic networking selection behavior. The matching
# network (based on either an enabled network block or a credential)
# with the highest priority value will be selected.
#
# pcsc: Use PC/SC and SIM/USIM card
#
# realm: Home Realm for Interworking
#
# username: Username for Interworking network selection
#
# password: Password for Interworking network selection
#
# ca_cert: CA certificate for Interworking network selection
#
# client_cert: File path to client certificate file (PEM/DER)
# This field is used with Interworking networking selection for a case
# where client certificate/private key is used for authentication
# (EAP-TLS). Full path to the file should be used since working
# directory may change when wpa_supplicant is run in the background.
#
# Certificates from PKCS#11 tokens can be referenced by a PKCS#11 URI.
#
# For example: private_key="pkcs11:manufacturer=piv_II;id=%01"
#
# Alternatively, a named configuration blob can be used by setting
# this to blob://blob_name.
#
# private_key: File path to client private key file (PEM/DER/PFX)
# When PKCS#12/PFX file (.p12/.pfx) is used, client_cert should be
# commented out. Both the private key and certificate will be read
# from the PKCS#12 file in this case. Full path to the file should be
# used since working directory may change when wpa_supplicant is run
# in the background.
#
# Keys in PKCS#11 tokens can be referenced by a PKCS#11 URI.
# For example: private_key="pkcs11:manufacturer=piv_II;id=%01"
#
# Windows certificate store can be used by leaving client_cert out and
# configuring private_key in one of the following formats:
#
# cert://substring_to_match
#
# hash://certificate_thumbprint_in_hex
#
# For example: private_key="hash://63093aa9c47f56ae88334c7b65a4"
#
# Note that when running wpa_supplicant as an application, the user
# certificate store (My user account) is used, whereas computer store
# (Computer account) is used when running wpasvc as a service.
#
# Alternatively, a named configuration blob can be used by setting
# this to blob://blob_name.
#
# private_key_passwd: Password for private key file
#
# imsi: IMSI in <MCC> | <MNC> | '-' | <MSIN> format
#
# milenage: Milenage parameters for SIM/USIM simulator in <Ki>:<OPc>:<SQN>
# format
#
# domain: Home service provider FQDN(s)
# This is used to compare against the Domain Name List to figure out
# whether the AP is operated by the Home SP. Multiple domain entries can
# be used to configure alternative FQDNs that will be considered home
# networks.
#
# roaming_consortium: Roaming Consortium OI
# If roaming_consortium_len is non-zero, this field contains the
# Roaming Consortium OI that can be used to determine which access
# points support authentication with this credential. This is an
# alternative to the use of the realm parameter. When using Roaming
# Consortium to match the network, the EAP parameters need to be
# pre-configured with the credential since the NAI Realm information
# may not be available or fetched.
#
# required_roaming_consortium: Required Roaming Consortium OI
# If required_roaming_consortium_len is non-zero, this field contains the
# Roaming Consortium OI that is required to be advertised by the AP for
# the credential to be considered matching.
#
# roaming_consortiums: Roaming Consortium OI(s) memberships
# This string field contains one or more comma delimited OIs (hexdump)
# identifying the roaming consortiums of which the provider is a member.
# The list is sorted from the most preferred one to the least preferred
# one. A match between the Roaming Consortium OIs advertised by an AP and
# the OIs in this list indicates that successful authentication is
# possible.
# (Hotspot 2.0 PerProviderSubscription/<X+>/HomeSP/RoamingConsortiumOI)
#
# eap: Pre-configured EAP method
# This optional field can be used to specify which EAP method will be
# used with this credential. If not set, the EAP method is selected
# automatically based on ANQP information (e.g., NAI Realm).
#
# phase1: Pre-configure Phase 1 (outer authentication) parameters
# This optional field is used with like the 'eap' parameter.
#
# phase2: Pre-configure Phase 2 (inner authentication) parameters
# This optional field is used with like the 'eap' parameter.
#
# excluded_ssid: Excluded SSID
# This optional field can be used to excluded specific SSID(s) from
# matching with the network. Multiple entries can be used to specify more
# than one SSID.
#
# roaming_partner: Roaming partner information
# This optional field can be used to configure preferences between roaming
# partners. The field is a string in following format:
# <FQDN>,<0/1 exact match>,<priority>,<* or country code>
# (non-exact match means any subdomain matches the entry; priority is in
# 0..255 range with 0 being the highest priority)
#
# update_identifier: PPS MO ID
# (Hotspot 2.0 PerProviderSubscription/UpdateIdentifier)
#
# provisioning_sp: FQDN of the SP that provisioned the credential
# This optional field can be used to keep track of the SP that provisioned
# the credential to find the PPS MO (./Wi-Fi/<provisioning_sp>).
#
# Minimum backhaul threshold (PPS/<X+>/Policy/MinBackhauldThreshold/*)
# These fields can be used to specify minimum download/upload backhaul
# bandwidth that is preferred for the credential. This constraint is
# ignored if the AP does not advertise WAN Metrics information or if the
# limit would prevent any connection. Values are in kilobits per second.
# min_dl_bandwidth_home
# min_ul_bandwidth_home
# min_dl_bandwidth_roaming
# min_ul_bandwidth_roaming
#
# max_bss_load: Maximum BSS Load Channel Utilization (1..255)
# (PPS/<X+>/Policy/MaximumBSSLoadValue)
# This value is used as the maximum channel utilization for network
# selection purposes for home networks. If the AP does not advertise
# BSS Load or if the limit would prevent any connection, this constraint
# will be ignored.
#
# req_conn_capab: Required connection capability
# (PPS/<X+>/Policy/RequiredProtoPortTuple)
# This value is used to configure set of required protocol/port pairs that
# a roaming network shall support (include explicitly in Connection
# Capability ANQP element). This constraint is ignored if the AP does not
# advertise Connection Capability or if this constraint would prevent any
# network connection. This policy is not used in home networks.
# Format: <protocol>[:<comma-separated list of ports]
# Multiple entries can be used to list multiple requirements.
# For example, number of common TCP protocols:
# req_conn_capab=6,22,80,443
# For example, IPSec/IKE:
# req_conn_capab=17:500
# req_conn_capab=50
#
# ocsp: Whether to use/require OCSP to check server certificate
# 0 = do not use OCSP stapling (TLS certificate status extension)
# 1 = try to use OCSP stapling, but not require response
# 2 = require valid OCSP stapling response
# 3 = require valid OCSP stapling response for all not-trusted
# certificates in the server certificate chain
#
# sim_num: Identifier for which SIM to use in multi-SIM devices
#
# for example:
#
#cred={
# realm="example.com"
# username="user@example.com"
# password="password"
# ca_cert="/etc/wpa_supplicant/ca.pem"
# domain="example.com"
#}
#
#cred={
# imsi="310026-000000000"
# milenage="90dca4eda45b53cf0f12d7c9c3bc6a89:cb9cccc4b9258e6dca4760379fb82"
#}
#
#cred={
# realm="example.com"
# username="user"
# password="password"
# ca_cert="/etc/wpa_supplicant/ca.pem"
# domain="example.com"
# roaming_consortium=223344
# eap=TTLS
# phase2="auth=MSCHAPV2"
#}
# Hotspot 2.0
# hs20=1
# Scheduled scan plans
#
# A space delimited list of scan plans. Each scan plan specifies the scan
# interval and number of iterations, delimited by a colon. The last scan plan
# will run infinitely and thus must specify only the interval and not the number
# of iterations.
#
# The driver advertises the maximum number of scan plans supported. If more scan
# plans than supported are configured, only the first ones are set (up to the
# maximum supported). The last scan plan that specifies only the interval is
# always set as the last plan.
#
# If the scan interval or the number of iterations for a scan plan exceeds the
# maximum supported, it will be set to the maximum supported value.
#
# Format:
# sched_scan_plans=<interval:iterations> <interval:iterations> ... <interval>
#
# Example:
# sched_scan_plans=10:100 20:200 30
# Multi Band Operation (MBO) non-preferred channels
# A space delimited list of non-preferred channels where each channel is a colon
# delimited list of values.
# Format:
# non_pref_chan=<oper_class>:<chan>:<preference>:<reason>
# Example:
# non_pref_chan=81:5:10:2 81:1:0:2 81:9:0:2
# MBO Cellular Data Capabilities
# 1 = Cellular data connection available
# 2 = Cellular data connection not available
# 3 = Not cellular capable (default)
#mbo_cell_capa=3
# Optimized Connectivity Experience (OCE)
# oce: Enable OCE features (bitmap)
# Set BIT(0) to Enable OCE in non-AP STA mode (default; disabled if the driver
# does not indicate support for OCE in STA mode)
# Set BIT(1) to Enable OCE in STA-CFON mode
#oce=1
# Extended Key ID support for Individually Addressed frames
# 0 = force off: Do not use Extended Key ID (default)
# 1 = auto: Activate Extended Key ID support if the driver supports it
#extended_key_id=0
# network block
#
# Each network (usually AP's sharing the same SSID) is configured as a separate
# block in this configuration file. The network blocks are in preference order
# (the first match is used).
#
# network block fields:
#
# disabled:
# 0 = this network can be used (default)
# 1 = this network block is disabled (can be enabled through ctrl_iface,
# e.g., with wpa_cli or wpa_gui)
#
# id_str: Network identifier string for external scripts. This value is passed
# to external action script through wpa_cli as WPA_ID_STR environment
# variable to make it easier to do network specific configuration.
#
# ssid: SSID (mandatory); network name in one of the optional formats:
# - an ASCII string with double quotation
# - a hex string (two characters per octet of SSID)
# - a printf-escaped ASCII string P"<escaped string>"
#
# scan_ssid:
# 0 = do not scan this SSID with specific Probe Request frames (default)
# 1 = scan with SSID-specific Probe Request frames (this can be used to
# find APs that do not accept broadcast SSID or use multiple SSIDs;
# this will add latency to scanning, so enable this only when needed)
#
# bssid: BSSID (optional); if set, this network block is used only when
# associating with the AP using the configured BSSID
#
# ignore_broadcast_ssid: SSID broadcast behavior
# Send empty SSID in beacons and ignore probe request frames that do not
# specify full SSID, i.e., require stations to know SSID.
# default: disabled (0)
# 1 = send empty (length=0) SSID in beacon and ignore probe request for
# broadcast SSID
# 2 = clear SSID (ASCII 0), but keep the original length (this may be required
# with some clients that do not support empty SSID) and ignore probe
# requests for broadcast SSID
#
# priority: priority group (integer)
# By default, all networks will get same priority group (0). If some of the
# networks are more desirable, this field can be used to change the order in
# which wpa_supplicant goes through the networks when selecting a BSS. The
# priority groups will be iterated in decreasing priority (i.e., the larger the
# priority value, the sooner the network is matched against the scan results).
# Within each priority group, networks will be selected based on security
# policy, signal strength, etc.
# Please note that AP scanning with scan_ssid=1 and ap_scan=2 mode are not
# using this priority to select the order for scanning. Instead, they try the
# networks in the order that used in the configuration file.
#
# mode: IEEE 802.11 operation mode
# 0 = infrastructure (Managed) mode, i.e., associate with an AP (default)
# 1 = IBSS (ad-hoc, peer-to-peer)
# 2 = AP (access point)
# Note: IBSS can only be used with key_mgmt NONE (plaintext and static WEP) and
# WPA-PSK (with proto=RSN). In addition, key_mgmt=WPA-NONE (fixed group key
# TKIP/CCMP) is available for backwards compatibility, but its use is
# deprecated. WPA-None requires following network block options:
# proto=WPA, key_mgmt=WPA-NONE, pairwise=NONE, group=TKIP (or CCMP, but not
# both), and psk must also be set.
#
# frequency: Channel frequency in megahertz (MHz) for IBSS, e.g.,
# 2412 = IEEE 802.11b/g channel 1. This value is used to configure the initial
# channel for IBSS (adhoc) networks. It is ignored in the infrastructure mode.
# In addition, this value is only used by the station that creates the IBSS. If
# an IBSS network with the configured SSID is already present, the frequency of
# the network will be used instead of this configured value.
#
# pbss: Whether to use PBSS. Relevant to IEEE 802.11ad networks only.
# 0 = do not use PBSS
# 1 = use PBSS
# 2 = don't care (not allowed in AP mode)
# Used together with mode configuration. When mode is AP, it means to start a
# PCP instead of a regular AP. When mode is infrastructure it means connect
# to a PCP instead of AP. In this mode you can also specify 2 (don't care)
# which means connect to either PCP or AP.
# P2P_GO and P2P_GROUP_FORMATION modes must use PBSS in IEEE 802.11ad network.
# For more details, see IEEE Std 802.11ad-2012.
#
# scan_freq: List of frequencies to scan
# Space-separated list of frequencies in MHz to scan when searching for this
# BSS. If the subset of channels used by the network is known, this option can
# be used to optimize scanning to not occur on channels that the network does
# not use. Example: scan_freq=2412 2437 2462
#
# freq_list: Array of allowed frequencies
# Space-separated list of frequencies in MHz to allow for selecting the BSS. If
# set, scan results that do not match any of the specified frequencies are not
# considered when selecting a BSS.
#
# This can also be set on the outside of the network block. In this case,
# it limits the frequencies that will be scanned.
#
# bgscan: Background scanning
# wpa_supplicant behavior for background scanning can be specified by
# configuring a bgscan module. These modules are responsible for requesting
# background scans for the purpose of roaming within an ESS (i.e., within a
# single network block with all the APs using the same SSID). The bgscan
# parameter uses following format: "<bgscan module name>:<module parameters>"
# Following bgscan modules are available:
# simple - Periodic background scans based on signal strength
# bgscan="simple:<short bgscan interval in seconds>:<signal strength threshold>:
# <long interval>"
# bgscan="simple:30:-45:300"
# learn - Learn channels used by the network and try to avoid bgscans on other
# channels (experimental)
# bgscan="learn:<short bgscan interval in seconds>:<signal strength threshold>:
# <long interval>[:<database file name>]"
# bgscan="learn:30:-45:300:/etc/wpa_supplicant/network1.bgscan"
# Explicitly disable bgscan by setting
# bgscan=""
#
# This option can also be set outside of all network blocks for the bgscan
# parameter to apply for all the networks that have no specific bgscan
# parameter.
#
# proto: list of accepted protocols
# WPA = WPA/IEEE 802.11i/D3.0
# RSN = WPA2/IEEE 802.11i (also WPA2 can be used as an alias for RSN)
# Note that RSN is used also for WPA3.
# If not set, this defaults to: WPA RSN
#
# key_mgmt: list of accepted authenticated key management protocols
# WPA-PSK = WPA pre-shared key (this requires 'psk' field)
# WPA-EAP = WPA using EAP authentication
# IEEE8021X = IEEE 802.1X using EAP authentication and (optionally) dynamically
# generated WEP keys
# NONE = WPA is not used; plaintext or static WEP could be used
# WPA-NONE = WPA-None for IBSS (deprecated; use proto=RSN key_mgmt=WPA-PSK
# instead)
# FT-PSK = Fast BSS Transition (IEEE 802.11r) with pre-shared key
# FT-EAP = Fast BSS Transition (IEEE 802.11r) with EAP authentication
# FT-EAP-SHA384 = Fast BSS Transition (IEEE 802.11r) with EAP authentication
# and using SHA384
# WPA-PSK-SHA256 = Like WPA-PSK but using stronger SHA256-based algorithms
# WPA-EAP-SHA256 = Like WPA-EAP but using stronger SHA256-based algorithms
# SAE = Simultaneous authentication of equals; pre-shared key/password -based
# authentication with stronger security than WPA-PSK especially when using
# not that strong password; a.k.a. WPA3-Personal
# FT-SAE = SAE with FT
# WPA-EAP-SUITE-B = Suite B 128-bit level
# WPA-EAP-SUITE-B-192 = Suite B 192-bit level
# OSEN = Hotspot 2.0 Rel 2 online signup connection
# FILS-SHA256 = Fast Initial Link Setup with SHA256
# FILS-SHA384 = Fast Initial Link Setup with SHA384
# FT-FILS-SHA256 = FT and Fast Initial Link Setup with SHA256
# FT-FILS-SHA384 = FT and Fast Initial Link Setup with SHA384
# OWE = Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (a.k.a. Enhanced Open)
# DPP = Device Provisioning Protocol
# If not set, this defaults to: WPA-PSK WPA-EAP
#
# ieee80211w: whether management frame protection is enabled
# 0 = disabled (default unless changed with the global pmf parameter)
# 1 = optional
# 2 = required
# The most common configuration options for this based on the PMF (protected
# management frames) certification program are:
# PMF enabled: ieee80211w=1 and key_mgmt=WPA-EAP WPA-EAP-SHA256
# PMF required: ieee80211w=2 and key_mgmt=WPA-EAP-SHA256
# (and similarly for WPA-PSK and WPA-PSK-SHA256 if WPA2-Personal is used)
# WPA3-Personal-only mode: ieee80211w=2 and key_mgmt=SAE
#
# ocv: whether operating channel validation is enabled
# This is a countermeasure against multi-channel man-in-the-middle attacks.
# Enabling this automatically also enables ieee80211w, if not yet enabled.
# 0 = disabled (default)
# 1 = enabled if wpa_supplicant's SME in use. Otherwise enabled only when the
# driver indicates support for operating channel validation.
#ocv=1
#
# auth_alg: list of allowed IEEE 802.11 authentication algorithms
# OPEN = Open System authentication (required for WPA/WPA2)
# SHARED = Shared Key authentication (requires static WEP keys)
# LEAP = LEAP/Network EAP (only used with LEAP)
# If not set, automatic selection is used (Open System with LEAP enabled if
# LEAP is allowed as one of the EAP methods).
#
# pairwise: list of accepted pairwise (unicast) ciphers for WPA
# CCMP = AES in Counter mode with CBC-MAC [RFC 3610, IEEE 802.11i/D7.0]
# TKIP = Temporal Key Integrity Protocol [IEEE 802.11i/D7.0]
# NONE = Use only Group Keys (deprecated, should not be included if APs support
# pairwise keys)
# If not set, this defaults to: CCMP TKIP
#
# group: list of accepted group (broadcast/multicast) ciphers for WPA
# CCMP = AES in Counter mode with CBC-MAC [RFC 3610, IEEE 802.11i/D7.0]
# TKIP = Temporal Key Integrity Protocol [IEEE 802.11i/D7.0]
# WEP104 = WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) with 104-bit key
# WEP40 = WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) with 40-bit key [IEEE 802.11]
# If not set, this defaults to: CCMP TKIP WEP104 WEP40
#
# group_mgmt: list of accepted group management ciphers for RSN (PMF)
# AES-128-CMAC = BIP-CMAC-128
# BIP-GMAC-128
# BIP-GMAC-256
# BIP-CMAC-256
# If not set, no constraint on the cipher, i.e., accept whichever cipher the AP
# indicates.
#
# psk: WPA preshared key; 256-bit pre-shared key
# The key used in WPA-PSK mode can be entered either as 64 hex-digits, i.e.,
# 32 bytes or as an ASCII passphrase (in which case, the real PSK will be
# generated using the passphrase and SSID). ASCII passphrase must be between
# 8 and 63 characters (inclusive). ext:<name of external PSK field> format can
# be used to indicate that the PSK/passphrase is stored in external storage.
# This field is not needed, if WPA-EAP is used.
# Note: Separate tool, wpa_passphrase, can be used to generate 256-bit keys
# from ASCII passphrase. This process uses lot of CPU and wpa_supplicant
# startup and reconfiguration time can be optimized by generating the PSK only
# only when the passphrase or SSID has actually changed.
#
# mem_only_psk: Whether to keep PSK/passphrase only in memory
# 0 = allow psk/passphrase to be stored to the configuration file
# 1 = do not store psk/passphrase to the configuration file
#mem_only_psk=0
#
# sae_password: SAE password
# This parameter can be used to set a password for SAE. By default, the
# passphrase from the psk parameter is used if this separate parameter is not
# used, but psk follows the WPA-PSK constraints (8..63 characters) even though
# SAE passwords do not have such constraints.
#
# sae_password_id: SAE password identifier
# This parameter can be used to set an identifier for the SAE password. By
# default, no such identifier is used. If set, the specified identifier value
# is used by the other peer to select which password to use for authentication.
#
# eapol_flags: IEEE 802.1X/EAPOL options (bit field)
# Dynamic WEP key required for non-WPA mode
# bit0 (1): require dynamically generated unicast WEP key
# bit1 (2): require dynamically generated broadcast WEP key
# (3 = require both keys; default)
# Note: When using wired authentication (including MACsec drivers),
# eapol_flags must be set to 0 for the authentication to be completed
# successfully.
#
# macsec_policy: IEEE 802.1X/MACsec options
# This determines how sessions are secured with MACsec (only for MACsec
# drivers).
# 0: MACsec not in use (default)
# 1: MACsec enabled - Should secure, accept key server's advice to
# determine whether to use a secure session or not.
#
# macsec_integ_only: IEEE 802.1X/MACsec transmit mode
# This setting applies only when MACsec is in use, i.e.,
# - macsec_policy is enabled
# - the key server has decided to enable MACsec
# 0: Encrypt traffic (default)
# 1: Integrity only
#
# macsec_replay_protect: IEEE 802.1X/MACsec replay protection
# This setting applies only when MACsec is in use, i.e.,
# - macsec_policy is enabled
# - the key server has decided to enable MACsec
# 0: Replay protection disabled (default)
# 1: Replay protection enabled
#
# macsec_replay_window: IEEE 802.1X/MACsec replay protection window
# This determines a window in which replay is tolerated, to allow receipt
# of frames that have been misordered by the network.
# This setting applies only when MACsec replay protection active, i.e.,
# - macsec_replay_protect is enabled
# - the key server has decided to enable MACsec
# 0: No replay window, strict check (default)
# 1..2^32-1: number of packets that could be misordered
#
# macsec_port: IEEE 802.1X/MACsec port
# Port component of the SCI
# Range: 1-65534 (default: 1)
#
# mka_cak, mka_ckn, and mka_priority: IEEE 802.1X/MACsec pre-shared key mode
# This allows to configure MACsec with a pre-shared key using a (CAK,CKN) pair.
# In this mode, instances of wpa_supplicant can act as MACsec peers. The peer
# with lower priority will become the key server and start distributing SAKs.
# mka_cak (CAK = Secure Connectivity Association Key) takes a 16-byte (128-bit)
# hex-string (32 hex-digits) or a 32-byte (256-bit) hex-string (64 hex-digits)
# mka_ckn (CKN = CAK Name) takes a 1..32-bytes (8..256 bit) hex-string
# (2..64 hex-digits)
# mka_priority (Priority of MKA Actor) is in 0..255 range with 255 being
# default priority
#
# mixed_cell: This option can be used to configure whether so called mixed
# cells, i.e., networks that use both plaintext and encryption in the same
# SSID, are allowed when selecting a BSS from scan results.
# 0 = disabled (default)
# 1 = enabled
#
# proactive_key_caching:
# Enable/disable opportunistic PMKSA caching for WPA2.
# 0 = disabled (default unless changed with the global okc parameter)
# 1 = enabled
#
# ft_eap_pmksa_caching:
# Whether FT-EAP PMKSA caching is allowed
# 0 = do not try to use PMKSA caching with FT-EAP (default)
# 1 = try to use PMKSA caching with FT-EAP
# This controls whether to try to use PMKSA caching with FT-EAP for the
# FT initial mobility domain association.
#ft_eap_pmksa_caching=0
#
# wep_key0..3: Static WEP key (ASCII in double quotation, e.g. "abcde" or
# hex without quotation, e.g., 0102030405)
# wep_tx_keyidx: Default WEP key index (TX) (0..3)
#
# wpa_ptk_rekey: Maximum lifetime for PTK in seconds. This can be used to
# enforce rekeying of PTK to mitigate some attacks against TKIP deficiencies.
#
# wpa_deny_ptk0_rekey: Workaround for PTK rekey issues
# PTK0 rekeys (using only one Key ID value for pairwise keys) can degrade the
# security and stability with some cards.
# To avoid the issues wpa_supplicant can replace those PTK rekeys (including
# EAP reauthentications) with fast reconnects.
#
# Available options:
# 0 = always rekey when configured/instructed (default)
# 1 = only rekey when the local driver is explicitly indicating it can perform
# this operation without issues
# 2 = never allow problematic PTK0 rekeys
#
# group_rekey: Group rekeying time in seconds. This value, if non-zero, is used
# as the dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyTime parameter when operating in
# Authenticator role in IBSS, or in AP and mesh modes.
#
# Following fields are only used with internal EAP implementation.
# eap: space-separated list of accepted EAP methods
# MD5 = EAP-MD5 (insecure and does not generate keying material ->
# cannot be used with WPA; to be used as a Phase 2 method
# with EAP-PEAP or EAP-TTLS)
# MSCHAPV2 = EAP-MSCHAPv2 (cannot be used separately with WPA; to be used
# as a Phase 2 method with EAP-PEAP or EAP-TTLS)
# OTP = EAP-OTP (cannot be used separately with WPA; to be used
# as a Phase 2 method with EAP-PEAP or EAP-TTLS)
# GTC = EAP-GTC (cannot be used separately with WPA; to be used
# as a Phase 2 method with EAP-PEAP or EAP-TTLS)
# TLS = EAP-TLS (client and server certificate)
# PEAP = EAP-PEAP (with tunnelled EAP authentication)
# TTLS = EAP-TTLS (with tunnelled EAP or PAP/CHAP/MSCHAP/MSCHAPV2
# authentication)
# If not set, all compiled in methods are allowed.
#
# identity: Identity string for EAP
# This field is also used to configure user NAI for
# EAP-PSK/PAX/SAKE/GPSK.
# anonymous_identity: Anonymous identity string for EAP (to be used as the
# unencrypted identity with EAP types that support different tunnelled
# identity, e.g., EAP-TTLS). This field can also be used with
# EAP-SIM/AKA/AKA' to store the pseudonym identity.
# password: Password string for EAP. This field can include either the
# plaintext password (using ASCII or hex string) or a NtPasswordHash
# (16-byte MD4 hash of password) in hash:<32 hex digits> format.
# NtPasswordHash can only be used when the password is for MSCHAPv2 or
# MSCHAP (EAP-MSCHAPv2, EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPv2, EAP-TTLS/MSCHAP, LEAP).
# EAP-PSK (128-bit PSK), EAP-PAX (128-bit PSK), and EAP-SAKE (256-bit
# PSK) is also configured using this field. For EAP-GPSK, this is a
# variable length PSK. ext:<name of external password field> format can
# be used to indicate that the password is stored in external storage.
# ca_cert: File path to CA certificate file (PEM/DER). This file can have one
# or more trusted CA certificates. If ca_cert and ca_path are not
# included, server certificate will not be verified. This is insecure and
# a trusted CA certificate should always be configured when using
# EAP-TLS/TTLS/PEAP. Full path should be used since working directory may
# change when wpa_supplicant is run in the background.
Add TLS client events, server probing, and srv cert matching This allows external programs (e.g., UI) to get more information about server certificate chain used during TLS handshake. This can be used both to automatically probe the authentication server to figure out most likely network configuration and to get information about reasons for failed authentications. The follow new control interface events are used for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR In addition, there is now an option for matching the server certificate instead of the full certificate chain for cases where a trusted CA is not configured or even known. This can be used, e.g., by first probing the network and learning the server certificate hash based on the new events and then adding a network configuration with the server certificate hash after user have accepted it. Future connections will then be allowed as long as the same server certificate is used. Authentication server probing can be done, e.g., with following configuration options: eap=TTLS PEAP TLS identity="" ca_cert="probe://" Example set of control events for this: CTRL-EVENT-EAP-STARTED EAP authentication started CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PROPOSED-METHOD vendor=0 method=21 CTRL-EVENT-EAP-METHOD EAP vendor 0 method 21 (TTLS) selected CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' hash=5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a CTRL-EVENT-EAP-TLS-CERT-ERROR reason=8 depth=0 subject='/C=US/ST=California/L=San Francisco/CN=Server/emailAddress=server@kir.nu' err='Server certificate chain probe' CTRL-EVENT-EAP-FAILURE EAP authentication failed Server certificate matching is configured with ca_cert, e.g.: ca_cert="hash://server/sha256/5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a" This functionality is currently available only with OpenSSL. Other TLS libraries (including internal implementation) may be added in the future.
14 years ago
#
# Alternatively, this can be used to only perform matching of the server
# certificate (SHA-256 hash of the DER encoded X.509 certificate). In
# this case, the possible CA certificates in the server certificate chain
# are ignored and only the server certificate is verified. This is
# configured with the following format:
# hash:://server/sha256/cert_hash_in_hex
# For example: "hash://server/sha256/
# 5a1bc1296205e6fdbe3979728efe3920798885c1c4590b5f90f43222d239ca6a"
#
# On Windows, trusted CA certificates can be loaded from the system
# certificate store by setting this to cert_store://<name>, e.g.,
# ca_cert="cert_store://CA" or ca_cert="cert_store://ROOT".
# Note that when running wpa_supplicant as an application, the user
# certificate store (My user account) is used, whereas computer store
# (Computer account) is used when running wpasvc as a service.
# ca_path: Directory path for CA certificate files (PEM). This path may
# contain multiple CA certificates in OpenSSL format. Common use for this
# is to point to system trusted CA list which is often installed into
# directory like /etc/ssl/certs. If configured, these certificates are
# added to the list of trusted CAs. ca_cert may also be included in that
# case, but it is not required.
# client_cert: File path to client certificate file (PEM/DER)
# Full path should be used since working directory may change when
# wpa_supplicant is run in the background.
# Alternatively, a named configuration blob can be used by setting this
# to blob://<blob name>.
# private_key: File path to client private key file (PEM/DER/PFX)
# When PKCS#12/PFX file (.p12/.pfx) is used, client_cert should be
# commented out. Both the private key and certificate will be read from
# the PKCS#12 file in this case. Full path should be used since working
# directory may change when wpa_supplicant is run in the background.
# Windows certificate store can be used by leaving client_cert out and
# configuring private_key in one of the following formats:
# cert://substring_to_match
# hash://certificate_thumbprint_in_hex
# for example: private_key="hash://63093aa9c47f56ae88334c7b65a4"
# Note that when running wpa_supplicant as an application, the user
# certificate store (My user account) is used, whereas computer store
# (Computer account) is used when running wpasvc as a service.
# Alternatively, a named configuration blob can be used by setting this
# to blob://<blob name>.
# private_key_passwd: Password for private key file (if left out, this will be
# asked through control interface)
# dh_file: File path to DH/DSA parameters file (in PEM format)
# This is an optional configuration file for setting parameters for an
# ephemeral DH key exchange. In most cases, the default RSA
# authentication does not use this configuration. However, it is possible
# setup RSA to use ephemeral DH key exchange. In addition, ciphers with
# DSA keys always use ephemeral DH keys. This can be used to achieve
# forward secrecy. If the file is in DSA parameters format, it will be
# automatically converted into DH params.
# subject_match: Substring to be matched against the subject of the
# authentication server certificate. If this string is set, the server
# certificate is only accepted if it contains this string in the subject.
# The subject string is in following format:
# /C=US/ST=CA/L=San Francisco/CN=Test AS/emailAddress=as@example.com
# Note: Since this is a substring match, this cannot be used securely to
# do a suffix match against a possible domain name in the CN entry. For
# such a use case, domain_suffix_match or domain_match should be used
# instead.
# altsubject_match: Semicolon separated string of entries to be matched against
# the alternative subject name of the authentication server certificate.
# If this string is set, the server certificate is only accepted if it
# contains one of the entries in an alternative subject name extension.
# altSubjectName string is in following format: TYPE:VALUE
# Example: EMAIL:server@example.com
# Example: DNS:server.example.com;DNS:server2.example.com
# Following types are supported: EMAIL, DNS, URI
# domain_suffix_match: Constraint for server domain name. If set, this FQDN is
# used as a suffix match requirement for the AAA server certificate in
# SubjectAltName dNSName element(s). If a matching dNSName is found, this
# constraint is met. If no dNSName values are present, this constraint is
# matched against SubjectName CN using same suffix match comparison.
#
# Suffix match here means that the host/domain name is compared one label
# at a time starting from the top-level domain and all the labels in
# domain_suffix_match shall be included in the certificate. The
# certificate may include additional sub-level labels in addition to the
# required labels.
#
# More than one match string can be provided by using semicolons to
# separate the strings (e.g., example.org;example.com). When multiple
# strings are specified, a match with any one of the values is considered
# a sufficient match for the certificate, i.e., the conditions are ORed
# together.
#
# For example, domain_suffix_match=example.com would match
# test.example.com but would not match test-example.com.
# domain_match: Constraint for server domain name
# If set, this FQDN is used as a full match requirement for the
# server certificate in SubjectAltName dNSName element(s). If a
# matching dNSName is found, this constraint is met. If no dNSName
# values are present, this constraint is matched against SubjectName CN
# using same full match comparison. This behavior is similar to
# domain_suffix_match, but has the requirement of a full match, i.e.,
# no subdomains or wildcard matches are allowed. Case-insensitive
# comparison is used, so "Example.com" matches "example.com", but would
# not match "test.Example.com".
#
# More than one match string can be provided by using semicolons to
# separate the strings (e.g., example.org;example.com). When multiple
# strings are specified, a match with any one of the values is considered
# a sufficient match for the certificate, i.e., the conditions are ORed
# together.
# phase1: Phase1 (outer authentication, i.e., TLS tunnel) parameters
# (string with field-value pairs, e.g., "peapver=0" or
# "peapver=1 peaplabel=1")
# 'peapver' can be used to force which PEAP version (0 or 1) is used.
# 'peaplabel=1' can be used to force new label, "client PEAP encryption",
# to be used during key derivation when PEAPv1 or newer. Most existing
# PEAPv1 implementation seem to be using the old label, "client EAP
# encryption", and wpa_supplicant is now using that as the default value.
# Some servers, e.g., Radiator, may require peaplabel=1 configuration to
# interoperate with PEAPv1; see eap_testing.txt for more details.
# 'peap_outer_success=0' can be used to terminate PEAP authentication on
# tunneled EAP-Success. This is required with some RADIUS servers that
# implement draft-josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap-05.txt (e.g.,
# Lucent NavisRadius v4.4.0 with PEAP in "IETF Draft 5" mode)
# include_tls_length=1 can be used to force wpa_supplicant to include
# TLS Message Length field in all TLS messages even if they are not
# fragmented.
# sim_min_num_chal=3 can be used to configure EAP-SIM to require three
# challenges (by default, it accepts 2 or 3)
# result_ind=1 can be used to enable EAP-SIM and EAP-AKA to use
# protected result indication.
# 'crypto_binding' option can be used to control PEAPv0 cryptobinding
# behavior:
# * 0 = do not use cryptobinding (default)
# * 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it
# * 2 = require cryptobinding
# EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin=<Device Password> or
# pbc=1.
#
# For wired IEEE 802.1X authentication, "allow_canned_success=1" can be
# used to configure a mode that allows EAP-Success (and EAP-Failure)
# without going through authentication step. Some switches use such
# sequence when forcing the port to be authorized/unauthorized or as a
# fallback option if the authentication server is unreachable. By default,
# wpa_supplicant discards such frames to protect against potential attacks
# by rogue devices, but this option can be used to disable that protection
# for cases where the server/authenticator does not need to be
# authenticated.
# phase2: Phase2 (inner authentication with TLS tunnel) parameters
# (string with field-value pairs, e.g., "auth=MSCHAPV2" for EAP-PEAP or
# "autheap=MSCHAPV2 autheap=MD5" for EAP-TTLS). "mschapv2_retry=0" can be
# used to disable MSCHAPv2 password retry in authentication failure cases.
#
# TLS-based methods can use the following parameters to control TLS behavior
# (these are normally in the phase1 parameter, but can be used also in the
# phase2 parameter when EAP-TLS is used within the inner tunnel):
# tls_allow_md5=1 - allow MD5-based certificate signatures (depending on the
# TLS library, these may be disabled by default to enforce stronger
# security)
# tls_disable_time_checks=1 - ignore certificate validity time (this requests
# the TLS library to accept certificates even if they are not currently
# valid, i.e., have expired or have not yet become valid; this should be
# used only for testing purposes)
# tls_disable_session_ticket=1 - disable TLS Session Ticket extension
# tls_disable_session_ticket=0 - allow TLS Session Ticket extension to be used
# Note: If not set, this is automatically set to 1 for EAP-TLS/PEAP/TTLS
# as a workaround for broken authentication server implementations unless
# EAP workarounds are disabled with eap_workaround=0.
# For EAP-FAST, this must be set to 0 (or left unconfigured for the
# default value to be used automatically).
# tls_disable_tlsv1_0=1 - disable use of TLSv1.0
OpenSSL: Allow systemwide policies to be overridden Some distributions (e.g., Debian) have started introducting systemwide OpenSSL policies to disable older protocol versions and ciphers throughout all programs using OpenSSL. This can result in significant number of interoperability issues with deployed EAP implementations. Allow explicit wpa_supplicant (EAP peer) and hostapd (EAP server) parameters to be used to request systemwide policies to be overridden if older versions are needed to be able to interoperate with devices that cannot be updated to support the newer protocol versions or keys. The default behavior is not changed here, i.e., the systemwide policies will be followed if no explicit override configuration is used. The overrides should be used only if really needed since they can result in reduced security. In wpa_supplicant, tls_disable_tlsv1_?=0 value in the phase1 network profile parameter can be used to explicitly enable TLS versions that are disabled in the systemwide configuration. For example, phase1="tls_disable_tlsv1_0=0 tls_disable_tlsv1_1=0" would request TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.1 to be enabled even if the systemwide policy enforces TLS v1.2 as the minimum version. Similarly, openssl_ciphers parameter can be used to override systemwide policy, e.g., with openssl_ciphers="DEFAULT@SECLEVEL=1" to drop from security level 2 to 1 in Debian to allow shorter keys to be used. In hostapd, tls_flags parameter can be used to configure similar options. E.g., tls_flags=[ENABLE-TLSv1.0][ENABLE-TLSv1.1] Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
5 years ago
# tls_disable_tlsv1_0=0 - explicitly enable use of TLSv1.0 (this allows
# systemwide TLS policies to be overridden)
# tls_disable_tlsv1_1=1 - disable use of TLSv1.1 (a workaround for AAA servers
# that have issues interoperating with updated TLS version)
OpenSSL: Allow systemwide policies to be overridden Some distributions (e.g., Debian) have started introducting systemwide OpenSSL policies to disable older protocol versions and ciphers throughout all programs using OpenSSL. This can result in significant number of interoperability issues with deployed EAP implementations. Allow explicit wpa_supplicant (EAP peer) and hostapd (EAP server) parameters to be used to request systemwide policies to be overridden if older versions are needed to be able to interoperate with devices that cannot be updated to support the newer protocol versions or keys. The default behavior is not changed here, i.e., the systemwide policies will be followed if no explicit override configuration is used. The overrides should be used only if really needed since they can result in reduced security. In wpa_supplicant, tls_disable_tlsv1_?=0 value in the phase1 network profile parameter can be used to explicitly enable TLS versions that are disabled in the systemwide configuration. For example, phase1="tls_disable_tlsv1_0=0 tls_disable_tlsv1_1=0" would request TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.1 to be enabled even if the systemwide policy enforces TLS v1.2 as the minimum version. Similarly, openssl_ciphers parameter can be used to override systemwide policy, e.g., with openssl_ciphers="DEFAULT@SECLEVEL=1" to drop from security level 2 to 1 in Debian to allow shorter keys to be used. In hostapd, tls_flags parameter can be used to configure similar options. E.g., tls_flags=[ENABLE-TLSv1.0][ENABLE-TLSv1.1] Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
5 years ago
# tls_disable_tlsv1_1=0 - explicitly enable use of TLSv1.1 (this allows
# systemwide TLS policies to be overridden)
# tls_disable_tlsv1_2=1 - disable use of TLSv1.2 (a workaround for AAA servers
# that have issues interoperating with updated TLS version)
OpenSSL: Allow systemwide policies to be overridden Some distributions (e.g., Debian) have started introducting systemwide OpenSSL policies to disable older protocol versions and ciphers throughout all programs using OpenSSL. This can result in significant number of interoperability issues with deployed EAP implementations. Allow explicit wpa_supplicant (EAP peer) and hostapd (EAP server) parameters to be used to request systemwide policies to be overridden if older versions are needed to be able to interoperate with devices that cannot be updated to support the newer protocol versions or keys. The default behavior is not changed here, i.e., the systemwide policies will be followed if no explicit override configuration is used. The overrides should be used only if really needed since they can result in reduced security. In wpa_supplicant, tls_disable_tlsv1_?=0 value in the phase1 network profile parameter can be used to explicitly enable TLS versions that are disabled in the systemwide configuration. For example, phase1="tls_disable_tlsv1_0=0 tls_disable_tlsv1_1=0" would request TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.1 to be enabled even if the systemwide policy enforces TLS v1.2 as the minimum version. Similarly, openssl_ciphers parameter can be used to override systemwide policy, e.g., with openssl_ciphers="DEFAULT@SECLEVEL=1" to drop from security level 2 to 1 in Debian to allow shorter keys to be used. In hostapd, tls_flags parameter can be used to configure similar options. E.g., tls_flags=[ENABLE-TLSv1.0][ENABLE-TLSv1.1] Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
5 years ago
# tls_disable_tlsv1_2=0 - explicitly enable use of TLSv1.2 (this allows
# systemwide TLS policies to be overridden)
# tls_disable_tlsv1_3=1 - disable use of TLSv1.3 (a workaround for AAA servers
# that have issues interoperating with updated TLS version)
OpenSSL: Allow systemwide policies to be overridden Some distributions (e.g., Debian) have started introducting systemwide OpenSSL policies to disable older protocol versions and ciphers throughout all programs using OpenSSL. This can result in significant number of interoperability issues with deployed EAP implementations. Allow explicit wpa_supplicant (EAP peer) and hostapd (EAP server) parameters to be used to request systemwide policies to be overridden if older versions are needed to be able to interoperate with devices that cannot be updated to support the newer protocol versions or keys. The default behavior is not changed here, i.e., the systemwide policies will be followed if no explicit override configuration is used. The overrides should be used only if really needed since they can result in reduced security. In wpa_supplicant, tls_disable_tlsv1_?=0 value in the phase1 network profile parameter can be used to explicitly enable TLS versions that are disabled in the systemwide configuration. For example, phase1="tls_disable_tlsv1_0=0 tls_disable_tlsv1_1=0" would request TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.1 to be enabled even if the systemwide policy enforces TLS v1.2 as the minimum version. Similarly, openssl_ciphers parameter can be used to override systemwide policy, e.g., with openssl_ciphers="DEFAULT@SECLEVEL=1" to drop from security level 2 to 1 in Debian to allow shorter keys to be used. In hostapd, tls_flags parameter can be used to configure similar options. E.g., tls_flags=[ENABLE-TLSv1.0][ENABLE-TLSv1.1] Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
5 years ago
# tls_disable_tlsv1_3=0 - enable TLSv1.3 (experimental - disabled by default)
EAP peer: External server certificate chain validation This adds support for optional functionality to validate server certificate chain in TLS-based EAP methods in an external program. wpa_supplicant control interface is used to indicate when such validation is needed and what the result of the external validation is. This external validation can extend or replace the internal validation. When ca_cert or ca_path parameter is set, the internal validation is used. If these parameters are omitted, only the external validation is used. It needs to be understood that leaving those parameters out will disable most of the validation steps done with the TLS library and that configuration is not really recommend. By default, the external validation is not used. It can be enabled by addingtls_ext_cert_check=1 into the network profile phase1 parameter. When enabled, external validation is required through the CTRL-REQ/RSP mechanism similarly to other EAP authentication parameters through the control interface. The request to perform external validation is indicated by the following event: CTRL-REQ-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:External server certificate validation needed for SSID <ssid> Before that event, the server certificate chain is provided with the CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT events that include the cert=<hexdump> parameter. depth=# indicates which certificate is in question (0 for the server certificate, 1 for its issues, and so on). The result of the external validation is provided with the following command: CTRL-RSP-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:<good|bad> It should be noted that this is currently enabled only for OpenSSL (and BoringSSL/LibreSSL). Due to the constraints in the library API, the validation result from external processing cannot be reported cleanly with TLS alert. In other words, if the external validation reject the server certificate chain, the pending TLS handshake is terminated without sending more messages to the server. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
9 years ago
# tls_ext_cert_check=0 - No external server certificate validation (default)
# tls_ext_cert_check=1 - External server certificate validation enabled; this
# requires an external program doing validation of server certificate
# chain when receiving CTRL-RSP-EXT_CERT_CHECK event from the control
# interface and report the result of the validation with
# CTRL-RSP_EXT_CERT_CHECK.
# tls_suiteb=0 - do not apply Suite B 192-bit constraints on TLS (default)
# tls_suiteb=1 - apply Suite B 192-bit constraints on TLS; this is used in
# particular when using Suite B with RSA keys of >= 3K (3072) bits
#
# Following certificate/private key fields are used in inner Phase2
# authentication when using EAP-TTLS or EAP-PEAP.
# ca_cert2: File path to CA certificate file. This file can have one or more
# trusted CA certificates. If ca_cert2 and ca_path2 are not included,
# server certificate will not be verified. This is insecure and a trusted
# CA certificate should always be configured.
# ca_path2: Directory path for CA certificate files (PEM)
# client_cert2: File path to client certificate file
# private_key2: File path to client private key file
# private_key2_passwd: Password for private key file
# dh_file2: File path to DH/DSA parameters file (in PEM format)
# subject_match2: Substring to be matched against the subject of the
# authentication server certificate. See subject_match for more details.
# altsubject_match2: Semicolon separated string of entries to be matched
# against the alternative subject name of the authentication server
# certificate. See altsubject_match documentation for more details.
# domain_suffix_match2: Constraint for server domain name. See
# domain_suffix_match for more details.
# ocsp2: See ocsp for more details.
#
# Separate machine credentials can be configured for EAP-TEAP Phase 2 with
# "machine_" prefix (e.g., "machine_identity") in the configuration parameters.
# See the parameters without that prefix for more details on the meaning and
# format of each such parameter.
#
# fragment_size: Maximum EAP fragment size in bytes (default 1398).
# This value limits the fragment size for EAP methods that support
# fragmentation (e.g., EAP-TLS and EAP-PEAP). This value should be set
# small enough to make the EAP messages fit in MTU of the network
# interface used for EAPOL. The default value is suitable for most
# cases.
#
# ocsp: Whether to use/require OCSP to check server certificate
# 0 = do not use OCSP stapling (TLS certificate status extension)
# 1 = try to use OCSP stapling, but not require response
# 2 = require valid OCSP stapling response
# 3 = require valid OCSP stapling response for all not-trusted
# certificates in the server certificate chain
#
# openssl_ciphers: OpenSSL specific cipher configuration
# This can be used to override the global openssl_ciphers configuration
# parameter (see above).
#
# erp: Whether EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP) is enabled
#
# EAP-FAST variables:
# pac_file: File path for the PAC entries. wpa_supplicant will need to be able
# to create this file and write updates to it when PAC is being
# provisioned or refreshed. Full path to the file should be used since
# working directory may change when wpa_supplicant is run in the
# background. Alternatively, a named configuration blob can be used by
# setting this to blob://<blob name>
# phase1: fast_provisioning option can be used to enable in-line provisioning
# of EAP-FAST credentials (PAC):
# 0 = disabled,
# 1 = allow unauthenticated provisioning,
# 2 = allow authenticated provisioning,
# 3 = allow both unauthenticated and authenticated provisioning
# fast_max_pac_list_len=<num> option can be used to set the maximum
# number of PAC entries to store in a PAC list (default: 10)
# fast_pac_format=binary option can be used to select binary format for
16 years ago
# storing PAC entries in order to save some space (the default
# text format uses about 2.5 times the size of minimal binary
# format)
#
# wpa_supplicant supports number of "EAP workarounds" to work around
# interoperability issues with incorrectly behaving authentication servers.
# These are enabled by default because some of the issues are present in large
# number of authentication servers. Strict EAP conformance mode can be
# configured by disabling workarounds with eap_workaround=0.
# update_identifier: PPS MO ID
# (Hotspot 2.0 PerProviderSubscription/UpdateIdentifier)
#
# roaming_consortium_selection: Roaming Consortium Selection
# The matching Roaming Consortium OI that was used to generate this
# network profile.
# Station inactivity limit
#
# If a station does not send anything in ap_max_inactivity seconds, an
# empty data frame is sent to it in order to verify whether it is
# still in range. If this frame is not ACKed, the station will be
# disassociated and then deauthenticated. This feature is used to
# clear station table of old entries when the STAs move out of the
# range.
#
# The station can associate again with the AP if it is still in range;
# this inactivity poll is just used as a nicer way of verifying
# inactivity; i.e., client will not report broken connection because
# disassociation frame is not sent immediately without first polling
# the STA with a data frame.
# default: 300 (i.e., 5 minutes)
#ap_max_inactivity=300
# DTIM period in Beacon intervals for AP mode (default: 2)
#dtim_period=2
# Beacon interval (default: 100 TU)
#beacon_int=100
# WPS in AP mode
# 0 = WPS enabled and configured (default)
# 1 = WPS disabled
#wps_disabled=0
# FILS DH Group
# 0 = PFS disabled with FILS shared key authentication (default)
# 1-65535 = DH Group to use for FILS PFS
#fils_dh_group=0
# DPP PFS
# 0: allow PFS to be used or not used (default)
# 1: require PFS to be used (note: not compatible with DPP R1)
# 2: do not allow PFS to be used
#dpp_pfs=0
# Whether beacon protection is enabled
# This depends on management frame protection (ieee80211w) being enabled and
# beacon protection support indication from the driver.
# 0 = disabled (default)
# 1 = enabled
#beacon_prot=0
# OWE DH Group
# 0: use default (19) first and then try all supported groups one by one if AP
# rejects the selected group
# 1-65535: DH Group to use for OWE
# Groups 19 (NIST P-256), 20 (NIST P-384), and 21 (NIST P-521) are
# currently supported.
#owe_group=0
# OWE-only mode (disable transition mode)
# 0: enable transition mode (allow connection to either OWE or open BSS)
# 1 = disable transition mode (allow connection only with OWE)
#owe_only=0
# OWE PTK derivation workaround
# Initial OWE implementation used SHA256 when deriving the PTK for all
# OWE groups. This was supposed to change to SHA384 for group 20 and
# SHA512 for group 21. This parameter can be used to enable older
# behavior mainly for testing purposes. There is no impact to group 19
# behavior, but if enabled, this will make group 20 and 21 cases use
# SHA256-based PTK derivation which will not work with the updated
# OWE implementation on the AP side.
#owe_ptk_workaround=0
# Transition Disable indication
# The AP can notify authenticated stations to disable transition mode
# in their network profiles when the network has completed transition
# steps, i.e., once sufficiently large number of APs in the ESS have
# been updated to support the more secure alternative. When this
# indication is used, the stations are expected to automatically
# disable transition mode and less secure security options. This
# includes use of WEP, TKIP (including use of TKIP as the group
# cipher), and connections without PMF.
# Bitmap bits:
# bit 0 (0x01): WPA3-Personal (i.e., disable WPA2-Personal = WPA-PSK
# and only allow SAE to be used)
# bit 1 (0x02): SAE-PK (disable SAE without use of SAE-PK)
# bit 2 (0x04): WPA3-Enterprise (move to requiring PMF)
# bit 3 (0x08): Enhanced Open (disable use of open network; require
# OWE)
# SAE-PK mode
# 0: automatic SAE/SAE-PK selection based on password; enable
# transition mode (allow SAE authentication without SAE-PK)
# 1: SAE-PK only (disable transition mode; allow SAE authentication
# only with SAE-PK)
# 2: disable SAE-PK (allow SAE authentication only without SAE-PK)
#sae_pk=0
Add support for using random local MAC address This adds experimental support for wpa_supplicant to assign random local MAC addresses for both pre-association cases (scan, GAS/ANQP) and for connections. MAC address policy for each part can be controlled separately and the connection part can be set per network block. This requires support from the driver to allow local MAC address to be changed if random address policy is enabled. It should also be noted that number of drivers would not support concurrent operations (e.g., P2P and station association) with random addresses in use for one or both. This functionality can be controlled with the global configuration parameters mac_addr and preassoc_mac_addr which set the default MAC address policies for connections and pre-association operations (scan and GAS/ANQP while not connected). The global rand_addr_lifetime parameter can be used to set the lifetime of a random MAC address in seconds (default: 60 seconds). This is used to avoid unnecessarily frequent MAC address changes since those are likely to result in driver clearing most of its state. It should be noted that the random MAC address does not expire during an ESS connection, i.e., this lifetime is only for the case where the device is disconnected. The mac_addr parameter can also be set in the network blocks to define different behavior per network. For example, the global mac_addr=1 and preassoc_mac_addr=1 settings and mac_addr=0 in a home network profile would result in behavior where all scanning is performed using a random MAC address while connections to new networks (e.g., Interworking/Hotspot 2.0) would use random address and connections to the home network would use the permanent MAC address. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
10 years ago
# MAC address policy
# 0 = use permanent MAC address
# 1 = use random MAC address for each ESS connection
# 2 = like 1, but maintain OUI (with local admin bit set)
Add support for using random local MAC address This adds experimental support for wpa_supplicant to assign random local MAC addresses for both pre-association cases (scan, GAS/ANQP) and for connections. MAC address policy for each part can be controlled separately and the connection part can be set per network block. This requires support from the driver to allow local MAC address to be changed if random address policy is enabled. It should also be noted that number of drivers would not support concurrent operations (e.g., P2P and station association) with random addresses in use for one or both. This functionality can be controlled with the global configuration parameters mac_addr and preassoc_mac_addr which set the default MAC address policies for connections and pre-association operations (scan and GAS/ANQP while not connected). The global rand_addr_lifetime parameter can be used to set the lifetime of a random MAC address in seconds (default: 60 seconds). This is used to avoid unnecessarily frequent MAC address changes since those are likely to result in driver clearing most of its state. It should be noted that the random MAC address does not expire during an ESS connection, i.e., this lifetime is only for the case where the device is disconnected. The mac_addr parameter can also be set in the network blocks to define different behavior per network. For example, the global mac_addr=1 and preassoc_mac_addr=1 settings and mac_addr=0 in a home network profile would result in behavior where all scanning is performed using a random MAC address while connections to new networks (e.g., Interworking/Hotspot 2.0) would use random address and connections to the home network would use the permanent MAC address. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
10 years ago
#mac_addr=0
# disable_ht: Whether HT (802.11n) should be disabled.
# 0 = HT enabled (if AP supports it)
# 1 = HT disabled
#
# disable_ht40: Whether HT-40 (802.11n) should be disabled.
# 0 = HT-40 enabled (if AP supports it)
# 1 = HT-40 disabled
#
# disable_sgi: Whether SGI (short guard interval) should be disabled.
# 0 = SGI enabled (if AP supports it)
# 1 = SGI disabled
#
# disable_ldpc: Whether LDPC should be disabled.
# 0 = LDPC enabled (if AP supports it)
# 1 = LDPC disabled
#
# ht40_intolerant: Whether 40 MHz intolerant should be indicated.
# 0 = 40 MHz tolerant (default)
# 1 = 40 MHz intolerant
#
# ht_mcs: Configure allowed MCS rates.
# Parsed as an array of bytes, in base-16 (ascii-hex)
# ht_mcs="" // Use all available (default)
# ht_mcs="0xff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 " // Use MCS 0-7 only
# ht_mcs="0xff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 " // Use MCS 0-15 only
#
# disable_max_amsdu: Whether MAX_AMSDU should be disabled.
# -1 = Do not make any changes.
# 0 = Enable MAX-AMSDU if hardware supports it.
# 1 = Disable AMSDU
#
# ampdu_factor: Maximum A-MPDU Length Exponent
# Value: 0-3, see 7.3.2.56.3 in IEEE Std 802.11n-2009.
#
# ampdu_density: Allow overriding AMPDU density configuration.
# Treated as hint by the kernel.
# -1 = Do not make any changes.
# 0-3 = Set AMPDU density (aka factor) to specified value.
#
# tx_stbc: Allow overriding STBC support for TX streams
# Value: 0-1, see IEEE Std 802.11-2016, 9.4.2.56.2.
# -1 = Do not make any changes (default)
# 0 = Set if not supported
# 1 = Set if supported
#
# rx_stbc: Allow overriding STBC support for RX streams
# Value: 0-3, see IEEE Std 802.11-2016, 9.4.2.56.2.
# -1 = Do not make any changes (default)
# 0 = Set if not supported
# 1 = Set for support of one spatial stream
# 2 = Set for support of one and two spatial streams
# 3 = Set for support of one, two and three spatial streams
# disable_vht: Whether VHT should be disabled.
# 0 = VHT enabled (if AP supports it)
# 1 = VHT disabled
#
# vht_capa: VHT capabilities to set in the override
# vht_capa_mask: mask of VHT capabilities
#
# vht_rx_mcs_nss_1/2/3/4/5/6/7/8: override the MCS set for RX NSS 1-8
# vht_tx_mcs_nss_1/2/3/4/5/6/7/8: override the MCS set for TX NSS 1-8
# 0: MCS 0-7
# 1: MCS 0-8
# 2: MCS 0-9
# 3: not supported
# multi_ap_backhaul_sta: Multi-AP backhaul STA functionality
# 0 = normal STA (default)
# 1 = backhaul STA
# A backhaul STA sends the Multi-AP IE, fails to associate if the AP does not
# support Multi-AP, and sets 4-address mode if it does. Thus, the netdev can be
# added to a bridge to allow forwarding frames over this backhaul link.
##### Fast Session Transfer (FST) support #####################################
#
# The options in this section are only available when the build configuration
# option CONFIG_FST is set while compiling wpa_supplicant. They allow this
# interface to be a part of FST setup.
#
# FST is the transfer of a session from a channel to another channel, in the
# same or different frequency bands.
#
# For details, see IEEE Std 802.11ad-2012.
# Identifier of an FST Group the interface belongs to.
#fst_group_id=bond0
# Interface priority within the FST Group.
# Announcing a higher priority for an interface means declaring it more
# preferable for FST switch.
# fst_priority is in 1..255 range with 1 being the lowest priority.
#fst_priority=100
# Default LLT value for this interface in milliseconds. The value used in case
# no value provided during session setup. Default is 50 msec.
# fst_llt is in 1..4294967 range (due to spec limitation, see 10.32.2.2
# Transitioning between states).
#fst_llt=100
# BSS Transition Management
# disable_btm - Disable BSS transition management in STA
# Set to 0 to enable BSS transition management (default behavior)
# Set to 1 to disable BSS transition management
#disable_btm=0
# Enable EDMG capability in STA/AP mode, default value is false
#enable_edmg=1
# This value is used to configure the channel bonding feature.
# Default value is 0.
# Relevant only if enable_edmg is true
# In AP mode it defines the EDMG channel to use for AP operation.
# In STA mode it defines the EDMG channel for connection (if supported by AP).
#edmg_channel=9
# Example blocks:
# Simple case: WPA-PSK, PSK as an ASCII passphrase, allow all valid ciphers
network={
ssid="simple"
psk="very secret passphrase"
priority=5
}
# Same as previous, but request SSID-specific scanning (for APs that reject
# broadcast SSID)
network={
ssid="second ssid"
scan_ssid=1
psk="very secret passphrase"
priority=2
}
# Only WPA-PSK is used. Any valid cipher combination is accepted.
network={
ssid="example"
proto=WPA
key_mgmt=WPA-PSK
pairwise=CCMP TKIP
group=CCMP TKIP WEP104 WEP40
psk=06b4be19da289f475aa46a33cb793029d4ab3db7a23ee92382eb0106c72ac7bb
priority=2
}
# WPA-Personal(PSK) with TKIP and enforcement for frequent PTK rekeying
network={
ssid="example"
proto=WPA
key_mgmt=WPA-PSK
pairwise=TKIP
group=TKIP
psk="not so secure passphrase"
wpa_ptk_rekey=600
}
# Only WPA-EAP is used. Both CCMP and TKIP is accepted. An AP that used WEP104
# or WEP40 as the group cipher will not be accepted.
network={
ssid="example"
proto=RSN
key_mgmt=WPA-EAP
pairwise=CCMP TKIP
group=CCMP TKIP
eap=TLS
identity="user@example.com"
ca_cert="/etc/cert/ca.pem"
client_cert="/etc/cert/user.pem"
private_key="/etc/cert/user.prv"
private_key_passwd="password"
priority=1
}
# EAP-PEAP/MSCHAPv2 configuration for RADIUS servers that use the new peaplabel
# (e.g., Radiator)
network={
ssid="example"
key_mgmt=WPA-EAP
eap=PEAP
identity="user@example.com"
password="foobar"
ca_cert="/etc/cert/ca.pem"
phase1="peaplabel=1"
phase2="auth=MSCHAPV2"
priority=10
}
# EAP-TTLS/EAP-MD5-Challenge configuration with anonymous identity for the
# unencrypted use. Real identity is sent only within an encrypted TLS tunnel.
network={
ssid="example"
key_mgmt=WPA-EAP
eap=TTLS
identity="user@example.com"
anonymous_identity="anonymous@example.com"
password="foobar"
ca_cert="/etc/cert/ca.pem"
priority=2
}
# EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPv2 configuration with anonymous identity for the unencrypted
# use. Real identity is sent only within an encrypted TLS tunnel.
network={
ssid="example"
key_mgmt=WPA-EAP
eap=TTLS
identity="user@example.com"
anonymous_identity="anonymous@example.com"
password="foobar"
ca_cert="/etc/cert/ca.pem"
phase2="auth=MSCHAPV2"
}
# WPA-EAP, EAP-TTLS with different CA certificate used for outer and inner
# authentication.
network={
ssid="example"
key_mgmt=WPA-EAP
eap=TTLS
# Phase1 / outer authentication
anonymous_identity="anonymous@example.com"
ca_cert="/etc/cert/ca.pem"
# Phase 2 / inner authentication
phase2="autheap=TLS"
ca_cert2="/etc/cert/ca2.pem"
client_cert2="/etc/cer/user.pem"
private_key2="/etc/cer/user.prv"
private_key2_passwd="password"
priority=2
}
# Both WPA-PSK and WPA-EAP is accepted. Only CCMP is accepted as pairwise and
# group cipher.
network={
ssid="example"
bssid=00:11:22:33:44:55
proto=WPA RSN
key_mgmt=WPA-PSK WPA-EAP
pairwise=CCMP
group=CCMP
psk=06b4be19da289f475aa46a33cb793029d4ab3db7a23ee92382eb0106c72ac7bb
}
# Special characters in SSID, so use hex string. Default to WPA-PSK, WPA-EAP
# and all valid ciphers.
network={
ssid=00010203
psk=000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
}
# EAP-SIM with a GSM SIM or USIM
network={
ssid="eap-sim-test"
key_mgmt=WPA-EAP
eap=SIM
pin="1234"
pcsc=""
}
# EAP-PSK
network={
ssid="eap-psk-test"
key_mgmt=WPA-EAP
eap=PSK
anonymous_identity="eap_psk_user"
password=06b4be19da289f475aa46a33cb793029
identity="eap_psk_user@example.com"
}
# IEEE 802.1X/EAPOL with dynamically generated WEP keys (i.e., no WPA) using
# EAP-TLS for authentication and key generation; require both unicast and
# broadcast WEP keys.
network={
ssid="1x-test"
key_mgmt=IEEE8021X
eap=TLS
identity="user@example.com"
ca_cert="/etc/cert/ca.pem"
client_cert="/etc/cert/user.pem"
private_key="/etc/cert/user.prv"
private_key_passwd="password"
eapol_flags=3
}
# LEAP with dynamic WEP keys
network={
ssid="leap-example"
key_mgmt=IEEE8021X
eap=LEAP
identity="user"
password="foobar"
}
# EAP-IKEv2 using shared secrets for both server and peer authentication
network={
ssid="ikev2-example"
key_mgmt=WPA-EAP
eap=IKEV2
identity="user"
password="foobar"
}
# EAP-FAST with WPA (WPA or WPA2)
network={
ssid="eap-fast-test"
key_mgmt=WPA-EAP
eap=FAST
anonymous_identity="FAST-000102030405"
identity="username"
password="password"
phase1="fast_provisioning=1"
pac_file="/etc/wpa_supplicant.eap-fast-pac"
}
network={
ssid="eap-fast-test"
key_mgmt=WPA-EAP
eap=FAST
anonymous_identity="FAST-000102030405"
identity="username"
password="password"
phase1="fast_provisioning=1"
pac_file="blob://eap-fast-pac"
}
# Plaintext connection (no WPA, no IEEE 802.1X)
network={
ssid="plaintext-test"
key_mgmt=NONE
}
# Shared WEP key connection (no WPA, no IEEE 802.1X)
network={
ssid="static-wep-test"
key_mgmt=NONE
wep_key0="abcde"
wep_key1=0102030405
wep_key2="1234567890123"
wep_tx_keyidx=0
priority=5
}
# Shared WEP key connection (no WPA, no IEEE 802.1X) using Shared Key
# IEEE 802.11 authentication
network={
ssid="static-wep-test2"
key_mgmt=NONE
wep_key0="abcde"
wep_key1=0102030405
wep_key2="1234567890123"
wep_tx_keyidx=0
priority=5
auth_alg=SHARED
}
# IBSS/ad-hoc network with RSN
network={
ssid="ibss-rsn"
key_mgmt=WPA-PSK
proto=RSN
psk="12345678"
mode=1
frequency=2412
pairwise=CCMP
group=CCMP
}
# IBSS/ad-hoc network with WPA-None/TKIP (deprecated)
network={
ssid="test adhoc"
mode=1
frequency=2412
proto=WPA
key_mgmt=WPA-NONE
pairwise=NONE
group=TKIP
psk="secret passphrase"
}
# open mesh network
network={
ssid="test mesh"
mode=5
frequency=2437
key_mgmt=NONE
}
# secure (SAE + AMPE) network
network={
ssid="secure mesh"
mode=5
frequency=2437
key_mgmt=SAE
psk="very secret passphrase"
}
# Catch all example that allows more or less all configuration modes
network={
ssid="example"
scan_ssid=1
key_mgmt=WPA-EAP WPA-PSK IEEE8021X NONE
pairwise=CCMP TKIP
group=CCMP TKIP WEP104 WEP40
psk="very secret passphrase"
eap=TTLS PEAP TLS
identity="user@example.com"
password="foobar"
ca_cert="/etc/cert/ca.pem"
client_cert="/etc/cert/user.pem"
private_key="/etc/cert/user.prv"
private_key_passwd="password"
phase1="peaplabel=0"
}
# Example of EAP-TLS with smartcard (openssl engine)
network={
ssid="example"
key_mgmt=WPA-EAP
eap=TLS
proto=RSN
pairwise=CCMP TKIP
group=CCMP TKIP
identity="user@example.com"
ca_cert="/etc/cert/ca.pem"
# Certificate and/or key identified by PKCS#11 URI (RFC7512)
client_cert="pkcs11:manufacturer=piv_II;id=%01"
private_key="pkcs11:manufacturer=piv_II;id=%01"
# Optional PIN configuration; this can be left out and PIN will be
# asked through the control interface
pin="1234"
}
# Example configuration showing how to use an inlined blob as a CA certificate
# data instead of using external file
network={
ssid="example"
key_mgmt=WPA-EAP
eap=TTLS
identity="user@example.com"
anonymous_identity="anonymous@example.com"
password="foobar"
ca_cert="blob://exampleblob"
priority=20
}
blob-base64-exampleblob={
SGVsbG8gV29ybGQhCg==
}
# Wildcard match for SSID (plaintext APs only). This example select any
# open AP regardless of its SSID.
network={
key_mgmt=NONE
}
# Example configuration ignoring two APs - these will be ignored
# for this network.
network={
ssid="example"
psk="very secret passphrase"
bssid_ignore=02:11:22:33:44:55 02:22:aa:44:55:66
}
# Example configuration limiting AP selection to a specific set of APs;
# any other AP not matching the masked address will be ignored.
network={
ssid="example"
psk="very secret passphrase"
bssid_accept=02:55:ae:bc:00:00/ff:ff:ff:ff:00:00 00:00:77:66:55:44/00:00:ff:ff:ff:ff
}
# Example config file that will only scan on channel 36.
freq_list=5180
network={
key_mgmt=NONE
}
# Example configuration using EAP-TTLS for authentication and key
# generation for MACsec
network={
key_mgmt=IEEE8021X
eap=TTLS
phase2="auth=PAP"
anonymous_identity="anonymous@example.com"
identity="user@example.com"
password="secretr"
ca_cert="/etc/cert/ca.pem"
eapol_flags=0
macsec_policy=1
}
# Example configuration for MACsec with preshared key
network={
key_mgmt=NONE
eapol_flags=0
macsec_policy=1
mka_cak=0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF
mka_ckn=6162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A303132333435
mka_priority=128
}